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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the ethical aspects of vaccination in children by focusing on 
vaccination against measles using the MMR vaccine. Applying a principlist ethical framework to 
the relevant medical and scientific facts, I articulate two ethical principles or action guides that 
can be used to formulate obligations resting on persons or institutions, as well as to guide 
measles vaccination policy. These ethical action guides are:  
  (1) All children eligible for measles vaccination should be vaccinated against measles, at least to 
the point of sustained measles elimination. 
  (2) Respect for parental decision-making and the parent-child relationship guide the response 
to parental vaccine refusals.   
Ethical action guide (1) describes the obligations of those who stand in significant relationships 
with children and of the just society – to protect children against measles using vaccination. 
Action guide (2) guides the individual and societal response to vaccine refusal, describing morally 
important considerations that should be kept in mind when responding to vaccine refusal. 
The dissertation proceeds as follows. First, the introductory chapter examines ethical tensions 
regarding measles vaccination in children, and identifies some deficiencies in the existing 
literature. Next, two chapters provide an overview of the scientific and medical facts regarding 
measles and MMR vaccination. Third, the principlist framework of Beauchamp and Childress is 
defended as an appropriate ethical framework for analysis of the problematic. Fourth, the 
individual case of measles vaccination is considered, using a medical decision-making framework 
based in the principlist approach. Fifth, the obligations of the just society with regards to measles 
vaccination is considered, using different conceptions of justice in turn. In the last section of this 
work, it is argued that action guides (1) and (2) bring all four principles into balance, a state of 
reflective equilibrium, and various ethical obligations and policy suggestions are derived from 
these two action guides. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
3 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1: Problem statement, ethics literature review, and overview of the project  5 
1. Introduction  5 
2. Ethics of MMR vaccination in the literature  9 
3. The aims and scope of this project and substantive contributions to the field  35 
Chapter 2: Scientific review of measles disease and epidemiology  42 
1. Measles disease  42 
2. Measles elimination and the concept of herd immunity  60 
3. The financial burden of measles  65 
4. Summary  67 
Chapter 3: Measles vaccine (with focus on MMR)  72 
1. Measles vaccine history and vaccines currently available  73 
2. MMR effectiveness, adverse effects and cost   78 
3. Does MMR cause autism?  90 
4. Vaccine opposition  98 
5. What influences parental decision making on vaccination?   104 
6. Summary  106 
Chapter 4: The principlism approach of Beauchamp and Childress   112 
1. The principlism of B&C  113 
2. The grounding of the four principles in the common morality   126 
3. Criticisms of B&C’s principlism and alternate approaches to bioethics   138 
4. Principlism and measles vaccination in children  159 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 4 
 
Chapter 5: The individual child and measles vaccination                                                                165 
1. The best interest standard and medical decision-making for children                                       168 
2. The individual case of measles vaccination in a child                                                                    174 
3. The objecting parent                                                                                                                            187 
4. Conclusion – two ethical principles/action guides                                                                         191 
 
Chapter 6: Justice and measles vaccination in children                                                                   195 
1. What is justice? A conceptual analysis                                                                                             198 
2. Theories of justice influential in bioethics as identified by B&C                                                  204 
3. The different conceptions of justice and measles vaccination in children                                 205 
4. Justice and measles vaccination in children: Two ethical principles/action guides                 254 
 
Chapter 7: Applying the ethical action guides                                                                                   257 
1. Bringing the four principles into balance: reaching reflective equilibrium                                257 
2. Who has which obligation?                                                                                                                259 
3. Suggestions for measles vaccination policy                                                                                     265 
 
Bibliography                                                                                                                                              274 
 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 5 
 
Chapter 1: Problem statement, ethics literature review, 
and overview of the project 
(1) Introduction 
Background: Vaccines   
  Vaccination has been heralded as one of the greatest medical achievements (CDC 1999). 
Vaccines have been shown to improve the overall health of the public through its dramatic impact 
on the incidence of infectious diseases (CDC 1999). Due to the success of vaccinations and the 
ongoing threat of vaccine preventable disease, influential health organizations such as the 
American College of Preventive Medicine (Adetunji et al. 2003), the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC 1999) and the American Academy of Pediatrics (Committee on Practice and 
Ambulatory Medicine and Council on Community Pediatrics 2010) recommend ongoing 
childhood vaccination programs in order to provide protection for individuals and populations 
from vaccine preventable infectious diseases.   
  Consider the illustrative example of measles vaccination. In the United States high rates of 
measles vaccination lead to elimination of measles transmission so that measles is no longer 
endemic in the United States (CDC 2008). However, outbreaks of measles still happen and are 
largely associated with unvaccinated persons (CDC 2008). The Netherlands has a high measles 
vaccination rate (around 95%) and endemic measles is considered eliminated (Knol et al. 2013). 
Yet, outbreaks occur among unvaccinated people. For example there has been an outbreak of 
measles in 2013 that is largely associated with unvaccinated populations within Dutch society 
(Knol et al. 2013). Although the Netherlands has a very high rate of measles vaccination, the 2013 
outbreak by August 2013 comprised of 1,226 cases of which 96% were unvaccinated persons 
(Knol et al 2013). These outbreaks are thought to occur because of pockets of unvaccinated 
communities within Dutch society who congregate together, typically members of religious 
communities who object to vaccination and who live in close cohesion (Knol et al 2013). So, even 
a highly vaccinated population can have pockets of susceptibility where measles outbreaks are 
possible, speaking to the need for ongoing expansion of vaccination coverage. More troublingly, 
measles can return to become endemic after elimination if immunity levels within society drop. 
This has been illustrated by experience in the United Kingdom (Euro Surveillance Editorial Team 
2008).  Although measles was considered non-endemic/eliminated in the UK in 1994, in 2008 it 
was declared endemic in the United Kingdom once again (Euro Surveillance Editorial Team 2008). 
The reason for the return of measles in the UK is the drop in vaccination rates below the threshold 
required to maintain measles elimination in the UK over the corresponding period (Euro 
Surveillance Editorial Team 2008). It is considered that vaccination coverage rates of 90-95% with 
two doses of measles containing vaccine are needed to achieve and maintain a non-endemic 
status for measles within a population (Gay 2004). 
  With measles vaccination, the concept of herd-immunity is an important one. If enough people 
are immune to measles within a population, the spread of measles will be halted within the 
community so that those with no immunity against measles are protected against the illness.  
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Those who are not eligible for the vaccine because of medical reasons or those who do not 
become immune through vaccination depend on herd-immunity for protection against measles.  
To achieve herd-immunity and thus halt the spread of measles within a population, vaccine 
coverage rates of at least 93%-95% with two doses of measles vaccine is required (CDC 2008; Gay 
2004). The concept of herd-immunity is an important one when the ethics of vaccination is 
considered; the actions of individuals with regards to vaccination impact the health of others and 
society as a whole. As seen in the Netherlands, where unvaccinated individuals congregate the 
protection of herd immunity is lost, and outbreaks can happen within these populations despite 
an overall high vaccination rate within the country (Knol et al. 2013).   
Vaccine opposition and vaccine refusals   
  It is therefore necessary from a public health perspective to maintain high rates of vaccination 
in order to protect individuals and populations from vaccine-preventable diseases. However, it is 
evident that there are numerous individuals who do not undergo vaccination to the point that 
outbreaks occur in the US and the Netherlands, and that a disease once eliminated from the UK 
is now endemic there once more.  Reasons offered as to why parents refuse vaccination for their 
children include concerns about vaccine safety, and underestimating the serious harm that may 
result from vaccine-preventable diseases (Omer et al. 2009). In that sense, vaccines may almost 
be victims of their own success. It appears as if concerns regarding vaccine safety among the 
general public have been growing, and as if there is a consequent gradual decline in vaccination 
rates in many Western countries (CDC 2008; Euro Surveillance Editorial Team 2008; Omer et al. 
2009). 
  Vaccine skepticism and opposition is nothing new. Ever since the advent of vaccination, which 
effectively occurred with Jenner's cowpox virus inoculation, there has been a vocal anti-
vaccination movement (Allen 2007, p. 64-111). In the early days of inoculation, the objections 
were perhaps more reasonable and well founded. Cowpox inoculation was not always successful 
in protecting one from illness, and could introduce a range of horrific side effects. Vaccine refusal 
was the only weapon that ordinary people had to defend themselves against a procedure where 
risks and benefits were not quite clear.  
  However, contemporary vaccination is markedly different, and there is good evidence that the 
benefits of vaccination substantially outweigh the risks (Adetunji et al. 2003; CDC 1999). Despite 
this, objections to vaccinations abound. Such objections are part of the "anti-vaccination 
movement" (Kata 2010). These objections are typically disseminated on the Internet and in the 
media, and often contain misinformation (Kata 2010). There are aspects of these objections that 
are rooted in the rejection of scientific explanations, alternative models of health, rejection of 
authority, conspiracy theories or skewed science (Kata 2010). 
  One of the biggest concerns raised regarding the mumps-measles-rubella combination vaccine 
(MMR) in particular, is an alleged causative link between MMR and autism (Goldacre 2008; Kata 
2010). The idea of a supposed link first came to light in a fraudulent study published in the Lancet 
by Wakefield, after which the idea was distributed in the media and through the public voices of 
some celebrities (Goldacre 2008). This was an important moment in the contemporary anti-
vaccination movement, and the idea that MMR causes autism is still prevalent in anti-vaccine 
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messages (Goldacre 2008; Kata 2010). The Lancet retracted Wakefield's article, and subsequent 
articles appeared indicating the fraudulent nature of Wakefield's study (Godlee, Smith & 
Marcovitch 2011; The Editors of the Lancet 2010; Goldacre 2008). The supposed link between 
autism and MMR has been the subject of many studies since then, and it has been found that 
there is no link between MMR and autism (Demicheli et al. 2012; Moss & Griffin 2012). Despite 
this, opposition to MMR on grounds that it causes autism persists within the anti-vaccination 
movement. 
Implicit ethical questions, the focus of this dissertation and the use of MMR as case 
study 
 Reflecting on these considerations raises numerous ethical questions that are implicit to the 
practice of vaccination in children. What are the ethical principles involved in vaccination?  Is 
there a moral obligation to see children immunized, and if so on whom does this obligation rest?  
How do we weigh the benefits to society from high vaccination rates against the autonomy of 
individuals?  How do we respond to parental refusal of immunizations? Bearing in mind herd-
immunity and the societal implications of vaccination, what are the demands of justice on the 
individual with regards to vaccination? 
  The task of this dissertation is to engage with these questions and to address gaps in the 
literature regarding the ethics of vaccination. In doing so I shall focus primarily on the example 
of measles disease and MMR vaccination. MMR as a preventive intervention against measles 
disease is the ideal candidate for such a study for a number of reasons. Measles is a serious and 
very contagious disease with serious consequences (Moss & Griffin 2012). High vaccination rates 
can eliminate measles, and a drop in vaccination rates leads to the re-emergence of measles 
transmission in populations (CDC 2008; Euro Surveillance Editorial Team 2008; Gay 2004). The 
vaccine is very effective and has a low risk of harm (Demicheli et al. 2012; Moss & Griffin 2012). 
With MMR vaccination, herd-immunity can be attained if sufficient vaccination rates are reached 
(Gay 2004; Moss & Griffin 2012). Lastly, despite being well researched and proven to be safe, 
MMR is quite controversial in the eyes of the anti-vaccine movement and is one of the prime 
targets for false anti-vaccine messages (Allen 2007; Goldacre 2008; Kata 2010).  
  It should also be noted that MMR vaccine has efficacy in preventing mumps and rubella in 
children (Demicheli et al. 2012). I will not focus in detail on these diseases or on this preventive 
action of MMR, but instead focus on measles disease and MMR as vaccine against measles 
disease. The reasons are simple: measles disease (as I have pointed out in the previous 
paragraph) has characteristics that make it the ideal candidate for the focus of this project, 
whereas mumps and rubella do not have all of the same characteristics and specifically is 
associated with lower mortality and morbidity than measles; MMR has high effectiveness in 
preventing measles disease (Demicheli et al. 2012; Moss & Griffin 2012); MMR is the most widely 
used and  most available vaccine against measles, used in over 90 countries and almost 
exclusively used as measles vaccine in many countries (Demicheli et al. 2012; Moss & Griffin 
2012); MMR is very well studied, and its effectiveness, cost, cost-effectiveness and adverse 
effects are well known (as I will show in chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation). So, while prevention 
of mumps and rubella in addition to effectiveness in preventing measles undoubtedly can be seen 
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as beneficial, I will in this dissertation specifically focus on the arguments as pertain to measles 
infection and MMR as the vaccination most commonly used to vaccinate children against 
measles. 
  Thus, MMR as preventive vaccine against measles is the ideal candidate for focused study on 
the ethics of vaccination where a safe and effective vaccine is available for the prevention of a 
serious, highly communicable infectious disease.  
  An important observation is that MMR vaccination appears to inhabit two different contexts. In 
one sense, it is a medical intervention administered to an individual child, and governed by 
medical ethics considerations of decision-making for children. In another sense, it is a societal 
level intervention, governed by ethical considerations regarding health of the population and 
society. It is therefore important that ethical analysis incorporates both these contexts, and that 
recommendations provide guidance for both individual medical decision-making and public 
policy. 
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(2) Ethics of MMR vaccination in the literature   
(2.1) Presenting and discussing the ethics of MMR vaccination in the literature 
(medical, nursing and public health literature)   
There is a lively discussion in the medical, nursing and public health literature examining the 
ethics of vaccination. In this section, I shall present a snapshot of the state of the discussion in 
the literature. The goal is to provide a general overview of the present discussion on the topic in 
this literature, in order to identify important themes and issues. To do so, I will present a number 
of papers that have been published on the subject, summarizing the content and then briefly 
offer critical discussion of each.  
    To identify papers, I performed a search on Medline and PubMed for vaccination ethics, 
measles vaccination ethics, and MMR ethics. I also perused the contents of relevant public health 
journals, such as Public Health Ethics. Furthermore, I examined the references of identified 
papers to identify further sources. 
  The papers I include in discussion here are those that focus on the ethics of measles vaccination 
in children, and that seek to provide ethical analysis and recommendations for both the medical 
decision-making context as well as the societal context. Some of these papers focus more on the 
individual context, that is on the medical decision-making for an individual child, while others 
focus more on a societal or public health context. The papers presented in this section, therefore, 
appears in the medical, nursing, and public health literature, and aims to provide ethical analysis 
and practical ethical guidance on an individual-medical and societal-policy level with regards to 
measles vaccination.     
  Some of these papers focus on vaccines and vaccine programs in general, but in their 
argumentation either refer to MMR/measles or rely on medical considerations that are inherent 
to MMR/measles. All these papers are therefore relevant to my project, which is a consideration 
of the ethical aspects of MMR vaccination to prevent measles in children.  
  In my critical discussion I will show that there are regularly recurring themes in this literature 
that highlights the central ethical tensions with regards to measles vaccination in children. I will 
also show that there are notable deficiencies in this literature on the subject as it stands.  
  Although I will be critical of these papers, it should be kept in mind that some of the deficiencies 
may relate to the nature of the journals, the type of literature it is, and the limitations within 
which these authors are asked to write. For example, medical journals typically ask authors to 
focus on practical considerations, and have fairly low word count allowances. The point of the 
critical discussion is therefore not meant to imply that this literature has no value, but rather to 
identify deficiencies in the literature which provide an opportunity for my work to add to the 
literature and contribute meaningfully in addressing these deficiencies. 
   In the next section I shall discuss these themes more fully, highlighting the present deficiencies 
in the literature on MMR vaccine ethics. From there I shall embark on a consideration of the goals 
and aims of this doctoral thesis in providing a substantial contribution to the field.   
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 (2.1.1) Diekema and Marcuse (2007)  
  Diekema and Marcuse (2007) address three ethical questions with regards to vaccination. First, 
they ask whether parents who refuse vaccinations harm their children to the point that parental 
refusal should be overridden. This question is considered from a “first-do-no-harm” paradigm as 
well as a “best-interests-of-the-child” paradigm. In essence, parents act as surrogate decision-
makers for their children, and have to weigh the benefits and risks of vaccination for their child. 
These benefits and risks are dependent on the level of communicable disease in the population, 
vaccination coverage in the population, as well as vaccine efficacy and adverse effects. Diekema 
and Marcuse argue that it is not always obvious to parents that vaccination is in the best interests 
of their child, and the risk of harm in highly vaccinated populations through not vaccinating is 
likely not sufficient to override parental decisions. However, where risk of harm to the child is 
high, parental refusal should be set aside in favor of vaccination.  
  Second, they ask what duties a parent has to avoid harms that may accrue to other members of 
the community through an unvaccinated child. They point out communal harms that may occur 
through non-vaccination of a child: the child may spread disease to those who are susceptible, 
the cost of the child’s medical care if she contracts disease accrues to society, and there are 
considerations of fairness in that non-vaccinators “free-ride” the public good of herd immunity 
and vaccination programs without paying their fair share. Arguing from a “first-do-no-harm” 
perspective and invoking a communitarian justice paradigm, they conclude that parents do in 
fact have duties of vaccination to the community.  
  Thirdly, they ask whether the value to the community of high vaccination rates and consequent 
herd immunity are sufficient to justify coercive vaccination policies. Arguing from Mill’s harm 
principle, which states that the free choices of individuals may be overridden if those free choices 
would result in harm to others, they conclude that vaccine refusals can be overridden through 
coercive vaccination policies when the risk of harm to members of the community is very high. 
They have two caveats. One is that voluntary vaccination uptake will probably be high in the case 
of an epidemic, so that coerced policies may be unnecessary and undesirable. The second is that 
if risks from disease are low and vaccination levels are high, coercive policies towards vaccine 
refusals would be hard to justify. They make an exception for measles, where there is always a 
susceptible group of people in society through vaccine failure. Until measles is eliminated, they 
argue, very few measles vaccine refusals can be justified.   
 Discussion: Diekema and Marcuse outline three important questions as relate to the vaccination 
of children, and the conclusions they offer seem reasonable. I am not convinced, however, by 
their method and approach.  
  In presenting their arguments, they jump around from one ethical paradigm to another without 
any indication of how these different paradigms are linked to one another. First they rely on the 
revered old medical adage “first do no harm” as a tool for ethical analysis, and then abruptly 
incorporate the “best interests standard” in a way that makes it appear as if these two different 
ethical approaches are similar to one another. Halfway through, they suddenly appeal to a 
communitarian justice standard without any warning that this is coming or without showing how 
this relates to the previous discussion. Shortly after that, they appeal to the work of John Stuart 
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Mill in On Liberty (2010a), who is a renowned utilitarian and whose liberty paradigm is decidedly 
at odds with the previously preferred communitarian standard. Their method reminds of a 
smorgasbord from which they pick whichever approach suits them, no matter how contradictory 
to previous approaches used. Although some of their conclusions seem on the surface to be 
reasonable and intuitively acceptable, their method leaves serious questions as to whether their 
conclusions are actually supported by the arguments they raise.  
  There is also an element of ad hoc-ness to some of their recommendations. For example, after 
concluding in question 2 that parents do have duties of vaccination to other members of the 
community through a communitarian perspective, they suddenly in question 3 appeal to Mill’s 
harm principle, and state that in many instances the risk from harm to others is not high enough 
to justify coercive vaccination policies. One feels that these statements should be backed up by 
more thorough argument and empirical examples. But more importantly, we have here two 
conflicting conclusions through invoking two different ethical paradigms. Overall, even though 
Diekema and Marcuse highlight important questions and delineate the important issues that 
should be addressed in the ethics of vaccination, their way of analyzing these matters leaves one 
with a lot of uncertainty and does not resolve the obvious ethical tensions present. 
(2.1.2) Diekema (2005) 
  The arguments raised in this paper are fairly similar to the arguments raised by Diekema and 
Marcuse (2007). There are a few differences in aims and scope: in this paper Diekema is mainly 
concerned with giving practical guidance to pediatricians on how to respond to parental refusals 
for vaccination, and the harm principle is not overtly stated as an ethical paradigm in the 
constructing of arguments. 
  Diekema argues that the American Academy of Pediatrics strongly endorses vaccination, but 
that many pediatricians (reportedly up to 7 out of 10) face situations of parental refusals. These 
refusals, argues Diekema, are mainly because of misinformation regarding vaccines. 
  Diekema offers two sets of ethical arguments to provide grounding for recommendations as to 
how pediatricians should respond to such refusals. The first set of arguments surround parental 
decision-making and the best interests of children. The best interests of the child should be the 
primary focus, and parents should be allowed to make medical decisions on what they perceive 
to be the best interests of the child. The only time anyone should interfere with these parental 
decisions is when such decisions place children at risk of considerable harm. Thus, in a highly 
vaccinated society, although vaccination is probably in the best interest of a child, the risk of 
harm does not rise to the level where the parental decision can be interfered with. The exception 
is always serious harm; for example, a child who has an injury and needs a tetanus vaccination is 
at risk of serious harm, and a pediatrician should consider calling in state assistance in response 
to such refusals. 
  The second set of arguments surround community interests. An unvaccinated child can harm 
the community in a number of ways: through spreading disease to those who are susceptible 
(such as unvaccinated people, people who have experienced vaccine failure, and people who are 
not eligible for vaccination), and through the cost of medical care should the child become sick 
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due to non-vaccination. Furthermore, those parents who rely on herd immunity while not 
vaccinating their own children are “free-riders”; taking advantage of the benefit of herd immunity 
while not paying their fair share for participation. Assuming a communitarian justice perspective, 
Diekema establishes by these arguments that parental refusals means that parents “reject what 
many would consider to be a moral duty”, namely the “civic responsibility” of having one’s 
children vaccinated. Nevertheless, Diekema argues, coercive vaccination policies should only be 
enacted to prevent serious harm to others, and therefore coercive approaches should only be 
used if parental refusal places others at risk. 
  Diekema uses these ethical considerations to provide practical recommendations to 
pediatricians. The main role of pediatricians is to educate, correct misinformation, and encourage 
vaccination. If a child is at risk of serious harm, or places others at risk of serious harm, a 
pediatrician should involve state agencies such as social services to protect the child. 
Discussion: This paper is mainly focused on practical advice to pediatricians, but Diekema does 
offer ethical arguments in support of his recommendations. As I already pointed out, the line of 
argument is fairly similar to the paper by Diekema and Marcuse (2007).  
  For the first set of ethical arguments, Diekema relies on a best interest standard. Parents are to 
make decisions for their children based on the best interests of children. It is not clear on what 
ethical considerations the best interests standard is based, and it is merely assumed to be the 
best way in which to proceed. Ethical arguments and justifications for using this standard are not 
provided.  
  Furthermore, it is not clear that the work has been done to show that vaccination is in fact in 
the best interest of children. This seems to be assumed as a basic premise before launching into 
argumentation rather than established and justified with valid reasons. Perhaps this can be 
excused to some extent, given the target audience of the paper. One would assume that 
pediatricians are familiar with the risks and benefits of the vaccinations in question and have 
shared assumptions regarding the best interests of children in this regard. However, it seems that 
some more grounding is needed for this assertion, in terms of providing ethical arguments and 
justifications for asserting why vaccines are in a child’s best interests, and in which ways vaccines 
are in a child’s best interests. The idea of “best interests” is after all vague and undefined; a child 
may have many different competing interests, such as familial, developmental, cultural, medical, 
and immediate interests. Different people may have different perceptions as to what “best 
interests” means, and which of these interests should be prioritized. All this is to say, the best 
interest standard is open to interpretation, and some work needs to be done here to show that 
vaccines are, in fact, in the child’s best interests, and to clarify what it means to say that it is in 
the child’s best interests.  
  It also seems clear that Diekema is in fact not relying solely on a best interest standard. He 
argues that providers should only interfere with parental decisions when there is a serious risk of 
harm. But this is not based on the best interest standard. Instead, this appears to be based on 
Diekema’s conception of the harm principle, an idea used in the paper with Diekema and 
Marcuse (2007). In fact, in other papers, Diekema argues that the best interest standard is an 
inappropriate ethical paradigm to use when thinking about the limits of parental decision-making 
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authority, and that instead the harm principle should be used (Diekema 2004; Diekema 2011). 
Thus, according to Diekema (2004; 2011), talk of restricting parental decision-making due to 
concerns of potential harms to the child is nestled in a harm-principle paradigm and not in best 
interests. In these other papers Diekema forcefully argues that the best interest standard is not 
feasible at all as a standard for restricting parental authority; yet in this paper on vaccines  (2005) 
he gives the appearance of relying on the best interest standard to limit parental decision-making 
in precisely the way he rejects elsewhere.   
  Returning now to the paper under consideration (Diekema 2005), it is evident that Diekema, 
without acknowledging it, subtly moves away from a best interest standard and uses the harm-
principle instead, arguing that the risk of serious harm is the threshold for the use of state power. 
This shift is never acknowledged, but it is clearly present. The conclusion reached through this 
process has the appearance of being intuitively appealing, but the method leaves much to be 
desired. The harm-principle (as I have pointed out before) is based on the work of Mill, a well-
known utilitarian (Mill 2010a). It is not clear how this relates to Diekema’s use of the best interest 
standard. Having said that, it is not clear what ethical paradigm Diekema bases the best interest 
standard on either.  
  On the whole, these ethical “arguments” appear to be a presentation of Diekema’s intuitions 
regarding vaccination of children, and after the fact different ethical concepts are loosely 
appealed to in order to provide the look of substance to the conclusions. Careful dissection of 
the arguments and conclusions show that there is very little substantive backing for the 
conclusions reached, and that as such the ethical case has not been sufficiently made. No doubt, 
many will find Diekema’s conclusions and appearance of supporting argumentation appealing, 
since they seem to be right and acceptable on some intuitive level. Indeed, it seems that Diekema 
is heavily relying on shared assumptions and intuitions in providing his ethical justifications and 
practical recommendations. 
  For the second line of argumentation, regarding community interests, Diekema assumes a 
communitarian conception of justice. Specifically, appeals to “free riding” and the unfairness of 
not paying one’s fair share is steeped in communitarian thinking. This is in order, for those who 
share this view of justice. But these arguments are unlikely to appeal to persons who adhere to 
other conceptions of justice. 
(2.1.3) Krantz et al. (Krantz, Sachs, & Nilstun 2004) 
 Krantz et al. argue from a principlist paradigm and specifically consider the ethics of measles 
vaccination. They reference three principles, namely beneficence, justice and autonomy. First, 
they argue from autonomy that parents have the “right to act as proxies” for their children, and 
to go against the will of the parents would incur “ethical costs”. Second, they consider the 
principle of beneficence. They argue  that in a highly vaccinated society such as Sweden, the risks 
of incurring disease is “negligible” and there is an “ethical cost” to vaccinating the child, as there 
is always risk of vaccine adverse effects. These risks and “ethical costs” change with the 
vaccination rate, and if vaccination rates drop below herd immunity levels, there is an argument 
from beneficence to institute public health immunization programs. They conclude that an 
“individual child, however, would be better off vaccinated than not vaccinated, especially if 
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travelling into areas where measles is still common.” Lastly, they consider justice. They assume a 
communitarian justice perspective, appealing to the value of solidarity. That is, members of the 
community have duties of solidarity to one another, and parents should therefore have their 
children vaccinated to ensure herd immunity.  These obligations do not rest on children, for 
“there can be no justice requirement for a child”. Herd immunity is meant to protect vulnerable 
children in society, as failure to establish herd immunity can incur “ethical costs” to individual 
children as “even a vaccinated child is not fully protected against measles”.  
  Krantz et al. reject coercive policies out of hand, stating that “coercion is neither possible nor 
desirable in a Swedish immunization programme.” They recognize a tension between individual 
interests/autonomy and community interests/justice. Their recommended solution is to appeal 
to the value of solidarity to motivate parents to get their children vaccinated. Integral to this 
approach is that parents trust the messages that come from health institutions. Community 
members may then act on these through the shared values within the community.   
Discussion: Krantz et al. addresses the ethics of MMR vaccination by reference to the principles 
of autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence. This presumably relies on the principlist 
approach of Beauchamp and Childress (B&C) (2013), although they do not specifically reference 
B&C.  
  Interestingly, Krantz et al. omits the principle of non-maleficence from their analysis. I am not 
sure why this is done, it is not explained. The difficulty this presents, is that the method of 
principlism relies on bringing the various principles that impinge on a case into a state of balance 
with one another, known as reflective equilibrium. It seems obvious that non-maleficence is of 
value in this instance, and some of their statements regarding “ethical costs” seem to be a 
recognition that harms that can accrue are ethically relevant. As such, their ethical analysis is 
likely not complete, as they have not brought all the relevant principles into reflective 
equilibrium.    
  Their consideration of the implications of the principle of beneficence is puzzling. Having 
considered benefits and risks to the extent that Swedish society has high vaccination rates and 
that vaccinating a child in such circumstances may incur “ethical costs”, they suddenly conclude 
without further explanation that it is probably best for the individual child to be vaccinated rather 
than not be vaccinated, especially if they travel to an area with low vaccination rates. This is a 
most extraordinary conclusion given the argument preceding it, and seems to be a loose-standing 
assertion rather than related to the arguments offered. In all, having considered “ethical costs” 
of vaccination, they seem to assert without further justification that it is probably in the best 
interests of a child to be vaccinated anyway. One can only assume that this is an intuitive 
assumption based on the general efficacy of vaccines. Suffice it to say, the assertion that 
beneficence supports vaccination and is ethically in the interests of the child is not sufficiently 
supported through arguments; instead it seems to be a sort of intuitive assumption. 
  With regards to the principle of justice, Krantz et al. assume a communitarian paradigm and a 
related societal value of solidarity. This seems to be based on the idea that it is the prevailing 
view in Sweden, and that the paper is aimed at a Swedish audience. Communitarianism is not the 
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only justice paradigm, and Krantz et al.’s arguments are unlikely to appeal to adherents of other 
theories of justice.  
  Lastly, Krantz et al. reject coercive or mandatory vaccination policies as “not possible or 
desirable in Sweden” without any further argumentation. This amounts to the rejection of the 
use of State power out of hand. This is rather surprising; the question over whether coercion is 
justified is a point for serious ethical reflection, and is central to any discussion on vaccination 
ethics, as pointed out by Diekema and Marcuse (2007). This seems intuitively right; given what is 
at stake in vaccination policies, and the role that state power can play in enforcing vaccination, 
the question of the ethical nature of coercive approaches is a central theme in vaccine ethics. To 
just reject the question as “not possible or desirable” begs the question: why is it not possible or 
desirable? Krantz et al.’s rejection of coercive approaches has the appearance of an appeal to 
cultural relativism, a position fraught with inherent contradictions and as such an implausible 
ethical framework. Krantz et al. do not sufficiently defend this rejection of coercive approaches, 
and this is a serious deficiency in their argument. What would they recommend if appeals to 
solidarity fail? Or if their society moves towards a different conception of justice, where their 
arguments from communitarian justice no longer speak to members of society?  
(2.1.4) Verweij and Dawson (2004) 
 Verweij and Dawson present ethical considerations of collective vaccination programs from a 
public health perspective. Their goal is to state a set of guiding principles that can be used to 
create ethically justified vaccination programs. The following assumptions form the basis of their 
guiding principles.  
  Firstly, government is tasked with the obligation of protecting the general health and well-being 
of the public. This means that governments have an interest in vaccination programs. 
Vaccinations work well in protecting the health of the public, but optimally so if it is not left to 
individuals or small groups. Rather, a concerted, population-level effort will ensure optimal 
population health. Collective vaccination efforts are in the public interest, as such type of 
vaccination programs realize important public benefits. 
  Secondly, people are not just citizens or members of the public, but are also individuals with 
rights that should be respected. Government has an obligation to protect the rights of individuals. 
There can be a tension between the public health obligations of government and respecting the 
rights of individuals. The “second assumption can run into conflict with the first” (p. 3123).  
  Furthermore, the principles that they derive from these two assumptions can also be in conflict 
with each other.  The two assumptions and the derived principles are to be thought of as general 
guidelines that can conflict with one another, and in order to resolve conflicts or to apply these 
assumptions and principles, “further reflection, interpretation and judgement” is needed (p. 
3123). These principles are “starting points for ethical reflection – not… devices which simply 
close discussion.” In essence, Verweij and Dawson present a framework of principles, based on 
public health ethics assumptions, which stand in need of further reflection and “balancing of the 
different principles” and “consideration of relevant empirical facts about the nature and 
incidence of the disease” (p. 3123). 
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  They present the following seven principles and provide a brief discussion of each (p. 3123-
3125): 
 1.  Collective vaccination programmes should target serious diseases that are a public health 
problem. 
2. Each vaccine and programme as a whole must be effective and safe. 
3. The burdens and inconveniences for participants should be as small as possible. 
4. The programme’s burden/benefits ratio should be favourable in comparison with alternative 
vaccination schemes or preventative options. 
5. Collective vaccination programmes should involve a just distribution of benefits and burdens. 
6. Participation should, generally, be voluntary unless compulsory vaccination is essential to 
prevent a concrete and serious harm. 
7. Public trust in the vaccination programme should be honoured and protected. 
 
  The discussion of each principle amounts to further clarifications of the principle and 
consideration of its implications. It is not clearly shown how the principles are derived from the 
ethical framework/assumptions initially presented. 
  I am particularly interested in the discussion around principle 5 and principle 6.  
  Principle 5 states that benefits and burdens should be justly distributed. In their discussion of 
this principle, Verweij and Dawson state the example of influenza vaccination of children and 
adolescents purely to protect elderly adults as an unjust distribution of benefits and burdens. But 
what is unclear is what theory of justice they are appealing to. No theory of justice is stated, and 
it is not clear how to determine what would be a just or an unjust distribution.  
  Principle 6 states that vaccinations should be voluntary unless compulsory vaccination is 
essential to avoid harm. This is, they argue, because of the importance of autonomous decision-
making in medical care. It would be hard, they say, to imagine scenarios where compulsory 
vaccination of adults is ethically justified. However, in children respect for autonomy relates to 
respecting the decisions of parents with regards to their children. They argue parental decisions 
may be overridden if such decisions are thought to be harmful to their children. Also, compulsory 
vaccination may be used if it is necessary to protect the general public. For instance, if 
compulsory vaccination is needed to reach sufficient vaccination rates to secure herd-immunity, 
such compulsory vaccination can be justified. In this way, compulsion “could serve the common 
good” (p. 3125). This argument is not always successful, they say, because usually the common 
good of herd-immunity can be achieved without compulsory measures.  
  Discussion: Verweij and Dawson set out to establish ethical principles that can be used to 
formulate ethically justifiable vaccination programs. Their stated starting point is public health 
ethics, and they clarify their two main assumptions. Ostensibly, they derive their seven principles 
from these two assumptions. However, they never show how the principles are related to the 
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two basic assumptions or how they are derived from the basic assumptions. The way in which 
the seven principles are presented and discussed leaves one with valid questions as to where 
exactly these principles come from, and how they relate to the stated ethical framework. 
  Whatever they purport their ethical framework to be, it appears as if they are in fact using an 
ethical framework related to the principlism of B&C (2013) and the moral theory of Ross (1930). 
Consider. They formulate a framework of principles that can be in conflict with one another. In 
order to know how to resolve these conflicts and to apply these principles in practice, one has to 
enter into a process of deliberation and balancing. The principles are stated as if they are true in 
themselves, without showing how they related to previous moral commitments or the previously 
stated ethical frameworks. It is almost as if these principles are intuitively arrived at; indeed, they 
do have a common-sense intuitively true appearance about them. Further discussion of these 
principles then focus on how they should be applied and balanced in specific situations, with the 
exception of principle 6. When discussing principle 6, it is indicated that this principle is derived 
from the principle of autonomy. Because we respect autonomous decision-making in the 
provision of medical care, we should accept the validity of principle 6. But this is extraordinary. 
Up to now there has been no mention of autonomy or of a principlist paradigm. The supposed 
paradigm is public health ethics, and the supposed underpinning for respecting individual choice 
is that governments have the obligation to respect the rights of individuals. Suddenly, in their 
discussion of principle 6, we find ourselves in a principlist paradigm. On the one hand we have 
autonomy and respecting parental decision-making in caring for children, and on the other hand 
we have justice, with discussions around the common good and obligations owed to each other. 
  It appears to me, therefore, that Verweij and Dawson actually argue from a paradigm that is a 
combination of Ross and B&C’s principlism. In their discussion of principle 6 they clearly revert 
to a principlist paradigm in stating the ethical obligations of different parties and the ethical 
tensions that exist. In order to resolve the tensions, they appeal to the methods of Ross and B&C 
– specifying and balancing conflicting and non-specific principles in order to determine what 
actual duties are conferred by their intuitively grounded principles.  
  I note two further things. One is that at the center of their work is the tension between individual 
freedom or autonomy and collective responsibility or justice. The second is that they assume a 
communitarian justice perspective, at least when discussing principle 6. Talk of the common good 
and obligations owed to each other is at home within a communitarian perspective. It is true that 
they mention what could be thought of as a libertarian justice perspective when they state their 
initial ethical assumptions – namely that government has the obligation to respect the rights 
(presumably liberty rights) of individuals. However, in their discussion of principle 6 they abandon 
this concept and instead appeal to autonomy, reverting to a principlist paradigm, and assume a 
communitarian theory of justice in tension with the demands of autonomy. 
  In conclusion, Verweij and Dawson’s principles appear intuitively useful and right. Applying 
these principles requires further balancing and deliberation, and they are considered a starting 
point for ethical reflection. Their method of justification is unclear, and they appear to be actually 
using a different paradigm than their stated paradigm. Like the other papers I have considered, 
they conceive of the tension between autonomy and justice as a central ethical theme in the 
ethics of vaccination. They also assume a communitarian theory of justice when dealing with this 
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issue. Lastly, their discussion of the limitations of parental decision-making is very similar to that 
of Diekema already considered.   
  Verweij and Dawson’s seven principles are further explored in a paper by Isaacs (2012). Isaacs 
discusses each of these seven principles in turn, and attempts to further “outline the ethical 
basis” for the seven principles (Isaacs 2012, p. 111). To do so, he discusses each of the principles 
in turn, engaging in some discussion as to how the principle can be applied in different 
vaccination programs. He does not identify a specific guiding ethical framework in his discussion, 
and seems to appeal to ethical concepts that he believes are generally well accepted. For 
example, when discussing the first principle, benefits, he writes, “It is generally accepted that an 
immunization program should benefit the individual and the community” (Isaacs 2012, p. 112). 
His discussion of specific immunization programs invokes many different types of vaccination, 
and he only in cursory fashion refers to measles vaccination. He also does not go into any great 
depth in exploring the empirical foundations of many of the vaccines he employs as examples. 
  Though Isaac’s paper adds to our understanding of how to apply Verweij and Dawson’s 
principles, it does not add much greater depth to the ethical grounding of these principles in a 
consistent ethical framework. The discussion appeals to a myriad of different ethical concepts 
that are at home in different ethical approaches. Lastly, it is also scant on establishing empirical 
facts.  
(2.1.5) Sheather (2013)   
Sheather considers three questions. First, do parents have a moral duty to get their children 
vaccinated? Second, should this obligation (if it exists) be enforced by the state? Third, if it is 
enforced, how should this best be done? 
  To answer the question of a moral duty, Sheather considers two moral dimensions involved in 
the decision to vaccinate. The first dimension is the interests of the individual child, or the 
“welfare decision” as Sheather calls it. Parents are tasked with making medical decisions for their 
children along the best interest standard. This involves weighing of benefits and risks, and then 
choosing that which brings about the greatest balance of benefit over risk. In most cases, 
Sheather argues, the benefits of vaccination outweigh the risk substantially. There is therefore a 
“strong prima facie duty on parents to ensure their children are vaccinated” with MMR at the 
earliest opportunity (p. 1390). The exceptions would be medical contra-indications to MMR.  
  The second dimension is the public good. Sufficient levels of vaccination lead to “population 
immunity”. When this has been reached, the balance of risks and benefits to the individual child 
changes somewhat, so that benefits from vaccination are slightly less. Overall, harms from 
vaccination are usually “trivial” and “children may still be exposed to diseases carried by people 
moving into the population”, so that vaccination still looks “prudential” (p. 1390). If a parent were 
to rely on population immunity in order to protect their child, foregoing vaccination, a problem 
of free-riding is created. Such people act unfairly; someone who benefits from collective action 
has a duty to take their share of the burden. Sheather also mentions the issue of potential harm 
to others. An unvaccinated child may spread disease to others who are not immune to the 
disease, and may put others at risk of harms that are avoidable. 
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  Thus, in answering the first question, Sheather argues that parents have a prima facie duty to 
have their children vaccinated with MMR from individual considerations. This duty is 
strengthened by considering the public good and potential harms that may accrue to others 
through non-vaccination. 
  To answer questions two and three, Sheather proceeds as follows. Liberal democracies 
recognize individual liberty as a primary good. When parents refuse to vaccinate their children, 
there is a moral tension between individual liberty and the moral considerations in favor of 
vaccination. Compulsion may be justified in two circumstances: when there is risk of serious harm 
to the child, and when there is risk of serious harm to others in the community. A caveat is that 
the “desired good cannot be achieved in a way less restrictive of liberties” (p. 1390).  
  Sheather states that in his opinion, once population health has been achieved, the legal case for 
mandating vaccination no longer exists. Furthermore, he cautions that using of compulsion can 
lead to public discontent and resistance. There are also other options that can be considered, 
such as educational measures.   
 Discussion: Sheather outlines a number of ethical issues that are primarily at stake when 
considering MMR vaccination in children. Once again, we see the central focus falling on the 
tension between individual freedom and collective responsibility. The discussion moves on to a 
consideration of circumstances in which free choices can legitimately be challenged under the 
law in a liberal democracy, and suggestions are offered for resolving these tensions. 
  Once again, the ethical paradigm used is not clear, and the ethical conclusions are not clearly 
grounded. For example, Sheather appeals to the best interest principle as the ethical guiding 
principle parents use when deciding for their children. He states that parents should make 
decisions that optimizes the welfare of their children. But this seems to be assumed rather than 
argued for. It is not clear on which ethical foundation these assertions and conclusions rest. Of 
course, they seem intuitively true – it seems like a truism that parents should want what is best 
for their children. However, there is more work to be done here in firmly grounding the best 
interests approach in an ethical framework. It also is not clear that the work has been done to 
show that vaccination would indeed be in the best interests of children. This is assumed rather 
than argued for in Sheather’s work. 
  When it comes to collective responsibility, Sheather assumes a communitarian perspective. He 
conceives of herd immunity as a public good, and considers those who benefit from the public 
good without paying their fair share “free riders”. He takes it as a given that individuals have 
duties to the collective. These are all considerations that are firmly at home in a communitarian 
justice perspective. 
  Sheather considers the question of compulsory vaccination mostly from a legal and political 
perspective, and sometimes muddles the two. For example, when he argues that liberal 
democracies have an obligation to respect individual liberty, it is not always clear if he is 
advancing an argument based on legal considerations or on libertarian or egalitarian justice 
notions of liberty.  Sometimes he appeals to both. 
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  The conclusions reached with regards to mandatory vaccination have the appearance of 
common sense about them, but it is not clear whether these are well grounded in ethical 
argument. For example, he states that it is his “opinion” that the case for compulsory vaccination 
falls away when sufficient population immunity is reached. Such an assertion needs grounding in 
substantive ethical argumentation. Next, he changes track and considers the consequences of 
the use of compulsory vaccination policies. He states, “although we have been dealing largely 
with questions of rights and duties, the consequences of any state action in the real world need 
to be assessed” (p. 1390). It is not clear whether he is invoking utilitarian or pragmatic 
considerations here. 
  Like with some previous authors, it is hard to pin down the exact framework that Sheather is 
appealing to. He jumps around from one framework to the other, and seems to use whichever 
approach is useful for the current purpose. At one point, liberalism is useful, so a liberalist 
approach of rights and duties conflated with legal considerations is used. At another point, 
communitarian considerations are useful, so a communitarian justice perspective is invoked. 
Elsewhere, parental decision-making in medical care and the best interest standard forms the 
basis for ethical argumentation without it being clear how these are justified in the overall 
scheme. 
  Once again, the conclusions and recommendations advanced have a common sense intuitive 
appeal as to being sensible and right, but the method of argumentation and the grounding of 
assertions in a consistent ethical framework is wanting. 
(2.1.6) van den Hoven (2012) 
  I examine this article fully in chapter 6 when I consider vaccine refusals and communitarian 
justice. Here, I will just make a few brief remarks as to van den Hoven’s approach.  
  In this article, van den Hoven addresses the problem of vaccine refusals from a public health 
perspective. She argues that herd immunity is a public good, something established by collective 
action that benefits all. Those who use this public good without “paying their fair share” are free-
riders. Therefore, every instance of vaccine refusals for reasons other than medical contra-
indication to vaccination constitutes an unjust act. There may, however, be reasons for not 
forcing people to get their children vaccinated even though free riding is unfair. For example, if 
forcibly vaccinating a child will not add to the herd immunity already established, it is difficult to 
justify forcible vaccination. Another reason is that public trust is an important factor in ensuring 
vaccination uptake. Eventually van den Hoven recommends approaches relying on education and 
building of public trust. 
Discussion: Van den Hoven engages with the problem of vaccine refusals from a communitarian 
justice perspective. She appeals to notions such as the common good, collective action, and the 
idea that individuals have an obligation to the collective. From this perspective she addresses the 
problem of vaccine refusals, acknowledging one of the main ethical themes within the vaccine 
ethics literature: the tension between individual freedom and collective responsibility. 
Concluding that every case of vaccine refusal is unjust (apart from medical contra-indications to 
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vaccination), she establishes a moral case for compulsory vaccination measures. However, there 
may be legitimate reasons why an alternate approach may be used to ensure vaccination uptake. 
  Van den Hoven’s arguments remain consistent within the communitarian justice paradigm. Van 
den Hoven’s article deals extensively with vaccine refusal, providing a thorough moral analysis of 
the concept of free riding. Many other writers rely on this concept when writing about the ethics 
of vaccination, perhaps without realizing that it relies on the communitarian justice paradigm 
that van den Hoven assumes.  
  Although these arguments are consistent and present a detailed consideration of the unfairness 
of free riding, a potential limitation is that it relies only on a communitarian justice perspective. 
As such, these arguments may not be persuasive to people who argue from different theories of 
justice, such as libertarians or egalitarians. 
(2.1.7) Wood-Harper (2005) 
  I shall examine this article more fully in chapter 6 as well, along with the van den Hoven article 
mentioned above. Here I will make a few short remarks. 
  Wood-Harper examines the tension between individual autonomy and collective responsibility 
as it pertains to MMR vaccination in children. She argues that there is a “moral and legal 
requirement, and a general assumption, that the right of parents to make medical decisions on 
their child’s behalf is exercised in his or her best interests” (p. 46). This parental right can be 
interfered with, however, when the decisions of parents are contrary to the child’s best interests. 
In arguing this point Wood-Harper cites examples from a legal perspective, and concludes that 
the state has the authority to overrule any parental decision that interferes with a child’s 
“physical integrity” (p. 46).  
  MMR vaccines, however, have more to them than that: they are also a matter of public interest. 
Sufficient vaccination uptake benefits the community as a whole, establishing herd immunity and 
protecting the health of the current and future community. Individuals share a “collective 
responsibility for promoting the health of future generations of children” since they “themselves 
have gained health benefits as a result of past vaccination programs”. Wood-Harper argues that 
individuals have a responsibility to the wider community and future children to have their 
children vaccinated. To strengthen the argument, she appeals to the value of altruism. According 
to this value, parents have to consider the effect of their decision on others, not just on their own 
children. The idea, once more, is that we have duties to members of society other than ourselves 
and our immediate family. From here, Wood-Harper launches a discussion of free riding, 
appealing to collective responsibility and the unfairness of not doing one’s share. 
  She then shifts to a discussion of autonomy, and the need for providers to respect the free 
choices of individuals, applying this to parental refusals of vaccination. Thus, here Wood-Harper 
relies on a principlist paradigm, and she highlights the tension between demands of autonomy 
and (communitarian) justice.  
  This leads her to ask – is there a case for mandatory vaccination? She is skeptical. Because 
“measles can be, but seldom is, fatal,” it is hard to justify mandatory policies (p. 52). As long as 
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there are any risks associated with vaccination, it would be “difficult to rationalize” overriding 
parental refusals (p. 52). Instead, she advocates persuasive techniques such as education as a 
way to respond to vaccine refusals. 
Discussion: Wood-Harper relies on different ethical approaches, and moves from one to the other 
without acknowledging a switch. It appears as if these different approaches are seen as 
complementary or equivalent. In one section she argues from a rights perspective, examining the 
rights of parents and legal limits to the rights of parents. Later, she argues from the principle of 
autonomy. It seems as if she moves unacknowledged from a rights and legal approach to a 
principlist paradigm. It is not clear whether she is aware of this change in ethical paradigm; but 
it appears as if she views these paradigms as similar. Like with many other authors who engage 
with the ethics of MMR vaccination, it appears as if Wood-Harper appeals to many different 
ethical paradigms without showing the connection between each or how different modes of 
justification are related to each other. Again we see the approach where an ethical paradigm that 
happens to suit the current argument is invoked, without it being clear how it is related to what 
preceded the present argument. 
  In engaging with the tension between justice and autonomy, Wood-Harper assumes a 
communitarian justice paradigm. She takes it that individuals have obligations to the collective, 
and she also examines the problem of free riding – benefiting from collective action without 
paying one’s fair share. 
  She also considers another central ethical question – whether there is a case for mandatory 
vaccination. Her argumentation and conclusions here are fairly puzzling. She argues that measles 
is, after all, not really that dangerous and as long as there is any risk from the vaccine one cannot 
override parental refusals. But what about her previous arguments regarding duties owed to the 
community and legal limits on parental rights? Her argument against mandatory policies do no 
address these. Essentially, in considering mandatory vaccination questions she pits autonomy 
against communitarian justice and then abandons the ethical conclusions she has drawn from 
communitarian justice earlier, making it inevitable that autonomy will win. Instead of dealing 
with the conflicting obligations, she merely focuses on autonomy. Measles is not often fatal, 
there are risks to vaccinations, so an argument for mandatory vaccination can never work. This 
is a very questionable argument. Even if measles is not often fatal, it has a whole host of other 
dismal complications that leads to immense burdens on the individual. And even though MMR 
carries risks with it, these risks are thought to be negligible. But more importantly, these 
considerations are relevant to the individual case of measles vaccination. It tells us nothing of 
how to balance individual autonomy against the obligations we have to the community. 
  In conclusion, then, Wood-Harper’s article raises interesting ethical issues, but has serious 
deficiencies. One is the unacknowledged moving from one ethical approach to another, what I 
have previously called the smorgasbord approach, where the author picks whatever ethical 
approach suits their present argument under consideration. The other is that she assumes a 
communitarian justice perspective when considering the tension between autonomy and justice. 
This is not a deficiency per se, but it does limit the persuasive scope of her argument. Lastly, 
having done all the work to establish obligations derived from communitarian justice, she 
virtually ignores these obligations when considering the question of mandatory vaccinations, and 
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introduces a questionable new argument based on questionable premises for why mandatory 
vaccination is never justifiable. 
(2.1.7) Gostin (2015) 
  Against the backdrop of a measles outbreak in the USA, Gostin examines the extent to which 
parental opt-out from the USA’s state vaccination requirements can be tolerated. He states the 
ethical question as, “whether parents’ rights to raise their children justify decisions that place the 
community at risk” (p. 1099). He briefly reviews some of the different state opt-out policies in 
the USA, concluding that states with easier opt-out procedures have lower vaccination uptake 
than those where parental opt-out is more difficult. He then analyzes such parental opt-outs and 
the provision of opt-out in a brief ethical argument, contrasting parental rights with community 
rights, an ethical principle of not imposing harm on others, and the consequences of specific 
types of opt-out policy on the public, such as “inflaming public opinion” (p. 1100). Eventually he 
concludes that more difficult opt out policies are ethically justifiable, but that harsher penalties 
should be avoided as it could lead to public resistance. 
Discussion: This is a short little paper in the “viewpoint” section of a medical journal, and as such 
does not aim at great rigor in ethical analysis, but rather to emphasize one or two important 
points with regards to ethical guidance for medical practice. In particular, Gostin emphasizes his 
view that state opt-out requirements in the US should be narrower than they are at present in 
many states, and that such an approach can be ethically justified. It can be noted, however, that 
Gostin appeals to different ethical frameworks and theories within the same argument. For 
example, in just one paragraph, he uses medico-legal considerations, rights theories, and 
consequentialism. The problem is that these theories conflict with one another, but in this paper 
it is used as if these theories are equivalent to one another, and supplement one another. Again, 
the article does not aim at great rigor, but it remains a sizeable deficiency to use conflicting 
ethical approaches and modes of ethical justification within the same argument in the way this 
paper does: moving from one framework to the next unacknowledged, using the different 
theories as if they are equivalent and complementary to each other, and not providing a 
framework or method for resolving the tensions between the conflicting methods of justification. 
(2.1.8) El Amin et al. (2012) 
  This paper conceives of vaccination primarily as a public health problem, while considering some 
issues within individual medical decision-making. It also focuses mostly on small pox vaccine and 
human papilloma virus vaccine, with only a few cursory references to measles and measles 
vaccination. However, there are some instructive themes that can be taken from this paper. 
El Amin et al. examine the ethical implications of state vaccination requirement in the USA, and 
state the central ethical tension to be the “balance of personal autonomy and choice versus 
protection of the entire at risk population” (p. 1).  
  Their stated ethical framework is a set of public health principles articulated by Childress et al. 
(2002), consisting of nine ethical principles that apply to public health programs. The extent of 
their justification for using this framework is that vaccination programs is a public health issue, 
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and that there is “some consensus” that the Childress principles are “the most relevant” of the 
public health principles (El Amin et al. 2012, p. 2-3).  
  Following this declaration, they also invoke the work of Diekema and Marcuse (2007), appealing 
to their do-no-harm approach as an ethical framework.  
  Next, they invoke Gostin, Bayer, and Fairchild’s (2003) articulation of the “precautionary 
principle” as an important framework in public health. This is a principle that is traditionally more 
related to environmental issues and where scientific knowledge is uncertain; when there is a 
threat to the environment the government should not use scientific uncertainty to avoid 
instituting measures that are known to prevent environmental damage (Goldstein 2001). There 
have been many different articulations of this principle and it has gradually been modified and 
applied as justification model for different public health measures (Goldstein 2001). Gostin, Bayer 
and Fairchild (2003), for example, uses it in a public health ethics analysis of the governmental 
response to SARS virus, describing the principle as being a central public health tenet. They write 
(p. 3232):  
“We take as a starting point the centrality of the precautionary principle for the ethics of 
public health. The principle stipulates an obligation to protect populations against reasonably 
foreseeable threats, even under conditions of uncertainty. First articulated in the context of 
environmental hazards, the precautionary principle seeks to forestall disasters and guide decision 
making in the context of incomplete knowledge. Given the potential costs of inaction, it is the 
failure to implement preventive measures that requires justification. Proponents of the 
precautionary principle explicitly defend their position by noting that entities that threaten the 
environment are best able to bear the burdens of regulation. Opponents warn that the imposition 
of such burdens may stifle economic progress and scientific innovation. The principle has not been 
explicitly invoked in the context of epidemic threats where preemptive actions may burden 
individuals and impose limits on their freedoms. Nevertheless, the precautionary principle has 
implicitly guided public health interventions designed to limit or forestall epidemic outbreaks.” 
  
 It is not clear what the grounding ethical framework is for the precautionary principle. In the 
cited articles, it appears as if it was first an environmental risk management principle that over 
time became incorporated into public health efforts.  
  Having identified three different ethical frameworks, the paper proceeds with an ethical analysis 
of compulsory vaccination programs of small pox vaccine and human papilloma virus vaccine. In 
their arguments, they present some precedent setting legal cases and legal arguments, consider 
the issue of paternalism, and public perception of vaccine related harms. Curiously, the 
presented arguments do not appear to draw on the stated ethical frameworks. Eventually the 
paper provides a set of recommendations, such as reviewing vaccination mandates, using more 
non-compulsory approaches, and addressing parent/guardian safety concerns. It is not always 
clear how these recommendations are connected with the ethical frameworks provided, 
although there are some passages that make reference to the ethical framework. For example, 
on page 13 it states, “It is compatible with the ethical principles previously discussed to assign to 
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government the responsibility for compensating persons who experience adverse events that 
have been documented to be causally related to vaccination,” without it being clear which 
specific ethical principles are referred to, or how this conclusion related to such ethical principles. 
  Discussion:  Once again, there is the use of different and divergent ethical frameworks as if they 
are similar or complementary to one another. The ethical argumentation presented do not 
clearly show how these different frameworks are employed, or how they support the eventual 
conclusion.  
  The ethical grounding of the precautionary principle and its role in ethical argumentation is also 
not clear. From cited sources it appears to be a risk management principle that originated within 
government’s responsibilities towards environmental harms and risks, which gradually became 
reformulated and incorporated into public health. Its relation to the other two stated 
frameworks, the principles of Childress et al. (2002) and the do-no-harm of Diekema and Marcuse 
(2007), is unclear. It does not appear as if these principles are directly applied during the 
argumentation stage of the paper. They are mentioned to some degree when the conclusions 
are presented, but it is not always clear which principle is being referenced. 
  One can see, however, that the same ethical tensions are stated in this paper as were identified 
in other papers with regards to vaccination programs: the tension between individual freedom 
and public interest. 
(2.1.9) Dawson (2011) 
  In this paper Dawson defends routine vaccination programs, assuming a public health 
perspective of the problematic. The paper examines vaccinations as a whole, lumping diverse 
vaccinations together, but does in places specifically refer to measles and measles vaccination in 
argument construction. It also aims to provide recommendations towards both the individual 
case of vaccination and public policy. It therefore matches my inclusion criteria. 
  Dawson considers vaccination using a variety of ethical concepts. First he considers harm and 
harm avoidance through a benefit lens, arguing that vaccines are morally justified in that they 
prevent harm to children. Next he embarks on a best interest analysis, and argues that vaccines 
are usually in the best interests of children. In this analysis he considers the tension between a 
parental vaccine refusal and the community’s conception of what is best for the child. Thirdly he 
considers the problem from a community perspective, and argues that herd immunity (or 
community immunity as he calls it in this paper) is in the public interest. For this analysis he uses 
the concepts of the common good and a public good, using language and arguments that are 
reminiscent of a Communitarian view of justice and society. Fourth, he constructs an argument 
from justice, arguing that justice is “a highly disputed concept”, but that it “generally requires us 
to do what is right and fair” (p. 1032). From here he argues that all children in the world, even 
those in less well-off settings in the third world, should have the same opportunity to enjoy the 
protection vaccines afford. 
  Discussion: The aim of the paper appears to be to highlight certain ethical tensions within 
vaccination programs in general and to provide a moral justification for the practice of public 
vaccination programs in general, and not a specific analysis of the ethics of measles vaccination. 
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The paper draws interesting conclusions and highlights interesting themes. It provides an analysis 
of the ethical tensions present in the individual case of vaccination, using concepts such as harm 
and best interest. It then provides an analysis of community interests and obligations we owe 
each other. Again, one of the central tensions identified is the tension between individual 
freedom and community interest. The argument surrounding justice is an interesting one, 
highlighting the specific need of people in resource poor countries.  
  The paper does not commit itself to a specific ethical framework, and uses different ethical 
concepts that are at home in different ethical frameworks as if they are related to one another. 
It is for example not clear how the discussion of community interests, justice, best interest, and 
harm avoidance fit together. These concepts are used as if they are complimentary and related 
to one another, without it being clear how, or what framework is used to ground them. 
  The paper also commits itself to a Communitarian view of justice in discussing community 
interest and obligations owed to the community. It does embark on a further discussion of justice, 
but no specific theory of justice is invoked, and it is not clear how these different arguments fit 
together. 
  Furthermore, the paper does not provide a lot of empirical information regarding vaccine 
efficacy, disease complications, disease epidemiology, vaccine side effects, and so forth. Such 
matters are critical in order to apply specific ethical concepts to a specific vaccine. 
(2.1.10) Dawson (2005) 
  Dawson here examines the role of the best interest standard in the provision of vaccinations in 
general. His focus is specifically to examine whether the best interest standard can be used to 
justify overriding parental vaccine refusal. He does not consider a particular vaccination, but 
rather vaccinations in general. Towards the end of the paper he makes a particular point about 
measles vaccination which is of particular relevance to my work. 
  Dawson states that many commentators argue that the idea of the child’s best interests is 
central to vaccine delivery. This claim appears to be true, given the analysis of the ethics of 
measles vaccination literature I have provided. He defends using a conception of the best interest 
standard as found in the work of Buchanan and Brock (1990). That is, the best interest standard 
requires that medical choices be made that optimize the child’s welfare or good. This requires 
that the various interests of the child be weighed with the potential benefits and harms of the 
available choices in question, and that the choice should be made that optimally promotes the 
child’s interests. 
  Dawson makes an interesting point on page 82: 
 “The ‘best interests argument’ is a general argument, but it will only be applicable in the 
real world once we consider both a particular type of disease and the relevant vaccination that is 
available to combat that disease. This is because the argument as a whole is dependent upon the 
idea of the relative risk of harm produced through two incompatible decisions (to vaccinate or not 
vaccinate). A sound judgment cannot be made in the abstract, but only in the light of the relevant 
and available empirical evidence.” 
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  On pages 83 and 84, he then considers some vaccinations in a short and abstract manner. When 
it comes to measles vaccination, he provides a brief one-paragraph summary stating that measles 
is highly contagious, can cause serious medical problems, and that the MMR vaccine is available. 
He states, however, that the “relevant evidence for its effectiveness and its risk of causing harm 
are contested” (p. 84). He concludes that it is difficult to decide whether measles vaccination is 
in the best interests of a child. It would depend on a careful weighing of the empirical evidence 
and the circumstances. 
  Discussion: Dawson here provides a consistent ethical framework and ethical grounding for the 
best interest standard in a way that other authors have not done. Dawson cites the work of 
Buchanan and Brock in this regard, and employs their ethical framework in using the best interest 
standard. This is important work, and emphasizes the importance of the best interest standard 
in vaccination decisions for children.  
  Dawson also argues for the importance of empirical evidence in analyzing the ethics of a specific 
vaccination. His consideration of measles vaccination is brief, and he states that the safety and 
efficacy of MMR is contested. This paper was written in 2005, and I will demonstrate in this 
dissertation that there is a high degree of empirical certainty at present regarding the safety and 
efficacy of MMR. The point is well made, though – a thorough empirical analysis is essential to 
the ethical analysis of MMR vaccination in children. 
  A potential deficiency in this paper is that it is not clear how this ethical framework focusing on 
best interests relates to community obligations and the public good that Dawson often employs. 
This paper highlights the best interest standard quite well, and I will return to it when I consider 
the individual case of measles vaccination in chapter 5. A lingering question, however, is how one 
should think about the individual case in relation to the public interest and justice considerations, 
how a paradigm of consideration for the individual can be reconciled with a societal paradigm.  
 
(2.2) Emerging themes and deficiencies in the medical, nursing and public health 
literature  
  Having presented an overview snapshot of the discourse on the ethics of MMR vaccination in 
this literature, it is apparent that some themes emerge with regularity. In this section I shall 
highlight these themes as well as the deficiencies. The highlighted themes suggest important 
questions and tensions within the issue of measles vaccination in children that my work should 
explore in making a contribution to the discourse. The identified deficiencies show areas in which 
my work can meaningfully add to the literature through addressing these. 
(2.2.1) The smorgasbord approach – moving haphazardly between different and 
competing ethical paradigms 
  Almost all the authors employ what I have called a smorgasbord approach to ethical 
justification. That is, they move from one ethical paradigm to the next when it suits the purpose 
at hand without acknowledging that a shift has happened and without showing how the different 
ethical paradigms are related to one another. An author may start off in a rights-based paradigm, 
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then invoke principlism, then communitarian justice, then a liberal view of justice, and for good 
measure add a dose of utilitarianism. Notable exceptions are the article examining free riding by 
van den Hoven (2012) using a communitarian justice approach and the article by Dawson (2005) 
focusing on the best interest standard. 
  I am not sure that the authors are even aware that they argue in this way. They may, in fact, 
view these different ethical paradigms as equivalent and handy tools, not aware of the inherent 
internal conflict in the arguments so constructed. Indeed, many of the authors don’t even 
acknowledge an ethical paradigm or defend certain ethical assumptions.  
  One possible explanation for this strange manner of justification is what can be considered 
putting-the-cart-before-the-horse argumentation. In reading these articles, the impression is in 
some instances created that the author has started off with a certain set of conclusions in mind 
– say, for example, that society should protect children but at the same time respect the free 
choices of their parents, and that a potentially good way to do this in practice is some 
combination of using educational interventions and state power. Having these conclusions in 
mind, the author would then after the fact construct arguments that would lead to these 
conclusions. To do so, they would scour the “ethical marketplace” and use any theory, concept, 
or manner of justification that seems handy or remotely relevant at different stages of argument 
construction. Once the conclusions are “established through moral argumentation”, we are left 
with the question of coercive vaccination policies, and here an author may then find it convenient 
to launch into a legal discussion on the limits of state authority. This may be why the conclusions 
presented invariably have a level of intuitive acceptability about them, while the methods 
employed to reach these conclusions leave one puzzled.  
  Another possible explanation for this smorgasbord approach is that the authors themselves 
think that this is the best way to proceed when constructing ethical arguments. Consider the 
critique of the method of contemporary bioethics by Clouser and Gert, appearing in their critical 
essay on principlism (Clouser and Gert 1990, p. 231).1 Instruction in medical and applied ethics, 
they argue, proceed as follows. First, a brief summary of major ethical theories are presented, 
such as utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics and contractarianism. Then, some 
insurmountable problem is pointed out in each theory, showing why the theory is inadequate. 
These inadequacies are never corrected, and students are not presented with a better theory. 
Instead, students are encouraged to use whatever of these defective (and competing) theories 
as they see fit when the problem at hand calls for it. “Having acknowledged that all of the 
standard theories are inadequate, one is then told to apply them anyway, and even to apply 
                                                          
1 Clouser and Gert’s main aim is a critique of principlism. I will consider and respond to their critique on principlism 
further in chapter 4. Here, I am interested in their observations regarding the practice of contemporary bioethics as 
a discipline. To my mind, they raise considerations that are vital for us to heed as we go forward within the field of 
bioethics. Their objections to principlism, however, I do not consider insurmountable as I will point out in chapter 4. 
Perhaps Clouser and Gert’s are subconsciously conflating the approach of principlism with contemporary bioethics 
as a whole. Given the prominence of the principlist approach within the field of bioethics, this seems like an easy 
assumption to make. Be that as it may, Clouser and Gert’s critiques of contemporary bioethics are salient and to the 
point when considering the articles I presented here regarding the ethics of MMR. In chapter 4 I shall indicate that I 
consider principlism robust enough to rise above the critiques of Clouser and Gert, especially when principlism 
moves away from seeking justification in a specific theory but rather relies on the idea of the common morality. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 29 
 
competing theories, without any attempt to show the theories can be reconciled” (Clouser and 
Gert 1990, p. 231). When examining the articles I presented, it does seem as if the authors 
proceed in the way that Clouser and Gert describes. This leaves the conclusions they draw 
hanging in the air without firm, consistent ethical justification.  
  Returning now to the MMR ethics articles under consideration. Whatever the reasons are for 
the use of the smorgasbord approach to justification, the effect of using such an approach on the 
arguments and conclusions is substantial. In general, the arguments offered do not provide 
substantive ethical justification for the conclusions and recommendations advanced. Numerous 
internal contradictions and unsupported assertions litters this literature. Ultimately, the 
conclusions reached are not firmly grounded in a consistent approach or in sound arguments, 
with the consequence that the conclusions cannot be considered substantively ethically justified. 
At best the conclusions offered in virtually every paper amounts to nothing more than the 
author’s intuitive conclusions as to what is ethically justified with regards to MMR vaccination, 
intermingled with loose and fragmented appeals to diverse and conflicting ethical concepts. 
  To correct this defect in the literature, the ethical questions inherent to the ethics of MMR 
vaccination have to be examined in a consistent and systematic way, staying within a robust and 
justifiable ethical framework and supporting conclusions firmly in consistent argumentation.   
(2.2.2) The individual case of vaccination: insufficient argumentation and 
justification  
  Almost all the authors consider the ethical aspects of the individual case of vaccination. 
Typically, there is a recognition of the fact that the central figure is a child that does not have the 
capacity to make medical decisions, and that parents direct the medical care of their children in 
accordance with the best interest standard. But in no paper is the best interest standard 
grounded in an ethical paradigm or justified through ethical argumentation. Rather, it is merely 
asserted that the best interest standard is the best way to proceed with decision-making, and the 
reader has to take this at face value. It is not clear, then, which ethical considerations ground 
such decision-making and what provides ethical force to conclusions reached through a best 
interest standard. 
  As an important and interesting aside, it is significant to note that the best interest standard has 
become a legal standard in many countries, forming an important legal paradigm used to make 
legal judgments where children are involved (Diekema 2011). The general idea with the legal 
application of the best interest standard is as follows. When faced with various options regarding 
the fate of a child, or when a decision should be made that substantially impacts a child, the 
option should be preferred that optimally promotes the welfare of the child (Diekema 2011). For 
example, if a court is asked to make a decision on which parent to award custody in a divorce 
proceeding, the court should favor the arrangement that works most towards the welfare of the 
child. Or, if the court is asked to make a judgment regarding the use of a specific medical 
treatment for a child, the court should choose among available courses of action that option that 
most works towards the child’s overall welfare and benefit. Courts and their delegates may 
interfere with or overrule parental decisions that are not in keeping with a child’s best interests 
(Diekema 2011), for example, courts may mandate life-saving blood transfusions for children in 
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spite of parental refusal of such procedures (Woolley 2005). In South Africa, the idea that the 
best interests of a child should be paramount in legal decisions pertaining to a child developed 
gradually throughout the country’s history, and mostly so through legal precedents in court cases 
where custody and guardianship of children were at stake (Walsh 2013). Eventually, the best 
interest standard was written into the South African Constitution during the writing of the 
Constitution for a new democratic South Africa after the end of apartheid, stating that, “a child’s 
best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child” (Walsh 2013). 
In 2006, the South African Children’s Act was signed into law (also known as Act Number 38 of 
2005). This law was meant to be a comprehensive legal framework for defining and protecting 
the rights of South African children (Walsh 2013). The act defined children as persons under 18 
years of age, and dealt in detail with issues such as child protection, custody, parental rights, child 
trafficking, and adoption (Children’s Act 38 of 2005; Walsh 2013). The Act declares the best 
interests of the child as guiding principle in all matters concerning a child, stating, “In all matters 
concerning the care, protection and well-being of a child the standard that the child's best 
interest is of paramount importance, must be applied” (Children’s Act 38 of 2005, Chapter 2). 
The Act does not specify a definition of the best interest standard, but provides a list of factors 
that must be considered by courts in determining best interests. This includes the relationship 
between the child and parent(s), the capacity of the parent(s), the effect on the child of any 
change in the child’s circumstances, the child’s age and maturity, the child’s emotional security, 
and the child’s intellectual, cultural, social, and emotional development (Children’s Act 38 of 
2005, Chapter 2). The Act provides guidelines for various situations thought to be relevant in the 
South African context, for example prohibiting certain cultural and religious practices such as the 
genital mutilation of girls. Furthermore, the Act specifies parents as medical decision-makers for 
their children, and forbids refusal of required medical treatment purely on the basis of religious 
or other beliefs, unless the parent(s) can show that a medically accepted alternative treatment 
exists (Children’s Act 38 of 2005, Chapter 7). 
  Getting back now to the articles I have reviewed regarding the ethics of measles vaccination and 
the use of the best interest standard in advancing recommendations. Authors in virtually all the 
articles use the best interest standard in their ethical argumentation, but never ground it in an 
ethical framework. Rather, it appears as if they use it partly as a legal standard and partly as a 
widely accepted ethical standard, without it being clear what the grounding is for the standard. 
This is an example of the smorgasbord approach I have previously mentioned, but it also makes 
another crucial mistake. It does not keep into account the difference between law and ethics. 
Legal argumentation and legal justification are very different from ethical argumentation and 
ethical justification.  
  When it comes to the content of the arguments surrounding the individual case of vaccination 
in these papers, the usual conclusion is that vaccination is thought to be in the best interests of 
the child, but that the parents’ decisions should be respected. Most authors argue that parental 
decisions can be interfered with if such decisions place children at substantial harm, but often 
legal considerations are conflated with ethical considerations, making it unclear what the basis 
for this conclusion is. One author (Diekema 2005) argues from a best interest standard, but then 
also appeals to an ethical principle he calls the harm principle, based on the work of Mill, without 
it being clear what the relationship is between the harm principle and the best interest standard. 
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He argues in accordance with this principle that parental decisions leading to substantial harm of 
the child can be interfered with.  
  From here, authors typically proceed with an argument as follows. Parental decisions can be 
interfered with if such decisions would lead to substantial harm to the child. In societies where 
MMR vaccination rates are high, the risk to the individual child through foregoing vaccination is 
low, since the child is protected through herd immunity. Thus, parental refusals of MMR should 
not be overturned when MMR vaccination rates are high. The general idea is that the moral 
obligation to vaccinate the individual is weakened or set aside when population immunity is high. 
Some authors respond to this by pointing out the problem of free riding, and the obligations to 
the community. Others just leave this conclusion as it is, but then strangely don’t take it into 
account further when they consider the question of mandatory vaccination policies. I shall 
discuss this specific aspect later, but when presenting arguments for or against coercive 
vaccination policies, some authors completely ignore the conclusions they have drawn from the 
best interest standard in the individual case of vaccination, and instead present a host of other 
considerations of which it is not always clear how it relates to the preceding argument. For 
example, Krantz et al. (Krantz, Sachs, & Nilstun 2004) consider the individual case of vaccination 
and concludes that it is in the best interests of children to be vaccinated, “probably” even when 
there is high population immunity. There is therefore presumably an ethical obligation on parents 
to have their children vaccinated. But when it comes to discussing mandatory vaccination 
policies, this conclusion is completely ignored; rather, it is argued that coercion is “not possible” 
and “not desirable” in Sweden, without it being clear what the underlying ethical justification for 
this assertion is. Sheather (2013) also argues from a best interest standard that vaccination is 
usually in the best interests of children, and that if population immunity is high that vaccination 
is still “prudential”. But when arguing around coercive vaccination policies, suddenly we read of 
liberal democracies and legal considerations and limitations of liberty. Such limitations to the 
legal right of liberty surround the risk of harm to a child, and in the author’s opinion (!) the legal 
case for coercive vaccination policies disappears when high levels of population immunity is 
reached.  
  Again we see the switching from one approach to the other, haphazard argumentation, and it 
being unclear to what extent conclusions are supported by the preceding argumentation. 
  The result of all these deficiencies in argumentation is that nobody actually substantively 
justifies the individual case of vaccination. It is merely asserted that MMR vaccination is in the 
best interests of children and that it is therefore ethically obligatory. Except when population 
immunity is higher, then the ethical obligation is said to be less clear, but this argument is also 
left open to individual interpretation and not precise. Other ethical issues surrounding the 
individual case of vaccination, such as the limits of parental authority and the ethical status of 
mandatory vaccinations, are often not consistently explored from a consistent ethical 
perspective, often times appealing to conflicting ethical paradigms or legal arguments.  
  What is required is a substantive consideration of the individual case of MMR vaccination, 
consistently grounded in a robust ethical approach. Therefore, rigorous analysis of the individual 
case of vaccination will be an important step in this dissertation. 
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(2.2.3) Obligations we owe to each other: assuming a communitarian justice 
perspective 
  One of the central ethical questions emerging from the literature is the tension between 
individual freedom and responsibility to others. Using principlist language, this can be roughly 
conceived of as a tension between autonomy and justice. 
  Without fail, every author assumes a communitarian theory of justice when dealing with this 
question. Under communitarian theories, individuals have obligations to the collective, and the 
collective to the individual. It is not hard to see that such a theory would favor public vaccination 
programs. Communitarian theories also focus on the common good, and collective action that 
establishes public goods. Prominent within this literature is the argument around free riding, 
which is when individuals make use of a public good without paying their share – joining in the 
collective action that brings about the good. This argument is typically used to show why it is 
unfair or wrong for people to refuse to vaccinate their children. 
  The trouble is that there are other, competing, theories of justice – liberal theories such as 
libertarianism or Rawls’ contractarian egalitarianism, utilitarian justice, and well-being justice. 
These are prominent theories and are influential in the contemporary discourse on justice. But 
nowhere are the implications of these theories for MMR vaccination considered. Instead, all the 
authors proceed as if communitarian justice enjoys universal appeal and as if their 
communitarian arguments would be persuasive to everyone. 
  This is a serious defect in the literature on MMR/measles vaccination. In this project I shall 
respond to this defect by considering the implications of various influential theories of justice 
with regards to the ethics of MMR vaccination in children. 
(2.2.4) Empirical assumptions, lack of referencing, and pervasive impreciseness 
  It is in the nature of the ethical questions at hand that empirical medical facts regarding measles 
infection and MMR vaccination are of the utmost importance in argument construction. For 
example, if an author wants to determine whether MMR vaccination would be in the best 
interests of a child, some medical data as to efficacy of the vaccine, potential harms from 
vaccination, and the nature of measles infection are crucial considerations. But these details are 
invariably lacking. Instead, most authors make fairly vague empirical assumptions and often 
times these are not adequately referenced.  
  A number of examples. None of these articles highlight to what extent the MMR vaccination is 
effective against measles infection, and how many doses of vaccination is needed. None of the 
articles deal with the concept of vaccine failure, the fact that some people just don’t become 
immune even if they are vaccinated. Many of the articles refer to herd immunity or population 
immunity, but nowhere do we see a clear explanation of what this is, what rate of vaccination 
would provide her immunity, or references to measles eradication. 
  The effect of this deficiency is that empirical premises used in argumentation appear vague, 
imprecise and unsupported by sufficient references to empirical sources. The reader is left to 
make up her own mind as to what exactly herd immunity is, what the efficacy of the vaccine is, 
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how dangerous or frequent vaccine adverse effects are, and the like. This introduces yet another 
source of doubt as to how substantive and robust eventual recommendations offered by authors 
are. 
  What is needed to correct this deficiency in the literature is a thorough analysis of the empirical 
medical facts with regards to measles infection and MMR vaccination, and to connect these 
empirically grounded facts with substantive normative ethical arguments within a consistent 
ethical paradigm. As Dawson (2005) points out, any comprehensive study on the ethics of 
measles vaccination will require careful analysis and weighing of the relevant empirical 
information regarding disease and vaccine characteristics. 
 
(2.3) Papers and work not included in the analysis above 
  There are a number of papers that touch on issues within the ethics of vaccination which I have 
not included in my review above. Some of these are in the medical literature, and some are in 
the philosophical literature. These papers are not directly applicable to my work; for example, 
some may not examine measles vaccination at all, or some may not seek to provide ethical 
recommendations for policy or medical decision-making. Others are too scant on empirical data 
to meaningfully construct arguments applicable to MMR in particular. I briefly list some examples 
here. 
  Tim Dare (1998) considers mass vaccination policy from a philosophical perspective. His goal is 
two-fold: to address a shortage of vaccination work in philosophy at the time, and to analyze and 
justify the idea of governmental pro-vaccination policies. The first half of this essay focuses on 
empirical uncertainty regarding vaccines; it should be said that in the time since this article 
appeared, a lot of empirical work has appeared that has substantially reduced uncertainties, 
specifically regarding measles vaccination. The second half of his essay is an analysis of the public 
vaccination policies of the US and New Zealand, using a utilitarian framework. There are a 
number of reasons this paper does not directly speak to the ethical analysis I am embarking on. 
First, this paper does not focus on measles vaccination, and in fact appears to lump all 
vaccinations together as if they are the same. There are major differences between different 
vaccinations, so that it is not clear to what extent the arguments are generalizable to measles 
vaccination in particular. Second, this paper is very scant on empirical data regarding matters 
such as vaccine efficacy and adverse effects, and in fact states that it does not aim at analyzing 
empirical data. Third, it only focuses on selected issues within the debate, and states that it the 
goal is more to raise these issues than to fully explore them. Fourth, the paper does not aim to 
provide ethical analysis and guidance for medical decision-making for the individual child, and 
only provides limited guidance on the policy level. An important observation is that the paper 
generally employs a utilitarian approach and mostly stays within this approach. 
  Roland Pierik examines mass vaccination policy in two articles (2016; 2014). In his more recent 
article (2016), he aims to provide a defense of mandatory mass vaccination policies by arguing 
that vaccination does not fall into the domain of free choice, but rather on a non-negotiable legal 
duty. In doing so, he appeals to different ethical and legal norms without declaring a clear ethical 
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framework, or how these ethical norms and arguments are related to one another. In the earlier 
article (2014) he contemplates the return of measles infection to certain areas within the 
Netherlands, and offer a suggestion that mandatory vaccination policies could increase 
vaccination uptake in these areas. In neither article does he declare or defend an ethical 
framework. He stipulates some duties, but doesn’t ground them in a framework, so that it is not 
clear how these duties relate to each other. The focus of his work seems to be to draw legal 
conclusions, and he does not provide guidance for individual medical decision-making, and only 
some guidance on a public health level. These papers are also fairly low on empiric information; 
for example, there is almost no discussion on the potential adverse effects of vaccination, or the 
risks that vaccinated people assume. These papers do not quite meet the criteria I’ve set for 
inclusion above. As far as they do, it appears that these articles show similar themes (individual 
autonomy vs public responsibility) and similar deficiencies (use of different unrelated moral and 
legal approaches in an unsystematic way) to the literature I have included. 
  T Heller writes an article from the perspective of a general practitioner questioning the safety 
of the MMR vaccine with responses from D Heller and S Pattison (Heller, Heller, & Pattison 2001). 
This article voices T Heller’s uncertainties, and asks for a deepening of the debate regarding MMR 
vaccination. It should be kept in mind that he writes shortly after the publication of the Wakefield 
article in 1998, which launched the MMR-autism scare. Many of the points raised mirror the 
questions vaccine hesitant parents may have – is the MMR safe? Can we trust the experts? Is 
vaccination not just recommended because of financial gain? This article is insightful in that it 
shows how such uncertainties can even affect practicing physicians. Since then, much work has 
appeared which directly addresses some of the uncertainties and address some of the questions 
in Heller’s article. Indeed, in this thesis I will address the safety, efficacy, and cost of MMR vaccine. 
I did not include this article in the analysis above, as it does not aim to provide ethical analysis or 
recommendations, but rather functions to raise a physician’s uncertainties and questions. 
  An article by Dawson in the journal Vaccine (2014) is an editorial aimed at introducing certain 
ethical questions in a medical context. It discusses that a small number of scholars are examining 
ethical issues in vaccination, and mentions vaccines such as influenza vaccine and zoster 
vaccination. This paper does not do much ethical analysis, does not consider measles vaccination, 
and does not provide much empirical data. Another paper by Dawson (2004) examines vaccine 
programs as a whole from a public health perspective. Here Dawson seeks to defend the concept 
of prevention over cure, providing an ethical defense of preventive programs in general. He 
defends vaccination programs by conceiving of herd immunity as a public good, therefore 
escaping the objections of unfair benefits and burdens as raised by the prevention problem. This 
is interesting, but one wonders if this is as relevant to illnesses such as measles where no cure 
exists, and prevention is essentially the only medical intervention available. Dawson’s defense of 
vaccination programs conceives of herd immunity as a public good, much along the lines of his 
2011 paper and van den Hoven’s paper (2012). As I’ve pointed out before, this argument relies 
on Communitarian assumptions. Of note, this paper does not consider measles vaccination in 
particular, appears to lump all vaccinations together as a whole, does not aim to provide guidance 
in both the individual and societal contexts, and does not provide sufficient empirical review.  
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(3) The aims and scope of this project and substantive contributions to 
the field 
  The current project has the goal of adding substantially to the discourse on the ethics of MMR 
vaccination in children to prevent measles infection. The goal is to provide ethical 
recommendations regarding vaccination with MMR that can guide individual decision-making in 
the medical context, as well as societal and government policy. To do so, I will structure this 
project in a way that will address the main deficiencies identified in the existing literature. 
  I shall perform a thorough analysis of the relevant medical facts surrounding measles infection 
and MMR vaccination. In chapter 2 I shall consider measles infection, including the epidemiology, 
complications, cost of measles infection to the health system, the concept of herd immunity, and 
measles virus characteristics of note. In chapter 3 I shall analyze measles vaccination with the 
focus on MMR, the most widely used vaccine to prevent measles infection. Here I shall address 
questions such as vaccine efficacy, vaccine cost, potential adverse effects, the autism 
controversy, vaccine history, vaccine opposition and refusal, and the anti-vaccine movement. I 
shall also present a comparison between the complications of measles and the potential adverse 
effects of MMR vaccination. The medical facts regarding measles and MMR vaccination will 
provide the necessary empirical background for the consideration of normative ethical 
arguments. 
  Next, I shall turn to the process of analyzing ethical considerations involved and advance ethical 
arguments. In the literature on the ethics of MMR vaccination, the following important ethical 
issues are addressed:  
 (1) Ethical considerations of the individual case of MMR vaccination. To my mind this is an 
appropriate ethical question, as vaccination surrounds a (usually) healthy and (usually) young 
child. Looking at this situation, ethical questions of justification for providing an intervention 
which can have adverse effects to a child who cannot provide consent arise. Although these 
questions are addressed in the existing literature, they have not been substantively answered 
due to the defects I previously identified.  
 (2) Individual freedom/autonomy versus responsibility to others/justice. This is a central 
question within MMR vaccination, and every author attempts to come to terms with this tension. 
However, invariably the author assumes a communitarian justice perspective. Nowhere do we 
find a serious analysis of the implications of other theories of justice for this question, which is 
strange since communitarianism does not enjoy universal appeal. Furthermore, I argued before 
that the way in which authors engage with the tension is highly unsystematic and unsubstantive, 
meaning that the tension is never satisfactorily dealt with through grounded ethical arguments 
that stay within a consistent ethical paradigm. 
(3) Are coercive vaccination policies, using state power, ethically justified? This is another central 
ethical issue that virtually all the authors address. Again, it is addressed in a very unsystematic 
and haphazard way. Often times it is not clear how preceding arguments and stated ethical 
paradigms are connected with arguments offered when considering the issue of coercive 
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vaccination. Consequently, the recommendations offered do not appear to be substantively 
grounded in ethical justifications. 
  I shall address all three of these central ethical questions with the goal of reaching ethically 
justifiable and ethically grounded recommendations for vaccination practice and policy. During 
this process, it would be important to analyze the ethical aspects of the individual case of MMR 
vaccination, the implications of different theories of justice, and to bring the conclusions of these 
arguments to bear on vaccination policy considerations. 
  I aim to make recommendations that are widely applicable and widely accepted, and not 
restricted to a specific country, community or context. Rather than writing a set of 
recommendations for the ‘American’ context, the ‘South African’ context, or the ‘European’ 
context, I aim to provide analysis and recommendations that can guide ethical decision-making 
for a variety of communities, countries, and individuals. Therefore, when I cite different countries 
in the empirical or policy section, it should be seen as examples of specific disease and vaccination 
trends or examples of different types of policy. These considerations function as premises in an 
ongoing argument throughout this dissertation, aimed at providing a set of ethical 
recommendations that can be used to formulate policy in the just society, and guide medical 
decision-making for the individual child. 
  To engage in ethical analysis, I shall make use of the principlist paradigm of Beauchamp and 
Childress. Principlism has arguably become the most popular approach to resolving knotty 
bioethical questions, and can arguably be considered the lingua franca of bioethics. One of its 
strong points is that it relies on widely shared moral judgments; conclusions reached through the 
application of principlism would appeal to persons of different ethical theoretical persuasion. For 
example, the four principles can be at home within both a utilitarian and a Kantian paradigm. 
This is not to say that they are relativistic: instead, they rely on those moral convictions that 
persons from such competing theories share. After all, there is a large amount of agreement 
about which actions are morally right between Kantians, utilitarians, contractarians, and so forth. 
They all know that it is wrong to steal, murder, torture innocents, and the like. The strength of 
the principlist approach is that the four principles appeal to adherents of the different theories 
in the same way these shared moral judgments do. Thus, in using the principlist paradigm I expect 
to reach conclusions that will enjoy wide appeal to persons all over the spectrum of ethical 
theory. If I were to ground arguments in a specific classical theory – say, for example, 
utilitarianism – the conclusions reached would only be persuasive to those who share the 
theoretical background. Using the principlist paradigm has the advantage of providing normative 
ethical justifications that would appeal to all people who see the sense of our shared moral 
judgments.  
  More importantly, the principlist paradigm is ideally situated to engage with the three central 
ethical questions identified in the MMR vaccination ethics literature. All four of the principles are 
engaged – autonomy speaks to the issue of respecting individual freedom and the individual case 
of MMR vaccination; beneficence and non-maleficence are relevant to the individual case; justice 
is relevant to the tension between individual freedom and what people owe each other. The four 
principles show themselves to be excellent starting points for the consideration of the main 
ethical questions at hand. The method of principlism requires application of the four principles 
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to the issue at hand, and then through a process of specifying to arrive at specified action guides. 
Through a process of balancing one then brings these action guides into equilibrium with one 
another, so that it is clear what the actual moral obligations in the given scenario is. Thus, the 
principlist paradigm offers the tools and methods necessary to bring all three central ethical 
questions in MMR vaccination into balance with one another, leading to clarity on ethical 
conclusions and obligations.    
  I shall therefore proceed as follows. In chapter 4 I shall examine the principlist paradigm, its 
method, some objections against it, and eventually endorse it as the paradigm of choice for the 
task at hand.  
  In chapter 5 I shall analyze the individual case of vaccination, bringing the principles of 
autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence to bear on the empirical facts. I shall ground a best 
interests approach firmly in these principles, and indicate how parental choices guided by best 
interests meet the requirements of these three principles. I shall also consider and defeat the 
argument that in a highly vaccinated society a child’s best interests may be to forego MMR 
vaccination. In conclusion I shall offer two ethical action guides, two principles derived from the 
analysis of the individual case of vaccination. 
  In chapter 6 I shall consider MMR vaccination from the perspective of five different theories of 
justice. I shall demonstrate how each theory of justice leads us to adopt two ethical action guides, 
delineating the ethical obligations of the just society. The goal of this chapter will not be to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of a specific theory of justice, such as libertarianism or Rawls’ 
egalitarian contractarianism. Instead, I will briefly introduce the main points of each theory of 
justice to the extent that is necessary to engage in meaningful ethical argumentation around 
MMR vaccination. The aim of this chapter is to show how each different theory of justice supports 
the same two ethical action guides. In terms of the overall principlist framework, the principle of 
justice would then endorse these two action guides derived from the different, competing 
theories of justice. 
  In chapter 7, the concluding chapter, I shall point out that the two action guides from chapter 5 
are similar to the two action guides from chapter 6. Therefore, we are able to bring all four 
principles into balance by stating two ethical action guides. These action guides are: 
    (1) All children eligible for measles vaccination should be vaccinated against measles, at least 
to the point of sustained measles elimination. 
   (2) Respect for parental decision-making and the parent-child relationship guide the response 
to parental vaccine refusals.   
  These two action guides of principles can be used to derive ethical obligations and to regulate 
policy. In chapter 7 I shall engage in this process, and offer recommendations as to ethically 
justifiable MMR vaccination policies. 
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Chapter 2: Scientific review of measles disease and 
epidemiology 
 
  In this chapter the scientific data regarding measles disease will be reviewed and discussed. 
Measles illness, complications and transmission will be considered as well as the historical and 
present-day epidemiology of measles. As important examples of the impact and spread of 
measles and the feasibility for eradication, the epidemiology of measles within the United States, 
Canada, South Africa and selected European countries will be examined. At the end of the 
chapter the most important aspects of measles as pertains to the ethics of measles vaccination 
will be summarized. 
 
(1) Measles disease 
(1.1)  Virus and infection basics 
  Measles is a serious infectious disease caused by Measles Virus (MV) (Buchanan & Bonthius 
2012; CDC 2013a; Dardis 2012; De Vries et al. 2012; Moss & Griffin 2012). MV is highly contagious 
(Buchanan & Bonthius 2012; CDC 2013a; Dardis 2012; De Vries et al. 2012; Moss & Griffin 2012). 
It has been called “the most communicable of childhood exanthems” and “one of the most 
communicable of all human diseases” (Buchanan & Bonthius 2012). It is almost certain that a 
non-immune individual will contract measles disease if exposed to MV (CDC 2013a). Outbreaks 
of measles can occur within a population even if fewer than 10% of people in the population are 
non-immune to the disease (Moss & Griffin 2012).   
  Measles does not cause prolonged or latent infections, and there are no human carriers without 
clinical disease.  There are also no animal carriers or non-human reservoirs for MV; rather, MV 
spread is maintained through acute infections and interlinked measles outbreaks (Moss & Griffin 
2012). Those individuals who successfully fight off measles infection through their immune 
system gain life-long immunity to measles and cannot become infected again if they remain 
immune-competent (CDC 2013a; De Vries et al. 2012; Moss & Griffin 2012).  
  Central to the concept of acquired immunity against MV is the humoral immune response, 
where antibodies against MV are created and memory cells are formed.  These memory cells 
provide life-long immunity (Buchanan & Bonthius 2012; De Vries et al. 2012; Moss & Griffin 
2012). The cellular immune response also plays an important role in combating acute measles 
infection, but the gaining of life-long immunity is a function of activation of the humoral immune 
system (Buchanan & Bonthius 2012; De Vries et al. 2012; Moss & Griffin 2012). A way in which 
immunity against MV can be acquired without measles disease is measles vaccination (Buchanan 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 43 
 
& Bonthius 2012; Dardis 2012; De Vries et al. 2012; Moss & Griffin 2012). Measles vaccination 
will be reviewed fully in chapter 3.  
  Infants born to immune mothers are typically protected against measles infection by acquiring 
maternal antibodies.  When this passively acquired immunity disappears, infants become 
susceptible to infection with MV and consequently measles disease (Leuridan et al. 2010; Moss 
& Griffin 2012). The maternal antibodies are transferred to the fetus through the placenta, and 
the duration of protection of the infant after birth is determined by the amount of maternal 
antibodies, gestational age (preterm birth leads to lower antibody transfer) and rate of decay of 
antibodies received from the mother (Leuridan et al. 2010). A prospective study compared the 
duration of maternal antibody protection between two groups of infants (Leuridan et al. 2010).  
One group of infants was born to vaccinated mothers (n=87), and another group of infants was 
born to mothers who had acquired measles immunity through natural infection (n=120).  Measles 
antibodies (IgG) were measured using an ELISA test in mothers (36 weeks/birth) and infants (1 
month/3 months/6 or 9 months), and the amount of antibody present for the two groups were 
compared.  They found a good correlation between amount of maternal antibody and amount 
of fetal antibody.  Vaccinated women had lower antibody counts than naturally immune women.  
It also seemed that maternal protection waned quicker in the vaccinated group: the median time 
to loss of maternal protection was 0.97 months for the vaccine group and 3.78 for the natural 
immunity group.  By six months, 99% of the vaccine group infants had lost all maternal immunity 
and 95% of the natural immunity group had lost maternal immunity.  It would therefore appear 
that maternal immunity is lost fairly rapidly, and more so in infants born to vaccinated mothers.  
This study is not without limitations; one of which is that it is not clear how it was ensured that 
the two comparison groups were similar or how potential confounders were removed.  However, 
this study does provide some important evidence.  One is that infants are susceptible to measles 
disease fairly early on (median 2.61 months for all infants in this study.)  The other is that infants 
born to vaccinated mothers have a much shorter duration of maternal protection than those 
born to mothers who had acquired passive immunity, a finding which reflects similar ideas from 
previous studies as cited by the authors.       
  MV is considered a respiratory virus, and is usually spread from one person to the next through 
respiratory droplets produced by coughing or sneezing (Buchanan & Bonthius 2012; CDC 2013a; 
Dardis 2012; De Vries et al. 2012; Moss & Griffin 2012). Less often it can be spread by small 
particles aerosols that can float in the air for some periods of time (Moss & Griffin 2012). It is 
estimated that MV can remain contagious in such particles for up to 2 hours (CDC 2009). The CDC 
(2009) states that it is highly probable that non-immune persons will become infected when they 
come in close proximity to someone who is infected, to the degree that about 90% of non-
immune people who come close to an infected person will get measles. Persons infected with 
measles become contagious a number of days before the onset of the rash, when coughing and 
sneezing is prominent, until a few days after the onset of the rash (Moss & Griffin 2012). For 
people with normal immune systems, the 4 days before the onset of the rash and the 4 days after 
the onset of the rash is the time of highest infectivity, where the virus is optimally spread 
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(Buchanan & Bonthius 2012). In those persons with immune compromise, virus shedding can 
happen for long periods after the rash has come on, however it is not clear to what degree the 
infectious period is affected by this (Buchanan & Bonthius 2012; Moss & Griffin 2012). 
  It is generally thought that once MV enters the respiratory system through infected droplets the 
virus invades the respiratory epithelial cells, and after replicating in these cells it spreads to the 
local lymphatic tissue (De Vries et al. 2012; Moss & Griffin 2012).  After replicating in the 
lymphatic tissue, it invades the bloodstream to cause a measles viremia.  Through the blood 
stream the virus then spreads to various tissues, such as the lymph nodes, kidneys, liver, and GI 
tract.  In these organs it invades epithelial cells as well as immune cells and replicates.  Another 
model has been suggested based on studies in monkeys, whereby it is thought that MV initially 
infects lymphocytes and monocytes, and where viral replication occurs mainly in lymphoid 
organs and tissues (De Vries et al. 2012; Moss & Griffin 2012). 
  The response of the immune system to MV is substantial and aggressive, including activation of 
both cellular immunity and humoral immunity (Buchanan & Bonthius 2012; De Vries et al. 2012; 
Moss & Griffin 2012). It is the immune response that is mainly responsible for the development 
of the symptoms that are associated with measles. During the aggressive and forceful immune 
response to MV, the reaction of the immune system to other pathogens are suppressed, leading 
to a period of general immune-suppression during and following measles infection. This may last 
a few weeks up to a number of months after measles infection. The measles-infected person is 
therefore susceptible to secondary infections by other bacteria and viruses, which contributes 
greatly to the complications and impact of measles (Buchanan & Bonthius 2012; De Vries et al. 
2012; Moss & Griffin 2012). 
  MV is a member of the family of Paramyxoviruses, of the genus Morbillivirus (Buchanan & 
Bonthius 2012; Dardis 2012; De Vries et al. 2012; Moss & Griffin 2012).  It is a single-strand RNA 
virus.  MV has two membrane proteins that are of importance within its pathogenesis: a 
haemaglutinin protein (H-protein) and a fusion protein (F-protein).  These proteins facilitate 
infiltration of host cells by the virus.  The H-protein allows binding of virus to host cell by binding 
to cell receptors and the F-protein allows the membrane of the virus to merge with the 
membrane of the host cell (Buchanan & Bonthius 2012; Dardis 2012; De Vries et al. 2012; Moss 
& Griffin 2012). Viruses with an RNA genome mutate at a high rate, and this usually makes it a 
challenge to develop an anti-viral agent (Moss & Griffin 2012).  However, the membrane proteins 
of the measles virus remain fairly stable, and this allows immune memory which confers life-long 
immunity to those who fight off the disease or receive the vaccine.  It is specifically thought that 
the H-protein is important in terms of immune memory; it is relatively stable over time with little 
antigenic change, and it provokes a strong response from the immune system.  Not only is this 
important when it comes to naturally acquired immunity, but it also provides for the feasibility 
of preventing measles infection through vaccination (Moss & Griffin 2012). 
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(1.2) Clinical disease and diagnosis 
  After infection with MV, there is an incubation period of 10-12 days before symptoms appear.  
During the incubation period there are no symptoms (Buchanan & Bonthius 2012; Dardis 2012; 
De Vries et al. 2012; Moss & Griffin 2012). From the time of infection there is an average of 10 
days until fever appears, and 14 days until the rash appears (De Vries et al. 2012; Moss & Griffin 
2012). 
  The first stage of the illness is a prodromal phase, during which the following occur (Buchanan 
& Bonthius 2012; Dardis 2012; De Vries et al. 2012; Moss & Griffin 2012): 
- Fever 
- Coryza (“cold” symptoms: stuffy, runny nose and coughing, sneezing) 
- Conjunctivitis (red, watery eyes) 
- Koplik spots (small white spots on the buccal mucosa, inside of the mouth) 
(Koplik spots are not always present, but if they are present they are pathognomonic.) 
 Typically, the prodromal phase lasts about 4-5 days before the onset of the rash.  During the 
prodromal phase, MV is shed in respiratory secretions during coughing and sneezing and the 
illness is therefore most communicable before the rash appears.  
  The rash is erythematous and maculopapular in appearance. It usually starts on the face and 
behind the ears, after which it spreads to the trunk and limbs (Dardis 2012; Moss & Griffin 2012). 
The duration of the rash can be variable, but seems to be about 5 days. One source reports that 
the rash is present 3-5 days (Moss & Griffin 2012), while another reports it as present for 5-6 days 
(Dardis 2012). Recovery begins soon after the rash appears and a full recovery is made unless 
complications set in (Moss & Griffin 2012). The rash gradually fades away (Dardis 2012). 
  The diagnosis of measles is usually based on the typical clinical presentation and can be 
confirmed with laboratory testing (Dardis 2012; Moss & Griffin 2012). The WHO case definition 
for clinical diagnosis of measles is fever with a maculopapular rash and cough, coryza or 
conjunctivitis (Moss & Griffin 2012). Additionally, the presence of Koplik spots are helpful for 
clinical diagnosis as they are pathognomonic for measles (Buchanan & Bonthius 2012; De Vries 
et al. 2012; Moss & Griffin 2012). 
  Laboratory testing to confirm measles infection includes serology, culture and PCR (Moss & 
Griffin 2012). Serology is the most often used method, and usually means testing serum for the 
presence of anti-MV IgM and IgG antibodies. A test is considered positive if anti-MV IgM is 
present, or if there is a four-fold increase in MV-IgG antibodies when comparing acute phase vs 
convalescent phase titres. Culture can be performed using nasopharyngeal or conjunctival swabs, 
blood, urine or respiratory secretions.  A test is positive if measles can be isolated from cell 
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culture using these clinical samples. Some laboratories also have the ability to perform PCR and 
detect MV RNA within clinical samples (Moss & Griffin 2012).  
  If it is decided that laboratory confirmation of measles is to be done, it is important to take 
infective precautions to prevent transmission of virus during the process of obtaining samples 
(Moss & Griffin 2012). For example, in Alberta the Medical Officer of Health recommends that 
naso-pharyngeal swabs be taken at the physician’s office, that these patients be isolated from 
other patients (in a negative pressure room if available) and that the room these patients were 
seen/swabbed in not be used for at least 2 hours after departure of the patient. The MHO further 
advises that if a patient is sent to a laboratory for blood/urine testing, the laboratory should be 
contacted before the patient arrives to ensure infective precautions are in place (Medical Officer 
of Health, Alberta 2014).     
 
(1.3) Complications of measles 
  Measles has a high rate of complications, with between 30-40% of persons infected with 
measles developing complications.  One review reports a complication rate of 40% (Moss & 
Griffin 2012), while the CDC reports a complication rate of 30% (CDC 2013b; Dardis 2012). 
Complications are worse in the very young and the very old, and those who are malnourished 
(Moss & Griffin 2012). 
  Respiratory complications are frequent with measles infections (Moss & Griffin 2012). A serious 
respiratory complication of measles is pneumonia; the CDC estimates that up to 1 out of 20 
children with measles will develop pneumonia (CDC 2013b). Pneumonia is the leading cause of 
measles-related death (Buchanan & Bonthius 2012; CDC 2013b; Moss & Griffin 2012). Other 
respiratory complications are croup and otitis media (middle ear infection) (Moss & Griffin 2012). 
Otitis media occurs in about 1 out of 10 cases of measles and can lead to permanent hearing loss 
(CDC 2013b). 
Figure 1.1: The clinical course of measles infection. 
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  Gastro-Intestinal complications of measles include stomatitis (mouth inflammation with ulcers 
of the mouth) and diarrhoea (Moss & Griffin 2012).  These contribute to inadequate nutrition, 
which can worsen or cause malnutrition, which in turn can worsen the complications of measles 
(Moss & Griffin 2012). Diarrhoea is thought to be present in about 8% of measles cases (CDC 
2013b). 
  Eye infections can set in as a complication of measles, most significantly keratoconjunctivitis 
(Moss & Griffin 2012). The risk for this type of complication is higher in those who have vitamin 
A deficiency.  Blindness is a possible result, particularly in children who lack vitamin A. 
  For pregnant women, measles infection can lead to premature delivery or miscarriage (White 
et al. 2012).  Additionally, MV can be transferred from mother to fetus if a susceptible mother is 
exposed to MV just prior to delivery, which could result in serious measles infection in the baby 
after delivery (White et al. 2012).  
  Central Nervous System (CNS) complications of measles can be devastating (Buchanan & 
Bonthius 2012).  Measles virus can infect the brain directly and cause measles encephalitis.  
Primary Measles Encephalitis (PME) can happen in 1-3 of 1000 measles cases, and has a poor 
prognosis (Buchanan & Bonthius 2012).  Ten to fifteen percent of persons with measles 
encephalitis will not survive, and 25% will have neurologic damage leading to outcomes such as 
seizures or mental retardation.  Encephalitis usually starts within 7 days of the prodromal phase 
of measles infection, and clinically features a variety of neurological abnormalities. Another 
inflammatory complication of measles is Acute Post infectious Encephalomyelitis (APME) 
(Buchanan & Bonthius 2012).  APME is an inflammatory condition of the brain caused by the 
immune response to measles, which leads to demyelination.  It occurs in about 1 in a 1000 
children who has measles. APME generally has better outcomes than PME, but some who have 
APME are left with various forms of permanent neurological damage. Another very rare CNS 
complication of measles Subacute Sclerosing Panencephalitis (SSPE) (Buchanan & Bonthius 2012; 
CDC 2013b). SSPE is a progressive, chronic, degenerative brain disease following measles 
infection.  It occurs in 4 to 11 of 100,000 cases of measles infection.  Symptoms include 
personality change, mental deterioration, muscle spasms and eventually motor dysfunction.  
SSPE is fatal, and average survival is 1-2 years (Buchanan & Bonthius 2012; CDC 2013b). 
  Measles can lead to death.  The highest death rate is in infants and young children (Moss & 
Griffin 2012). The CDC (2013b) estimate the morality rate from measles infection in children to 
be 1-2 out of a 1000. 
 




    Figure 1.2 is a graphic representation of the outcomes of measles infection, using estimates 
out of a 1000 cases of measles infection. In this graph, it is accepted that 30% of measles cases 
will have some complication, and that 70% will therefore recover with no complication. 
 
(1.4) Treatment of measles 
  There is no effective anti-viral therapy for measles infection.  However, there is some evidence 
that vitamin A administration may limit mortality and morbidity associated with measles 
infection in some patient groups.  A Cochrane review analyzed studies in which vitamin A was 
compared with placebo for the treatment of measles infection (Yang, Mao, & Wan 2005). Pooled 
analysis of study data showed no significant benefit to overall mortality associated with measles, 
and no reduction in mortality with a single dose of Vitamin A (RR 0.70; 95% CI 0.42-1.15) . 
However, two doses of vitamin A at 200,000 International Units seemed to lower the mortality 
in children below 2 years of age (RR 0.21; 95% CI 0.07-0.66). Also, two doses of Vitamin A also 
decreased incidence of croup (RR 0.53; 95% CI 0.29-0.89), but not pneumonia (RR 0.92; 95% CI 
0.69-1.22) or diarrhoea (RR 0.8; 95% CI 0.27-2.34). It therefore seems that vitamin A may have 
some benefit in reducing some of the complications of measles, particularly in young children. 
Moreover, two doses of vitamin A is not associated with significant adverse effects.  The level of 
evidence with regards to preventing complications is moderate, and the study authors state that 
they would recommend further study in this area.  Therefore it is not clear what the role of 
Vitamin A is in preventing complications in general, but it does seem clear that overall deaths 








Figure 1.2: Complications of measles infection per 1000 cases
Pneumonia Otitis Media Diarrhea PME APME SSPE Death Recovery Other
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and pneumonia-related deaths are decreased in children under two years when two large doses 
of Vitamin A is administered. 
  Another review advances the use of Vitamin A as treatment as per the WHO recommendation 
(Moss & Griffin 2012). This recommendation is that vitamin A should be administered for two 
doses of 200 000 IU on consecutive days for children over 12 months who have acute measles 
infection. For children 6-12 months of age, the recommendation is for two doses of 100 000 IU 
vitamin A, and for children under 6 months two doses of 50 000 IU. In children where vitamin A 
deficiency is diagnosed, a third dose of vitamin A is recommended 2 to 4 weeks after the initial 
two doses. 
  As stated before, measles complications are more severe in children who are malnourished and 
blindness/keratoconjunctivitis specifically is more common in children with vitamin A deficiency.  
  Other treatments have been tried for measles infection and specifically for serious 
complications such as PME, including ribavirin and interferon alpha, but this is not standard 
practice and it is not clear how effective they are (Moss & Griffin 2012). Ribavirin does seem to 
have activity against measles virus in experimental, laboratory-type studies but there are no 
clinical studies on management of PME with ribavirin (Buchanan & Bonthius 2012). Ribavirin is 
not licensed in the US for the management of measles (Buchanan & Bonthius 2012).  
  Of course, secondary bacterial and viral infections contribute to measles mortality and 
morbidity and as such secondary infections should be looked for and managed appropriately 
(Moss & Griffin 2012). Examples of this includes managing bacterial pneumonia with appropriate 
antibiotics, and managing diarrhoea with appropriate rehydration and supportive care. 
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(1.5) Epidemiology of measles – a snapshot of the impact of measles 















































































































Table 1.1: Measles cases and vaccine coverage percentage among 1 year olds for selected 
countries, 2005-2013.  Compiled using WHO data (WHO 2014a; WHO 2014b). 
 
 
Figure 1.3 compares global vaccine rate and global measles disease burden for the years 2000 
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Figure 1.3: Comparison of global measles statistics 2000 vs 
2012
Year 2000 Year 2012
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  The different countries cited here are examples of different vaccination patterns and how these 
affect epidemiology. These considerations are important in informing eventual ethical 
argumentation. I also include a section showing the global burden of measles, demonstrating the 
need for ongoing expansion of global vaccination uptake. Table 1.1 and Figure 1.3 on the previous 
page provides a summary of measles cases and vaccination rates from 2005 to 2013 for these 
example countries as well as global measles burden and vaccination coverage comparing the year 
2000 to 2012. 
USA 
  Measles statistics is well studied and well documented in the United States; measles is a 
notifiable disease by law (Fiebelkorn et al. 2010; Gastañaduy et al. 2014), and the CDC publishes 
regular updates on measles data in the Mortality and Morbidity Weekly Report (Gastañaduy et 
al. 2014). Additionally, the WHO records data on US measles rates, including vaccination rates 
and case incidence (WHO 2014a; WHO 2014b). 
  Prior to the introduction of the vaccine in 1963, almost everyone acquired measles infection in 
the US (Orenstein, Papania, & Wharton 2004). More than 90% of people in the US were infected 
with measles by their 15th birthday.  Between 1912 and 1916 there was an average of 5 300 
measles deaths per year. In the 1950s measles deaths were decreasing because of the general 
improvement in public health, including better nutrition and general health care. Yet, from 1956 
to 1960 there was an average of 542 000 cases reported every year. It is thought that there were 
more cases than these, and that there was a degree of under reporting. In this time period, there 
were an average of 450 measles deaths per year (about 1 per 1000), 150 000 cases of measles 
related respiratory complications per year, 4 000 cases of measles encephalitis each year and an 
average of 48 000 measles related hospitalizations each year (Orenstein, Papania, & Wharton 
2004).    
  Measles vaccine was licensed in the US in 1963 (Orenstein 2006). In 1966 a project was 
undertaken to attempt elimination of measles in the US. This effort focused on ensuring 
vaccination of infants and those who were unvaccinated when first entering school, as well as 
measles surveillance and epidemic control measures.  These steps had a significant impact on 
measles in the US.  In 1968 the number of cases reported was 22 000.  This represents a decrease 
in measles incidence of over 90%.  Measles eradication was not achieved by this effort; it is 
estimated that a population immunity level of 72% was achieved during this time, which was 
inadequate for measles eradication (Orenstein 2006). 
  In 1970 and 1971 an important outbreak occurred in a city that straddles the border between 
Arkansas and Texas (Orenstein 2006). The state of Arkansas had school entry measles vaccine 
requirements, and there was consequently very few measles cases on the Arkansas side of the 
city. Texas had no measles vaccine school entry requirements, and a large number of cases was 
reported on the Texas side of the city during this outbreak, and thus this outbreak demonstrated 
the effectiveness of school entry vaccine requirements. Another important outbreak happened 
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in 1977 in Los Angeles. It was during this outbreak, where large numbers of measles cases were 
reported, that a “no shots no school” policy was first implemented, paving the way for such type 
of policies in the future (Orenstein 2006). 
  Another major return of measles happened in the period between 1989 and 1991, thought to 
be due to two reasons (Orenstein, Papania, & Wharton 2004). One reason was the use of only 
one dose of measles vaccine. It was discovered that a percentage of persons do not develop 
immunity to just one dose of vaccine, and presently a two dose vaccine policy is advocated. A 
second reason was insufficient vaccine coverage among children prior to school entry in this time 
period. This 89-91 resurgence of measles brought with it 55 000 cases, 123 measles deaths and 
about 11 000 measles related hospitalizations (Orenstein, Papania, & Wharton 2004). 
  In 1993 a concerted effort was once more undertaken to achieve elimination of measles in the 
US (Orenstein, Papania, & Wharton 2004). This included ensuring very high rates of vaccine 
coverage in children under two years of age, using two doses of vaccine rather than one dose, 
implementing state requirements for ensuring measles vaccine coverage among school 
attendees, and tracking measles virus closely using molecular epidemiology (Orenstein, Papania, 
& Wharton 2004). The central goal for the vaccine program undertaken at this time period, called 
the Childhood Immunization Initiative, was to ensure coverage rates of at least 90% for children 
before school entry (Orenstein 2006). 
  These efforts to eradicate measles in the US through vaccination have proven successful. High 
rates of vaccination have been achieved in the US since these efforts have been undertaken, 
typically over 90% coverage (Gastañaduy et al. 2014; Orenstein 2006). 
  Measles was declared eliminated in the US in the year 2000 (Fiebelkorn et al. 2010; Orenstein, 
Papania, & Wharton 2004; Gastañaduy et al. 2014). This means there is no longer transmission 
of endemic measles virus year round in the US. Even though measles is no longer endemic in the 
US, cases are imported from outside the US so that measles outbreaks occur every year. These 
outbreaks are highly associated with persons who have not been vaccinated (Fiebelkorn et al. 
2010; Gastañaduy et al. 2014). For example, in the period 1 Jan 2014 to 23 May 2014, a total 
number of 288 measles cases were reported in the US. This is the highest number of measles 
cases reported for the same period of time since 1994, and these outbreaks seem to be related 
to vaccine refusal (Gastañaduy et al. 2014). Of these 288 cases, 200 (69%) were unvaccinated and 
58 (20%) had unknown vaccination status (Gastañaduy et al. 2014). Of those who were 
unvaccinated in these outbreaks, 85% were unvaccinated because of some objection against 
vaccination. Only 6% were missed opportunities for vaccine administration, and 5% were 
ineligible for vaccination because they were too young to receive the vaccine (Gastañaduy et al. 
2014). 
  In the US the pattern is that of imported measles cases causing outbreaks in susceptible groups 
of persons.  Although the vaccination rate in the general population is high, there are some local 
populations and communities where vaccination rates are lower. Those who refuse vaccinations 
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seem to be geographically clustered, creating pockets of susceptibility to measles outbreaks 
within the general population. Presently, the majority of measles outbreaks in the US are 
associated with persons who refuse vaccination because of an objection against vaccines 
(Fiebelkorn et al. 2010).    
Canada 
   Similarly to the US, measles was very common and caused substantial disease burden prior to 
introduction of vaccination in 1963 (King et al. 2004). Since 1924 measles is a notifiable disease 
in Canada except for the period between 1958 and 1969, so that there is good historical data on 
the disease burden of measles in Canada with the exception of the years between 1958 and 1969. 
Prior to vaccine introduction, measles occurred in epidemic cycles and reported cases varied 
from 10 000 to above 83 000 per year (King et al. 2004).  
  In 1992, the goal was set to eliminate measles in Canada by 2005 (King et al. 2004). In 1996-
1997 a two-dose measles vaccine strategy was adopted and increased surveillance of measles 
was started.  The last case of endemic measles in Canada was diagnosed in 1997, and measles is 
considered to be eliminated in Canada since 1998.  This means that there is no more endemic 
transmission of measles, and that measles cases that occur are imported from elsewhere (King 
et al. 2004; Public Health Agency of Canada 2014a). 
  Even though Canada has maintained a general vaccination rate of over 90% (WHO 2014b), 
outbreaks still occur among the non-immune sections of the population.  Such an outbreak 
occurred in Quebec in 2007, involving a total of 94 people (Dallaire et al. 2009).  This outbreak 
affected various different clusters of unvaccinated individuals.  It started with a one man 
importing measles to Quebec after travel; from him it spread to three people, and from one of 
these 3 people to 9 people.  One of these 9 people attended an alternative type school with very 
low vaccination rates (47%), where 31 cases were confirmed.  It is thought that the 31 is an 
underestimation, as many people in this school were skeptical of medical care and likely did not 
seek out medical attention. From this school it spread to other networks. In all, this outbreak had 
between 12 and 17 generations of transmission, and it was not clear exactly how each of these 
were linked.  Of the 94 cases involved in this outbreak, 68 were unvaccinated (72%) and 11 had 
received only one dose of measles vaccine (12%). The main reason for non-vaccination was 
objection against vaccination (Dallaire et al. 2009). 
  There are pockets of susceptible communities within the general population, vulnerable to 
spread of measles from imported cases despite high levels of vaccination in the general 
population (Dallaire et al. 2009; King et al. 2004; Public Health Agency of Canada 2014a). Such 
pockets particularly exist in communities of objectors, typically communities that are tightly knit, 
such as certain religious communities (Dallaire et al. 2009; King et al. 2004). The Quebec outbreak 
shows that such outbreaks within these susceptible pockets can be sustained through various 
networks and can affect numerous susceptible persons. In 2011, for example, Canada had 759 
reported cases of measles (WHO 2014a) – a substantial number for a country with no endemic 
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transmission. This high number of cases occurred despite a very high rate of vaccination in the 
general population (WHO 2014b), and shows how vulnerable pockets of unvaccinated individuals 
are to measles disease from imported sources.  It also demonstrates that measles can easily come 
back and become endemic once more within a country; Canada would certainly be vulnerable to 




  Figure 1.4 was compiled using WHO data on measles cases and measles vaccination rates in 1 
year olds (WHO 2014a; WHO 2014b). A number of important conclusions can be drawn from this 
data. Measles is not eliminated in South Africa, and is still spread by endemic transmission. Over 
the past 20 years the vaccination rate in 1 year olds has never been above 90%, and the best year 
was 85% in 1993.  Further perusal of the WHO data shows that there were over 22 000 cases in 
1992, which counts as a massive epidemic.  Measles epidemics occur in South Africa and in 
between the epidemics there can be numerous years where fairly low numbers of measles cases 
are reported.  There were major epidemics in the years 1992-1996, and then smaller epidemics 
2000-2005. In 2005-2008 the number of measles cases was quite low, with a major epidemic 
following in the years 2009-2010. In the years with lower case burden it appears as if the 
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Fig 1.4: South Africa reported measels cases and vaccination rates 
1993-2013
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concern is that vaccination rates have dropped again in 2013, after increasing in the wake of the 
epidemic in 2009-2010. 
   In 1996, South Africa together with six other Southern African countries who had relatively high 
vaccine rates (about 80%) adopted a strategy to decrease measles cases and measles deaths 
(Shibeshi et al. 2014).  This strategy included WHO recommended measures such as a high rate 
of first dose measles vaccination at age nine months through routine health services (MCV1), 
catch-up supplemental immunization activities (SIA) and improved measles surveillance and 
management. In 2010 the WHO added some measures to their recommendation, which was also 
adopted by South Africa: adding a second dose of measles vaccine at 18 months, and ensuring 
95% or greater vaccine rates every year for both doses of measles vaccine. Thus, the stated 
present measles vaccination approach in South Africa comprises routine immunization with the 
first dose at 9 months (MCV1) and the second dose at 18 months (MCV2), and then 
supplementary immunization activities (SIA) - specific outreach activities aimed at targeted 
population groups which aim to supply vaccinated to persons who did not receive the routine 
vaccinations (Shibeshi et al. 2014).  
  There are some differences between the WHO estimates of measles vaccination rates and the 
official South African estimates of vaccination rates.  The estimates coming from official sources 
in South Africa report higher coverage of measles vaccination; the WHO estimates are generally 
lower. Figure 1.5 is compiled from WHO data (WHO 2014c) and shows the differences between 
the WHO estimates and official country estimates of MCV1 and MCV2. The reason for the 
discrepancy between these two data sets seems to be related to inadequate official reporting 
from some districts within South Africa.   
 
 
2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
Official country estimates MCV1 87 100 99 95 99 85 83 85 84 78
Official country estimates MCV2 74 88 83 83 87 70 69 72 65 68
WHO estimates MCV1 66 79 78 74 78 73 72 74 72 64








Fig 1.5: Comparison of Country estimates and WHO 
estimates of routine measles vaccination rates South Africa
Official country estimates MCV1 Official country estimates MCV2
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  Which of these two data sets is more accurate is not clear, yet they both show a similar picture: 
vaccination rates are generally below 90%. Rates increased dramatically, presumably because of 
SIAs, in the aftermath of measles epidemics.  As previously stated, outbreaks of measles occur 
readily in populations where more than 10% is susceptible to measles infection, as is the case in 
South Africa. Generally the official South African estimates seem more optimistic with regards to 
vaccine coverage than the WHO estimates. Yet, even if we accept the official South African 
estimates we can see that the vaccination rates in South Africa are too low to achieve elimination 
of measles transmission. 
  To achieve elimination of measles within a country and to sustain elimination, the WHO 
recommends vaccination with two doses sustained at levels upwards of 95% (Shibeshi et al. 
2014). The data from the US and Canada confirms the effectiveness and necessity of such 
sustained levels of vaccination to eliminate measles. 
  It is therefore clear that current vaccination levels in South Africa are inadequate to attain 
elimination of measles. If vaccination levels are maintained at current estimated levels, South 
Africa will remain susceptible to large epidemics. After an epidemic there appears to be increased 
vigilance to ensure adequate vaccination and an increase in the coverage of routine vaccinations 
as well as SIAs. The subsequent rise in vaccination coverage combined with increased levels of 
natural immunity acquired from measles infection lead to decreased susceptibility to measles 
outbreaks in the population.  During these times population immunity to measles is high and the 
number of measles cases fall. If vaccination rates remain below the elimination threshold, the 
number of susceptible persons in the population accumulates over time. It then is inevitable that 
at a certain point the susceptibility within the population will again lead to a large epidemic. 
  The HIV epidemic does not seem to have influenced measles spread or the epidemiological 
pattern of measles in South Africa substantially (Helfand et al. 2005; Shibeshi et al. 2014). It is so 
that there is an increase in the proportion of the population susceptible to measles because of a 
higher rate of vaccine failure among HIV positive children. This is estimated to be a 2-3% increase 
in the susceptible pool of each new birth cohort. This increase in susceptibility is largely 
neutralized by the higher all-cause death rates among HIV positive children, so that the overall 
susceptibility to measles within the population does not seem to be substantially increased by 
the HIV pandemic (Helfand et al. 2005). The experience with measles spread during the HIV 
pandemic in South Africa confirms that the impact of the pandemic has been minimal (Helfand 
et al. 2005; Shibeshi et al. 2014). Rather, it is that absence of sufficient vaccination coverage that 
is responsible for the measles epidemics in South Africa. It has been shown that the most 
significant factor leading to increased susceptibility of children in South Africa to measles 
infection is lack of a second measles vaccination opportunity (Helfand et al. 2005).      
  Even though HIV has not affected the pattern of measles spread significantly, individual HIV 
affected children are more vulnerable to measles illness and its complications (Helfand et al. 
2005; Shibeshi et al. 2014). Children born to HIV positive mothers have less maternal protective 
antibodies, and such children are therefore more susceptible to measles infections (Helfand et 
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al. 2005; Shibeshi et al. 2014). It also appears that HIV positive children have a lesser response to 
measles vaccine and have a decline in vaccine protection more quickly (Helfand et al. 2005; 
Shibeshi et al. 2014). Therefore, although HIV has not increased the spread of measles, children 
who are affected by HIV are more prone to becoming infected by measles and therefore are more 
vulnerable than the general population. It is different for adults or adolescents who become 
infected with HIV after getting measles vaccine when they were not HIV positive; these persons 
seem to keep their immunity to measles (Helfand et al. 2005). It is specifically HIV 
infected/affected children that are at higher risk, and it makes sense to offer such children 
measles vaccination at a younger age.  For example, there is a WHO recommendation adding a 
measles vaccine at 6 months in addition to the usual 9 month/18 month schedule for infants who 
are born in areas with very high HIV and measles levels (Shibeshi et al. 2014).  
  It seems clear given the epidemiological data that simple steps to curb measles spread and 
epidemics in South Africa would include high rate of routine coverage with MCV1 and MCV2, 
while ensuring numerous strategic SIA outreaches to reach those who do not have sufficient 
access to routine vaccine coverage.  
Europe 
  Fourteen years after measles was eliminated in the United Kingdom, measles was once again 
declared to be endemic in that country in June 2008 (CDC 2008; Euro Surveillance Editorial Team 
2008). The statement from the Health Protection Agency at that time was that “the number of 
children susceptible to measles is now sufficient to support the continuous spread of measles” 
(Euro Surveillance Editorial Team 2008). The reason for this was that vaccination rates had 
dropped to 80-85% for a number of years, so that the susceptible portion of the population 
increased each year (CDC 2008).  
  The case of the United Kingdom provides evidence that even if measles is eliminated in a 
country, it is necessary to maintain high levels of immunity against measles in the population 
through vaccination to prevent measles from returning to a pattern of continuous spread. When 
vaccination rates fall in countries where measles has been eliminated, every year with every birth 
cohort the pool of people susceptible to measles infection grows within that country. As the 
United Kingdom example bears out, the country then becomes vulnerable to the return of 
measles as an endemic illness with continuous spread within the country. This is no surprise; 
measles is highly contagious and cases can be imported quite easily from countries where 
measles still occur endemically to countries where measles had been eliminated.    
  Table 1.1 shows the number of measles cases per year in recent years in the United Kingdom, 
as well as vaccination rates.  Just recently vaccination rates seem to have returned to higher 
levels in the United Kingdom, showing rates of 90% or higher since 2011. 
  A recent outbreak in the Netherlands provides interesting insights with regards to the spread of 
measles in a country that has a high vaccination rate. In the Netherlands measles vaccination 
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rates are typically over 95%. Yet, in 2013 the Netherlands experienced a measles outbreak 
affecting well over a 1,000 cases.  In fact, in table 1.1 it is shown that the reported number of 
measles cases in the Netherlands for 2013 was 2,653 which is a marked increase from the 
previous year’s 10 cases. This reflects the magnitude of the outbreak in 2013.  
  One article reported statistics from this 2013 epidemic as on 28 August 2013 and discussed the 
implications of this outbreak (Knol et al. 2013). At that stage there had been 1,226 reported 
measles cases with 82 hospitalizations. There was a strong correlation with being unvaccinated, 
with 96.5% of the cases occurring in unvaccinated people. There was also a strong correlation 
with being an orthodox Protestant, with 91.7% of affected people being orthodox Protestants. 
The authors also estimate that the official statistics (reported measles cases) represent an 
underestimation of the true magnitude of the outbreak, since experience with previous measles 
outbreaks in the Netherlands have shown that many people infected by measles do not seek 
physician treatment. If the same level of under-reporting existed in the 2013 outbreak as in 
previous outbreaks, the number of measles cases in the 2013 outbreak would actually be around 
13,000. The author also argues that although most cases had been Protestants in the 2013 
outbreak, it is likely that this epidemic will eventually spread to non-Protestants as well. Only 
15% of vaccine-refusers in the Netherlands are Protestants.  The Protestant vaccine-refusers tend 
to live close to each other in congregated communities, making measles spread within these 
communities easy. Non-protestant vaccine-refusers tend to be more widely distributed and 
interspersed within the highly vaccinated population, so that they are protected by herd-
immunity. Herd-immunity will be discussed in a separate section below. 
  From the Netherlands outbreak we can see that even if a country has very high levels of 
vaccination, pockets of susceptible populations can still exist within the country due to the 
congregation of vaccine-refusers in communities. Where susceptible persons live in close 
proximity or congregate together, measles outbreaks are likely. Where susceptible persons are 
spread out within a highly vaccinated population, they seem to be relatively more protected 
against measles by virtue of the high vaccination rate in the general population. This is similar to 
the experience in the US and in Canada, where high vaccination rates exist but where pockets of 
susceptible populations exist within the country. When measles is imported from elsewhere, 
these pockets of susceptible populations are at high risk of experiencing measles outbreaks.  
Global 
  The World Health Organization is engaged in ongoing efforts to increase vaccination coverage 
globally and to decrease the global burden of measles (CDC 2013c). Their strategy focuses on 
increasing MCV1 and MVC2 coverage world-wide through various monitoring and intervention 
measures. These measures have been met by some success; estimates of global MCV1 coverage 
has increased from 72% in the year 2000 to 84% in the year 2011, and the number of countries 
providing MCV2 has increased from 97 (50%) in 2000 to 141 (73%) in 2011. Correspondingly, the 
estimated number of measles cases per population has decreased in this time period as did the 
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estimated number of measles deaths. In 2000, the estimated global measles cases per 1 million 
population was 146 per year, while in 2011 this number dropped to 52 per year. In 2000 the 
estimated number of global measles deaths were 542,000 while in 2011 the estimated number 
of global measles deaths were 158,000 (CDC 2013c).  
  According to figure 1.3, compiled from WHO statistics, the estimated number of measles deaths 
globally was 564,200 in 2000 and 122,000 in 2012.  The estimates of global mortality for 2000 
vary very slightly between the two sources, within the range of being acceptable. The estimate 
in figure 1.3 (564,200) is the latest estimate by the WHO of measles deaths in 2000.  Both sets of 
estimates show a similar decline in measles case rates as well as global mortality rates over the 
corresponding time period.   
  In 2010-2011 there was an increase in the global measles incidence rate with many countries 
experiencing an increase in reported measles cases.  There were numerous countries that 
experienced substantial measles outbreaks in 2011: the DRC, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Somalia, 
France, Zambia, Chad, Philippines, Sudan, Italy, Pakistan, Romania, Spain, Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Afghanistan. Investigations into some outbreaks in this time period suggested the main cause of 
these outbreaks was “persistent gaps in immunization coverage, despite overall increased 
measles vaccine coverage” (CDC 2013c).  
  It should also be pointed out that the estimated global measles mortality is based on a WHO 
model that is dependent on reported vaccination rates and reported measles cases. This explains 
the slight difference between the two estimates highlighted earlier; as updated vaccine and 
measles case reporting becomes available, the WHO updates the estimates according to their 
model (CDC 2013c).  
   Some of the countries who have the highest disease burden do not have the ability to report 
exact number of cases accurately (CDC 2013c). Also, it seems reasonable given the socio-political 
realities in most of the countries with high measles burden that the actual number of cases are 
underreported while vaccination coverage may be overestimated. Yet, it does seem that there 
has been a marked decline in global measles burden that is attributable to an increase in global 
measles vaccine coverage. 
  Even though this is good news, it is clear that measles still presents a worldwide health challenge 
and that measles is responsible for substantial global burden of disease. It also seems that there 
are many countries experiencing outbreaks and continuous measles spread from where measles 
can be imported to countries where measles have been eliminated. Thus, although progress has 
been made the numbers bear out that measles is far from a vanquished foe when speaking in 
global terms. 
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(2) Measles elimination and the concept of herd immunity 
(2.1) Can measles be eradicated? 
  Two concepts in need of clarification here: measles elimination and measles eradication (Moss 
& Griffin 2012; Moss & Strebel 2011). 
  Measles elimination is when measles spread is halted within a specified geographical area, such 
as a country. This means that there is no longer a chain of ongoing measles infection within that 
geographical area, and cases that occur are brought in from outside the geographical area. 
Another way of referring to this idea is the halt of endemic transmission of measles. To declare 
measles elimination, there should be no ongoing measles transmission within the geographical 
area for 12 months.  
  Measles eradication would be when measles infections no longer occur anywhere in the world, 
so that no further preventive action is needed to stop the spread of measles. 
  A good example of a country that has achieved measles elimination is the United States.  
Measles has been eliminated in the United States since the year 2000, so that ongoing 
transmission of measles no longer occurs (Fiebelkorn et al. 2010; Moss & Strebel 2011; Orenstein, 
Papania, & Wharton 2004). In the WHO region of the Americas, measles has been eliminated 
since 2002 (CDC 2013c). However, elimination is not necessarily permanent. As was seen with 
the United Kingdom, ongoing measles transmission can return to a country where measles once 
was considered eliminated. Re-establishment of endemic transmission is when measles 
transmission occurs uninterrupted for 12 months or more in a geographical area where measles 
had previously been eliminated (Moss & Griffin 2012). 
  It is theoretically possible to achieve measles eradication. Three factors are needed to achieve 
eradication of an infectious disease (Moss & Griffin 2012; Moss & Strebel 2011): 
(1) Humans are the only pathogen reservoir 
(2) Availability of accurate diagnostic tests 
(3) An effective intervention at reasonable cost. 
  Measles meets these criteria quite well (Moss & Griffin 2012; Moss & Strebel 2011).  
- There are no animal reservoirs or natural reservoirs for the spread of measles virus. Thus, 
measles virus spread is dependent on transmission between humans. 
- There are no latent or prolonged infections, nor are there carrier states where healthy-
looking individuals can spread measles virus. Transmission only happens during acute 
measles illness, and a person with measles is generally infectious 4 days before the rash 
appears to 4 days after the rash appears. 
- Measles can be diagnosed accurately. The illness is therefore easily identifiable and its 
spread can be monitored. In areas where high rates of measles infection exist, clinical 
diagnosis is easy. In places where low rates of measles exist or when the diagnosis is 
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unclear, accurate laboratory testing is readily available. It is not likely that measles 
outbreaks will be missed. 
- An effective and cost-effective intervention to prevent the spread of measles is available 
(vaccine). 
  It is therefore biologically possible to eliminate measles within a geographical area and 
eventually to eradicate measles globally. If transmission of the virus is halted for a sufficient 
period of time within a geographical area, measles will no longer be present in that area unless 
it is imported from the outside. And globally, once transmission between humans has been 
halted for a sufficient period of time, measles will be absent from the world. 
  The challenges for measles eradication are not biological; rather they are logistical, political and 
financial (Moss & Strebel 2011). Ongoing measles outbreaks have been attributed to insufficient 
vaccination coverage. There are many reasons for this, ranging from vaccine opposition to 
military conflict to lack of sufficient funds or infrastructure. If these can be overcome and 
sufficient vaccination rates be maintained globally, measles can be eradicated. 
  The WHO has the goal of working towards measles eradication through strategic increase of 
measles vaccine coverage globally (CDC 2013c). These goals include reduction or elimination of 
measles transmission in four WHO regions by 2015, and reduction or elimination of measles in 
five WHO regions by 2020 (CDC 2013c). Another WHO goal is to reduce the estimated annual 
number of global measles deaths by 90% from 2000 to 2015 (Moss & Griffin 2012). There are six 
WHO regions in all. Thus far, the WHO region of the Americas has achieved elimination of 
measles, and four other WHO regions have set the goal to eliminate measles by 2020. South East 
Asia is the remaining WHO region (Moss & Griffin 2012). The Western Pacific WHO region was 
approaching measles elimination in 2011/2012, while the other regions (Africa, Europe, Eastern 
Mediterranean, and South East Asia) have experienced large outbreaks in the period 2008-2011, 
resulting in a large setback for the elimination goals. These outbreaks are attributed to ongoing 
deficiencies in vaccination coverage, both inadequate routine first-measles vaccine (MCV1) 
coverage and inadequate supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) (CDC 2013c).    
 
(2.2) Herd immunity 
  If sufficient members of a population acquire immunity to measles the spread of measles within 
the community will be interrupted. As we have already seen, it is possible to reach a stage where 
continuous transmission of measles no longer occurs within a population. In such populations, 
those who do not have immunity against measles are provided with a measure of protection 
against measles they would not have otherwise enjoyed. This protection derived from high 
immune levels in the general population is generally referred to as herd immunity. 
  In one article (John & Samuel 2000) three definitions of herd immunity as it is encountered in 
the medical literature is identified and explored: 
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1) “Herd immunity. The resistance of a group to attack by a disease because of the immunity 
of a large proportion of the members and the consequent lessening of the likelihood of 
an affected individual coming into contact with susceptible individual.” 
2) “Herd immunity. It is not necessary to immunise every person in order to stop 
transmission of an infectious agent through a population. For those organisms dependent 
on person-to-person transmission, there may be a definable prevalence of immunity in 
the population above which it becomes difficult for the organism to circulate and reach 
new susceptibles. This prevalence is called herd immunity.” 
3) “Herd immunity. It is well know that not everyone in a population needs to be immunised 
to eliminate the disease – often referred to as herd immunity. This is because successful 
immunisation reduces the number of susceptibles in the population and this effectively 
reduces the efficiency with which the microbe is transmitted from one person to the 
other.” 
  The authors point out that there is some confusion in how the term is used. They suggest 
changing the term to “herd effect” and propose the following definition:  
  “The reduction of infection or disease in the unimmunised segment as a result of immunising a 
proportion of the population” (John & Samuel 2000). 
  Other authors have maintained the term “herd immunity” to refer to the concept of 
unimmunised individuals deriving protection from measles through high immunity rates within a 
population (CDC 2008; Fiebelkorn et al. 2010; Meissner, Strebel, & Orenstein 2004). What is said 
of “herd immunity” in these sources is: 
- There is a threshold of required population immunity that affords herd immunity within 
that population. If immunity rates fall below the threshold, herd immunity decreases or 
evaporates (CDC 2008; Fiebelkorn et al. 2010; Meissner, Strebel, & Orenstein 2004). 
- Herd immunity depends on “maintaining high immunization rates in the community” 
(Meissner, Strebel, Orenstein 2004). 
- The herd immunity threshold is 93%-95% (Fiebelkorn et al. 2010), meaning that between 
93% and 95% of persons in a population need to be immune to measles to attain herd 
immunity within the population. 
- Herd immunity decreases everyone’s risk of exposure to measles and therefore affords 
protection to persons who cannot receive measles vaccination (CDC 2008). 
  On reflection it seems that the concept of herd immunity lacks a standard definition, but that it 
includes important ideas. If enough people are immune to measles within a population, there is 
a measure of protection against measles infection for those in the population who are not 
immune. There is a threshold of population immunity that is required for this herd immunity 
effect. Herd immunity seems dependent on the interruption of measles transmission within the 
population, so that it seems the idea of herd immunity is closely related to the interruption of 
endemic transmission (measles elimination). It appears that most authors have the idea of 
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measles elimination in mind when they refer to herd immunity. In essence, the “herd immunity” 
threshold is the same as the “measles elimination” threshold in the way the term is used so that 
it is not clear whether there is a distinction between these two concepts. 
  I shall in future retain the term “herd immunity” and include the following concepts when I use 
that term: 
- Herd immunity refers to the protection afforded to non-immune individuals against 
measles by virtue of high levels of measles immunity within the population. 
- This protection is dependent on a high threshold of population immunity. 
- Non-immune individuals are at high risk of acquiring measles if there is 
uninterrupted/endemic spread of measles within their population, so that the immunity 
threshold for herd immunity is the same as the threshold for measles elimination within 
a population (93-95%). 
  Thus, herd immunity in reality seems to reflect the fact that sufficiently high levels of measles 
immunity within a population will halt the spread of measles within that population. So the “herd 
immunity” threshold is really the “measles elimination” threshold. However, the concept of herd 
immunity includes the idea that those who are susceptible to measles infection derives 
protection against measles by virtue of this interruption in measles transmission.  
  To demonstrate the dependence of some individuals in society on herd immunity, consider the 
CDC report in 2008 that two children had died in the period April 2008 – June 2008 in Europe 
from measles complications (CDC 2008).  Both of these children were ineligible to receive the 
measles vaccine because of an inherited immune disease. The CDC writes, “such children depend 
on herd immunity for protection from the disease, as do children aged <12 months, who are 
normally too young to receive the vaccine” (CDC 2008).  
  It is clear that a high level of population immunity is needed to achieve this herd immunity 
benefit. To interrupt measles virus transmission, and thus attain this herd immunity protection, 
a rate of measles immunity of 93-95% is needed within a population (Fiebelkorn et al. 2010; 
Meissner, Strebel, & Orenstein 2004; Moss & Strebel 2011). To achieve this, a 2-dose routine 
measles vaccine schedule is needed with coverage near or above 95% (Moss & Strebel 2011), as 
is made clear by the following considerations.  
At 9 months of age, 85% of children will develop immunity against measles after one dose of 
measles vaccine (MCV1) and at 12 months of age 95% of children will develop measles immunity 
with one dose of vaccine (MCV1) (Moss & Griffin 2012; Moss & Strebel 2011). Almost everyone 
will however develop measles immunity after the second dose of measles vaccine (MCV2) [29]. 
So, for example, if only a single vaccine dose is given at 12 months it will have 95% effectiveness. 
If the vaccination rate is 95% of children with one dose of vaccine, it will only lead to a population 
measles immunity of 90% (Moss & Strebel 2011). 
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 Take another example given by one group of authors of how susceptibility to measles can 
increase in a population with inadequate levels of vaccination (Helfand et al. 2005). Consider a 
hypothetical society where 100,000 children are born each year, and 90% of them are vaccinated 
with the routine first measles vaccine (MCV1). Without the second vaccine the routine 
vaccination at 9 months is only about 85% effective.  So if no second vaccine is given to these 
children, every year 23,500 susceptible children are added to the population. Over 5 years 
117,500 susceptible children accumulate. 
  In both examples it can be seen that a two dose schedule (almost everyone becomes immune) 
in very high rates (around 95%) is needed to achieve the herd immunity threshold. 
  In an article on the elimination of measles in the US the authors write, “the absence of endemic 
exposure to measles means few persons in the United States will be infected and risk 
complications of measles. This decreased risk of exposure provides protection to groups not 
protected directly by vaccination: children too young for routine vaccination; the few persons 
who, although vaccinated, are not protected, primarily from failure to mount an adequate 
response to vaccine; persons for whom vaccine is contraindicated (e.g. those with 
immunodeficiency)” (Orenstein, Papania, & Wharton 2004, p. S2). Here, the groups that benefit 
from herd immunity is identified. As will be seen later, this is ethically speaking a very important 
idea. For there are always those within society who do not have immunity to measles because of 
valid reasons: they cannot get the vaccine due to medical reasons or they lose immunity to the 
vaccine over time. These persons depend on herd immunity to protect them against measles. 
Those who are non-immune to measles through no fault of their own depend on high levels of 
vaccination within the population to protect them against the complications of measles. 
  Thus in summary. There are individuals who derive protection from measles by the interruption 
of measles transmission within their population. To maintain this interruption of transmission, a 
2-dose vaccine approach is needed in coverage rates of 95% or higher. This is to ensure a 
population immunity against measles of 93-95%. If this level of vaccination coverage is lost, 
susceptibility to measles will accumulate within the population over time and those who are not 
immune to measles will be at increased risk of measles infection. There are some persons in the 
community who depend on the herd immunity effect for protection from measles: those who 
lose their immunity from the measles vaccine (about 5% will lose their immunity over 10-15 
years) (Moss & Griffin 2012), the very young who have lost maternal protection but cannot yet 
receive the vaccine, and those with contra-indications to receiving the vaccine.  
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(3) The financial burden of measles 
  Measles infection caused a large disease burden prior to the vaccination era, and this disease 
burden translated to a substantial financial burden in terms of health care expenditure.  
  An article that appeared in 1985 calculated the impact that measles vaccine has had in the 
United States with regards to reduction of disease burden and health care expenditure since its 
introduction in 1963 (Block et al. 1985). From these estimates we can get an idea of what the 
financial burden of measles was pre-vaccine. The authors included cost of health care provided 
to measles cases, ongoing health care for measles induced disability, lives saved by measles 
prevention, and additional years of normal productive life added by preventing disability or 
death. They estimate that in the period 1963-1982, measles vaccination has prevented measles 
disease burden as follows: 
 52 million measles cases 
 5,200 measles deaths 
 17,400 cases of mental retardation  
  It is estimated that these reductions in disease burden led to a net decrease in health care 
expenditure of $5.1 billion. Of course, that estimate is in 1985 dollars and one would likely have 
to convert it to a higher number to get an accurate estimate in contemporary US dollar value. 
Yet, the savings already gained by 1985 gives one an idea of the tremendous cost that measles 
disease incurred to the healthcare system prior to the vaccine era. 
  In a more recent article, the healthcare costs per case of measles in the US is calculated using a 
complex formula (Zwanziger, Szilagyi, & Kaul 2001). The aim is to calculate the healthcare cost 
saving per averted case of measles, so that a complete cost/benefit analysis of measles 
vaccination can be performed. The basis of the calculation is that Total Benefit per Averted Case 
= Costs saved + Health Loss Averted. To obtain “costs saved” and “health loss averted”, the 
authors include: doctor visit costs, days absent from work with lost wage, probability of 
hospitalization with cost of hospitalization, probability of disability with costs of disability, health 
loss and loss due to death. According to their calculation, every case of measles averted leads to 
cost savings of $2,089. Thus, according to this 2001 estimate every case of measles incur an 
average of $2,089 of healthcare expenditure.  
  Now of course, this is an average estimate and uncomplicated measles cases will cost far less 
while measles cases with complications will cost far more. It should be remembered that the 
authors took variations of that nature into account in their calculation by using likelihood of 
complications in their calculation. Thus, the $2,089 is an average cost per case of measles all 
things considered. Again, it is an estimate in 2001 dollars and one would have to adjust the 
number to get a contemporary US dollar value. But it does give one an idea of cost of measles in 
dollars, and especially how it multiplies with larger outbreaks. For example, if an outbreak of a 
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1,000 cases happen in the US, it would incur an estimated $2,089,000 in healthcare expenditure 
according to the 1999 US dollar estimate.  
  A retrospective observational study was performed in a Pediatric Intensive Care Unit in South 
Africa in 2010 to determine the cost of measles incurred due to resource use in this ICU unit 
(Coetzee, Morrow, & Argent 2013). As previously seen there was a major measles outbreak in 
South Africa in 2009-2010, and this study therefore falls within the time frame of the epidemic. 
In the year 2010, this Intensive Care Unit admitted 58 measles cases. This represents 4.6% of 
their total admissions for the year (total admissions were 1,274). These 58 measles related 
admissions had a median of 5.5 days’ duration of stay and these patients occupied 379 bed days 
in the ICU. The estimated costs associated with this were R 4,813,300 or $543,900 given the 
exchange rate at that time. Also of note is that during this time 67 elective surgeries were 
cancelled and 87 other referrals for admission to this ICU were refused.  
  This study was conducted in Red Cross War Memorial Children’s hospital, and therefore shows 
costs accrued to the state-funded health care system in South Africa. Therefore the more-or-less 
$500,000 measles related ICU costs just from this one unit represents direct cost to South African 
public funds and thus to South African society. Also bear in mind that there were other costs 
incurred by society: the decreased availability of scarce ICU resources due to the measles 
outbreak led to the cancellation of surgeries and the refusal of access to other persons in need.  
  Thus, it would be reasonable to argue that the cost of the recent measles outbreak was likely 
tremendous, both in healthcare expenditure and in the limitation of resources for non-measles 
illnesses. Exact numbers and estimates of the cost of the 2009-2010 outbreak is not clear, but if 
we just take the ICU study into account we can see that the costs were probably substantial. If 
we use the US 1999 estimate of $2,089 per case, the 12,499 reported cases in 2010 cost South 
Africa $26,110,411 in healthcare costs. Of course, the US estimate does not translate directly to 
the South African situation, and the costs between the countries per case of measles are likely 
different. But given the cost related to just 1 ICU for 2010 of about $500,000, the sheer number 
of measles cases, and the cost of lost lives and ongoing disability, the healthcare costs were likely 
in the millions of dollars if not exactly around $26 million as per the US 1999 estimate. This of 
course only means the costs incurred by the healthcare system, and does not include the knock-
on effect of limiting resources and access for people with other illnesses. The cost of measles to 
the South African healthcare system is large, and this burden falls directly on South African 
society. 
  It can be seen from these studies that measles outbreaks create substantial healthcare costs. 
These costs often come down directly on society at large, especially in societies with publically 
funded healthcare systems like South Africa. The burden of measles is therefore more than just 
the illness experienced by an individual. Rather, the burden of measles is felt by society as a 
whole in various ways: by increased healthcare costs, by limiting of healthcare resources and by 
increasing the burden of disability and lost lives to society.  
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 (4) Summary 
 Measles is a highly infectious viral illness with a relatively high rate of serious 
complications. Measles is so infectious that outbreaks can be sustained if 10% or more of 
a large enough population are susceptible to measles. 
 In the pre-vaccine era measles was very common and almost everyone got it. This caused 
substantial costs to society through health care spending, ongoing disability, illness 
burden and lives lost. In the vaccine era there has been a marked decrease in measles 
cases and deaths. 
 Continued measles cases and measles outbreaks incur substantial healthcare costs to 
society. 
 Measles has no animal reservoir, and does not cause latent or subclinical infections. It is 
dependent on an ongoing chain of human to human spread. If the chain of spread can be 
interrupted within a population, measles can be eliminated from that population. It is 
therefore possible to eliminate measles from countries and eventually to eradicate 
measles from the Earth. 
 Measles has been eliminated in the Americas, yet cases are imported every year. From 
these cases measles can be transmitted to non-immune individuals. In the US and in 
Canada there are vulnerable pockets of measles susceptibility within the highly 
vaccinated general population where measles outbreaks can occur due to such importing 
of measles. Recent outbreaks in these countries have been associated with non-
vaccination, and clustering of such non-immune individuals to create these susceptible 
pockets within the largely immune population. 
 South Africa experiences cyclical large outbreaks of measles related to persistent 
inadequate levels of vaccination to ensure elimination. HIV has not had a significant 
impact on the distribution and spread of measles in South Africa; rather it is ongoing low 
vaccination that explains the ongoing outbreaks.  
 Countries where measles is not eliminated typically experience measles outbreaks every 
few years when enough susceptible persons have been added to society to sustain a large 
outbreak. 
 Experience in the United Kingdom provides evidence that measles can return and become 
endemic once again after it had previously been eliminated from a country. If vaccination 
rates drop, every birth cohort will add to the pool of susceptible individuals within the 
country. Over time enough susceptibility accumulates to enable ongoing measles spread 
within the country, meaning the disease is endemic once again. This proves that even 
after elimination vigilance in vaccination is essential to ensure that elimination is 
maintained. This will be the case until measles is completely eradicated globally.  
 If enough people in a population is immune to measles, those who are not immune derive 
a measure of protection against measles by virtue of the fact that it is unlikely for them 
to come into contact with measles. This is called herd immunity. Herd immunity 
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protection seems to be dependent on the interruption of measles spread within a 
population, and therefore seems to be related to elimination of measles from a 
population. Thus, what is required for successful protection of non-immune individuals in 
a population is measles elimination so that the “herd immunity threshold” is the same as 
the measles elimination threshold.  
 To eliminate measles from a population, 93-95% of the population has to be immune to 
measles. In order to achieve that number, a two-dose measles vaccination program with 
coverage of at least 95% is needed. This is the requirement to reach the elimination or 
the herd-immunity threshold. 
 There are members of society that are dependent on herd-immunity for protection from 
measles infection. These include the very young (who cannot yet receive the vaccine), 
those who have lost their vaccine acquired immunity (about 5% of people will lose their 
measles immunity in 10-15 years, called secondary vaccine failure) and those with 
medical contra-indications for receiving the vaccine. 
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Chapter 3: Measles vaccine (with focus on MMR) 
 
  In chapter two it was seen that the disease burden of measles has markedly decreased and that 
much of the success has been attributed to measles vaccination. Global efforts to combat 
measles focus on increasing measles vaccination levels. It was also discussed that measles is 
amenable to eradication because it fulfills the criteria for eradication; among these criteria is the 
existence of an effective intervention at reasonable cost. The measles vaccine is thought to be 
an effective intervention at reasonable cost, making eradication of measles feasible. Measles 
vaccines have been well studied. A number of authoritative reviews have recently been 
published, all highlighting the safety and efficacy of measles vaccine (Demicheli et al. 2012; 
Lievano et al. 2012; Maglione et al. 2014; Moss & Griffin 2012). 
  Yet, measles vaccine has faced opposition from some quarters and consequently, as we have 
seen, vaccination rates have dropped in some parts of the world. The United Kingdom was 
highlighted as a specific example where measles vaccination rates decreased so much that the 
once-eradicated illness made its return. Examples of the effects of vaccine opposition were also 
cited from Canada, the USA and the Netherlands. We have seen that in these countries pockets 
of susceptibility to measles exist, largely associated with the congregation and geographic 
concentration of some who oppose vaccination.  
  In this chapter the scientific data regarding measles vaccine will be reviewed. The central 
questions I shall examine are: is the vaccine safe and effective, and is it at reasonable cost? The 
issue of vaccine adverse effects and a supposed link between autism and the measles vaccine will 
specifically be highlighted. There will also be a section on vaccine opposition and trends in the 
anti-vaccine movement, and some focus on the factors that influence parental decision-making 
when it comes to vaccination. 
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(1) Measles vaccine history and vaccines currently available 
(1.1)  Vaccine history (Allen 2007, pp. 215-247) 
  In 1963 the first measles vaccine was licensed in the United States; this was a single component 
vaccine containing an attenuated live measles virus (Allen 2007; Demicheli et al. 2012; Moss & 
Griffin 2012). In the 1950’s a scientist by the name of John Enders isolated measles virus from a 
young boy named David Edmonston. Swabs and blood were collected from the 11-year old 
Edmonston while he was symptomatic from measles infection, and the virus captured in tubes 
containing human kidney cells. This strain of virus became known as the Edmonston strain. Under 
the direction of Enders, a whole laboratory of scientists worked on augmenting the virus, until 
they had created a strain of virus that could induce measles immunity in children without causing 
clinical measles infection (Allen 2007). Thus, the captured Edmonston strain was passed through 
cultures in chicken embryo cells to give rise to the attenuated Edmonston B virus. This attenuated 
Edmonston B virus was the first live virus measles vaccine (Moss & Griffin 2012).  
  At a later stage the Edmonston B virus was further changed and attenuated to form the Schwarz 
vaccine, also an attenuated virus originally derived from the Edmonston measles virus strain 
(Allen 2007). Schwarz adopted methods originally used by Sabin in the making of the polio 
vaccine to arrive at an attenuated virus strain that was less aggressive than the original 
Edmonston B strain, thus causing less adverse symptoms. The Schwarz strain became popular 
because of its more favourable side effect profile, and eventually formed the basis of most of the 
measles vaccinations used in the present day (Allen 2007). The Schwarz vaccine was licensed in 
1965 in the US (Allen 2007; Moss & Griffin 2012). In 1968 a further strain became available and 
was licensed in the US, called the Moraten strain. This strain was also developed from the Enders 
virus strain to form an attenuated live virus vaccine and was developed by Hilleman (Moss & 
Griffin 2012). However, genetic testing in later years showed that the Schwarz strain and the 
Moraten strain were identical, and many scientists claimed that Hilleman had stolen Schwarz’s 
ideas or virus. Hilleman denied these claims and it had been impossible to prove the contrary 
(Allen 2007).  
  Over the next few years vaccines against mumps and rubella were developed, also being 
attenuated live virus vaccines (Allen 2007). Hilleman had the goal of creating a combined vaccine, 
which would impart immunity to three different diseases while needing only one injection. This 
became a reality in 1971 with the licensing of MMR (Allen 2007). The 1971 Merck vaccine M-M-
RTM (measles, mumps, and rubella virus vaccine live) was followed up by the M-M-RTMII in 1978. 
In the new M-M-RTMII the rubella component of the vaccine was changed while the measles and 
mumps components remained unchanged (Lievano et al. 2012). Since then, combination MMR 
has become the most widely used way to vaccinate against measles, as I will show in the next 
section. 
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(1.2) Available vaccine preparations – single component and MMR 
  For brevity I shall refer to combination mumps, measles, and rubella vaccines as MMR. Various 
MMR preparations are available and in use. A recent Cochrane review on measles, mumps, and 
rubella vaccines (Demicheli et al. 2012) identifies five MMR vaccines known, and they are the 
following: 
- Triviraten Berna. (It contains Edmonston Zagreb measles stain, Wistar rubella strain and 
Rubini mumps strain. Also contains lactose, human albumin, sodium bicarbonate, 
medium 199 and distilled water.) 
- M-M-R (and subsequently M-M-R II, according to Lievano et al. 2012) by the company 
Merck. (It contains Enders’ attenuated Edmonston measles strain grown in chick 
embryos, Jeryl Lynn mumps strain and Wistar rubella strain. Also contains medium 199 
and the antibiotic neomycin as stabilizer.) 
- Morupar by the company Chiron. (It contains Schwartz measles strain grown in chick 
embryos, Urabe mumps strain and Wistar rubella strain. It has neomycin as stabiliser.) 
- Priorix by the company Glaxo SmithKline Beecham. (It contains Schwartz measles strain 
grown in chick embryos, CCID50 mumps strain which is derived from Jeryl Lynn, and 
Wistar rubella strain. There is also a small dose of neomycin in the vaccine.) 
- Trimovax by the company Pasteur-Merieux Serums and Vaccines. (It contains the 
Schwartz measles strain, the Urabe mumps strain and the Wistar rubella strain.) 
 
  Combination MMR is used in over 90 countries in the world, including many countries in Europe 
and North America. The advantage of MMR is that three vaccine doses are delivered through one 
administration, thus improving vaccine coverage and at the same time decreasing costs. Most 
African countries (44 out of 47) use a single-component measles vaccine as opposed to MMR. 
Apart from these African countries, there are also 24 other countries who use single-component 
measles vaccine rather than MMR, which includes Russia (Demicheli et al. 2012). 
 
  (1.3) The emergence of MMRV 
  In some countries a combination measles, mumps, rubella and varicella vaccine (MMRV) is 
available. For example, according to the Public Health Agency of Canada, the measles vaccines 
available in Canada are M-M-R II, Priorix and Priorix-Tetra. Priorix Tetra is a combination of 
measles, mumps, rubella, and varicella vaccine in a single dose. Single-component measles 
vaccine is not available in Canada (Public Health Agency of Canada 2014b).  
  A review of the safety and immunogenicity of MMRV (specifically Priorix-Tetra by 
GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals) appeared in 2009 (Czajka et al. 2009). This review included eight 
studies with well over 3,000 study subjects. The aim of these studies were to see whether MMRV 
was non-inferior to the separate administration of MMR and Varicella vaccines. The review 
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concludes that MMRV is non-inferior to the separate administration of MMR and Varicella 
vaccines in conferring immunity to the four illnesses up to 3 years after vaccination. There seems 
to be a higher fever response and a small increase in localized reactions such as redness and 
swelling with MMRV.  
  It should be mentioned that there is substantial potential for conflict of interest with this review. 
Some of the authors of this review are employees of GlaxoSmithKline and are actively involved 
in industry-sponsored clinical trials. Also, the trials included appear to be GlaxoSmithKline 
sponsored clinical trials, specifically aimed at evaluating their Priorix-Tetra vaccine.  
  MMRV can be used either as a two-dose vaccine by itself, or it can be used as a second dose 
after an initial MMR (Czajka et al. 2009). In Germany, MMRV has been part of the immunization 
schedule since 2006. In the USA, MMRV was preferred in some recommendations over MMR 
after the initial introduction of MMRV. However, this has now been modified to giving equal 
preference to MMR alone after it was found that MMRV causes a higher rate of febrile 
convulsions than MMR (Czajka et al. 2009). 
  Czajka et al. (2009) argue that there are benefits to MMRV over MMR. Mainly, it will facilitate 
varicella immunity. Parents and children prefer fewer shots, and thus MMRV will lead to greater 
acceptance for varicella vaccination. Thus, if MMRV is introduced in the place of MMR it will have 
the high uptake that MMR has currently with the added advantage of bringing about varicella 
immunity without an additional injection. 
  Since this review more studies have been published on MMRV, such as the study by Rümke et 
al. (2011). The results of this randomized controlled trial published in 2011 were largely similar 
to the results of the 2009 review. The study found that the MMRV (Priorix-Tetra) was satisfactory 
in stimulating immunity against measles, mumps and rubella when compared with MMR. There 
was a marginal increase in after-vaccine fever in the MMRV group that only had 4 weeks between 
MMRV doses. Apart from the fever response, the adverse effects between the MMRV and MMR 
groups were not significant (Rümke et al. 2011).  
  Again, there are some things to keep in mind when interpreting this study:  
(1) The study was funded by industry and some of the authors were employees of the company 
that manufactures the vaccine. This creates room for possible bias in performing the study and 
in interpreting and reporting the data.  
(2) When looking at the study itself it seems that the number of people being studied were 
sufficient: there were three study groups with 188, 184 and 187 children in each group. Two of 
the groups were MMRV groups, with one group having 4 weeks between MMRV doses and the 
other 12 months between MMRV doses. The MMR group had 4 week between the doses. It could 
therefore be said that the MMRV groups and the MMR group were not exactly equivalent; the 
MMR group only had 4 weeks between doses. It could perhaps be that the MMR would perform 
much better in terms of adverse effects if a 12-month period was allowed between MMR doses. 
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It is the 4-week MMRV group, for example, that was mainly responsible for the increased fever 
adverse effects when compared to the 4-week MMR group. The MMRV groups and the MMR 
groups were therefore not exactly equivalent. 
(3) The immune response elicited by MMRV and MMR was tested 4-6 weeks after vaccination. 
This study therefore tells us about the immune response directly after vaccine administration but 
does not tell us about the long term effectiveness against measles infection or the long term 
retention of immunity between MMR and MMRV. Yet, it could be inferred that equivalent 
immune responses after vaccination would most probably lead to equivalent long-term immunity 
against measles. It should be kept in mind though that both the 2009 and 2011 publications cited 
provide short term immunity data, and that long term immunity data on MMR has not been 
established through studies. 
  Thus, the 2011 study (Rümke et al. 2011) gives us important information about the MMRV, as 
does the 2009 review (Czajka et al. 2009). Both of these studies, however, have some deficiencies 
that should be remembered when the results and the conclusions of these studies are 
considered. 
  Two additional studies looked at MMRV and febrile seizures. One was MacDonald et al (2014), 
which found that there was indeed an increased risk for febrile seizures after MMRV when 
compared to MMR, but that this increase in risk was quite small and needed to be weighed 
against the benefit of having a combination vaccine that includes a varicella component. This 
study had no industry links and seems to have been done in a rigorous manner. It is a cohort 
study, however, which is a lower level of evidence than a randomized-control trial.  
  The second was Gavrielov-Yusim et al. (2014), which looked specifically at the proportion of 
febrile seizures in the period after vaccination that is vaccine-attributable and compared MMRV 
with MMR. This study found that there was a slight increase in vaccine-attributable febrile 
seizures after MMRV when compared with MMR, but that this increase was marginal and that 
the overall risk-benefit ratio of the vaccine is good. This study has some industry links, with 
funding from the company making the vaccine in question and with one of the authors being 
employed by a pharmaceutical company. 
MMRV: discussion and conclusion 
  There are some data that show MMRV is equivalent to MMR with one difference being that 
MMRV is associated with a slightly increased rate of fever and febrile seizures than MMR. 
Although febrile seizures can be terrifying for parents, they have no long term adverse outcomes 
(Sadleir & Scheffer 2007). Febrile seizures are in essence benign clinical phenomena. Children 
with febrile seizures have normal outcomes and development (Sadleir & Scheffer 2007). One of 
the important aspects of management of febrile seizures is parental reassurance and education 
(Sadleir & Scheffer 2007). 
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  It should be kept in mind, however, that MMRV has not been as well studied as MMR and that 
there is no long-term data on the immunity conferred by MMRV as opposed to MMR. In addition 
to this, the current available studies on MMRV have some defects, such as industry influence. 
This does not completely disqualify these studies, it only means that we should bear in mind that 
these studies are not perfect and have some defects. 
  Thus, in conclusion, it seems likely that the MMRV is equivalent to the MMR given the current 
level of evidence with the exception of marginally increased risk of febrile seizure with MMRV. I 
shall however focus my attention on MMR in this project, and consider the evidence behind MMR 
when arguing for the ethics of measles vaccination. The reasons for this are plentiful: MMR has 
been very well studied, with high-quality studies and reviews available on MMR.  There is long-
term data available on the effectiveness of MMR. The data on MMRV are less complete and less 
robust with no long-term studies on MMRV effectiveness. Additionally, MMR is widely used and 
remains the vaccine of choice in many countries. 
  In what follows I shall therefore focus on MMR. When the ethics of measles vaccination in 
children is considered in future chapters, it will specifically focus on the MMR vaccine. If long 
term studies find that MMRV is equivalent, these arguments will likely be applicable to MMRV as 
well. 
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(2) MMR effectiveness, adverse effects and cost 
(2.1) Vaccine effectiveness 
  As discussed in the previous chapter, measles vaccination is highly effective and is credited with 
the elimination of measles in countries like the US and Canada. It was also seen that measles 
elimination requires two doses of measles containing vaccine at population coverage rates of 
95%. As shown in the previous chapter, the historical experience with measles vaccines and their 
effect on measles epidemiology are well known; these historical and epidemiological 
considerations provide compelling evidence for the effectiveness of measles vaccines in 
preventing measles infection. 
  One review of the literature gives the following vaccine efficacy and recommendations (Moss & 
Griffin 2012). For a single dose of measles containing vaccine, about 85% of children will develop 
antibodies against measles at 9 months of age and about 95% of children will develop antibodies 
at 12 months of age. The age at which the first vaccine is administered varies, and is dependent 
on the balance between the best age for developing measles immunity and the likelihood of 
getting measles before vaccination. So, for example, the age at which WHO recommends the first 
measles dose is 9 months. Before this age it is thought that too few will develop immunity to 
measles from the vaccine. In some countries where measles is not endemic the first dose is 
sometimes delayed to 12 months or up to 15 months. This ensures greater rates of immunity 
from the first dose, and since the risk of a child getting measles is small the delay in giving the 
vaccine is seen as acceptable.  
  A Cochrane review of MMR effectiveness and adverse effects concluded that one MMR vaccine 
dose is 95% effective in preventing measles and 92% effective in preventing the spread of 
measles to household contacts (Demicheli et al. 2012). This review included five randomized 
controlled trials, one controlled clinical trial, 27 cohort studies, 17 case-control studies, five time-
series trials, one case cross-over trial, two ecological studies and six self-controlled case series 
studies. This amounts to around 14,700,000 study participants. In this review, studies were 
critically appraised for sources of bias and methodology. This MMR Cochrane review represents 
high quality evidence for the effectiveness of the MMR vaccine in conferring measles immunity.  
  Another review article also comments on the effectiveness of measles vaccine (Meissner, 
Strebel & Orenstein 2004). According to this review, 95% of children who receive measles vaccine 
after 12 months of age will develop immunity against measles. With a second dose of measles, 
more than 99% of children will develop immunity against measles. A single dose measles vaccine 
is not enough to ensure elimination of measles from a population; a two-dose regimen is needed. 
This is not a systematic review, and is therefore a lower level of evidence than the two systematic 
reviews already cited. However, the results seem to be in keeping with the findings of the 
systematic reviews and the review itself seems rigorous. It therefore adds to the body of evidence 
and increases the certainty we have of the effectiveness of measles vaccine. 
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  It can be noted that the vaccine is highly effective, but not 100% effective. Two review articles 
describe two different kinds of vaccine failure (Meissner, Strebel, & Orenstein 2004; Moss & 
Griffin 2012). 
  Primary vaccine failure: As stated, a single dose of measles containing vaccine after 12 months 
is 95% effective in conferring measles immunity. The 5% of children who do not develop measles 
immunity remain susceptible to measles. This is referred to as primary vaccine failure. Of course, 
the rate of primary vaccine failure is higher if the first dose of measles is given at 9 months; at 
this age only 85% of children develop measles immunity. It is because of primary vaccine failure 
that a two-dose approach is recommended. After a second dose of measles vaccine >99% of 
children develop immunity. 
  Secondary vaccine failure: It can happen that some people who developed measles immunity 
after vaccination can lose their immunity to measles. This is called secondary vaccine failure. It is 
estimated that secondary vaccine failure rates are about 5% after 10 years. It may actually be 
lower than that in people who have been vaccinated after 12 months, for example in those who 
have received the second vaccine at 15-18 months. 
   
(2.2) Adverse effects 
(2.2.1) Cochrane review (Demicheli et al. 2012)   
  The MMR Cochrane review mentions aseptic meningitis, febrile seizures and thrombocytopenic 
purpura as possible adverse reactions based on the studies included in their review. 
  Aseptic meningitis was associated with MMR that contained either the Urabe or the Leningrad-
Zagreb mumps strains. The relative risk (RR) for aseptic meningitis was 14.28 (95% CI 7.93-25.71) 
with the Urabe strain and 22.5 (95% CI 11.8-42.9) with the Leningrad-Zagreb strain. This means 
that the risk is about 14 times higher than baseline and 22.5 times higher than baseline with the 
respective vaccines. It is important to note that this adverse effect is not associated with the 
measles strains, and therefore is not associated with vaccines containing only measles. It is also 
important to note that aseptic meningitis is not associated with the MMR formulations that are 
most commonly used. For example, MMR-II is exclusively used in the US (Lievano et al. 2012) and 
it does not contain the Urabe or Leningrad-Zagreb strain, and thus is not associated with aseptic 
meningitis. Similarly, Canada uses MMR-II and Priorix (Public Health Agency of Canada 2014b), 
neither of which contains the Urabe or Leningrad-Zagreb mumps strain. It is therefore possible 
to avoid the adverse effect of aseptic meningitis by using MMR the commonly-used MMR 
formulations that do not contain the Urabe or Leningrad-Zagreb strain, or to use a single-
component measles vaccine. Even though aseptic meningitis can be painful and cause short term 
suffering, the long-term outcome of aseptic meningitis is good and it does not seem as if aseptic 
meningitis causes adverse neurological outcomes (Rorabaugh et al. 1993). 
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  The review included two studies that associated MMR with febrile seizures. One was a good 
person-time cohort study, including 537,171 children under 5 years of age. This study found that 
the risk for febrile seizure was slightly raised for the two weeks after MMR administration with a 
RR of 1.10 (95% CI: 1.05-1.15). Thus, this study showed an increase in risk for febrile seizure of 
about 10% from baseline. The other was a self-controlled case series study in 894 children, which 
had a moderate risk of bias and thus is not of the quality of the first study mentioned. The second 
study found an increased incidence of febrile seizure after MMR in children 12 to 23 months old 
(relative incidence between 3 and 5 times higher than baseline). As already mentioned, febrile 
seizures have good long term outcomes and are thus considered benign clinical entities (Sadleir 
& Scheffer 2007).   
  The reviewers identify an increased risk for thrombocytopenic purpura in the first six weeks 
after MMR administration. Thrombocytopenic purpura refers to a decrease in platelets, which 
are instrumental in blood clotting. It is not clear how high the risk is for this adverse effect from 
the studies included; the confidence intervals are large and the estimated increased risk ranges 
from 2 fold to 30 fold higher than baseline.  
  Based on the available evidence, the reviewers reject any significant association between MMR 
vaccine and autism, asthma, leukemia, hay fever, type 1 diabetes mellitus, gait disturbances, 
Crohn’s disease, demyelinating diseases (such as multiple sclerosis), bacterial or viral infections. 
The authors also could not find statistically significant associations between MMR and 
encephalopathy in the included studies.  
  In the light of the available evidence, the authors endorse the current approach of mass 
vaccination against measles disease with MMR. They are critical, however, of many of the studies 
that they have included. Specifically, they are concerned with inconsistent reporting between 
some of the study types and inconsistent methodology with regards to vaccine contents, study 
populations, time from exposure and so forth. These issues affect the generalizability of the 
results. They were also concerned that with some of the studies there were potential sources of 
bias present, such as selection and performance bias, affecting the internal validity of the studies. 
Thus, although this review provides evidence for the effectiveness and safety of MMR vaccines, 
the authors would like to see improvement in studies on MMR in the following two areas: 
improved design with standardisation of safety outcome reporting for MMR studies, and more 
studies examining to what extent measles immunity decreases over time after MMR vaccine.  
(2.2.2) Moss/Griffin review (Moss & Griffin 2012) 
  The Moss/Griffin review identifies the following adverse reactions from measles vaccination: 
- Fever in 5% of recipients who have no measles immunity 
- Transient rash in 2% of recipients 
- Transient thrombocytopenia with a median incidence of 2-6 cases per 100,000 MMR 
doses 
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  The authors argue that measles vaccines are effective and safe for children and adults who do 
not have immune compromise. They also cite evidence against any association between autism 
and MMR; they state that “several comprehensive reviews and epidemiological studies found no 
evidence of a causal relation between MMR vaccination and autism” (p. 160). 
(2.2.3) MMR II review (Lievano et al. 2012) 
  This review includes adverse events reported for MMR II by the company Merck, the MMR 
vaccine that has been exclusively used in the United States for the reporting period (1978 to 30 
September 2010). The data for this review were located in Merck’s adverse event database, 
containing records of vaccine adverse events that were reported to Merck. This database was 
also updated with reports to the US government’s Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System 
(VAERS). There were 17,536 adverse events reported in this 32 year time period, and 4822 of 
these adverse events were considered serious by regulatory criteria. If the amount of MMR II 
vaccine given to the population is taken into account, this leads to a rate of 8.4 serious events for 
every 1 million doses of MMR II distributed (8.4/1,000,000).  
  The authors of this review consider the following reported adverse event outcomes, and 
consider whether these event outcomes were related to MMR vaccination or not: 
- Death 
136 temporally associated deaths were reported after MMR II in the 32 years. Investigation of 
these showed that these deaths were mainly associated with infections that were unrelated to 
the vaccine. There was no unusual pattern of significance.  
14 of the deaths were in immunocompromised patients; six of these died due to measles 
complications and in four of these the vaccine measles strain was identified as the cause of the 
complications. 
It does not seem, therefore, that there is a causative link between MMR II and the reported 
deaths, except for the immunocompromised patients who developed measles related 
complications from the vaccine measles strain.  
The contraindications for receiving MMR includes known severe immunodeficiency, such as 
hematologic and solid tumours, chemotherapy, congenital immunodeficiency, HIV patients with 
severe immunodeficiency, and long-term use of medications that suppress the immune system. 
It is important to note in the South African context that HIV positive children are eligible for the 
MMR vaccine if their CD4 lymphocyte count is above 15%. 
- Subacute Sclerosing Panencephalitis (SSPE) 
18 cases of SSPE were reported. 12 of these ended in death. In 10 out of the 18 cases, the children 
had a positive history of measles infection. One case out of the 18 was reportedly attributed to 
MMR II, but the investigations used to make this claim were not specified. The authors point out 
that there has been no cases of SSPE where the vaccine virus has been identified through PCR 
testing as being the causative agent. It therefore does not appear as if SSPE is linked to MMR II, 
but rather is caused by a prior measles infection with SSPE. 
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- Aseptic meningitis 
57 cases of aseptic meningitis after vaccination were reported. One case was fatal, and one case 
reported hearing loss in one ear, three years after vaccination. 
Of the 57 cases, 50 did not meet the criteria for aseptic meningitis after review. Of the other 
seven reports, five had no specific organism isolated as cause, and two had mumps strains 
isolated as cause. It was reported that there may have been community acquired mumps 
infection in these cases, but the temporal association with MMR II could not be ignored, and thus 
it was reported as such. The authors point out that the Jeryl Lynn mumps strain was not positively 
identified in any of the 57 reported cases. 
- Encephalitis 
120 cases of encephalitis after vaccination were reported. 58 recovered, 21 did not recover, in 
30 the outcome was unknown and 11 died. Of the 120 reports, 60 had insufficient information 
to make a conclusion. 
The authors state that the relative rate of occurrence of encephalopathy is 0.22 per million MMR 
doses. Of these, about 50% are reported to recover. This means that for every 4,545,454 doses 
of MMR given to non-immune individuals, 1 will develop encephalitis. 
- Autism 
433 events of autism were reported. Time to onset of autism after MMR was known in 130 cases, 
and ranged from 1 day to 19 years with a median onset of 339 days after MMR. 
The authors cite evidence against the causative association between MMR and autism; they 
argue that “by 2011, both biologic implausibility and the support of over 20 epidemiologic studies 
have confirmed that MMR II does not cause autism.” 
- Febrile seizures 
773 events of febrile seizures were reported after MMR II; median time to onset after MMR II is 
9 days. In 12 % of these cases other infections were also present, contributing to fever. 
The authors state that the body of evidence supports a causal relationship between MMR II and 
febrile seizures. They argue, however, that the risk for febrile seizure is smaller with MMR II than 
with measles infections, where the febrile seizures happen in 0.6-0.7% of cases. They do not 
exactly quantify the risk of febrile seizures from MMR II. 
- Deafness 
89 reports of deafness after MMR II. In 27 of these there were other medical conditions present 
that may have contributed, such as otitis media. In these reports deafness onset was also quite 
long after MMR II exposure (median 57 days after vaccination). The authors argue that these 
considerations make it seem like these cases of deafness were not caused by MMR II. 
- Thrombocytopenia 
259 events of low platelets (thrombocytopenia) were reported, within 77 days after MMR II. 159 
of these recovered to normal platelet counts, 31 did not recover and in 60 outcome is unknown. 
The authors write that the most common cause for low platelets in children is excessive 
breakdown due to immune thrombocytopenic purpura (ITP). The 31 children in their data who 
did not return to normal platelet levels presumably had some diagnosis such as ITP. There does 
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appear to be a slightly increased risk for lower platelets and ITP with MMR II, but this risk is lower 
than with viral infection prevented by MMR II.  
The rate of thrombocytopenia for MMR II is less than 1 per 30,000 doses. The authors compare 
this with the rate of thrombocytopenia of 1/3,000 for rubella infection.  
- Hypersensitivity and anaphylaxis (allergic reactions) 
158 reports of hypersensitivity were described, and 228 reports of anaphylaxis (severe allergic 
reaction) were described. Of these, 14 cases progressed to anaphylactic shock. There was only 
one anaphylaxis related death in the authors’ data, and this child received pneumococcal vaccine 
at the same time as MMR vaccine. 
Allergy to MMR may be because of allergy to vaccine components, such as chick embryo, gelatin 
and neomycin. The relative rate of allergic type reactions to MMR II is less than 1 per million 
doses. 
 
  Taking the above data into consideration would give the following known serious adverse events 
for MMR II vaccination: Encephalitis (0.22 per million MMR doses), Febrile seizures (increased 
risk, not quantified but said to be less than measles infection), thrombocytopenia (less than 1 per 
30,000 MMR doses), and allergic reactions (less than 1 per million MMR doses). 
  On review of the data, the authors reject a significant causative association between MMR II 
and death, SSPE, aseptic meningitis, autism and deafness. 
  The authors also mention the following significant but non-serious adverse events: fever (5.49 
reports per 1 million MMR doses), rash (4.63 reports per 1 million MMR doses), injection site 
reaction (2.19 reports per 1 million MMR doses), vasovagal/syncope/fainting (0.85 reports per 1 
million MMR doses), and arthritis (0.67 reports per 1 million MMR doses). They cite evidence 
indicating that there is no association between MMR vaccine and chronic arthritis in women. 
Also, it is thought that the rate of local injection site reactions are underreported. Of note is that 
the vaccine, being a live virus vaccine, is contraindicated during pregnancy. 
(2.2.4) Childhood vaccine safety review, 2014 (Maglione et al. 2014) 
  This review examined adverse effects associated with all childhood vaccines. For MMR they 
found the following: 
  There is convincing evidence of: a causal relationship between MMR vaccine and febrile 
seizures; anaphylaxis in allergic patients; a causal relationship between MMR and inclusion body 
encephalitis in immunocompromised children; a causal relationship between Urabe mumps 
strain and aseptic meningitis, although there is no evidence of a link between Jeryl Lynn mumps 
strain and aseptic meningitis. 
  The available evidence “favors acceptance” of a causal relationship between MMR and transient 
joint pain in children. There is also moderate quality evidence indicating a link between MMR 
and thrombocytopenic purpura for a short period after vaccination. 
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  The available evidence “favors rejection” of a causal relationship between MMR and autism. 
(2.2.5) CDC: measles vaccine adverse effects (CDC 2012) 
    The CDC gives the following adverse effects of measles vaccine (MMR): 
- Fever (5-15% of recipients) 
- Rash (5% of recipients) 
- Joint pain/arthralgia (25% of recipients) 
- Thrombocytopenia (low platelets) – less than 1 in 30,000 of recipients. They also state 
that the thrombocytopenia is usually transient and benign, although very rare episodes 
of bleeding have occurred. 
- Parotitis (inflammation of the parotid salivary gland) – rare, but there have been some 
reports. 
- Deafness (rare) 
- Transient lymphadenopathy (temporarily enlarged lymph nodes) – rare. 
- Allergic reactions (rare, uncommon, and usually limited to rash/urticarial. Anaphylactic 
reactions are extremely rare.) 
- Encephalopathy (less than 1 per 1,000,000 doses)  
  According to the CDC, these adverse effects represent mild illness following replication of the 
live vaccine virus. As can be seen, the adverse effect rate is low. 
  Citing two independent non-governmental groups, American Academy of Pediatrics and the 
Institute of Medicine, the CDC states that the research evidence available shows no link between 
autism and MMR, and consequently that autism should not be considered an adverse effect of 
MMR. 
(2.2.6) Summary of findings: Measles vaccine adverse effects 
  I shall summarize here the adverse effect of measles containing vaccines, derived from the 
various reviews cited above. I shall focus on the adverse effects of commonly used MMR 
formulations, and will therefore not include aseptic meningitis. Aseptic meningitis is associated 
with a mumps strain that is not commonly used, and can be avoided by using MMR that does not 
have the offending mumps strain.   
  These adverse effects can be divided into minor and major categories. 
Minor adverse effects: 
  These are mild, benign and have no long term adverse outcomes. They may be bothersome or 
distressing to the patient and family in the short term, but carry no long term implications.  
- Fever (5-15%; 50 to 150 per 1,000) 
- Rash (about 5%; 50 per 1,000) 
- Joint pain (up to 25%; 250 per 1,000) 
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- Parotitis (very rare, not quantified) 
- Lymphadenopathy (very rare, not quantified) 
- Febrile seizures (calculated to be between 0.3 and 0.8%; 3 and 8 per 1,000) 
The prevalence of febrile seizures in the general population is between 3% and 8% before age 7 
(Sadleir & Scheffer 2007). That means that for every 1,000 children in the general population, 
between 30 and 80 will have a febrile seizure by age 7. There is an increased risk of febrile seizures 
with MMR of about 10% over baseline (Demiceheli et al. 2012). This means that if MMR is added 
to our group of 1,000 children, the number who will have a febrile seizure will be between 33 
and 88. Thus, for a 1,000 doses there will be between 3 and 8 extra cases of febrile seizure due 
to the addition of MMR. 
 
Major adverse effects: 
  These can have serious outcomes and are thus worrisome. I include thrombocytopenia in this 
list, although I provide an explanation that this usually is transient and mild. I do not include 
deafness: although there have been some reports of hearing loss after children have received 
MMR, it seems that there is no evidence that these were linked to MMR. Three reviews do not 
mention it (Demicheli et al. 2012; Maglione et al. 2014; Moss & Griffin 2012), and Lievano et al. 
(2012) cites considerations that would favour rejection of a link between MMR and deafness. 
- Thrombocytopenia (less than 1 per 30,000) 
This usually seems to be transient, and in the vast majority of cases the low platelets are self-
corrected without serious complications. Since there have been some reports of bleeding 
because of the low platelets, and because there may be a very slightly increased risk of conditions 
such as ITP where platelets will remain low due to increased destruction, I include these in the 
list of major adverse effects. 
 
- Anaphylaxis (less than 1 per million doses) 
Allergic reactions to MMR are very rare. When they occur, they seem to usually be minor 
reactions. Anaphylactic reactions are therefore extremely rare. However, when they occur they 
are life-threatening and require emergency medical treatment. 
 
- Encephalitis/Encephalopathy (0.22 per 1 million doses) 
One review stated that there is no evidence of a statistically significant association between MMR 
and encephalitis (Demicheli et al. 2012). This is a significant finding; it means that there is doubt 
as to whether the reported cases of encephalopathy following MMR were indeed caused by the 
vaccine. In the review by Lievano et al. (2012) there is mention of 120 reported cases of 
encephalitis in 32 years of MMR II use. In half of these cases (60) there was not enough data to 
determine what the cause of the encephalitis was. It may therefore have been MMR related. The 
authors estimate a rate of 0.22 per 1 million doses for encephalitis; this correlates well with the 
CDC’s (CDC 2012) figure of less than 1 per 1 million doses. 
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It seems doubtful whether there actually is evidence for a causative connection between MMR 
and encephalitis. Yet, because this is a serious adverse effect and there have been reports of 
cases that could potentially be linked to MMR, I include this as a potential adverse effect. 
 
  The common adverse effects of MMR are not serious and pass quickly. These include rash, fever 
and joint pain. Febrile seizures are distressing to parents, but essentially are benign with good 
long term outcomes. 
  The potentially serious adverse effects of MMR are thrombocytopenia, anaphylaxis and 
encephalitis. MMR thrombocytopenia is relatively rare, and when it occurs it usually passes 
without causing trouble. Anaphylaxis is extremely rare, but when it occurs is a serious 
complication. There is doubt as to whether MMR really causes encephalopathy, but if it does it 
is extremely rare. 
  Based on these data, measles vaccines are safe for use and the risk of serious adverse effects 
are very low.  
(2.2.7) Comparing MMR adverse effects with complications of measles 
  Figure 3.1 and 3.2 compare the complications of measles with the adverse events following 
vaccination. Data presented in chapter 2 on the complications of measles were used and 
compared with data presented in chapter 3 on measles vaccines. As can be seen, the serious 
complications of measles vaccines are not clearly visible on the chart as a separate colour, simply 
because there are so few serious adverse events following measles vaccines. 
  If a million children were infected with measles, 700,000 would recover and 300,000 would have 
some complication. About 50,000 would have pneumonia, 80,000 diarrhea, and 10,000 otitis 
media. There would be 1,000 cases of primary measles encephalitis and 110 cases of Subacute 
Sclerosing Panencephalitis. This is a large burden of disease, leading to many hospitalizations and 
cases of disability. There would be an estimated 2,000 deaths out of the million children. 
  If a million children were given measles vaccine, 33 would develop a transient 
thrombocytopenia, there would be about 1 significant allergic reaction, and there would be less 
than 1 (0.22) cases of encephalitis. Out of the million, 999,966 children would not have a serious 
adverse reaction. It should also be pointed out that the thrombocytopenia usually passes without 
any serious complications, so that essentially less than 2 per million children have a serious 
adverse event. These numbers include the assumption that MMR can cause encephalopathy; as 
stated before, there is some doubt about this, but if it does it is extremely rare. 
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(2.3) Contra-indications: Who should not get the vaccine? 
  The CDC indicates the following contra-indications to MMR (CDC 2012): 
- Known severe allergy to measles vaccine or components of the vaccine, such as gelatin. 
Egg allergy is not a contra-indication, as studies have shown that MMR is safe in children 
with egg allergy. 
- Pregnancy. Additionally, women should not fall pregnant within 4 weeks after MMR 
administration. 
- Severe immunodeficiency. This would include advanced HIV disease, leukemia, or use of 
immunosuppressive drugs for a long time or in large doses. HIV positive children may 
receive MMR; only those with evidence of severe immunodeficiency should not receive 
the vaccine. Severe HIV immunodeficiency is either diagnosed clinically or by CD4 count 
of less than 15% of total lymphocytes. It is not necessary to test children for HIV prior to 
giving MMR if they do not have clinical features of severe immunodeficiency. 
- Moderate or severe illness. MMR should not be given to a child who has an acute illness 
that needs treatment, such as pneumonia. This is to avoid making the management of the 
illness more difficult by adding a potential vaccine adverse reaction into the clinical 
picture. Vaccination should in these cases be delayed until improvement of the child. 
However, minor illnesses such as viral upper respiratory infections are not a contra-
indication to MMR. 
- Recent administration of a blood product. If a child has recently received a blood product 
that contains immunoglobulins, these could prevent the child’s becoming immune to 
measles following vaccination. The waiting period for vaccination after blood product 
administration can range from a few months to almost a year, depending on the product 
given. 
 
(2.4) Vaccine cost and cost-effectiveness 
  In 1985 a review was conducted which examined the impact of 20 years of measles vaccination 
in the United States (Bloch et al. 1985). Measles vaccination was introduced in 1963, and the 
review estimated the net effect of measles vaccination by 1983. The results of this review were 
quite impressive. By 1983 measles vaccination in the US has prevented an estimated 52 million 
cases of measles, 5,200 measles deaths, and 17,400 cases of mental retardation. An estimated 
net savings of $5.1 billion in healthcare expenditure was the result.  
  In 2004 an analysis of the cost-effectiveness of the measles vaccination program in the US was 
published (Zhou et al. 2004). In this review they followed a hypothetical birth cohort of 3,803,295 
children until age 40. They compared the costs of the MMR vaccination program with the costs 
of absence of vaccination, and they also analyzed the cost-benefit of adding the second dose of 
MMR. They argue that the first dose of MMR protects most children, and thus is the most cost-
effective, but that the second dose adds the population immunity that is required to achieve 
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interruption of endemic transmission and thus eradication of measles. They furthermore assume 
vaccination rates that are consistent with actually achieved vaccination rates for the time period 
when the children were born; this means that by age 6, 95% of the children would have had the 
first MMR dose and 79% would have had the second MMR dose. 
  The 2004 analysis found that net savings from the MMR program for this hypothetical birth 
cohort were $3.5 billion in direct savings to healthcare expenditure, and $7.6 billion savings in 
societal perspectives (Zhou et al. 2004). The benefit-cost ratios were impressive, with a ratio of 
14.2 saved for every dollar spent in direct costs and 26.0 saved for every dollar spent in societal 
perspectives. Direct costs refer to medical spending, hospitalization, special education and the 
like. Societal perspectives include aspects such as loss of productivity in patients and caregivers. 
In this analysis, cost savings from rubella and mumps reduction was also included in the cost-
benefit calculation.   
  At the time the 2004 review was conducted, the price for MMR vaccine in the US was $15.08 in 
the public sector and $28.19 for the private sector (Zhou et al 2004). The total costs of the MMR 
vaccination program were $0.27 billion in direct costs and $0.30 billion in societal perspectives. 
In direct costs only, the MMR program spent $78 to prevent one case of measles while saving 
$1,023 by preventing one case of measles.  
  A 2001 analysis found that the total savings in cost to society for each averted case of measles 
were $2,089 (Zwanziger, Szilagyi & Kaul 2001). If the $78 cost to prevent one case through MMR 
is taken as correct, that translates into impressive savings in societal cost through a program of 
MMR vaccination, with a cost-benefit of 26.78 saved for every dollar spent. 
  In the United States, MMR currently costs $19.91 per dose if procured through a publically 
funded agency such as the CDC, and $56.139 per dose if privately bought (CDC 2014b). This is 
fairly affordable, and access to vaccination is readily available through a variety of means in first 
world countries. For example, Canada has a publically funded health systems that pay for basic 
health care such as vaccines. In the United States there are a variety of ways in which to access 
vaccination through either public or private funding.  
  In the developing world, close to $20 for a vaccine is not affordable. Through UNICEF the vaccine 
can be procured for $0.30 per dose, which includes $0.15 for the vaccine and $0.15 for injection 
equipment (UNICEF 2007). This means that a child can be immunized against measles for less 
than one US dollar, including injection equipment and operational costs.  
  Measles vaccination is therefore inexpensive and cost-effective, with substantial savings in 
medical expenditure and indirect societal costs. 
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(3) Does MMR cause autism? 
(3.1) Autism and Wakefield’s paper  
   Allen (2007, p. 371-420) describes some of the relevant preceding history. Autism was 
discovered as a separate disease entity in 1943. It was poorly understood and very rare; by 1971 
the prevalence of autism was thought to be 3 to 5 in 10,000 children. The cause of autism was 
not clear, and theories ranged from psychological causes to nutritional and environmental. In the 
1990s scientific consensus was that autism was caused by biological factors, yet it remained 
unclear how much of the cause was genetic and how much was environmental. By the year 2000 
the diagnosis rate of autism had increased dramatically, and the prevalence rate was 3 to 5 in a 
1,000 children. For numerous years some alternative medicine adherents had been voicing claims 
that increased vaccine use had been responsible for the increase in autism diagnoses. For 
example, a navy psychologist by the name of Bernard Rimland who had an autistic son advocated 
in the 1960s that medications were dangerous, Diphtheria-Tetanus-Pertussis (DTP) vaccines 
caused autism, and that natural supplement treatments were safe. Thus, the idea that there may 
be a causative link between vaccines and autism has a fairly long history. 
  The thought that vaccines, and MMR in particular, may be the cause of autism gained scientific 
traction and public attention by the publication of an article by Andrew Wakefield in 1998 in the 
Lancet (Allen 2007; Demicheli et al. 2012; Godlee, Smith, & Marcovitch 2011; Kemp & Hart 2010; 
Peterson & Barbel 2013). The Wakefield article postulated a causative association between 
autism and MMR vaccination. Taken at face value, the scientific merits of the paper were 
questionable: the study consisted of a case series of 12 children with no control cases, included 
three common medical conditions, and based its conclusions mainly on the recollections and 
beliefs of the parents of the affected children (Godlee, Smith, & Marcovitch 2011). These are 
indeed very unimpressive and doubtful scientific methods, with ample room for bias and skewed 
conclusions.  
  Further investigation by a journalist by the name of Brian Deer revealed that Wakefield’s article 
was fraudulent (Godlee, Smith, & Marcovitch 2011). Wakefield had falsified information and had 
altered facts to fit his conclusions. It also became apparent that Wakefield had substantial 
conflicts of interest, and sought to gain financially through the MMR scare that would follow from 
his article. In 2004, 10 of the co-authors of this article had retracted this article’s interpretation 
of a link between autism and MMR vaccines. Wakefield kept insisting that his article and ideas 
were credible (Godlee, Smith, & Marcovitch 2011). Wakefield has been found guilty of “ethical, 
medical and scientific misconduct in the publication of the paper”; his work had clearly been 
fraudulent (Demicheli et al. 2012). Wakefield has since been stripped of his medical and academic 
credentials (Godlee, Smith, & Marcovitch 2011). 
 
 




(3.2) The role of the media in the MMR-autism scare 
  Although Wakefield’s paper has been withdrawn by the Lancet and been discredited in various 
ways, it remained a defining moment (Demicheli et al. 2012; Godlee, Smith, & Marcovitch 2011; 
Kemp & Hart 2010; Peterson & Barbel 2013). Large scale, unbalanced media coverage of 
Wakefield’s article caused the public to doubt vaccines, vaccine safety and public health led 
vaccine programs. The idea that there may be a causative link between MMR and autism was 
presented in large print to the public, and latched onto by many. This directly led to a decline in 
MMR vaccine rates, with re-emergence of measles in the United Kingdom (Demicheli et al. 2012; 
Godlee, Smith, & Marcovitch 2011; Kemp & Hart 2010; Peterson & Barbel 2013). 
  Ben Goldacre (2008) describes the role of the media in creating the MMR scare in the early 
2000’s. He specifically examines the role of the media in the UK with the subsequent drop in 
MMR vaccination rates and the consequent return of measles to the UK. He writes (p. 209):  
   “But as we shall see, Dr Wakefield cannot carry the blame for this scare alone, however much 
the news media may now try to imply that he should; the blame lies instead with the hundreds of 
journalists, columnists, editors and executives, in every single news outlet in the UK, who drove 
this story cynically, irrationally, and willfully onto the front pages for nine solid years. 
  …they overextrapolated from one study into absurdity, while studiously ignoring all reassuring 
data and subsequent refutations. They quoted ‘experts’ as authorities instead of explaining the 
science, they ignored the historical context…  
  … they pitched emotive stories from parents against bland academics (whom they smeared), and 
most bizarrely of all, in some cases they simply made stuff up.”  
  Goldacre (2008) describes how the MMR scare peaked in the British media in the year 2002. 
About 10 percent of science stories in this time period were devoted to MMR. In 2002 there were 
over 1,000 MMR stories in the media, in 2003 and 2004 over 500 each, and in 2005 and 2006 
over 250 each. These stories were generally not covered by science reporters, but instead about 
80% were by generalist reporters. Less than a third of the stories referred to the scientific 
evidence that MMR was considered safe. In many of the stories a false impression was created 
that there was a body of medical opinion doubtful of the safety of MMR. 
  Instead of presenting evidence, the media focussed on placing statements from experts such as 
“science has proven the safety of the vaccine” against emotional narratives from distraught 
parents and celebrities (Goldacre 2008). Although the media largely demanded “more evidence”, 
whenever negative studies were published in peer-reviewed journals the media largely ignored 
them. Instead, they focussed on unsubstantiated claims from persons who did not publish their 
“findings” in peer review journals. As an example, some of the United Kingdom MMR headlines 
from 2006 are as follows (Goldacre 2008): 
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“US scientists back autism link to MMR” – The Telegraph 
“Scientists fear MMR link to autism” – The Daily Mail 
“US study supports claims of MMR link to autism” – The Times  
    All three of these headlines were based on claims in interviews with the media by Dr Arthur 
Krigsman that he had been able to replicate Wakefield’s findings in experiments. These findings 
had never been published in peer review journals. However, a study that was published in a peer-
review journal which showed that Wakefield’s findings could not be replicated and followed 
similar methodology to the claims of the unpublished Krigsman was ignored by the media 
(Goldacre 2008). 
  Goldacre summarises the main points conveyed by the UK’s media with regards to MMR from 
1998 until the mid-2000s as follows (p.212). Autism is more common, and it is not known why. 
Dr. Wakefield published a scientific study which shows a link between MMR and autism. More 
research since then has agreed with Dr. Wakefield’s findings. Single vaccinations may be safer, 
but government health officials and big pharma have discredited these findings. Tony Blair’s son 
did not get the MMR vaccine. Measles is not really that serious, and measles declined despite the 
vaccine, not because of it. 
  It appears that the media coverage of the MMR scare following Wakefield’s article was in a large 
part responsible for creating and propagating the MMR scare, fuelling public fears and doubts 
with skewed and irresponsible reporting. This directly led to decreased vaccination rates in the 
United Kingdom with the result that measles, mumps and rubella infections soared.  
  Goldacre’s work provides a good and very readable summary of the role of the media in the 
MMR-autism scare. It has also been well documented elsewhere  that media reporting has played 
a significant role in the establishment and propagation of the MMR controversy, with consequent 
loss of trust by the public in vaccinations, vaccination programmes, government initiatives and 
the like (Allen 2007; Demicheli et al. 2012; Flaherty 2011; Hilton, Petticrew, & Hunt 2007). 
  
(3.3) The scientific evidence regarding MMR and autism 
(3.3.1) The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP 2013; AAP 2014) 
  The AAP indicate on their website that they have arranged several panels of independent 
scientists who have reviewed the available evidence regarding MMR and autism (AAP 2014). 
These independent reviews have found that there is no link between autism and MMR. 
Furthermore, on the AAP website there is a list of all the relevant studies that examine a potential 
link between MMR and autism. This list summarises the statistics and findings of the studies. This 
list includes summaries of 45 publications, with the overwhelming conclusion that there is no 
association between MMR and autism (AAP 2013). 




(3.3.2) The Institute of Medicine (IOM 2004) 
  The IOM consists of independent scientific experts. They reviewed the available evidence 
regarding MMR and autism independently, and concluded in their 2004 report that the “evidence 
favours rejection of a causal relationship between MMR vaccine and autism” (IOM 2004). 
  In their review, the included nine controlled observational studies, three ecological studies, and 
two passive reporting studies, all of which showed evidence of no link between MMR and autism. 
Thus, the review included 14 studies providing credible evidence in support of a rejection of a 
link between MMR and autism. 
 Two studies did show a possible link between MMR and autism: one was an ecological study that 
showed a potential correlation between measles containing vaccine doses and the cases of 
autism reported to the special education system in the 1980s; the other was a study of passive 
reporting data by the same authors that showed a positive correlation between autism and doses 
of MMR in the Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting System in the US. However, both studies were 
characterised by serious methodological flaws and lack of clarity. No clear conclusions could be 
drawn from these two studies. These studies were so unclear and uninterpretable, that they were 
considered non-contributory to the IOM review on the link between MMR and autism. 
  The evidence reviewed by the IOM therefore is strongly against an association between MMR 
and autism. 
(3.3.3) Cochrane systematic review (Demicheli et al. 2012) 
  A comprehensive review of the literature regarding measles, mumps and rubella vaccines was 
published by the Cochrane collaboration in 2012. They reviewed and analyzed numerous studies 
addressing the question of a link between autism and MMR vaccines. 
  This included the following study types: three retrospective cohort studies, three case-control 
studies, two time-series studies, and two self-controlled case series. 
Three retrospective cohort studies: 
  These three studies included over 500,000 children in their various cohorts. Each of the studies 
were designed to evaluate an association between MMR and autism spectrum disorders.  
  One of the studies (Madsen et al. 2002) was conducted in Denmark, and included children born 
between Jan 1991 and Dec 1998, for a total of 537,303 children included in the study. No 
significant association was found between MMR and autism spectrum disorder; children who 
had MMR vaccines did not seem more likely to have autism or autism spectrum disorder. The 
Cochrane review demonstrated this study to be at moderate risk of bias with high generalizability 
of the study findings. Given the study design and type, this is acceptable and the Madsen study 
provides fair evidence against a link between autism and MMR. 
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  The other two cohort studies also found no association between MMR and autism, but these 
studies were felt to be at high risk of bias and low generalizability. They also included fewer 
participants, 904 in one and 195 in the other. These two studies therefore provide weaker 
evidence than the Madsen study, although their conclusions are similar to the Madsen study. 
Three case-control studies: 
  The Smeeth et al. (2004) study was a case-control study that compared 1294 children with 
autism type diagnosis with 4469 controls. Data was collected from the United Kingdom General 
Practice research database. This study found no significant association between MMR and 
pervasive developmental disorder, with an odds ratio of 0.86 (95% CI 0.68-1.09) for an 
association between MMR and pervasive developmental disorder. (An odds ratio above 1 
indicates an association between two entities, although it does not prove causation.)    
  The Cochrane review found the Smeeth et al. study to be at moderate risk of bias and the 
generalizability to be medium. Furthermore, the 95% confidence interval for the odds ratio is 
fairly broad, with a top end above 1. These issues decreases the strength of the conclusion 
somewhat, but even with those problems the Smeeth et al. study provides moderately 
trustworthy evidence that there is no link between MMR and autism. 
  The DeStefano et al. (2004) study was a case-control study with 624 children with autism and 
1824 controls. There was no significant difference in MMR vaccination rates between cases and 
controls up to age 24 months. At age 36 months, those with autism had slightly higher rates of 
MMR vaccination than controls. This seemed to be because of vaccination requirements imposed 
on autistic children when they enter early intervention programs to manage their autism. This 
study was assessed to be at moderate risk of bias and medium generalizability. 
  The Mrozek-Budzyn study (Mrozek-Budzyn, Kieltyka, & Majewska 2010) included 96 children 
with autism diagnosis, and 192 control cases. This study found that MMR vaccination was 
associated with lower risk of autism if the vaccine was given before diagnosis, with an impressive 
odds ratio of 0.17 (95% CI 0.06-0.52). The risk for vaccinated children (MMR and single-vaccine) 
compared to non-vaccinated to develop autism was 0.28 (95% CI 0.10-0.76), which means that 
the estimated risk to develop autism was 72% lower in vaccinated children. Furthermore, the risk 
for autism was lower in those who had MMR versus those who had single measles vaccine. This 
study was found by the Cochrane review to be at moderate risk of bias and medium 
generalizability. Therefore, this study provides moderate quality evidence against an association 
between MMR and autism. 
Two time-series studies: 
  The Honda study (Honda, Shimizu, & Rutter 2005) in Japan followed children born between 1988 
and 1996 in the Kohoku Ward of Yokohama, approximately 300,000 in total. MMR declined 
significantly in 1988-1992, and in 1993-1996 no child received vaccination in this Ward. Autism 
spectrum diagnosis increased significantly in 1988-1996, and the rise after 1993 was dramatic. 
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The conclusions drawn from this study is that MMR is unlikely to be the cause of autism spectrum 
disorders, that MMR cannot explain the increase in autism diagnoses and that cessation of MMR 
vaccination will not lead to a decrease in numbers of autism spectrum diagnoses. The Honda 
study was assessed to be at moderate risk of bias and medium generalizability by the Cochrane 
reviewers. 
  The Honda study is fairly persuasive. If MMR is withdrawn and yet numbers of autism diagnosis 
rise dramatically, it seems to provide convincing evidence that MMR is not the cause of autism 
and that withdrawal of MMR will not halt the rise in autism diagnoses. However, given the 
identified limitations of the study, the Honda study is also considered moderate level evidence 
against an association between autism and MMR.  
  The other time-series trial, Fombonne et al. (2006), followed 27,749 children born 1987-1998 in 
Montreal over time. A total of 180 children with pervasive developmental disorder were 
identified. The study found a statistically significant, linear increase in pervasive developmental 
disorder in the study time period. MMR vaccination rates decreased significantly during their 
study period, while pervasive developmental disorder increased significantly. Also, in 1996 a 
second dose of MMR was introduced to vaccination schedules and there was no effect on the 
rate of increase of pervasive developmental disorder. These findings suggest that there is no 
association between MMR vaccine rates and pervasive developmental disorder rates. They 
conclude that the increase in pervasive developmental/autism diagnoses were because of better 
diagnostic procedures and identification of children with these problems, and that there is no 
association between MMR vaccines and pervasive developmental disorders. This study was 
found by the Cochrane review to be at high risk of bias and medium generalizability, which 
somewhat diminishes the confidence one can have in the results. Still, this provides some 
evidence against an association between autism and MMR vaccines. 
Two self-controlled case series: 
    The Cochrane review included two self-controlled case series that provide evidence against a 
possible link between autism and MMR vaccines. These two studies include over 500,000 
children and found no association between MMR vaccines and autism. Both were found to be at 
moderate risk of bias and medium generalizability. 
Conclusion: the Cochrane review 
  The authors conclude that it is unlikely that there is an association between MMR vaccines and 
autism, given the available evidence. They argue that the present evidence “supports current 
policies of mass immunisation aimed at global measles eradication in order to reduce morbidity 
and mortality associated with mumps and rubella” (Demicheli et al. 2012). 
  On review of the studies included in the Cochrane review, one can see that the current evidence 
available is moderate in quality, and is against a possible association between MMR vaccines and 
autism.  
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(3.3.4) The causes of autism 
  A review of the literature point out that the cause of autism is not fully understood, but that 
various theories have emerged, all the subjects of further study (Peterson & Barbel 2013). These 
include associations between autism and advanced paternal age, neonatal jaundice, and genetic 
factors. This review also refers to the evidence that there is no association between MMR and 
autism, and argues that foregoing MMR to avoid autism would lead to harm. The treatment for 
autism relies on early identification and intervention, as many children can improve significantly 
with the appropriate developmental interventions (Peterson & Barbel 2013). 
  The increase in recent diagnosis rates of autism is thought to be because of greater diagnostic 
clarity, a change in the diagnostic criteria and greater awareness of autism in the general public 
(Hilton, Petticrew, & Hunt 2007; Peterson & Barbel 2013). 
  The American Academy of Pediatrics also point out that the MMR vaccine is usually given 
between the age of 12-15 months, and the first signs of autism is usually seen at 15-18 months 
(AAP 2014). It may therefore be natural for some parents to infer a causal association between 
MMR vaccine and autism, especially given the backdrop of the MMR scare in the media. 
However, such temporal associations seem incidental and unfortunate, and inferences regarding 
causal associations are not borne out by the available studies (AAP 2014). 
(3.3.5) Summary: scientific evidence regarding MMR and autism 
  There are no randomized control trials available to address the question of a link between 
autism and MMR. The reason for this is simple: the benefit of the MMR vaccine is enormous and 
the epidemiological evidence is against a possible link between the vaccine and autism, so that 
conducting a randomized control trial to answer this question would be unethical.  
  Thus, we are limited to epidemiological evidence, case-control studies and case series. The 
available evidence is by nature only moderate level evidence, but does give us conclusions that 
we can be reasonably sure of.  
  Of note, no single study has ever found a possible association between autism and MMR 
vaccines. The only study that purported to find such a possible association was a fraudulent study 
by Wakefield, which has since been retracted. 
  Numerous independent reviews of the available evidence have agreed that there does not 
appear to be a link between MMR and autism. The IOM review goes into depth, arguing that 
there is an absence of biological plausibility and no epidemiological association so that the 
available evidence favours rejection of any hypothesis of a link between autism and MMR 
vaccine. 
  We therefore have moderate level evidence, the best we can do given the ethical 
considerations, of which we can be reasonably certain. This evidence is against the possibility of 
an association between MMR and autism. Those persons who continue to hold to a belief that 
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MMR vaccines cause autism do so in opposition to the available evidence, and with no evidence 
in support of their belief. 
  The idea that MMR causes autism should be rejected on the basis of the available studies. Since 
no RCT will be forthcoming, it seems reasonable to continue further epidemiological and case-
control studies to provide further strength to the body of evidence regarding this issue. 
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(4) Vaccine opposition 
(4.1) The historical roots of the anti-vaccination movement 
  Ever since the advent of vaccination, which was born with Jenner’s cowpox virus inoculation, 
there has been an anti-vaccination movement. In his book on the history of vaccination, Allen 
(2007, pp. 64-111) describes this movement in detail: how it started with some dissenting voices; 
how the movement grew in Britain and opposed the 1871 Vaccination Act which subjected 
refusers to fines, loss of property or sentence to the workhouse; how objections against 
vaccinations were a mixture of well-founded criticisms and erroneous criticisms of vaccines; and 
how the British parliament eventually passed a law in 1898 to allow objectors to forego 
vaccination. In the face of organized resistance, Britain finally ended mandatory vaccination in 
1948. 
  Of course, these struggles and anti-vaccine movements were all surrounding small pox vaccine. 
Commenting on the issues surrounding smallpox vaccination in the years leading up to 1948, 
Allen writes (p. 69): 
  “Having struggled for half a century with compulsory vaccination, Britain made peace with the 
antivaccinators by essentially surrendering to them. In the United States, compulsory vaccination 
was only beginning, and so was the struggle over it. There was no federal vaccination law, but as 
the public health movement grew, state laws tightened, and many cities began excluding 
unvaccinated pupils from schools. These laws and practices galvanized the previously passive 
resistance to immunization. The more the public resisted, the more stridently the newly 
empowered public health officials defended the vaccine. The smarter among them understood 
the need for improvement in the smallpox vaccination. Vaccines were unreliably available, of 
uncertain origin, and difficult to make safe. They did not always offer good protection. But 
medicine was not powerful enough to be self-critical, so it persisted in its blinkered unanimity: 
whatever the dangers and drawbacks of vaccinating, it had to be done, unquestioningly.” 
  It appears that, both in the UK and the US, anti-vaccination voices and sentiments were initially 
private and passive, whereas increased pressure to forcibly vaccinate created a more organized 
and cohesive anti-vaccination movement. In the early days of inoculation, the anti-vaccine 
movement may have had some legitimacy as the cowpox vaccine was not always safe and not 
always effective. Not all the concerns raised by the anti-vaccine movement were correct, though. 
These included that smallpox was an “impurity of the blood” which does not need vaccination 
but sanitation; that vaccination is unnatural; that vaccines only work by causing blood poisoning; 
that smallpox was easily preventable and curable by simple lifestyle measures (Allen 2007). There 
was also a strong focus on taking personal responsibility for oneself and control over one’s own 
health.  Allen writes (p104) “The antivaccinists were fueled by a spirit of rebelliousness, a sense 
of being right and outside the law.”  
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  The anti-vaccine movement in the UK and the US were quirky mixtures of legitimate objections 
and false claims, of fact and fiction, of the conceivable and the bizarre, intermingled with a sense 
of personal control and personal rights. It is hard to condone such a strange movement with such 
strange components. Still, vaccine refusal was the only weapon that ordinary people had to 
defend themselves against a procedure where risks and benefits were not always clear. Thus, 
resisting forced vaccinations in that time period seems reasonable, given the value of hindsight. 
  It is evident that the anti-vaccine movement has a long history and a complex heritage. Against 
the backdrop of the medical system of the 1800’s, the anti-vaccine movement may have had 
some legitimacy. The contemporary medical system, however, is very different from the one that 
existed when cowpox inoculations were first performed. Contemporary vaccinations are safe and 
effective, and contemporary medicine is self-reflective and self-correcting. Taking the MMR 
vaccine as an example, conclusive evidence exists of its safety and efficacy, making it an 
outstanding intervention to prevent the dreaded complications of measles, mumps and rubella. 
The legitimacy of the anti-vaccine movement in the present vaccine age is therefore in serious 
doubt. 
  Despite the overwhelming evidence for the safety and effectiveness of contemporary vaccines, 
the anti-vaccination movement still exists and is very vocal in its opposition, particularly against 
the MMR vaccine. Given the evidence, these objections may appear hard to understand. Recent 
publications in the scientific literature have provided some insight into the contemporary anti-
vaccination movement.  
 
(4.2) The contemporary anti-vaccination movement 
  As described in a previous section, sensationalized and irresponsible media coverage of 
Wakefield’s fraudulent study has been responsible for a dramatic increase in concerns regarding 
vaccines and consequent decreased vaccination rates, particularly so for MMR vaccination. 
Recently, however, the Internet has become more prominent in spreading and maintaining anti-
vaccination groups and their beliefs. This is borne out by three recent studies that have looked 
at the role of the Internet in the present day anti-vaccination movement. I shall briefly discuss 
these three relevant papers, mentioning their main findings, and then summarize some 
important conclusions that have important implications for those who seek to engage with anti-
vaccine views. 
(4.2.1) Kata 2010  
  Kata shows in this paper that the anti-vaccination movement has in recent times created a 
visible presence on the internet, and that they use the internet to disseminate their ideas. This is 
to be thought of against the background of a contemporary culture that relies heavily on the 
Internet for health information. Kata cites statistics that 75-80% of Internet users search for 
health information using the Internet, and 70% if these indicate that the information on the 
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Internet influences their healthcare decisions. Furthermore, 52% of users believe that most of 
the health information they access on the Internet is true and accurate. It has also been shown 
that parents who decline vaccinations are more likely to have gained information on vaccination 
from the Internet, and that they use certain anti-vaccination websites. 
  Kata performed vaccination related searches on Google.com and Google.ca, and analyzed the 
content of the websites so retrieved. American searches overall returned 24% anti-vaccine 
information, and Canadian searches 6%. Certain search terms retrieved much higher rates of anti-
vaccine websites, such as the term “vaccination” returning 71% anti-vaccination results. 
  The websites abounded in emotive appeals, featuring pictures of injured children and of scary 
needles. Main themes were:  
 Denying safety and effectiveness of vaccines. For example, this includes claims that 
vaccines cause Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, autism and asthma. There are also claims 
that vaccines do not confer immunity and actually weaken the immune system. Another 
common claim is that the vaccine-preventable diseases such as measles and smallpox are 
actually not harmful, and that these diseases were already disappearing before vaccines 
were created.  
 Promoting alternative medicine and alternative views of health. This includes ideas such 
as “moving back to nature” and using more natural ways of treating illness. There is a 
large scepticism in these posts towards science and the scientific method. 
 Focus on civil liberties. A number of the websites contain allegations of totalitarianism 
and government control, and encouraged parents to take up their rights and protect their 
children. 
 Conspiracy theories or “search for the truth”.  All the anti-vaccination websites had some 
component of conspiracy theory. This included the idea that important information is 
systematically being hidden from the public by government agencies and/or 
pharmaceutical companies. Typically people like Andrew Wakefield is seen as a martyr 
who dared to stand up to the system. 
 Religious themes. Only 25% of the websites cited religious arguments against vaccination, 
such as God making a perfect immune system and using vaccines therefore being an 
affront to God. 
 Falsehoods and incorrect information. Misinformation was found to be widespread, on at 
least 88% of anti-vaccination websites analyzed. This included half-truths and blatant 
falsehoods. There were many claims that were not evidence based, such as that polio is 
caused by sugar. Interestingly enough, the Wikipedia vaccination page contained no 
misinformation and was the most accurate of all the websites viewed. Kata argues that 
this is probably because of the way Wikipedia works, where all users can edit content. 
This created a sort of informal “peer-review”, where errors and misinformation was 
corrected by users. 
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 Emotional appeals. Many of the websites contained emotionally laden stories and 
appeals, meant to sway opinion by use of emotion. This would be something like “do what 
is best for your children by protecting them from these harmful vaccines”. 
  Three main themes emerge from the analysis of the websites.  They are: 
1) Belief in and promotion of alternate models of health. This includes rejection of biomedicine, 
and focus on combination of “natural” views and mind-body-spiritual type views. 
2) Parental autonomy and responsibility. Parents are encouraged to be “experts” on their own 
child and take responsibility for their own child, against a healthcare system that does not care. 
3) Suspicion of expertise. The anti-vaccination movement propagates the idea that the 
healthcare system is not trustworthy, and that “experts” should be viewed with suspicion. 
  Kata argues that these themes are part of a view of the world that may be thought of as 
postmodern. Typically, adherents of a postmodern view would seek alternate explanations for 
illness, not limiting themselves to “evidence” or “facts”. The postmodern view also is skeptical of 
truth-claims, of experts, and of authority figures. Many of the arguments are that parents 
themselves are the experts, and that parents should educate themselves in order to not be taken 
in by the perspectives of the “expert” or “authority”. Postmodernism does not accept one version 
of the truth; therefore the misinformation and misleading statements in the anti-vaccine 
movement is not seen as false, but rather as their version of the truth. 
  Thus, Kata argues that it is not effective to try and combat the anti-vaccine movement solely 
with education or arguments based on scientific data. These types of approaches are seen either 
as part of a conspiracy, or is seen as “your version of the truth”. Education and evidence therefore 
does not remove “my version of the truth”. Thus, although education is important, it really is not 
enough to remove the arguments typically forwarded within the anti-vaccine movement. 
(4.2.2) Kata 2012  
  In this paper, Kata does a follow up analysis of the anti-vaccination movement, specifically on 
the Internet. Since the previous paper, the Internet has become much more focused on user-
generated content, called “Web 2.0”. This means that information is readily shared and accessed 
through social media sites and other ways of user-generated content such as posted videos and 
comments. 
  The main content of anti-vaccine messages includes various strategies, such as shifting 
hypotheses, censorship of pro-vaccine information, attacking critics, misinformation and 
misrepresentations of science. There are also certain often repeated tropes, such as “I am not 
against vaccines, I am for safe vaccines” and that “vaccines are unnatural”. These approaches are 
usually in the form of compelling narratives and are not based on scientific evidence. 
  Kata argues that the contemporary medical paradigm is postmodern, and this means shared 
decision making instead of medical authority, emphasizing values in conjunction with evidence 
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and prioritizing risk over benefit. Web 2.0 plays an important role in this. Users can access health 
information on their own, and educate themselves at “the University of Google”. Many think of 
this as the empowered patient. The trouble, however, is that not all the information is reliable 
and that many users have no way of distinguishing reliable from non-reliable information. Kata 
argues that the contemporary medical paradigm is one where authority is not always trusted, 
anyone can be an “expert”, and suspicion towards science. 
  Mainstream media, such as news and television, have now swung away from the anti-vaccine 
messages and recently are against the anti-vaccination movement. Yet, the anti-vaccination 
movement thrives and flourishes online through various social media sites. They form their own 
communities, in which the mentioned anti-vaccination messages are shared and distributed. 
  It is once again clear in Kata’s analysis that the anti-vaccination movement embraces a 
postmodern view. This means they are skeptical of authority and experts, there are many 
different truths, facts and evidence are less important than narrative and belief/values. Kata 
therefore argues again that education and correcting of flawed arguments, though important, 
are not enough engage the anti-vaccine movement. The anti-vaccination paradigm is sceptical of 
a scientific paradigm, and views evidence and facts as “just another opinion”. 
(4.2.3) Bean 2011  
  Bean also analyzed anti-vaccine content on the Internet. Similarly, it was found that anti-vaccine 
websites are plentiful. On such sites, safety and effectiveness of vaccines are denied, there is a 
focus on civil liberties and totalitarianism from government, there are alternative explanations 
for sickness and health and there is a large focus on conspiracy theories. 
  A new theme identified is an increase in anti-vaccine testimony that is alleged to be from 
physicians. This can persuade people who are otherwise uncertain or on the fence, since it brings 
in a supposed “expert view”. This is rather ironic, since the anti-vaccine movement is sceptical of 
authority but seems to embrace those expert and authority figures that supposedly agree with 
their point of view. 
  Bean argues that vaccine refusers are often well-meaning parents who want the best for their 
children, and who are confused by the anti-vaccine messages. Such people attach value to the 
opinions of their social group, those people with whom they share commitments. “The people 
they trust, naturally enough, tend to be the ones who share their worldview.” Thus, taking this 
argument Bean forwards, the healthcare provider who wishes to address concerns with the 
parent will need to be in a position of trust.  
  Secondly, Bean shows that anti-vaccine messages are typically in narrative form, with 
substantial emotive appeal. Such messages are compelling for emotional reasons. Merely trying 
to combat such messages through evidence is not enough. Bean suggests that narrative and 
emotive components also be incorporated in pro-vaccine messages. This would mean that sound 
scientific evidence be communicated in a way that is gripping and narratively interesting. As an 
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example, Bean mentions a video on the CDC parents’ portal, where parents have a conversation 
with a pediatrician regarding their vaccine fears. 
(4.2.4) Summary and conclusions 
  Whereas the post-Wakefield MMR scare was largely created and sustained by mainstream 
media, the anti-vaccine movement now relies on the Internet for its existence. Anti-vaccine 
messages abound on the Internet, are readily accessible, and influence the actions of those who 
are uncertain regarding vaccinations. 
  The anti-vaccination movement now relies a lot on user-created content and social media/social 
networking. The movement also embraces a view of the world that is suspicious of biomedicine, 
scientific evidence and experts. There is also a sustained belief in conspiracies and government 
totalitarianism. All of this means that health authorities are not trusted by adherents of the anti-
vaccine movement. Furthermore, anti-vaccine adherents typically reject biomedical evidence in 
favour of alternate views of health and illness. 
  Engaging with anti-vaccine messages is more complex than merely correcting poor arguments 
or providing evidence and education. Anti-vaccine messages embrace a completely different 
view of the world, one that Kata describes as post-modern, where there are many different 
“truths” and where facts are “just one more opinion”. 
  Two factors seem to be important in correcting anti-vaccine messages or in engaging with 
parents who have been the subject of such messages. One is the building of trust; being a figure 
of trust is essential in being taken seriously by such parents. Another is the use of narrative and 
emotion in a way that aids the communication of evidence and education, techniques that 
engage the recipient. The idea is not to be deceptive or to appeal to emotion, but rather to make 
it easier for people with an alternate view of the world to engage scientific evidence. These 
approaches may be helpful in correcting the erroneous messages and the way in which they are 
presented on the Internet. 
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(5) What influences parental decision making on vaccination? 
  A systematic review concludes that vaccine refusal was often associated with concerns 
regarding safety and effectiveness of vaccines, dissatisfaction with vaccine information provided 
through health resources, and lower trust in the government and healthcare system (Brown et 
al. 2010). Also, some studies showed that media reports influenced opinion. Rather than official 
sources, other parents were more likely to be trusted because they were thought to have no 
agenda. The authors argue that fostering trusting relationships between healthcare providers 
and parents is important. They also argue that efforts at correcting vaccine refusal should be 
multifactorial, but that it should not antagonise vaccine refusers on issues that they strongly hold 
to – this may lead to an increased anti-vaccine stance. Therefore, it seems that an individualized 
approach is needed, and that trusting relationships between providers of healthcare and parents 
are important in addressing vaccine refusal. The authors also warn against changing current 
approaches too much: using current approaches, vaccine uptake is actually quite high. Any new 
methods incorporated should be such that it would not decrease vaccine uptake in those who 
already accept vaccination. Thus, to reach vaccine refusing parents tailoring an individualized, 
multi-factor approach with a large focus on trust relationships between individual providers and 
parents seems key (Brown et al. 2010). 
  A recent randomized control study studied educational interventions and their effect on 
parental attitudes towards vaccination (Nyhan et al. 2014). The four interventions studies were 
(1) information explaining the absence of evidence for a link between MMR and autism, (2) 
written information of the dangers from vaccine preventable diseases, (3) images of children who 
have vaccine preventable diseases and (4) a dramatic narrative type educational intervention 
about a baby who was close to dying of measles. This trial found that the educational 
interventions corrected misconceptions regarding MMR, but it actually decreased parental intent 
to vaccinate in those parents who started out with low intent to vaccinate. Also, images of sick 
children and a dramatic narrative increased concerns about vaccine side effects. Thus, these 
types of educational interventions do not seem to alter unfavourable parental attitudes towards 
MMR, but rather to strengthen them. Parents who start out with moderate or favourable views 
of vaccination may benefit from educational interventions of the kinds mentioned, but anti-
vaccine parents are likely to be strengthened in their resolve not to vaccinate by such educational 
interventions.   
  Another study conducted focus groups with mothers of infants, and exposed these mothers to 
typical pro- and anti- vaccine messages they may encounter (Leask et al. 2006). Mothers in these 
groups were surprised and concerned by the anti-vaccine messages, but could quickly mitigate 
these anti-vaccine messages and regain their favourable view of vaccines through a variety of 
techniques. This included trust in physicians or healthcare providers, specifically related to 
personal experiences. Family physicians specifically seemed to play an important role in 
vaccination decisions and in negotiating risk. Other techniques used by mothers to dispel anti-
vaccine messages were typecasting of vaccine opponents, anticipation of regret over not 
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immunising, being a good parent and social responsibility. Core influences were doctors, social 
networks and personal experience in seeing the vaccine-preventable diseases. 
  It seems therefore that parents can be influenced by anti-vaccine messages in the media and on 
the internet, and that those parents who refuse vaccination are more likely to be influenced by 
such messages. It also seems as if educational interventions correcting misinformation on 
vaccines can strengthen anti-vaccine attitudes in those who hold unfavourable views on 
vaccination. An important factor that protects parents against anti-vaccination misinformation is 
trust in a healthcare provider. Those who trust their healthcare provider and who have had 
positive experiences with a provider explaining vaccination information seem relatively 
protected against vaccine misinformation. 
  It would seem that two things are important in educating parents. One is ensuring that correct 
information on vaccination is portrayed in the media, in ways that engage parents. A second is 
fostering trusting relationships between parents and healthcare providers. The role of a family 
physician seems particularly important in this regard, and it underlines the importance of 
relationship-centered care in contemporary healthcare. 




 Measles vaccine, whether single dose or combined MMR vaccine, is effective in 
preventing measles infections. One dose of MMR after 12 months of age is 95% effective 
in preventing measles, and two doses over 99% effective. 
 The most common adverse effects of measles vaccines are not concerning and are 
transient: rash (5%), joint pain (25%), fever (5-15%), and febrile seizure (slightly increased 
risk). 
 The serious adverse effects of MMR are very uncommon. Thrombocytopenia (1 per 
30,000 doses) is transient and usually passes with no complication. Anaphylaxis and other 
allergic reactions (less than 1 per million doses) are very rare. It is unclear whether MMR 
truly causes encephalitis, but if it does it is extremely rare (estimated 0.22 cases per 1 
million doses). 
 Epidemiological evidence and various other studies indicate that there is no association 
between autism and MMR vaccination. Independent authoritative reviews of the 
evidence by various organizations have concluded that the evidence is against any 
association between MMR and autism. 
 The benefits of MMR vaccination are sizeable, far outweighing any risk from vaccination. 
 The mainstream media played a large role in creating and sustaining the MMR 
controversy after the publication of Wakefield’s article. This led to a decrease in MMR 
vaccination rates, which directly led to the return of measles as endemic disease to the 
United Kingdom. 
 The anti-vaccination movement now largely depends on the Internet to spread its ideas. 
Anti-vaccination messages depend on an alternate worldview that is sceptical of facts, 
evidence, authority and scientific explanations of health. Central to anti-vaccination 
messages is the idea of a conspiracy and untrustworthiness of health providers and health 
systems. Recently the anti-vaccine movement has moved towards using social media and 
user-generated content. 
 Educational messages from public health to correct misinformation on vaccination can 
benefit those who have moderate or favourable views of vaccines, but they increase anti-
vaccine attitudes in parents who have unfavourable views of vaccination. 
 Some authors have suggested using narrative and emotive content when presenting pro-
vaccine messaging. Although this has its place in helping parents engage with evidence, 
one should guard against solely using emotive appeals. This could alienate parents who 
are successfully reached by current approaches. Best is the use of multiple methods, 
focused on multiple populations. It is best to know the population at which the 
intervention is aimed, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach. 
 A trust relationship with a healthcare provider is key. Such a relationship can protect 
parents against misinformation, and can be a source of credible vaccine information. 
Specifically the role of family physicians seems important. 
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 Since it is known that the mainstream media have influence over the opinions and beliefs 
of parents regarding information, the media have a responsibility to ensure that their 
information is reliable and truthfully presented. 
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Chapter 4: The principlist approach of Beauchamp and 
Childress 
 
  To analyze the ethical aspects of measles vaccination in children, I shall make use of the 
approach to bioethics espoused in Principles of Biomedical Ethics by Beauchamp and Childress 
(B&C) (Beauchamp & Childress 2013). This approach, which I shall refer to simply as principlism, 
has been extremely influential in the field of bioethics, and specifically B&C’s work in this regard. 
This fact is even acknowledged by the opponents of principlism; take as an example the following, 
from authors that are highly critical of principlism: 
  “This approach is taken by most bioethicists, but all three of us regard Beauchamp and 
Childress’s Principles of Bioethics (in its various editions) as the field’s most influential book 
espousing principlism” (Green, Gert, & Clouser 1993, p. 477).  
  Another author, writing on the debate surrounding principlism, states the following: 
  “Widely regarded as the most popular and influential product in the current bioethical 
marketplace, principlism – as it has come to be known – is perhaps best exemplified in Beauchamp 
and Childress’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics (1994)” (Davis 1995, p. 85). 
  The principlist approach of B&C is widely used, extremely influential, and has shown staying 
power. I consider it to be a good framework to use to analyze the ethical issues at stake in specific 
cases, as well as to address practical problems in bioethics. 
  In this chapter, I shall examine the principlism of B&C. This will be done as follows.  
(1) Provide a brief overview of the principles and the method of B&C. 
(2) Examine the grounding of the principles and the idea of the common morality. 
(3) Consider some important criticisms of the principlist approach, and the responses to these 
criticisms. 
(4) Use of the principlism to approach measles vaccination in children. 
  In section 4, I will outline how principlism will be brought to bear on the issue of measles 
vaccination in children; this will lay the foundation for the work of the next few chapters, and 
indicate the method I will use in going forward to reach my eventual conclusions. 
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(1) The principlism of B&C 
  Although the main text in this regard is B&C’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Beauchamp & 
Childress 2013), both authors defend and expound on their work in other places as well. Notably, 
Beauchamp wrote a number of essays that have been collected into one volume, Standing on 
Principles (2010a), and Childress wrote an essay that has been published in A Companion to 
Bioethics (Childress 2001).  
 
(1.1) The central idea  
  The central idea in B&C’s work is that there is a set of four principles that can be used to analyze 
and approach bioethical concerns. They are: (1) respect for autonomy, (2) beneficence, (3) non-
maleficence, and (4) justice (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 13; Beauchamp 2010b). These four 
principles are general guides for action, and are described by B&C as a “starting point” for 
bioethics (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 13), central to bioethics, and as the foundation for 
many other moral judgements and justifications [Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 13; Beauchamp 
2010b, p. 36].  
  It is important to note that these four principles are thought by B&C to be binding on all persons 
engaged in biomedicine, everywhere. B&C claim that these four principles are derived from the 
common morality; that is, a set of moral norms that is agreed upon by all persons who are serious 
about living a moral life (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 3-5, p. 13-14; Beauchamp 2010b, p. 43-
44). The common morality is the result of a series of universally recognised and accepted 
intuitions that, according to B&C, all moral agents in all cultures adhere to and identify with. The 
common morality is not only recognized by all persons committed to morality, but is also binding 
on all persons everywhere. It is a universal morality with universal binding force. Because the 
four principles are derived from the common morality, they are binding on all persons engaged 
in biomedicine everywhere. Another important implication of this idea is that the principles are 
binding no matter what ethical theory one adheres to. Adherents of differing moral theories all 
recognize the validity of the four principles of bioethics, because everyone recognizes the force 
of the common morality. Consequently, the principlist approach provides a means for proceeding 
with ethical deliberation even when persons disagree in theoretical matters. People from 
different backgrounds and persuasions find common ground in the principles of bioethics, and 
can jointly work towards resolving moral problems by use of the principlist approach. The 
principlist approach therefore fosters agreement and common ground, and provides a 
framework to use in interacting with bioethical principles even when people disagree on ethical 
theory. I shall return to the idea of the common morality and the universal nature of the 
principles in more detail a little later. 
  In short, the four principles form a basic summary of the ethical obligations resting on those 
who within biomedicine and biomedical research, and can be used to analyze ethical issues 
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within all spheres of biomedicine and related fields. What is remarkable in this regard, is that our 
moral intuitions cannot be “summed up” or reduced to a single moral principle, as some of B&C’s 
critics insisted it ought to do (more about that later). There are not one, two, three, five, etc. such 
principles, but four.  That, according the authors, is an empirical fact and one that we simply must 
live with, until such time as an analysis of the common morality yields an entirely different, yet 
adequately argued and demonstrated result. 
  Consider this passage written by Beauchamp: 
  “The principles are understood as standards of conduct on which many other moral claims and 
judgments depend. A principle, then, is an essential norm in a system of moral thought and one 
that is basic for moral reasoning. More specific rules for health care ethics can be formulated by 
reference to these four principles, but neither rules nor practical judgements can be 
straightforwardly deduced from the principles” (Beauchamp 2010b, p. 36). 
   Two of their four principles are historic or traditional principles, which have been historically 
recognized as central to medical ethics. These are beneficence and non-maleficence. Non-
maleficence has a long history within medical ethics, usually associated with the oft-quoted 
adage primum non nocere – “first do no harm” (Beauchamp 2010b, p. 38). Both beneficence and 
non-maleficence find expression in the Hippocratic tradition of medicine and the Hippocratic 
Oath (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 150). Thomas Percival’s 1803 publication on medical 
ethics, considered to be the first modern account of medical ethics, also contains an account of 
these two principles (Percival 1803). Percival presented beneficence and non-maleficence as the 
two main ethical obligations of the physician, even arguing that a patient’s wishes should be 
overridden if the patient’s wishes were to conflict with the physician’s duties of beneficence and 
non-maleficence. B&C acknowledge and incorporate the two historical principles of beneficence 
and non-maleficence in their principlist approach to bioethics (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 
13; Beauchamp 2010b, p. 38]. In addition to these two historical principles, B&C’s account 
contain two newer ones: justice and respect for autonomy. Recognition of the principles of 
justice and autonomy developed throughout the 20th century and after, so that contemporary 
principlism contains four principles of bioethics: beneficence, non-maleficence (the two 
Hippocratic/historical principles), autonomy, and justice (the two newer principles that 
developed during and after the 20th century). 
  In two essays on the development of the principles and the Belmont report, Beauchamp 
describes the historical context for these principles (Beauchamp 2010c; Beauchamp 2010d). The 
principles in the Belmont report and the principles in Principles of Biomedical Ethics developed 
side by side, one influencing and informing the other. Beauchamp was involved in both these 
projects, and these ideas therefore necessarily influenced each other. Whereas the Belmont 
report focused specifically on principles that would govern research ethics, B&C’s work in 
Principles had a wider scope, and sought to set our principles that would form the foundation for 
all bioethical matters. The background is important though.  Public outrage in the face of various 
abusive research practices, such as the Tuskegee syphilis study, gave rise to the National 
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Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 
(Beauchamp 2010c; Beauchamp 2010d). The National Commission was tasked with developing 
guidelines and ethical principles that govern biomedical research. One of the important 
documents that was produced, was the Belmont report, with the full name of The Belmont 
Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research. The 
Belmont report identified three ethical principles, meant to protect research subjects: respect 
for persons (treating people as autonomous agents and protecting those without autonomy), 
beneficence (protecting the well-being of participants) and justice (ensuring equitable 
distribution of research burdens and benefits) (The National Commission for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1979).  Beauchamp was a leading figure 
in the development of the Belmont report, and it is easy to see how the ideas in the Belmont 
report and in Principles developed side-by-side. When Principles was completed, B&C included 
the two newer principles of autonomy and justice alongside the traditional medical ethics 
principles of beneficence and autonomy. 
 
  (1.2) The four principles 
Beneficence describes the moral obligation to work towards the benefit of others (Beauchamp & 
Childress 2013, p. 203-248; Beauchamp 2010b, p. 39-41). Thus, in bioethical terms, to say that a 
healthcare provider has a duty of beneficence means that the provider has the duty to provide 
benefits to their patients. These benefits can be varied, but are usually understood to mean 
benefits appropriate to the role of persons engaged in biomedicine; that is, promoting health and 
healing, diminishing suffering, treating pain and so forth. Providers who are actively working to 
further the best interests of their patients in keeping with the scope of biomedicine are said to 
be acting in accordance with the principle of beneficence. Basically stated, beneficence means 
furthering the patient’s best interest through the practice of biomedicine. It is the simple yet 
noble notion of “helping people”. 
  Non-maleficence is the moral obligation to avoid doing harm (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 
150-201; Beauchamp 2010b, p. 38-39). It places an obligation on persons engaged in the practice 
of biomedicine to consider their conduct in the light of potential harm that might result, and to 
avoid such actions that may lead to harm. Whereas the principle of beneficence includes taking 
action to remove harm and remove suffering, the principle of non-maleficence is more to be 
thought of as placing a prohibition on actions that would result in harm. There is thus a distinction 
in scope and intent of these two principles. Yet, it seems that there are some areas of overlap 
and that the distinction is not always as clear. In general, the principles of beneficence and non-
maleficence seem to act in unison in placing an obligation on those practicing biomedicine to 
further the best interests of their patients through removing and avoiding harm while providing 
benefits where possible. Of course, it is not always possible to do “no harm.” Performing surgery 
is quite harmful, and can even be quite violent. It was also recognised as such in the Hippocratic 
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tradition of medicine; hence the strict ban on surgery in the classical Hippocratic Oath. The 
question is whether the risk of harm is justified by the benefit of the action. Taking an antibiotic 
may cause harm through adverse effects, but if the benefit through the healing action of the 
antibiotic is necessary to save a life, it is thought that the risk of harm is acceptable. Non-
maleficence does not in such cases prohibit the use of surgery or the use of antibiotics because 
it may cause adverse effects. It should therefore be said that non-maleficence asks of persons in 
biomedicine not to do “net harm” or “overall harm”. Thus, correctly understood, the principle of 
non-maleficence does two things. First, it provides a check on actions of persons involved in 
biomedicine. Persons in biomedicine should consider their actions and if it is so that their actions 
would lead to harm, such actions are prohibited through non-maleficence. Second, those 
involved in biomedicine may not do “overall harm” or “net harm” when the sum of the result of 
actions are considered. Whenever a treatment or project is undertaken and it is clear that there 
are possible resultant harms, it should be that the net end result is not overtly harmful. 
Furthermore, when potential harms can be foreseen, the potential harm has to be justified. 
Persons in biomedicine cannot accept inflicting potential harms unless morally justified. Thus, 
the principle of non-maleficence provides an ethical check on the actions of persons within 
biomedicine. They may not cause overt or overall harm, and when it seems that harm may result 
from a certain course of action that harm must be justified, as in the case of life-saving surgery 
that may result in adverse effects. 
  The principle of Respect for autonomy (autonomy) refers to the obligation on persons within 
biomedicine to respect the free decisions of patients themselves (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, 
p. 101-147; Beauchamp 2010b, p. 37-38). The idea is that people should be given the freedom to 
make their own decisions with regards to their healthcare and best interests without coercion or 
interference. B&C argue that the principle of autonomy encompasses a negative and a positive 
obligation (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 107). The negative obligation is to avoid controlling 
or manipulating the free choices of persons. In other words, providers may not place obstacles 
in the way of the free choices of individuals. The positive obligation is to promote autonomous 
decision making. For example, this may mean disclosing information that is relevant to the 
decision making of the person in question, or explaining relevant treatment options and 
outcomes in ways that make it possible for the person to decide freely. Thus, health care workers 
not only have the obligation to avoid burdening the free choices of individuals through coercion 
and manipulation, they also have the obligation to promote the capacity of individuals to decide 
for themselves through relevant disclosure and explanations. Of course, the principle of 
autonomy rests on the assumption that a person is capable of making decisions for themselves. 
This requires the ability to understand the options before them, to engage in a process of 
reasoning and to eventually choose the option that they deem to bring about their desired goals. 
The capacity to engage in this sort of activity is a necessary requirement for autonomous decision 
making. Many of the challenges posed by autonomy happen when a patient lacks this capacity, 
or when there are doubts as to a patient’s capacity to make their own decisions. 
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  The principle of justice refers to ensuring that people are fairly treated with regards to what is 
owed them (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 249-293; Beauchamp 2010b, p. 41-42). Thus, justice 
requires that people are treated in accordance with what they deserve; to be treated justly is to 
get what is rightfully yours. Distributive justice in the bioethical context, specifically, refers to a 
fair distribution of burdens and benefits within society. This means that people get the benefits 
that they deserved, based on criteria of desert, and that patients are not recipients of undeserved 
or undue burdens. Drawing on Aristotle, B&C formulate a “formal principle of justice”: equals 
must be treated equally, and unequals must be treated unequally. But how to determine the 
criteria for desert, how to determine who are equals and in what sense, is controversial. To 
specify criteria for a just distribution, one needs a material principle of justice. Such a material 
principle of justice identifies the relevant properties of desert, and specifies how distribution 
should happen in accordance with these properties. B&C identify six different material theories 
of justice, each of which specifies a set of criteria along which a just society distributes benefits 
and burdens.  
  Thus, substantial controversy and disagreement can arise as to what exactly constitutes a just 
distribution of, for example, medical benefits and burdens. Proponents of a specific theory of 
justice could disagree completely with proponents of alternate theories of justice, while each 
party claims the authority of the principle of justice as providing justification for their own 
conclusions. This is a serious shortcoming in the explication of this principle. B&C’s solution is to 
appeal to qualities of all the different conceptions of justice. They argue that none of the different 
theories of justice are perfect or complete, each having a set of defects. Yet, each theory of justice 
highlights something of importance in understanding the principle of justice, and therefore each 
of these different theories can be used in the making of health policy. Over time, health policy 
will sometimes emphasize one theory of justice and at other times other theories of justice. It 
appears as if B&C mean to say that the different theories of justice can be used together. Rather 
than viewing them as opponents of one another, one can use features of each in addressing 
problems of distributive justice within society, in a sort of a “mixed use” of the varying principles 
(Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 293; Beauchamp 2010b, p. 41). It is not quite clear how this is 
to be done, or how to avoid arbitrarily appealing to the theory of justice that happens to suit 
one’s fancy in the particular circumstance. For my present project, this is a problem to take 
seriously. I shall show that the main material theories of justice in the B&C account can be 
brought into agreement on the subject of measles vaccination in children. Consequently, I will be 
able to claim the support of the principle of justice for my eventual conclusions, without being 









  The principles are general guides for action, and confers duties on persons engaged in 
biomedical matters. But these principles are very general, and in their general forms lack the 
focus and specificity required to provide specific guidance for specific situations. The general 
principles are meant to be used to formulate specific action guides that provide ethical guidance 
in specific situations. That is to say, in order to give concrete guidance to actions, these general 
principles need to be further specified. Specification means that the vague nature of these moral 
norms are reduced by giving them concrete content that can be used to guide actions 
(Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 17; Beauchamp 2010b, p. 45). For example, the principle of 
non-maleficence is too vague in itself to guide action when confronted with a questions in end-
of-life decision making. The physician knows the principle states not to do harm to the patient; 
but in order to know how to ethically proceed with care, the physician needs to know what would 
constitute a harm in this situation, and how best to avoid it.  
  Specification can take the form of narrowing the scope of the norms, by answering the questions 
“where, when, why, how, by what means, to whom, or by whom the action is to be done or 
avoided” (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 17; Beauchamp 2010b, p. 45). Specification 
furthermore adds information to the general principles, to clarify the norms in specific contexts. 
So, for example, autonomy may be specified in a specific context to say, “Respect the autonomy 
of persons when they become incapacitated by following their advance directive” (Beauchamp 
& Childress 2013, p. 17; Beauchamp 2010b, p. 46). This creates a clear ethical action guide for a 
concrete situation by specifying the implications of the principle of autonomy for a specific set of 
circumstances. If further specification is needed, progressive specification can continue until a 
clear action guideline emerges. The proviso is that there must be a visible connection between 
the specification and the original principle all the way through (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 
17; Beauchamp 2010b, p. 46).   
  Elsewhere Beauchamp explains that specification augments indeterminate moral principles by 
supplying them with specific moral content. Specification adds details that removes conflict and 
incompleteness from generalized rules and principles. Thus, principles are “explicated and made 
suitable” for application to certain situations, by developing concrete rules or policies through a 
process relying on moral judgement and decision making (Beauchamp 2010e, p. 157). 
 
(1.4) Prima facie versus actual obligation and weighing of principles 
  Each principle confers an obligation on a person engaged in biomedicine. But how do we know 
when a specific principle is applicable to a specific situation, and what do we do if the different 
principles demand different courses of action? Before I consider these questions, I will take a step 
back and briefly introduce the work of W.D. Ross. The work of Ross has influenced the 
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development of B&C’s principles, and particularly the idea of resolving conflicts between 
principles (Beauchamp 2010b, p. 44). 
The work of Moore and Ross 
  Ross advances a theory of ethics based on the work of GE Moore. Moore has theorized that we 
intuitively recognize the property of “good” when it is attached to a specific thing or set of 
circumstances, and that right action consists in maximizing good (Moore 2004). Moore argued 
that the term “good” can never be defined in some naturalistic sense. For example, utilitarians 
would define “good” as “that which produces the most happiness”. But, then it would be to say 
“good is the greatest happiness”, which is to say “the greatest happiness is the greatest 
happiness”, which is essentially meaningless. Another way to think of this is the following. We 
may say that “good means to promote happiness”. But then, if we are faced with a specific 
circumstance, we may ask: “we are now creating happiness; but is it good?” 
  Moore is particularly interested in what the term “good” – the fundamental category of morality 
and ethics – denotes. He claims that “good” is one of the simple, indivisible notions/qualities (like 
“yellow”) in the world that are indefinable. To say “yellow is that which produces a certain 
vibration in the light”, or that “good” is “that which produces pleasure”, is not to define these 
terms. When the effects of a simple property are confused with the property itself, we see the 
“naturalistic fallacy” 
  Moore’s point is that if the utilitarian definition of “good” is correct, the question “is happiness 
always good?” would be a tautology, since it would amount to the question: “is the good always 
the good?” Moore’s point, however, is that the question “is happiness good?” is not a tautology; 
in fact it is a quite meaningful question. That demonstrates that “the good” cannot be equated 
or reduced to something else, like happiness. What the good is, is something that we simply 
intuitively know.  In this sense the term “good” is indefinable. Yet, although it is indefinable, we 
have a pretty good idea of what “good” is. It’s one of the “irreducables” of language in terms of 
which other definitions are constituted.  
  Thus, Moore argues that ethics is concerned with the study of the good; and that “good” is an 
indefinable, non-naturalistic property that is present to a greater or lesser degree in different 
sets of circumstances. Humans can look at a set of circumstances and judge how much “good” is 
present in it by direct judgement (Moore 2004, p. 36,148). In this sense, it is like the property 
“yellow”. “Yellow” may be defined as the physical effects of certain light-vibrations on the eye 
(Moore 2004, p. 10). But that is not what is meant when we say something is “yellow”. Humans 
do not perceive light vibrations when they look at a yellow object – they simply see a yellow 
object. These light vibrations are “what corresponds in space with the yellow we perceive.” 
Similarly, “good” is a property of some sets of circumstances that we can recognize when we see 
it. Describing instances of good or things that are good, such as pleasure or happiness, does not 
constitute a definition. Thus, on Moore’s theory, good is an indefinable non-naturalistic property 
that we can recognize when we see it. Right actions, then, are those actions which cause more 
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“good” to exist – “Our ‘duty’, therefore can only be defined as that action, which will cause more 
good to exist in the Universe than any possible alternative” (Moore 2004, p. 148). Thus, 
judgements about what is “good” is made intuitively, seen directly as being self-evidently “good” 
(Moore 2004, p. 148); and duty then consists in those actions that brings about the greatest 
amount of this intuitively recognized “good”. 
  Moore’s theory is therefore a form of intuitionism. That is, we as humans can directly and 
intuitively see how much good is present in a situation, and how much more good will be present 
if we bring about a different set of circumstances through performing our duty. Ross accepts 
Moore’s theory as “attractive” (Ross 1930, p. 16), and formulates it as follows: “that what makes 
actions right is that they are productive of more good than could have been produced by any 
other action open to the agent” (Ross 1930, p.16). Ross, however, expands Moore’s theory 
substantially. Being critical of Moore, he writes that Moore’s theory simplifies the relations in 
which we stand. Specifically, Moore’s theory conceives of all people as merely “being possible 
beneficiaries by my action” (Ross 1930, p. 19). But, this is not the only morally significant 
relationship in which a person stands. A person may stand in different relationships that may 
confer different duties; Ross recognizes the following: promisee to promiser, creditor to debtor, 
wife to husband, child to parent, friend to friend and fellow countryman to fellow countryman 
(Ross 1930, p. 19). A person who stands in any of these relationships is in a position to bring 
about good in a way that other persons can’t. These relationships create special avenues for 
bringing about the maximal amount of good, and therefore each of these relationships create a 
special obligation or a specific duty. 
  Ross argues that each of these relationships creates a prima facie duty (Ross 1930, p. 19). That 
is, each of these confers a duty which is at first glance binding. This duty should be discharged if 
it is not overruled by some other duty or morally relevant set of circumstances that negates the 
prima facie duty (Ross 1930, p. 19-20). So, one’s actual duty depends on the interplay of the 
different prima facie duties. Ross recognizes the following groups of prima facie duties (Ross 
1930, p. 21): 
(1) Duties that rest on previous acts of my own (those resting on a promise or an implicit promise, 
or those resting on a wrongful act I have committed) 
(2) Duties that rest on the acts of others (services performed to me). 
(3) Duties of justice (the duty to upset distributions of pleasure and happiness that are not in 
accordance with merit). 
(4) Duties of self-improvement. 
(5) Duties that can be summed up in “not injuring others” (non-maleficence). 
  Ross considers these prima facie duties as self-evident in a way that is akin to mathematical 
axioms (Ross 1930, p.29-30). Mathematical axioms are self-evidently true and are not in need of 
proof. Rather, one can see intuitively by direct judgement, when apprehending these axioms, 
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that they are true. But one is not at every stage in one’s life able to appreciate this fact. One 
needs a certain level of cognitive development and “sufficient mental maturity” to appreciate 
the truth of the axioms. Yet, the axioms are undoubtedly true. The same can be said of these 
prima facie duties. They are self-evidently true, and intuitively seen to be true. They are “as much 
a part of the fundamental nature of the universe (and, we may add, of any possible universe in 
which there were moral agents at all) as is the spatial or numeric structure expressed in the 
axioms of geometry or arithmetic” (Ross 1930, p. 29-30).  
  Thus, there are two influential themes in Ross’s work. One is that there is a set of prima facie 
duties that confers obligations on a person. These obligations are binding and should be 
discharged, except when they are overruled by another compelling moral reason. So, when 
different duties are in conflict, one arrives at one’s actual duty by weighing the prima facie duties 
against each other. So, Ross states that we all know it may sometimes be necessary for us to 
break a promise to relieve someone’s distress or to lie to protect someone from harm (Ross 1930, 
p. 28). In these cases, a person’s actual duty is determined by weighing the various prima facie 
obligations against each other. The second theme is that one can intuitively see the presence of 
these prima facie duties in the situations and relationships one finds oneself in. It does require 
what Ross calls “sufficient mental maturity”. If one has this capacity, as presumably most adults 
do, then one can intuitively see these 5 duties impinging on one and demanding certain actions 
from one. To then arrive at one’s actual duty, one has to weigh the different prima facie duties. 
Prima facie obligations and weighing in B&C’s principlism 
  The principles function in practical situations fairly similarly to the prima facie duties that Ross 
describes. A person engaged in some field of biomedicine, finding themselves confronted with a 
specific situation, will be able to intuitively see which of the four principles are involved in the 
case. It may be that more than one principle is involved. These principles may even be (and often 
are) in conflict. Each of the principles confer a prima facie obligation on the person. That is, the 
principles each create a duty that has to be discharged, unless a sufficient moral reason exists to 
overrule the prima facie duty. Should a person have conflicting prima facie duties, these have to 
be weighed against each other to find the person’s actual duty. 
  B&C argue that moral norms can often justifiably be overridden by other moral norms with 
which they are in conflict (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 15; Beauchamp 2010b, p. 44). For 
example, we may be morally justified in not telling the truth to prevent one person from 
murdering another. When principles are in conflict, one has to determine one’s actual obligation 
through a process of weighing the conflicting principles. B&C argue that this distinction of prima 
facie vs actual obligation resembles our moral experience very well, and is in practice an essential 
framework for resolving bioethical problems (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 16). 
  Weighing is the process of using supporting reasons to assign relative importance to conflicting 
principles in a specific situation (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 20). Thus, when one is faced 
with conflicting principles in a certain situation, weighing involves considering reasons as to why 
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one of the conflicting principles should be followed over another. Through supplying of 
supporting reasons and reasoned argument, relative weights are assigned to conflicting moral 
considerations, until a supportable ethical decision is made.  
  A distinction between specification and weighing should be highlighted. Weighing is concerned 
with finding reasons to follow one moral principle over another in a specific instance of conflict. 
It is more suited to specific cases and practical deliberations. Specification has to do with 
narrowing the scope of principles and supplying them with additional information that will lead 
to clear action guides. Specification is therefore more suited to formulating of policies 
(Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 20). 
  Beauchamp gives the following example of weighing when principles conflict (Beauchamp 
2010b, p. 45). Suppose a physician has a patient that works at the same hospital as the physician. 
The physician knows that this patient has mental health concerns and does not cope with stress 
well. The patient and fellow-employee is applying for a position at the hospital that would mean 
a significant promotion for the employee, but it is a very demanding and stress-filled position. 
The physician knows that the information regarding the employee’s mental health concerns are 
confidential. But, the physician also feels concerned about the effects this promotion may have 
on the patient/employee. Thus, the physician has conflicting duties: confidentiality (supported 
by respect for autonomy), beneficence and non-maleficence. Should the physician break 
confidence in order to protect the health of the patient? Are there other alternatives, such as 
directly talking with the patient even though this may harm the physician-patient relationship? 
In order to know how to proceed, a process of weighing should take place. That means finding 
the action alternatives, seeing which principles support which action alternatives, and finding 
reasons that would assign relative weight to one principle over another. 
  Such a process of weighing can be vulnerable to arbitrariness or biases. To prevent this, B&C 
suggest six conditions that have to be met before one principle can be allowed to overrule 
another (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 23). 
(1) Good reasons can be offered to act on the overriding norm rather than on the infringed norm. 
(2) The moral objective justifying the infringement has a realistic prospect of achievement. 
(3) No morally preferable alternative is available. 
(4) The lowest level of infringement, commensurate with achieving the primary goal of the action, 
has been selected. 
(5) All negative effects of the infringement have been minimized. 
(6) All affected parties have been treated impartially. 
  If these six conditions are met, one principle may be given weight over another so that the actual 
obligation in the circumstances would emerge. 
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(1.5) Justification in principlism and the idea of reflective equilibrium 
  Once we have engaged in a process of specification or weighing, we need to be sure that our 
judgements are ethically justifiable. This brings in the question of justification – how do we know 
if a specific judgment or belief is ethically justified?  
  Justification in ethics refers to showing that there exists sufficient reasons to accept the ethical 
judgment in question. Our judgments and decisions are ethically justified if we can demonstrate 
that we have adequate reasons to accept the judgment. These reasons need to be sufficient to 
support the judgment, and have relevance to the judgment itself (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, 
p. 390). 
  B&C argue for a method of justification based on achieving reflective equilibrium (Beauchamp 
& Childress 2013, p. 404-410). Reflective equilibrium in this sense refers to bringing practical 
judgments and the four principles in balance with one another in a way that brings about the 
most coherence possible. It is based on the concept of reflective equilibrium espoused by Rawls 
(Rawls 1971, p. 19-21, 46-55).  
Rawls’ reflective equilibrium 
  Rawls (1971) is engaged in a project of identifying contractual principles of justice based on a 
hypothetical “initial position” where all persons are called upon to agree on the most just way to 
distribute societal goods in a situation where these goods will become available in a society in 
which they do not beforehand know what their socio-economic position will be. In other words, 
they have to deliberate about what a just distribution of goods will be while they all still are 
behind a “veil of ignorance”. This initial position is hypothetical, and asks us to imagine all people 
who are to make up society behind a veil of ignorance, where everyone is equal and no-one 
knows what their position or level in society is to be. Now, says Rawls, we want to identify the 
principles of justice that people behind this veil of ignorance would agree to. People who are 
rational and concerned with their self-interest would want to make sure that whatever principles 
are chosen to govern the society they are about to enter would ensure the best possible situation 
for themselves in society. Because no-one knows what position or place they will occupy in 
society, they would want to ensure that the position of the worst off is nevertheless acceptable; 
that the worst possible life in society would still be a fairly acceptable life. Thus, says Rawls, 
people in such an original position behind the veil of ignorance would choose a specific set of 
principles of justice to govern society. Rawls eventually adopts these principles as the central 
tenets of his theory of justice (Rawls 1971, p. 60). 
  However, there is a second way in which to proceed in order to justify the principles coming 
from the original position. This is to see if the principles that we come up with when we think of 
the original position match up with our “considered convictions” of justice (p.19). That is, do 
these principles of justice Rawls have identified match up with our considered practical 
judgments regarding what is just and what is not? To answer this question, we must compare 
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these principles with what Rawls calls our considered judgments – the practical judgments we 
have a lot of confidence in. Thus, does the newly identified principles deliver the same 
judgements as those intuitive judgments we have a great degree of confidence in? Rawls uses 
the examples of religious intolerance and racial discrimination. We have a great degree of 
confidence that religious intolerance and racial discrimination are unjust, and that we are free 
from bias and swaying influences when we make this judgement. But, there are other things we 
are much less sure of intuitively – how wealth should be distributed in society or how authority 
should be distributed, for example (p.20). 
  So, argues, Rawls, we begin by matching our principles to our considered judgments. If we see 
discrepancies, we can do one of two things. We can either modify our principles of justice to 
match our considered judgements more closely, with the implication of having to adjust the 
conditions of the initial position. Or, we can modify those aspects of our considered judgments 
that conflict with the principles. This process can continue in a back-and-forth way, introducing 
judgments of different levels of certainty along the way. This will mean sometimes we modify 
the original position and our principles, and sometimes we modify our judgments to more closely 
line up with our principles. Eventually, the goal is to reach a stage where our judgements and our 
principles are matched. In Rawls’ words, “I assume that eventually we shall find a description of 
the initial situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match 
our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted” (p. 20). This is called “reflective 
equilibrium”, and refers to that point where we can on reflection appreciate that our judgments 
are balanced with our principles. 
B&C’s justification through reflective equilibrium (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 
404-410) 
  Reflective equilibrium, then, refers to a way of bringing harmony between our practical 
judgments (arrived at through weighing and specification in a given situation) and the four 
principles. Once we have specified and weighed, we want to reach the point where there is 
maximal coherence between our set of moral judgments or beliefs. If we note instances of 
conflict between some of the judgments arrived at through weighing, or conflict between a 
current set of judgments and a prior set of moral beliefs we hold to, we have to enter into a 
process that would restore equilibrium. This would mean that we could modify some of the 
judgments we have just arrived at to harmonize them with our other moral beliefs, or we could 
slightly modify prior moral beliefs to align all our judgments with each other. The goal is always 
the greatest amount of coherence in our moral beliefs; if incoherence and internal conflict 
between different moral judgments remain, we should continue to work back and forth. B&C 
describe the process as follows: 
  “The goal of reflective equilibrium is to match, prune, and adjust considered judgments, their 
specifications, and other beliefs to render them coherent. We then test the resultant guides to 
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action to see if they yield incoherent results. If so, we must further readjust the guides.” 
(Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 405) 
  This process is ongoing; it is unlikely that we will ever fully settle every moral question or arrive 
at a final solution of sorts. What we should be in search of is the maximal amount of coherence 
we are capable of, making our moral beliefs and judgments line up with the principles in a way 
that brings the most harmony between all our beliefs and principles possible. When new cases 
arise that test our moral beliefs, we embark on the process again. 
The approach is perhaps best summed up in this paragraph, taken from an essay by Beauchamp: 
  “A specification is justified, in the four-principles approach, if and only if it maximizes the 
coherence of the overall set of relevant, justified beliefs. These beliefs could include empirically 
justified beliefs, justified basic moral beliefs, and previously justified specifications. This is a 
version of so-called wide reflective equilibrium” (Beauchamp 2010b, p. 47). 
  Thus, once a person has considered a specific biomedical issue from the perspective of the 
principles, and arrived at action guides for this specific issue, it is necessary to keep working until 
reflective equilibrium is reached. To do this, the various action guides are brought into harmony 
with each other, and with other moral beliefs the person already affirms and adheres to, by the 
process described by Rawls and B&C. This is only at an end once a maximal coherence is reached 
between the various action guides and other moral beliefs. That is, the newly formed moral 
judgments are on reflection in balance with one another and with other moral beliefs in a way 
that maximizes coherence in the person’s set of moral beliefs. If conflicts remain, the work of 
justification is not yet done. Only once maximal coherence is reached can a set of moral beliefs 
be viewed as ethically justified. 
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(2) The grounding of the four principles in the common morality 
  In the earlier versions of B&C’s Principles, the principles were seen as midlevel constructs, in-
between ethical theory and action rules. According to this view, ethical theories are the highest 
levels of abstraction. Principles are then supported by the ethical theories. In their turn, principles 
are used to specify ethical rules. Lastly, rules are used to justify concrete moral judgments and 
actions. For example, in their second edition a diagram of this sort appears (Beauchamp & 
Childress 1983, p. 5):  
 
    











Diagram 4.1: From B&C 2nd Edition (format modified, content the same)    
 
  This diagram is accompanied by the following explanation (Beauchamp & Childress 1983, p. 5): 
  “According to this diagram, judgments about what ought to be done in particular situations are 
justified by moral rules, which in turn are justified by principles, which ultimately are justified by 
ethical theories.” 
  This is therefore a deductivist way of thinking about the role of the principles: the principles are 
deduced from ethical theories. From the principles rules are deduced. And from the rules, 
particular judgments and actions are deduced. According to B&C, it does not matter which theory 
one would place in position (4) on the diagram: deontological or consequentialist theories would 
all lead to support for the same four principles they have identified. Thus, even though there is 
(4) Ethical theories 
(3) Principles 
(2) Rules 
(1) Particular judgments 
and actions 
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sustained controversy around which ethical theory is to be preferred, and no single ethical theory 
enjoys universal support in moral philosophy, we can all agree on the validity of the four 
principles. People from different ethical backgrounds would all support the four principles, B&C 
argued. Competing moral theories would each lead us to support the validity of the four 
principles. Therefore, discussions on rules and on particular judgments rightly start with the 
principles. In fact, Beauchamp and Childress apparently are adherents of different moral theories 
– one deontological, the other utilitarian – and the implication is that both of these competing 
theories lead to support for the four principles of bioethics. 
  In later editions (such as the 7th edition which I used as the basis for this work), B&C move away 
from the deductivist mode of thinking in favour of the reflective equilibrium method of 
justification, which I have described above. Thus, the principles are not to be applied deductively. 
Instead, they are to be used for specification and practical judgments in a process of back-and-
forth application and pruning, until a balance is achieved between principles and judgments that 
allows the greatest amount of coherence possible between moral beliefs. 
  In addition to this, B&C have also moved the grounding of the principles to the common 
morality. Instead of the claim that the principles are deduced from ethical theories, with different 
theories all leading to the same principles, the claim is now that the principles are directly found 
in the common morality. To understand this claim, one has to first understand B&C concept of 
the common morality. I shall here briefly outline two different discussions of the common 
morality; the first from two different editions of Principles, and the other from the essays of 
Beauchamp.  
The common morality of B&C (Beauchamp & Childress 2001, p. 2-4, 401-408; 
Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 3-5, 410-423) 
  The common morality can be thought of as follows. There are areas of great agreement between 
people who live a moral life, even though their moral commitments may be based on different 
ethical theories or different cultural backgrounds. There are a set of moral norms that would be 
agreed to by Kantians, utilitarians, Catholics, virtue adherents and human rights theorists – 
people who have widely disparate theoretical commitments and backgrounds. This set of moral 
norms that everyone would agree on, no matter their theory of persuasion, is the common 
morality. 
  Within the common morality, there are various action guides, for example: (1) Do not kill, (2) 
Do not cause suffering, (3) Prevent harm, (4) Rescue those in danger, (5) Tell the truth, (6) Nurture 
the young and the dependent, (7) Keep your promises, (8) Do not steal, (9) Do not punish the 
innocent, and (10) Obey just laws [1, p.3]. The common morality also contains moral character 
traits, or virtues. Within the common morality is also found principles and human rights. Various 
different types of moral norms find a place within the common morality, all of these agreed on 
by everyone who is serious about living a moral life. 
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  Based on the work of Frankena and Ross, B&C identify the following features of common 
morality theories (Beauchamp & Childress 2001, p. 402-403; Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 
410-411):  (1) The common morality relies on every day, shared moral beliefs and judgments for 
its starting point. (2) If an ethical theory cannot be made consistent with the contents of the 
common morality, this theory is suspect. (3) The common morality is pluralistic, containing two 
or more principles that are not absolute (prima facie) nor reducible to a single one. 
  Thus, the common morality can be thought of as pre-theoretical. It is not based on a specific 
moral theory, and it is not dependent on the validity of a specific moral theory. In fact, the 
common morality provides support for theories. An ethical theory that contradicts the norms of 
the common morality is not a feasible ethical theory. Note also that the common morality has at 
least two (and in fact more) principles that confer a prima facie duty. In keeping with the work of 
Ross (1930), these prima facie duties have to be weighed to find the actual duty of a person.  
  B&C state that the four principles of bioethics are found within the common morality, and derive 
their binding force from the common morality rather than any specific ethical theory (Beauchamp 
& Childress 2013, p. 13). Thus, the validity of the four principles is based on our shared moral 
judgments, so that everyone who is serious about living a moral life can recognize the moral force 
of the four principles without appealing to a specific moral theory. B&C argue that there is no 
single ethical theory that enjoys universal consensus or that is widely accepted as the standard 
moral theory (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 411-412). There is no single moral theory that 
enjoys the wide acceptance that the norms in the common morality does. The closest we get to 
such an ideal, are four principles. The common morality is therefore, according to B&C, the 
correct starting point and grounding for the four principles. 
  The implication of these arguments is that a unified ethical theory does not hold a central place 
in practical bioethics, at least according to the principlism paradigm. The correct starting point is 
not theory, say B&C, but the common morality – from which the four different principles are 
derived. It is not possible to find a single theory that would deliver these insights or enjoy the 
same amount of moral consensus as the common morality and the four principles do. Thus, to 
say that the principles should be derived from a specific theory would be to “put the cart in front 
of the donkey” (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 411). The common morality is the appropriate 
starting point, and the appropriate grounding for any theory. Not the other way around.  
  B&C therefore argue for four different principles, derived from the common morality, as the 
starting point for bioethical reflection rather than a single unified ethical theory. In their view, an 
ethical theory would not allow the same amount of nuance and depth as the four principles do, 
a single theory would not enjoy the same amount of validity and binding force, and a single theory 
would always come second to the shared judgments found in the common morality. 
  It is clear from their work that B&C have been markedly influenced by the work of Ross 
(Beauchamp & Childress 2001, p. 402) and that their account of the common morality relies 
heavily on Ross. To recall, Ross (1930) argued for the existence of a set of irreducible moral 
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principles that can be intuitively seen as being valid. Each of these principles confer a prima facie 
duty on a person. There is no hierarchy and there is no rule for deciding between them in times 
of conflict; rather, one determines one’s actual duty through weighing the demands of the 
principles against each other.  
  Thus, we can see this theme in B&C’s common morality account as well: a set of principles that 
we can all recognize to be self-evidently true and valid. They are not reducible to one another, 
and there is no hierarchy between them. Each principle confers prima facie duties in a given 
situation; to arrive at one’s actual obligation one has to enter into a process of weighing.  
  So, the four principles each have a different ethical focus and bring about a different set of 
ethical duties. They are derived from the common morality, a set of pre-theoretical and 
universally valid moral judgments we can all see intuitively to be true. In a sense, a unified ethical 
theory is superfluous and does not add anything to bioethical reflection. Rather, the more 
appropriate starting point is the four principles of bioethics. 
The common morality in the essays of Beauchamp (Beauchamp 2010b, p. 43-44; 
Beauchamp 2010e, p. 155; Beauchamp 2010f] 
  Beauchamp in his essays affirm that the source of the four principles is the common morality. 
He conceives of the common morality as “the morality that all reasonable persons share and 
acknowledge – common-sense ethics, as it is sometimes called” (Beauchamp 2010e, p. 155). He 
repeats the claim that the common morality is a universal morality, and that it contains moral 
norms by which the actions of individuals are rightly judged. However, he takes a slightly different 
route towards the grounding of the common morality.  
  In the B&C account previously mentioned, the argument was that the common morality consists 
of those moral norms that is agreed upon by everyone serious about living a moral life. This 
appeals to either a Ross-like intuition, where we all can intuitively see the value of the norms 
within the common morality, or to a broadly shared consensus, namely that everyone who thinks 
about moral matters come to these same conclusions. In his essays, Beauchamp does not appeal 
to consensus among those who are morally serious or to Ross-like intuitionism. Instead, he starts 
with something he calls “the objectives of morality” (Beauchamp 2010b, p. 43; Beauchamp 2010f, 
p. 176).  
  Beauchamp modifies the concept of the common morality slightly, to be “the set of norms 
shared by all persons committed to the objectives of morality” (Beauchamp 2010f, p. 176). What 
are the objectives of morality? Beauchamp specifies one overall goal of morality: To promote 
human flourishing by counteracting conditions that cause the quality of people’s lives to worsen 
(Beauchamp 2010b, p. 43; Beauchamp 2010f, p. 176). The norms of the common morality 
prevent deterioration of the quality of people’s lives by working against the things that cause 
such deterioration: things such as indifference, conflict, scarce resources, and limited 
information. Where we see indifference, hostility, conflict, scarce resources and so on, we see 
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that people’s lives fall into misery and confusion. The goal of morality is protect human 
flourishing by working against the forces that lead to misery and suffering. Over time, claims 
Beauchamp, the norms within the common morality have shown themselves to be the most 
suited for this purpose. The norms of the common morality are therefore the surest anti-dote to 
the evils that would bring misery and suffering. The common morality is the best set of norms to 
ensure that human flourishing is protected. If another set of norms could be found that would 
do this job better, that set of norms should be preferred. But there is no such set of norms; the 
common morality is the best we have (Beauchamp 2010b, p. 43; Beauchamp 2010f, p. 176-177). 
  Here are three paragraphs taken from Beauchamp’s essay on the common morality (Beauchamp 
2010f) to illustrate his views in his own words: 
  “I understand the common morality as the set of norms shared by all persons committed to the 
objectives of morality. The objectives of morality, I will argue, are those of promoting human 
flourishing by counteracting conditions that cause the quality of people’s lives to worsen” (p. 176). 
  “The common morality is not merely a morality that differs from other moralities. It is applicable 
to all persons in all places, and all human conduct is to be judged by its standards” (p. 176). 
  “In every well-functioning society norms are in place to prohibit lying, breaking promises, causing 
bodily harm, stealing, fraud, the taking of life, the neglect of children, and failures to keep 
contracts. These norms occupy a central place in the moral life because they have proven that 
they successfully achieve objectives of morality. This success in the service of human flourishing 
accounts for their moral authority” (p. 177). 
  Beauchamp’s work in these essays seem to base the norms of the common morality on different 
ground than consensus or intuition. Instead, Beauchamp argues that the common morality is 
justified by the objectives of morality. This argument appears almost consequentialist in nature, 
like a type of rule-utilitarianism. Utilitarians argue that morality is concerned with assuring the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number (Mill 2010b); rule-utilitarians like Mill hold that we 
should recognize those moral rules that promotes the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number.   As an example of this, Mill argues for a strong conception of liberty on the basis of the 
principle of utility (Mill 2010a). Beauchamp’s argument for the common morality has that kind 
of look to it – we should endorse those norms that bring about human happiness (which he calls 
flourishing, presumably after Aristotle). Beauchamp’s claim is that this morality is a universal 
morality, and that everyone can see the value of this fact.  
 Discussion of the common morality and potential objections 
  Beauchamp in his essays moves away from the mere observation of wide moral agreement to 
something he calls “the objectives of morality”. When reading B&C’s Principles, their argument 
revolves around the remarkable fact that people holding to different and conflicting ethical 
theories nevertheless share a wide range of moral commitments and moral judgments, things 
such as not to steal, not to kill, not to harm others and the like. This grounds the common morality 
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either in a type of intuitionism, the idea that we can all intuitively see the value of these 
judgments no matter what theory we hold or what background we come from, or in widely 
shared social consensus. Beauchamp’s argument removes the possibility of an intuitionism and 
does not base the validity of the norms on the fact of remarkable widely shared agreement, but 
on a type of rule-utilitarian argument.  
  This has one positive outcome for Beauchamp: he is able to respond to a specific objection 
against the idea of the common morality more readily. When reading the account of the common 
morality in Principles, an immediate question and objection presents itself: is the common 
morality merely based on consensus? Are B&C arguing that widely shared consensus on the 
norms of the common morality establishes the validity of the common morality? That would be 
rather troubling. For if we all were to change our minds tomorrow that, in fact, torture of 
innocents is morally praiseworthy, then the norms of the common morality would change to 
include that fact. That would make light of the claims by B&C that the common morality contains 
universal norms with binding force, which we can use to judge the conduct of all persons in all 
places. Rather, it would seem then that the common morality is nothing but a sort of widely 
shared agreement that could change if we all wanted it to, with no real binding force except what 
the majority wish it to have. Furthermore, if the common morality was merely based on a broad 
consensus, how would one account for the reality of moral growth? Using historical examples, 
racism and slavery were widely considered to be acceptable practices in various countries in the 
past. In contemporary times, racism and slavery are widely viewed as great evils. These changes 
in widely held moral views regarding racism and slavery can be considered moral growth or moral 
development; it can be argued that societies of times past were in error when they considered 
slavery and racism to be morally acceptable. But if the common morality is merely based on the 
consensus of the majority of people who are serious about living a moral life, how can one 
account for this idea of moral growth? If the common morality derives its normative force from 
consensus, isn’t it simply the case that whatever the majority approves is the common morality, 
and that there really is no objective rightness or wrongness about slavery or racism except what 
the majority of persons ascribe to it? Thus, basing the common morality on consensus faces 
serious objections; Beauchamp takes these seriously in his essays.  
  Beauchamp responds to the objection of basing morality on consensus in four ways (Beauchamp 
2010f, p. 181): 
(1) B&C engage in both normative and non-normative claims to defend the common morality. 
Describing widely shared consensus is an example of a non-normative claim. They are merely 
stating that we see widely shared agreement on the norms of the common morality, an empirical 
claim. Whether the common morality is to be seen as a universally binding moral code rests on 
normative justification. Here, Beauchamp appeals to the objectives of morality as being the 
normative justification for the binding force of the common morality. 
(2) It is not assumed that all people everywhere accept the common morality. There are many 
people who reject it – those who are immoral, selectively moral or amoral. Some are morally 
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weak, others are just evil. The common morality is not irresistible. This does not change its 
universal nature or its normative force. 
(3) Beauchamp categorically rejects the idea that the common morality is based on consensus. It 
is “preposterous” to hold that a set of consensus norms have moral authority just because of 
consensus (p. 181). “The proposition that moral justification derives from custom or consensus 
is a moral travesty” (p. 181). Local consensus moralities may prevent people from acting on the 
universal moral norms of the common morality. 
(4) Fairly universal agreement on the content of the common morality does not justify the norms 
of the common morality. Rather, the justification for these norms rests in the fact that they are 
the best suited set of norms to achieve the objectives of morality. Thus, universal agreement 
explains why we see the existence of a common morality, but it does not provide normative 
justification for the validity of the norms of the common morality. 
  Beauchamp’s addition of the “objectives of morality” does allow him to successfully counter the 
objection of mere consensus. That is, the normative force of the common morality does not rest 
merely on the arbitrary fact that there is widely shared consensus. Rather, argues Beauchamp, 
the normative force of the common morality is supported by the fact that these norms fulfill the 
objectives of morality. Beauchamp argues that the object of morality is to “counteract the 
inconvenience, misery, violence, and distrust” that the “human condition tends to deteriorate 
into” (Beauchamp 2010f, p. 176). According to Beauchamp, morality is meant to decrease 
avoidable human misery and death. He maintains that complying with the norms of the common 
morality ensures that human suffering is limited, that society functions well, and that people’s 
quality of life and social relationships are protected from breakdown (Beauchamp 2010f, p. 176-
177). Thus, in Beauchamp’s view, what gives normative force to the common morality is that it 
fulfills the objectives of morality he has described. Beauchamp argues that those set of norms 
that works most towards preventing deterioration of the human condition into suffering are the 
very norms found in B&C’s concept of the common morality. Every society that functions well 
and buffets people against deterioration into suffering recognizes prohibitions against lying, 
breaking promises, causing of physical harm, lying, killing, abuse of children and so forth 
(Beauchamp 2010f, p. 176). Thus, Beauchamp argues that the common morality is not dependent 
on mere consensus, but finds its normative force from the fact that it fulfills the objectives of 
morality, that is to say, limits human suffering.   
 I wonder, however, if this does not backtrack on the B&C argument that ethical theory is 
superfluous. Beauchamp has done nothing more than provide a justification for a universally 
objective morality based on a rule-utilitarian argument. Perhaps ethical theory is after all 
important, and perhaps the B&C argument that ethical theory is not necessary in bioethics has 
been refuted by Beauchamp himself. 
  Personally, I find the statement of the common morality in B&C’s Principles to be a promising 
starting point for bioethics. It does appear that people who are committed to morality share a 
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wide range of commitments, of the kind B&C state. Perhaps the best explanation for this is a kind 
of intuitionism, such as Ross’ intuitionism. Perhaps it is just so that serious moral reflection 
reveals the self-evident validity of the norms of the common morality. It is reassuring that other 
people who are committed to serious reflection on morality also come to the same conclusions, 
and affirm the same norms, even if they have a different background or ethical theory. And 
certainly, the B&C claim that the common morality provides grounding for ethical theories is very 
plausible. An ethical theory that proclaims norms in conflict with the common morality would be 
worthy of rejection indeed. Imagine what such an ethical theory would look like – condoning of 
lying, congratulating us for deception and harming others, encouraging torture and killing of 
innocents, or demanding that we break our promises. A theory that comes up with such “moral 
duties” would rightly be rejected, and precisely because it collides with moral norms that we just 
know to be right. Beauchamp moves away from his Rossian roots in his later essays, in his view 
to provide normative force to the common morality. This does allow him to successfully respond 
to the potential objection that the common morality is merely dependent on consensus. But in 
my view, it does little else, and in fact leaves the common morality open to criticism and rejection 
by people who reject the rule-utilitarian way of justifying moral claims. I therefore overall do not 
regard it as a strength, but as a potential vulnerability. To my mind, retaining roots in the theory 
of Ross is more promising. The common morality does not depend on consensus. Instead, we see 
consensus because morally serious people upon reflection can see the validity of the norms in 
the common morality. This is a Ross type intuitionist argument with much more bite to it; to 
reject this argument one would have to explain the remarkable amount of agreement in some 
other more plausible way. 
   This brings me to a second possible objection against the common morality. Is it really so that 
there is widely shared agreement on the common morality? What about all the disagreement we 
see between the different codes of morality found in different cultures or in different points of 
time? After all, moral disagreement is a real thing. This objection centers around whether we can 
empirically show that there is in fact widely shared agreement on the norms of the common 
morality. One can think of many potential examples which suggests such moral disagreement, 
historical and contemporary. Think of apartheid South Africa, a culture where systematic racial 
discrimination was promoted as morally praiseworthy. During its existence, the values and tenets 
of apartheid South Africa were heavily criticized as being morally objectionable by various 
persons, countries, and cultures from different corners of the world. This would therefore seem 
to present a historical example of real moral disagreement. For a contemporary example, think 
of the moral status of abortion. Many persons argue “pro-choice”, that abortion is an issue of 
women’s liberty rights, and that abortion therefore is morally justifiable. Other persons argue 
“pro-life”, that a fetus should be considered endowed with a right to life and that abortion is 
therefore the same as murder. There is an ongoing (and seemingly intractable) debate on this 
issue, in what seems to be genuine moral disagreement. 
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  Beauchamp responds to objections regarding the very real existence of moral disagreement 
between different moral codes, and objections regarding empirical justification in the following 
three ways (Beauchamp 2010f, p. 178-180): 
(1) One should make a clear distinction between the common morality and particular moralities. 
Of course there are differences between the moral codes of different cultural groups; but these 
are examples of particular moralities. Particular moralities are formed by specification and 
application of the norms in the common morality to specific situations and contexts. Thus, it is 
possible for people to arrive at different conclusions as to how exactly the norms of the common 
morality should be applied in given situations. For example, in the abortion debate, both “pro-
choice” and “pro-life” adherents may affirm the norms of the common morality. That is, they 
may all agree that causing bodily harm is wrong, that killing is wrong, that people should be free, 
and so forth. However, they disagree about how to apply these moral norms in the context of 
abortion, disagree about the moral status of the fetus, and weigh the calculus of women’s 
freedom versus moral concern for the fetus differently. Or, for another example think of the 
contemporary controversy surrounding physician aid in dying (PAD). Some persons morally 
approve of PAD in some circumstances, and some countries allow physician aid in dying. At the 
same time PAD is considered illegal in some other countries and found morally objectionable by 
some persons. Here, people who all agree that killing is wrong and that murder should be 
condemned may weigh the moral norms regarding killing and prevention of suffering differently, 
and come to different conclusions: some affirming PAD as morally justifiable, others condemning 
it as morally wrong. Thus, although there is moral disagreement here, the disagreement is about 
how the common morality should be applied in certain contexts, and how particular moralities 
should be constructed by using the norms of the common morality. The common morality itself 
is not in doubt; in none of these examples is anyone arguing that causing bodily harm is, in fact, 
morally praiseworthy or that killing in the absence of a compelling moral reason is, in fact, 
laudable.  
(2) Beauchamp states that there are no empirical studies known to him that show that some 
cultures reject and other accept the norms within the common morality. Empirical studies, he 
says, show how different rules are embedded within cultural moralities; these studies usually 
accept general moral norms and then show how these norms are differently specified and 
interpreted in different cultures. For example, studies do not examine whether cultures reject 
norms against killing and theft. Rather, studies examine how cultures think about these norms; 
when a specific culture would think killing and theft has happened, and how cultures recognize 
exceptions. 
(3) Empirical studies can be done to test the Beauchamp hypothesis regarding the common 
morality, but then it should be clear what that hypothesis is. Beauchamp says that he defends 
the hypothesis that the common morality is the “set of norms shared by all persons committed 
to the objectives of morality” (p. 179). Thus, any empirical study should test this hypothesis, and 
not mere agreement and disagreement. As yet, no such study has been done. Such a study would 
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include participants who are committed to the objectives of morality, and the study would then 
examine their views on the best norms that would achieve those objectives. If a different set of 
norms emerge than the B&C common morality, the hypothesis has been falsified. 
  I do not think it worthwhile to do any such study as Beauchamp proposes. I take it as self-evident 
that everyone who is serious about living a moral life, who is committed to moral reflection, will 
see the binding force of basic moral tenets such as not lying, not killing, keeping one’s promises 
and not causing harm. B&C point out the fact that there is remarkable agreement among people 
who are committed to morality on these matters, and that these principles are not controversial. 
I agree with them. These norms, which B&C call the common morality, form objective and 
universal moral standards against which we can measure the actions of individuals and cultures. 
For example, we know that apartheid was wrong, and those who perpetrated apartheid’s racial 
discrimination performed acts of injustice. We do not need to specify a theory of ethics or a 
theory of justice to recognize the injustice of apartheid. Similarly, we know that the Nazi moral 
code was a travesty. Judging Nazi precepts against the content of the universal, objective set of 
moral norms of the common morality shows us that the Nazi moral code contained serious moral 
defects. 
  It is so that disagreements exist between different cultures, but I take Beauchamp’s point to be 
correct. There is a difference between particular moralities and the common morality. 
Furthermore, some cultures did reject some of the precepts of the common morality; but this is 
an error on their part rather than a reflection on the common morality. 
  If empirical evidence of sorts is necessary, then one could point to the work done by CS Lewis. 
Lewis took the time to compare various different historical moral codes with each other. This list 
appears as an appendix to his book, The Abolition of Man (Lewis 2002). In this work, he lists the 
principles of morality as are found in the moral traditions of the Chinese, the Ancient Babylonians, 
the Ancient Egyptians, the Jews, Hindu morality and Christian morality. These different moral 
codes come from different cultures and from different times in history – some more ancient, 
some fairly recent. With regularity, we see the same core principles in each of these moral 
theories – principles of beneficence and of justice, principles to avoid harm and for special 
consideration of the young and dependent. The specifications differ, and the contexts and 
applications of these principles differ. But there is a striking amount of agreement between the 
central and basic principles of these moral codes. Remarkably, the principles Lewis so identifies 
shows a fair amount of agreement with Ross’ list of intuitive principles and with B&C’s conception 
of the contents of the common morality. Consider the list Lewis identifies (2002, p. 430-437): 
(1) The law of general beneficence (includes a negative component, to refrain from doing harm, 
and a positive component, showing good will to others). 
(2) The law of special beneficence (special obligations based on social roles or relationships, such 
as parents to children). 
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(3) Duties to parents, elders, ancestors (duties of care and beneficence to those who are aged 
and to one’s parents). 
(4) Duties to children and posterity (duties of care to those who are dependent and to protect 
the interests of future generations). 
(5) The law of justice (including sexual justice, honesty, treating people as they deserve in courts, 
rules against stealing and unjust gain). 
(6) The law of good faith and veracity (refraining from deceit and manipulation). 
(7) The law of mercy (taking care of the sick and the poor). 
(8) The law of magnanimity (protecting the innocent, sacrifice of one’s own interests to further 
what is right and good). 
  Lewis has argued for something similar to the common morality – a set of universally binding, 
objective moral principles that people can intuitively see to be true and that has normative 
binding force for all persons everywhere. In formulating this list of principles as found with 
repeated frequency in historical moral codes, he is trying to show instances of these principles 
and their occurrence in different moral codes. But he says this should not be seen as empirical 
proof of the idea that such an objective, universal morality exists. He writes: 
  “I am not trying to prove its validity by the argument from common consent. Its validity cannot 
be deduced. For those who do not perceive its rationality, even universal consent could not prove 
it” (Lewis 2002, p. 430). 
  This again is very similar to the B&C argument for the common morality, a set of norms that 
everyone would agree to if they were committed to morality, and to the argument of Ross, that 
there is an intuitively true set of irreducible moral principles that confer prima facie duties on us. 
  Conclusion 
  B&C defend a specific conception of a universal, objective morality they call the common 
morality. This conception of the common morality can be successfully defended against 
objections such as mere reliance on arbitrary factors such as consensus and empirical claims that 
moral disagreement exists.  
  The four principles of bioethics are derived from the common morality, and therefore has moral 
force for all persons in all places. Because of this fact, the principles cross the boundaries that 
disagreements in ethical theory would otherwise create. The principles rely on our shared moral 
convictions and commitments, being founded on moral norms we know to be true and binding. 
The principlist approach therefore is powerful in its moral force and in building consensus among 
people with different theoretical commitments, and is therefore a good starting point for 
bioethical reflection. 
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  Strong objections have been raised against the principlist approach of B&C as such. To these 
objections I will now turn. 
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(3) Criticisms of B&C’s principlism and alternate approaches to 
bioethics 
(3.1) Clouser and Gert (C&G) and the role of ethical theory 
(3.1.1) The main criticisms of C&G 
  C&G provide strident criticisms of the principlist approach, using B&C’s principlism as an 
example of the principlist paradigm. These criticisms appeared initially in an essay they co-
authored (Clouser & Gert 1990). In response to their essay, Lustig (1992) published a “critique of 
the critique”, defending principlism and criticizing the approach to morality advanced by Gert. 
Together with co-author Green, C&G respond to Lustig’s arguments while re-emphasizing their 
objections to principlism (Green, Gert, & Clouser 1993). This literature presents a well-known and 
lively discussion on principlism. In this section, I shall consider C&G’s two main criticisms of the 
principlism of B&C and consider B&C’s responses to these criticisms.  
Criticism 1 – Lack of systematic unity and an overarching/unifying moral theory 
  According to C&G one of the serious shortcomings of the principlist approach is the lack of a 
single or unifying moral theory. Among other things, such a theory would explain how and when 
to apply a specific principle to a practical scenario, and how to resolve conflicts when principles 
are in opposition.  Instead, C&G argue that it is left to the individual to decide when and how to 
apply which principle, and how to resolve conflicts between principles in individual situations. 
What is lacking, is systematic guidance on how the principles function and how they are to be 
used (Clouser & Gert 1990, p. 222). 
  In essence, the four principles are also not what they purport to be – moral action guides. 
Instead, they are like “chapter headings” and “checklists” (Clouser & Gert 1990, p. 222) of 
important moral considerations that people should keep in mind when considering bioethical 
issues. Each principle includes widely different moral considerations, thrown together under the 
same heading, with no clear guidance on how to apply them (Clouser & Gert 1990, p. 222). There 
is no clear guide to action, or how these differing moral concepts thrown together are to be 
universally applied in moral situations. In fact, C&G argue that each “principle” is actually just an 
“eclectic discussion that emphasizes a different type of ethical theory, so that a single unified 
theory is not only not presented, but the need for such a theory is obscured” (Clouser & Gert 
1990, p. 228).  
  C&G maintain that the four principles are in fact manifestations of four very different moral 
theories, and therefore “applying” the four principles amounts to considering the same practical 
circumstance from conflicting theoretical points of view (Clouser & Gert 1990, p. 223). 
Beneficence is based on Mill’s utilitarianism, justice is based on Rawls’ Theory of Justice, 
autonomy on the work of Kant, and non-maleficence on the work of Gert. So, applying the four 
principles means that a case is analysed from various conflicting theoretical points of view. In 
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presenting the four principles as a unified work, B&C create the impression that there is some 
unified way in which these four principles are related to one another, when this is not true. In 
fact, there is marked conflict between the four principles as they are each a representative of a 
conflicting moral theory. 
  The problems created with the principlist approach are therefore troubling. Principles are in fact 
not action guides, and it is not clear how to apply them, so that a haphazard and non-systematic 
way of ethical reasoning takes place. In fact, true ethical reasoning is obscured, as the need for a 
unifying or systematic approach to ethics is obscured by the use of principles. Using the principles 
will then lead to people making instinctive or highly individualistic ethical judgments, after which 
the language of the principles will be “applied” to justify such idiosyncratic or personally 
preferred judgments. The principles end up hindering moral reasoning instead of being a tool 
that is useful for moral deliberation. 
  What is needed, say C&G, is an ethical theory that can clarify moral reasoning and explain moral 
agreement and disagreement (Clouser & Gert 1990, p. 232). Such a theory would help us see how 
ethical rules are formed, how they are applied to concrete situations, and how to resolve conflicts 
between rules. It would specify different types of duties and how to discharge them. Such a 
theory would take away guesswork and ad hoc applying or weighing of principles.  
  So, turning to principlism. Each of the principles capture some morally relevant aspects; 
beneficence reminds us that consequences are important, autonomy emphasizes the individual 
person, and justice speaks of the equitable distribution of benefits and burdens. An adequate 
moral theory would then tell us how each of these moral considerations are connected with one 
another, and when and how these different moral considerations should be applied (Clouser & 
Gert 1990, p. 233). An adequate ethical theory would therefore include (Clouser & Gert 1990, p. 
233): 
(1) a concern for consequences;  
(2) a concern for how consequences are distributed; 
(3) acknowledgement of the importance of the individual; and 
(4) a prohibition against harming individuals. 
  Such an ethical theory will provide clear and coherent answers, which can be understood and 
used by all. Those who work on problems in bioethics will have a single decision-making system, 
and will be able to communicate with each other clearly. Rather than a haphazard or ad hoc 
application of principles, it will be clear how and when moral rules are to be applied, and how to 
deal with disagreements. With principlism, it is not always clear what the basis of a disagreement 
is, or how to proceed with resolving it; with an adequate ethical theory, it will at least be clearly 
understood what the basis for disagreement is and what needs to happen to resolve 
disagreements. 
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  In their second essay, C&G together with Green advance the following features of morality 
(Green, Gert, & Clouser 1993, p. 481): 
(1) It is systematic; no rule or ideal can be fully understood until it is clear how it functions in the 
entire moral system (and therefore not haphazard or ad hoc). 
(2) It is a public system (and not an individualistic affair; acceptable to all to whom it applies). 
(3) It applies to all rational persons and is accepted by all rational persons as far as they reason 
impartially (again, not an individualistic or preference-based system). 
  This underlines their views of the need for an adequate moral theory. Furthermore, this 
emphasizes their rejection of a pluralism of principles; the principlist approach (in their view) is 
a highly ad hoc and haphazard application of whichever moral considerations strike one’s fancy, 
with no specific way to foster agreement in judgments and applications.  
  To summarize C&G’s first objection: the principlist approach lacks a systematic, unified theory. 
This means that the principles cannot be applied to moral reasoning, do not function as action 
guides, and in fact obscures moral reasoning. What is needed for accurate moral reasoning is an 
adequate ethical theory, that will show how rules and duties function within a system, when and 
how to apply them, and how to resolve disagreements in an impartial and universally acceptable 
way. 
Criticism 2 – Relativism 
  In this critique, C&G conceive of the principles as mid-level constructs, standing between 
theories and ethical rules (Clouser & Gert 1990, p. 231). As I have shown before, B&C had this 
conception of the principles in their earlier editions of their work, but in the later editions moved 
away from it. According to this idea, the principles are supported by ethical theories, such as 
utilitarianism and deontology. From these principles, rules are then derived for application in 
concrete situations. 
  It is apparent, say C&G, that there is an inherent relativism present in using a principlist 
approach. Each of the four principles are in essence a set of ethical considerations, derived from 
a specific ethical theory and set of arguments. But the different principles are all derived from 
competing and conflicting theories, and therefore are at odds with one another. In essence, C&G 
say that the principles each have a “life and logic of its own, as well as a number of internal 
conflicts” (Clouser & Gert 1990, p. 231).  
  In essence, each of the four principles are dependent on a different ethical theory. Each principle 
commits one to a different perspective. This means that the only way in which one can accept all 
four principles at the same time, is to subscribe to relativism – the view that all these competing 
theories are equally true. But of course, relativism has at its essence the core absurdity that 
conflicting truth-statements are all equally true. This premise can a priori be rejected out of hand 
as absurd. C&G’s criticism is therefore that principlism cannot be a reasonable approach to 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 141 
 
morality, as its internal structure commits one to the philosophically fatal position of ethical 
relativism. 
  C&G go further with their argument, and say that this approach is actually endemic to applied 
ethics as a whole (Clouser & Gert 1990, p. 231). It is typical practice in applied ethics courses and 
anthologies to present various ethical theories, such as utilitarianism and Kantianism, then point 
out the fatal flaws in each of these theories, and then to proceed with using the theories anyway 
as if no flaws exist. Students and adherents are typically encouraged to apply any of these 
competing theories as they see fit, if the situation (in their judgment) calls for it. So, if a concrete 
ethical problem calls for utilitarianism, by all means use utilitarianism. If it calls for Kantianism or 
Rights Theory, go ahead and use those. This, says C&G, is “an extraordinary way to proceed. It is 
difficult to imagine any respectable discipline proceeding in a similar fashion. Having 
acknowledged that all of the standard theories are inadequate, one is then told to apply them 
anyway, and even to apply competing theories, without any attempt to show how the theories 
can be reconciled” (Clouser & Gert 1990, p. 231). This, say C&G, is exactly the approach of B&C’s 
principlism. They discuss varying theories, find them all inadequate, apply them anyway to derive 
the principles, and then encourage the practitioner to apply whichever principle/theory seems 
relevant or applicable in a given situation. 
  The second critique of C&G is therefore: principlism has an intrinsic relativism in its structure, 
making it an incoherent and unacceptable method to approach ethical deliberation. 
Criticism 3 – Critique of individual principles 
  C&G also critique individual principles as being confused and conflicting internally. For example, 
note their discussion of the principle of beneficence (Clouser & Gert 1990, p. 228). It is not 
possible to have “duty” of beneficence, they argue, to all people all the time. It is not possible for 
us to do good impartially and equally to all people all the time. Instead, beneficence should be 
seen as an ideal, a supererogatory moral act. That is, doing good to others is something to be 
desired, but cannot be a duty if we consider the impossibility that a “duty” of beneficence would 
convey upon individuals. At best, there is a duty to refrain from harming others, but there cannot 
be a duty to actively and impartially do good and beneficial actions to everyone all the time. 
  Thinking of beneficence as a “general duty” also misses the point as to where duties come from. 
Duties, say C&G, come from social roles or special relationships. So, a healthcare practitioner has 
duties towards her patients, but to lump these duties in with moral ideals of general beneficence 
under a catch-all principle of beneficence, confuses the issue and leads to error.  
  Once again, this can be rectified by having an overarching and unifying ethical theory, clarifying 
the distinction between moral ideals and duties. Yet, the principlist approach obfuscates the 
need for such a theory. 
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(3.1.2) B&C’s responses C&G 
  B&C defend their principlist approach vigorously from the criticisms of C&G. They identify the 
main critiques, and then rebut them each in turn (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 393-397). 
  It will be recalled that C&G’s first major critique was the lack of a systematic theory that unifies 
the principles, and shows how they are related to each other. This includes three issues to which 
B&C respond in turn. 
  Firstly, C&G argue that the principles are not action guides as such, being very vague and not 
providing clear direction. Rather, they are merely chapter headings or checklists of morally 
interesting aspects. It is not clear how to apply these principles to a given situation. B&C respond 
by pointing out that any moral norm that is not adequately specified for a given situation will face 
this problem. Principles are in their essence very broad moral norms that lack specific guidance 
for concrete situations. For the principles to be of practical use, they need to be specified in order 
to be applied to concrete situations. B&C point out that even the moral rules advanced by C&G 
as being superior to the principlist approach are similar in that they also need additional 
specification to be useful as action guides. C&G advance rules such as “Don’t kill”, “Don’t 
deceive”, “Keep your promise”, and “Do your duty” (Clouser & Gert 1990, p. 234). These form 
part of a comprehensive moral system, undergirded by a systematic moral theory, and are in 
C&G’s view an improvement on the four principles. B&C point out that these rules are at a lower 
level of abstraction than their four principles, so that one could consider them to be specified 
principles. Yet, they stand in need of further specification before they can be applied to concrete 
situations. Furthermore, when considering the whole of B&C’s work, one would find an account 
of specified principles and rules that do not differ much from the rules advanced by C&G. 
Beauchamp emphasizes this in one of his essays (Beauchamp 2010e). Consider the following 
(Beauchamp 2010e, p. 169): 
Beauchamp and Childress                                    Gert & Clouser 
4 rules based on nonmaleficence                       4 of the 10 basic rules 
1. Do not kill.                                                            1. Don’t kill. 
2. Do not cause pain.                                              2. Don’t cause pain. 
3. Do not incapacitate.                                           3. Don’t disable. 
4. Do not deprive of goods.                                4. Don’t deprive of pleasure.   
 In essence then, there is not much to choose between the rules advanced by C&G and the 
specified principles and rules of B&C. B&C contend that the principles stand in need of additional 
specification in order to arrive at more specific action guides with more directive moral content. 
It is therefore not so that principles can merely be applied ad hoc or in a way that merely relies 
on personal preference, and it is not so that the principles are devoid of moral content. One 
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should understand though at which level of abstraction they function, and that their task is to 
provide support for more specified principles and rules. Principles can be applied directly in some 
circumstances, in cases where conflict between obligations is at a minimum or straightforwardly 
resolved (Beauchamp 2010e, p. 168). Generally though, the principles need to be specified in 
order to arrive at more substantive and specific action guides. Principles are meant to be abstract 
starting points.  
  Secondly, C&G argue that since there is no systematic theory to show how principles are related 
and how to resolve conflicts between principles, weighing proceeds in an unclear and arbitrary 
fashion. B&C acknowledge that the principles often conflict, but argue that this does not mean 
that they lead to incommensurable moral commitments. The principles require specification and 
balancing, so that eventually a state is reached where various moral commitments are in 
equilibrium with each other. In order to make progress in such matters, one needs some 
experience and the capability of good ethical judgment, practical wisdom in a sense. It is simply 
not so that a full account of all healthcare duties can be drawn up without conflicts between 
various duties and the existence of moral dilemmas. No such theory exists or has ever existed. In 
fact, B&C argue that they consider conflict between various norms and ambiguity as part and 
parcel of morality; a commitment to the moral life includes dealing with such difficulties. C&G 
are asking for no less than a moral theory that eliminates all conflict and disagreement between 
principles. This is simply not possible, argues B&C, and instead they offer a version of moral 
deliberation that makes sense of moral ambiguity and conflicting moral obligations. In their view, 
dealing with such conflict requires the use of practical wisdom and providing good reasons for 
weighing one principle over another.  
  Thirdly, B&C respond to the charge that they lack a unifying ethical theory in general. They 
acknowledge that they lack such a theory, but they dispute that such a theory is necessary. They 
are, in fact, skeptical of such theories in general. None of the most popular theories come to 
terms with our whole moral experience; none of them give us a complete description of all that 
is important in the moral life. With their principles, B&C do not mean to replace these theories 
and they do not attempt to provide a theory that would make sense of our entire moral 
experience. Instead, they offer a common-ground moral starting point, basing their principles on 
those moral judgments that find wide acceptance among people who are serious about living a 
moral life. B&C think it unlikely that we will ever have an ethical theory that will gain universal 
acceptance, that will eliminate moral disagreement, or that will do everything C&G demand from 
an ethical theory. Instead, we should rely on those moral judgments of the common morality, 
those judgments that are shared and uncontroversial despite differences in theoretical 
commitments. This leads us to an adoption of a principlist approach. So, according to this 
response by B&C, an ethical theory is not only unnecessary when engaging in practical bioethics, 
it may even be undesirable. 
  Fourthly, C&G have criticized individual principles. For instance, they have argued that the 
principle of beneficence is nonsensical; beneficence can at most be a moral ideal. To this B&C 
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respond by saying that this is mistaken: the common morality undoubtedly commits one to a 
principle of beneficence. Beauchamp addresses this point in one of his essays, pointing to several 
examples which make it apparent that there are instances where beneficence is a moral duty 
(Beauchamp 2010e, p. 169-170). Take this example: Mr. X’s life is in danger, but if I warn him 
through a phone call, he will be fine. According to C&G’s critique of the principle of beneficence, 
it would be a moral ideal but not a duty to make the phone call. But this seems wrong; and as 
such, this example (along with three others Beauchamp provides) illustrates that there is in fact 
a moral duty of beneficence in some circumstances.  B&C argue that this point is even 
acknowledged in Gert’s work on morality. Indeed, Gert does seem to endorse a duty of 
beneficence in one of his books (Gert 1988, p. 154-155). In this work, for example, Gert argues 
that one has a duty to seek help when a child collapses in one’s arms. It would be wrong to, say, 
lie the child down on the ground and walk away without procuring help. Gert argues that one 
generally has a duty to help if someone else is in serious danger, one is close by, and it would be 
fairly free of costs for one to provide that help. Gert justifies these duties by invoking the rule 
“Do your duty,” but in truth his arguments are nothing more than strong reasons to accept duties 
of beneficence. What is interesting is that Gert also relies heavily on the idea of the common 
morality in his work, and derives his rules also from the common morality. Thus, the B&C claim 
seems credible – Gert does seem to recognize a principle of beneficence to be present in the 
common morality, and uses this principle to specify more direct moral rules and guidelines. The 
C&G critique of beneficence can therefore rightly be disputed: not only do B&C maintain that 
beneficence clearly is present in the common morality, they also point to Gert’s apparent 
acceptance of this fact in his own work. In fact, much of what B&C find problematic in principlism 
is actually present in the rules and methods they proscribe, specifically in the work of Gert as 
illustrated.  
(3.1.3) Discussion 
  C&G’s criticism of principlism are worthwhile to reflect on, and indeed add much to the 
discussion on principlism. B&C’s responses are interesting and in my view successful. The 
principles are indeed action guides, but they are in need of further specification. Balancing and 
specification require the use of good reasons and a form of practical wisdom. The moral rules of 
C&G do not seem that far removed from the principles of B&C; when one specifies the principles 
of B&C one ends up with a similar list of rules as we find in C&G. 
  With regards to the charge of relativism, it is interesting to note that B&C have moved away 
from ethical theory as the basis for the principles. The principles are not derived from specific 
ethical theories; rather, the principles are derived from the contents of the common morality. In 
a sense, the four principles encapsulate moral commitments we all agree on, no matter what our 
theoretical background is. And to me, this is the strength of the B&C principlist approach: it takes 
as starting point moral commitments that are universally shared, and use these commitments to 
create a framework for ethical deliberation. The four principles therefore foster consensus and 
ethical agreement, even among people with differing theoretical commitments. It is possible for 
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people of different faiths and who adhere to different moral theories to use the principles and 
arrive at moral conclusions that are defensible and acceptable. This is not because of an inherent 
relativism, but rather because of the wide agreement on the contents of the common morality. 
  I am also not convinced by C&G’s argument that the four principles rest on four different 
theories. It is possible to argue for all four principles from a single theoretical perspective. Take 
utilitarianism as an example. It is easy to see how beneficence and non-maleficence can be 
derived from utilitarianism; such principles will likely lead to the greatest good for the greatest 
number. But Mill shows us how the other two principles can be derived from utility. In On Liberty, 
Mill argues for a conception of personal freedom that reminds strongly of the principle of 
autonomy, on the basis that such liberty is derived from utility. In Utilitarianism, Mill argues that 
utilitarianism forms the basis of justice; utility would demand that society be just. A utilitarian 
would therefore subscribe to all four principles. It is not necessary to be a Kantian to see the 
value of the principle of autonomy.   
  B&C argue that we have no universally acceptable theory, and that it is not likely we will ever 
have one. Disagreements will remain. This point is persuasive, and is one of the most compelling 
reasons to prefer a principlist approach; while we may disagree on which ethical theory is 
preferable, we can all agree on the moral force of specified moral principles. The claim B&C 
makes is that everyone who is serious about morality will see the moral force of the four 
principles, no matter what theory they adhere to. This almost makes ethical theory redundant in 
practical bioethical deliberation; if we all agree on the principles, then principles are the 
appropriate starting point in deliberation, not theory. 
  The principlist approach has also stood the test of time. C&G published their criticisms more 
than two decades ago. Yet, principlism is still an attractive and popular approach to bioethics, 
widely influential and enduring. C&G’s criticisms have in fact strengthened the principlist 
approach. B&C have clearly considered the criticisms carefully, and strengthened their principlist 
approach in response. One example of this is that the four principles now are derived from widely 
shared moral judgments, rather than from ethical theories. Ironically, C&G’s critique has driven 
principlism further away from a unifying theory than closer towards it. 
  In summary, B&C successfully rebuts the criticisms of C&G. Added to this are that the principlist 
approach has improved owing to B&C’s reflection on these criticisms, and the fact that a unifying 
ethical theory is elusive. I am confident that using a principlist approach in my inquiry will yield 
robust and morally compelling conclusions, which will be acceptable to all people who are serious 
about living a moral life. 
 
(3.2) Casuistry as an alternate approach 
  Casuistry as an alternative to the principlist approach finds its expression in the work of Stephen 
Toulmin and Albert Jonsen (Jonsen & Toulmin 1988; Jonsen 1991; Jonsen 2010; Toulmin 1981). 
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In essence, casuistry is case-based reasoning. The process of moral deliberation starts with 
paradigm cases, where we can be sure of our moral judgments. By use of analogous reasoning, 
conclusions reached in paradigm cases are extended to other cases that share similar 
characteristics. Casuistry relies on case analysis and comparisons between cases, using a form of 
practical knowledge to reach moral conclusions. Casuists maintain that we should not start with 
universal moral rules or moral principles, arriving at moral judgments by trying to apply these in 
practical cases. Rather, what is morally relevant in a case is wrapped up within the details of the 
case. It is evident to those involved in the case what the morally relevant features are; once we 
know what moral conclusions can be drawn from a paradigm case, these conclusions can be used 
to reason through analogous cases. Particularly, adherents of casuistry are concerned about a 
principlist approach. They feel that the application of conflicting principles will lead to gridlock, 
impeding moral reasoning. In essence the principles will lead to interminable disagreements and 
halt progress in making judgments. It is often in practical cases clear what moral judgments 
should be drawn, but not clear which principles should be used or are relevant. Insistence on 
using principles will then hinder, and not help, moral deliberation. This can lead to a “tyranny of 
principles” (Toulmin 1981), where the inflexible application of principles dominate discussion at 
the expense of real moral deliberation. Instead, they argue, we should proceed with moral 
judgments by appealing to the moral aspects of cases, without use of principles. 
  As an example of how principles are superfluous, Toulmin and Jonsen refer to the work done by 
the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research in drawing up the Belmont report (Jonsen & Toulmin 1988, p. 16-19). Both Jonsen and 
Toulmin were part of this process. They recall that individual participants would frequently agree 
on specific moral judgments, but they could not find common ground on justification for these 
judgments. They agreed on moral conclusions, but it was not clear what drove the agreement. 
Eventually it became clear that participants were not appealing to universal principles or ethical 
theory; they would frequently mention principles, but in justification they invariably relied on 
shared insights as to what was morally relevant in individual cases. In essence, what drove moral 
agreement and moral reasoning at the National Commission was a case-based approach, and not 
the application of principles. Beauchamp responds to Toulmin and Jonsen by agreeing that case-
based reasoning was an important aspect of the work at the National Commission, but that 
development and use of the principles were also intricately involved (Beauchamp 2010c, p. 10-
12). There was “a constant movement from principle to case and from case to principles. 
Principles supported arguments about how to handle a case, and precedent cases supported the 
importance of commitment to principles” (Beauchamp 2010c, p. 11). This is, in fact, the way B&C 
respond to casuistry: casuistry is complementary to a principlist approach and not a rival. 
Casuistry is consistent with a strong commitment to the principles. 
  In their response to casuistry, B&C defend principlism by considering casuistry as entirely at 
home within a principlist paradigm (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 398-404; Beauchamp 2010c, 
p. 10-12). Within the method of casuistry, the idea is to draw on paradigm cases and use 
analogous reasoning. The morally relevant aspects of the case are embedded within the facts of 
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the case. But this means that there are two aspects of importance in every case: the facts of the 
case (such as, ‘the patient refused treatment’) and the settled generalizable values (such as, 
‘competent patients have the right to refuse treatment’) (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 401). 
There is therefore a practical component and a value component within each case. But it is 
possible to bind cases together that share similar value components, and to draw general sets of 
value judgments from such groups of cases. These connecting norms can be generalized into 
rules and principles, which can then be applied to other cases where the factual circumstances 
are similar (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 401). Take as an example Jonsen’s method of 
casuistry (Jonsen 1991; Jonsen 2010). The morally relevant aspects of a case forms a rule, or a 
maxim. There may be several maxims at play in a specific case, and they may even conflict. The 
casuist must then decide which maxim is most relevant and should be given preference. B&C 
argue that this is very similar to their account of prima facie principles and rules needing 
specification and balancing (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 401). Thus, B&C argue that casuistry 
actually presupposes the existence of moral principles and rules, identifies them within a case, 
and then proceeds by use of analogy and practical reasoning to apply conclusions to similar cases. 
  I agree with B&C’s argument. In essence, casuists argue that we can see the morally relevant 
features of a case by intuition. When we have settled cases where our intuitions are straight-
forward and clear, we can use the conclusions from these cases to resolve other more 
problematic cases. In a sense, it is not so much different from the B&C approach of intuitively 
seeing which principles apply to a case, engaging in specification and balancing, and then using 
our conclusions (considered judgments) to reach reflective equilibrium in cases where we are 
less sure of our conclusions. Also, it appears as if the casuists take the same starting point as B&C 
do – moral judgments that we can all agree on and that we are sure of. Casuists appeal to 
paradigm cases, whereas B&C appeal to the common morality. But in both instances, there is a 
reliance on shared and widely endorsed moral judgments rather than on a specific ethical theory.  
  There are some important differences between a purely casuistical approach and principlism, 
and B&C point these out (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 400-404). Principlists have the four 
principles as a guide, making sure that conclusions are safe-guarded against bias such as 
individual or popular preferences. It is not clear how casuists avoid prejudice or incorrect 
judgments, such as can be caused by the swaying influence of (unjust) popular opinion. 
Principlists can challenge their own incorrect assumptions by reference to the principles. In 
casuistry, case analysis of similar cases leads to generalizations – but without a guide of bulwark 
such as the principles, such generalizations can become biased or morally suspect by not having  
a check against individual or cultural biases. 
  In summary, I find nothing in the work of the casuists that provide an insurmountable challenge 
to a principlist paradigm. Casuistry highlights the important place that cases and practical 
considerations play in reaching our moral judgments, and reminds us of the usefulness of analogy 
and practical reasoning in ethics. As such it can be seen as a complementary approach to the 
principles. It does not, however, replace a principlist approach. As Beauchamp states in his 
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comments on the National Commission, principles and case-based reasoning worked together 
through “a constant movement from principle to case and from case to principles. Principles 
supported arguments about how to handle a case, and precedent cases supported the 
importance of commitment to principles” (Beauchamp 2010c, p. 11).  
 
(3.3) The ethics of care as criticism of traditional ethics and possible alternate 
approach 
  The ethics of care developed in the 1980’s through the work of feminist philosophers such as 
Gilligan (1982) and Noddings (1984). Gilligan (1982) was critical of the work done by Kohlberg on 
moral development, which she conceived of as biased towards a masculine perspective. Gilligan 
argued that women often have a different voice and a different perspective when it comes to 
principles of justice than men, informed by a primary concern with relationships and the moral 
significance of caring. Noddings (1984) wrote along similar lines, arguing that women bring a 
different perspective to moral deliberation than traditional theories afford. This different 
perspective, she argued, is grounded in a recognition of the central role that caring relationships 
play in moral deliberation. For both these writers, caring relationships play a central role in moral 
theorizing, and traditional “masculine” ethical theories such as utilitarianism and deontology fail 
to take such caring relationships into account. 
  Contemporary adherents of the ethics of care, such as Held (2006), view the ethics of care as a 
fully-fledged ethical theory that is meant to be an alternative to other theories such as 
Kantianism, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. The central focus of the ethics of care, Held argues, 
is “the compelling moral salience of attending to and meeting the needs of the particular others 
for whom we take responsibility” (Held 2006, p. 10). Traditional moral theories are preoccupied 
with rational, independent, autonomous selves – in contrast to the care ethic which focuses on 
the primacy of relationships. In developing the theory further, Held applies the ethics of care 
frame work to areas such as medicine, politics and international relations between countries. 
Held argues that there is a tension between theories of justice and the ethic of care, and how 
these two are to be “meshed without losing sight of their different priorities is a task still being 
worked on” (Held 2006, p. 17). Her suggestion is to keep both frameworks, and apply them to 
different areas. For example, in making of society’s laws the impartiality of justice and a rights-
paradigm should have priority, without forgetting the importance of care relationships. In the 
area of relationships, such as friendships and families, care ethics should be the primary 
consideration without forgetting the principles of justice. In international affairs, universal 
human rights discourse is important, but placing a primary focus on an ethic of care will reach 
the goal of universal respect for human rights much better than the traditional rationalistic 
paradigm (Held 2006, p. 17). Thus, in a sense, the important insights of the ethics of care are to 
be seen as an alternative to a justice paradigm or a rights-paradigm, but depending on the 
situation and context, these differing theories may inform one another. 
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  A central and important insight delivered by the ethics of care is the primacy of relationships, 
questioning the validity of a paradigm that construes humans as individualistic, autonomous, 
unsituated selves. In this way it reminds of the work of communitarians and virtue-ethicists such 
as MacIntyre, who also is deeply critical of this conception of human beings (MacIntyre 2007). 
MacIntyre’s solution is a return to the virtues and an espousal of communitarian conceptions of 
justice, whereas the ethics of care focuses primarily on caring relationships. Although there is 
some clear overlap, there are also some differences.  
  As a critique of principlism, it would therefore primarily focus on criticizing the principles of 
justice and autonomy, arguing that these are entrenched in the “masculine” paradigm which 
overemphasizes the rational, adult, independent, fully developed human being at the expense of 
the dependent and weak and at the expense of caring relationships. To my mind, these critiques 
miss the point in the case of principlism, and I will offer reasons why. 
  First, this criticism misses the paradigm in which principlism usually operates, and in which the 
principles developed. The principles developed primarily against the context of medical care and 
biomedical research. Medical care is delivered through caring relationships – the relationship 
between nurse and patient, doctor and patient, therapist and patient, and the like. Such 
relationships are essentially caring relationships, and often the patient is a vulnerable person 
who does not epitomize the rational, adult, independent, unsituated self. Often these 
relationships have an asymmetry to them: picture the young, learned, financially well-off, 
empowered physician on one side and the frail, suffering, weak, sick patient on the other side. 
The person whose interests are primarily at stake, the patient, is also the one who is weaker and 
more disadvantaged. Against this backdrop the principles developed – caring clinical 
relationships with power imbalances. The principlist approach espouses the four principles as the 
starting point for reasoning about the ethical implications of such relationships. Within such 
caring relationships, physicians have to respect the autonomy of their patients where such 
autonomy exists. This idea developed directly as a response to abuses of the past and 
unjustifiable paternalism of yesteryear. Furthermore, within such relationships beneficence, non-
maleficence and justice are primary considerations. 
  This is not much different than the conclusions a care-ethicist would come to. Consider: if we 
take the prototype case within the ethics of care and think about a mother who has four children. 
Clearly, here we have caring relationships in place, and similar to the clinician and patient there 
is an imbalance of sorts. If we were to ask the mother – what are your obligations to your 
children? – would we not hear her say that she has to provide for them, love them, and protect 
them from harm? And what is this other than the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence 
applied? Should we then ask the mother how she decides to distribute resources between her 
four children, and how she distributes her love and time between her four children – do we not 
enter on a discussion on the principles of distributive justice? Suppose her children range from 
20 years of age to 8 years of age. The 20 year old has her own values, ideas, and the capacity to 
rationalize them, while the 8 year old still does not have a fully developed decision-making 
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capacity. Will we not hear some recognition of different degrees of autonomy, and consequently 
a mother’s discretion in how to promote and respect the decision-making capacity of her children 
in different ways? For the 8 year old, she may simply restrict her respect of decision-making to 
choice of clothes and flavour of juice. For the 20 year old, she respects and promotes significant 
life choices, such as the choice of a future career or an avenue of study.  
  Thus, the main objection raised against traditional ethical approaches by care ethicists does not 
obtain in the case of principlism. Principlism can readily incorporate the important insights 
delivered by the ethics of care, namely the importance of caring relationships in moral 
deliberation. To an extent, it depends on the baseline assumptions taken into moral deliberation. 
If a person is committed to individualistic, rational selves, and applies the principles in this way, 
the conclusions reached will no doubt be skewed towards an individualistic perspective. Care 
ethicists would point out that such conclusions are skewed and mistaken; but it would not be the 
fault of the principlist approach. If we use principlism in the context that it developed – namely, 
caring clinical relationships – the conclusions reached should be acceptable to the care ethicist. 
  Secondly, care ethics is not so much an alternative to principlism as it is to traditional ethical 
approaches. The ethics of care should be seen as an opponent of Kantianism or utilitarianism, 
not principlism. The strength of principlism is that it relies on widely shared moral judgments, 
and that the conclusions delivered through principlism is acceptable to people from differing 
theoretical backgrounds. These shared moral judgments include that it is wrong to kill innocents, 
to steal, or to break promises. But these shared moral judgments also include the value of caring 
relationships and of friendships. Principlism is not much concerned with the theory that a person 
espouses; it is more interested in the moral judgments that the person shares with most other 
persons serious about morality. The ethics of care operates more at a theory level – as an 
alternative to Kantianism or utilitarianism – and does not operate at the same level that 
principlism does. Thus, I would argue, the ethics of care is not really an opponent nor critic of 
principlism, but rather of specific ethical theories. And if a principlist approach is used to address 
an ethical problem, taking into account widely shared moral values as espoused in the four 
principles – the conclusions reached would be acceptable to care ethicists, Kantians, and 
utilitarians. 
  For the purposes of my project, principlism is the appropriate ethical paradigm rather than the 
ethics of care. Basing this inquiry in principlism will yield conclusions that will be persuasive to 
persons from varying ethical theoretical backgrounds. Basing the work in care ethics would 
deliver conclusions that would persuade people who adhere to care ethics, but no one else. 
Furthermore, principlism is able to take the considerations dear to care ethics into account – 
namely the central position of caring relationships and family.  
  Lastly, I am not convinced that the ethics of care can adequately deal with the ethical problem 
of individual freedom versus responsibility to others, a central issue in the ethics of MMR 
vaccination of children. Principlism is ideally suited to manage this tension, and the problem can 
be best conceived of as autonomy in tension with justice. Held points out that the relationship 
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between the ethics of care and justice is not fully clarified yet, but suggests that both frameworks 
be used in practical situations. I take this to mean that one applies principles of justice where this 
seems appropriate and principles of care where these seem appropriate. This reminds a lot of 
the haphazard approach which characterizes the current state of the literature on the ethics of 
MMR vaccination in children. I have been critical of what I have called the smorgasbord approach 
to the problem – using whichever ethical approach seems to be most useful for the problem at 
hand. The fact that a prominent thinker within the ethics of care proposes just such an approach 
to issues of societal concern shows that the ethics of care is not the appropriate framework from 
which to consider the tension between individuals and society in MMR vaccination.  
  For these reasons, I consider the principlist approach superior to the care approach for my 
project. The central insight delivered by the ethics of care, namely the centrality of caring 
relationships, is nevertheless an important ethical insight and I will in my analysis of the individual 
case of vaccination consider family and relational interests as important moral considerations. 
 
(3.4) A public health ethics framework as alternate approach 
  Some public health ethicists have approached vaccination and vaccination programs from a 
purely public health perspective (Dawson 2004; El Amin 2012; Isaacs 2012; Pierik 2016; Verweij 
& Dawson 2004). This raises the question as to whether a public health ethics framework is not 
a better or more suitable ethical framework for the ethical analysis provided in this dissertation. 
I will offer three reasons why the Beauchamp and Childress principlist approach serves the aims 
and goals of this thesis better as an ethical framework over a public health ethics framework. 
Guidance for both the medical and public contexts 
  First, one of the aims of this dissertation is to provide ethical analysis that can provide guidance 
both for medical decision-making for the individual patient, as well as for societal responsibilities 
and policy. Whereas a public health ethics framework appears well suited to analysing policy 
from a population perspective, it is not quite clear to what extent it can provide guidance for 
individual of medical decision-making. The focus of public health is on populations, not on 
individuals (Kass 2001; Childress et al. 2002). Public health is concerned with a community 
perspective, and not with guiding the individual physician (Kass 2001; Childress et al. 2002). It 
considers the government and its institutions as playing a unique role in delivery of services and 
interventions, and does not focus as much on the professional responsibilities of individual 
healthcare workers or parents (Kass 2001; Childress et al. 2002). In a sense, the ‘patient’ is the 
community or population, and the ‘doctor’ is the government and its public health institutions. 
The principles-paradigm of B&C is much better suited to ethical analysis for medical decision-
making, while it also incorporates consideration of societal perspectives and policy through 
specification and application of the principle of justice.  
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Public health ethics frameworks are conflicting and contested 
  Second, there does not seem to be a unitary or agreed-upon framework of public health ethics. 
Rather, there are various different ethical approaches, sets of principles, or ethical frameworks 
within public health ethics which give the impression of a quagmire of loosely related ethical 
concepts rather than a clear and consistent ethical approach grounded in a systematic and 
coherent foundation. What should be included in a public health ethics framework seems 
controversial. Given this situation, it is not clear to me which public health ethics framework to 
choose out of the ones available, and what reasons one could ultimately give for one’s choice 
apart from arbitrary personal preference. Indeed, this issue seems to me to be a worthwhile topic 
of focus for a doctoral dissertation on its own! 
  Consider the following examples.  
  (1) Childress et al. (2002) formulate a set of 9 principles for public health ethics. It appears as if 
these are influenced by the B&C principlist approach: these principles are general guides, provide 
prima facie duties, can be in conflict with one another, and should be specified and weighed 
when applied in ethical analysis. They call these principles ‘general moral considerations’ (p. 171), 
and the 9 principles are: 
- producing benefits; 
- avoiding, preventing, and removing harms; 
- utility (producing maximal balance of benefits over harms and other costs); 
- distributing benefits and burdens fairly (distributive justice) and ensuring public participation; 
- respecting autonomous choices, and liberty of action; 
- protecting privacy and confidentiality; 
- keeping promises and commitments; 
- transparency (disclosing information, speaking honestly and truthfully); and 
- building and maintaining trust (Childress et al. 2002, p. 171-172). 
  The general method of ethical analysis seems similar to the method of B&C. These principles 
are applied to public health interventions and when in conflict weighed against each other. Five 
additional principles or conditions are stipulated to aid in weighing the principles and deciding 
which principle in a conflict to prioritize over another: effectiveness, proportionality, necessity, 
least infringement, and public justification (p. 173). 
  The trouble is, it is not clear where these principles exactly come from. What is the foundation 
of these principles? What grounds them? Why these principles, and not others? A variety of 
different ethical frameworks are mentioned throughout the paper. On page 171 the authors 
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describe the commitments of public health, including communal action and communal good, in 
what appears to set the stage for a Communitarian justification. Further down on page 171 they 
invoke the paradigm of casuistry as being “compatible with” and “indispensable” to their 
conception of public health ethics. On page 173 they invoke the concept of a “social contract” 
and a “liberal, pluralistic democracy”. On page 174 they cite Norman Daniels, who is a known 
Rawlsian egalitarian. On page 175 they argue from Mill’s work in On Liberty. To complete the full 
circle, on page 176 they cite a human rights paradigm. The authors appeal to these different and 
conflicting ethical paradigms within the same overarching argument as if they are somehow 
related to one another, moving from one to the other almost unacknowledged. Serious conflicts 
between these different approaches are not addressed, and no systematic approach for how 
these different theories are reconciled is offered. But even more surprisingly, the 9 principles 
offered are not in any noticeable way based on these ethical frameworks or derived from these 
ethical frameworks. Instead, the authors write: 
  “We can establish the relevance of a set of these considerations in part by looking at the kinds 
of moral appeals that public health agents make in deliberating about and justifying their actions 
as well as at debates about moral issues in public health” (p. 171). 
  So then, the 9 principles are derived from the “moral appeals” that public health agents make 
during the course of their work, and from debates on specific public health issues. It is not shown 
how this is done. It is also not shown what then provides normative grounding for these 
principles. It appears as if the authors imagine that simply because public health officials 
generally appear to appeal to principles of this sort, they enjoy binding normative grounding. 
Interestingly, the authors appear to be somewhat aware of these deficiencies, as they write: 
  “The terrain of public health ethics includes a loose set of general concepts and norms that are 
variously called values, principles, or rules – that are arguably relevant to public health. Public 
health ethics, in part, involves ongoing efforts to specify and to assign weights to these general 
practices, and actions, in order to provide concrete moral guidance” (p. 171). 
  Thus, I find in the paper by Childress et al. (2002) not a coherent and adequately grounded 
ethical framework for analysis to the same extent as can be found in the principlism of B&C. 
Rather, this seems to be an attempt at a starting point to draw out some important themes within 
public health ethics.  
  (2) Kass (2001) attempts to provide an ethics framework for public health. Like the Childress et 
al. article, she describes public health as focusing on the health of populations, and not 
individuals. She describes the communal nature of public health, collective communal actions 
leading to improved health for the entire community, and describes the particular role of the 
government in delivering public health. She then stipulates the need for an ethical framework for 
public health, distinct from medical ethics: public health institutions and governments can 
exercise a lot of power and consequently a code of ethics functioning of as a code of restraint is 
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important. “A code to preserve fairly… the negative rights of citizens to non-interference” (p. 
1777).  In her argument she cites various components and requirements of such a framework – 
the need to include “positive rights”, “affirmative obligations to improve the public’s health, and 
arguably, to reduce social inequities”, and the “social justice functions of public health” (p. 1777). 
From this foundation, she proceeds to develop a 6-step framework for public health ethics, 
containing the following components (p. 1777-1781): 
- What are the public health goals of the proposed program? 
- How effective is the program in achieving its stated goals? 
- What are the known or potential burdens of the program? 
- Can burdens be minimized? Are there alternative approaches? 
- Is the program implemented fairly? 
- How can the benefits and burdens of a program be fairly balanced? 
  This framework is described as an “analytic tool” (p. 1777) which can be used to analyze the 
ethical implications of specific interventions and public health programs. According to this 
framework, a public health intervention has to adhere to all of these different elements in order 
to be ethical. First, it should be clear what the goals of the program are, how the program 
improves the health of the public, and to whom the benefits accrue. Second, it should be 
demonstrated to what extent the program can reach the stated goals. Third, risk for harms should 
be identified. The majority of such harms, she argues, include risk to confidentiality, risks to 
liberty and self-determination, and risks to justice if only certain groups are targeted by 
interventions (p. 1779). She does not here consider physical harms that may result from public 
health interventions. Fourth, consideration should be given to modifying programs to minimize 
the harms identified in step three. Fifth, the program should distribute benefits and burdens 
fairly, using principles of distributive justice. Initially she does not state a specific theory of justice 
when considering a fair distribution of benefits and burdens. But when she comes to a second 
argument, considering whether public health has a role in addressing existing societal inequities, 
she cites the theory of justice of John Rawls, and argues that justice requires society to help the 
least well-off. She does acknowledge that this theory of justice is not supported by all 
philosophers. Sixth, if a program is such that there is clear public health benefit that outweighs 
the burdens, the program should go forward. She acknowledges that citizens would disagree on 
how benefits and burdens are to be balanced, and therefore fair procedures should be in place 
to address such disagreements. This could include societal discussion on public health programs, 
including avenues such as public hearings to encourage the inclusion of minority views. 
  This framework is evidently very different from the framework in the Childress et al. article, yet 
starts off with similar assumptions regarding the nature of public health, its Communitarian 
commitments, and the role of government in public health practice. Once again a variety of 
ethical approaches are invoked to provide ethical grounding for the framework and norms 
elicited, without it being clear how different and conflicting ethical approaches are related to one 
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another. The ethical framework for public health that is presented provides a tool with six 
questions to which every public health intervention must adhere. There is some role for 
individual liberty or autonomy, the violation of which is considered a potential harm of public 
health interventions. In the balancing section in question six, it is mentioned that disagreements 
about benefits vs. burdens have to be settled by public discourse, without it being clear what 
framework can be used to settle such conflicts between ethical goals. For example, is one 
dissenter to a public health program enough to invalidate the program? Or can the majority 
overrule a dissenter and force compliance with the program? The provided framework does not 
provide a clear avenue for resolution of this tension, which is a central tension in public health in 
general, and in vaccination programs in particular. 
(3) Gostin and Gostin (2009) considers the tension between individual autonomy and the public 
good. They state that they consider the problem using a Millian framework. In this article they 
argue for a hard form of paternalism in public health, arguing that public health interventions 
aimed at limiting the autonomy of individuals for their own good can be tolerated. Examples of 
the kind of interventions they have in mind are laws that prohibit smoking, laws that enforce 
helmet use for motorcycle riders, and regulations that combat obesity. Laws of this kind can be 
shown, they argue, to improve the overall health of the population. Since public health focuses 
on the health of the public and is communal in nature, and does not focus on individuals, 
infringements on autonomy that promote the overall good and wellbeing of the population can 
be justified.  
  Apart from using different ethical theories in their process of justification in a typical 
smorgasbord way, there is another serious objection to the entire overarching argument in this 
paper. Gostin and Gostin do not seem to realize the degree to which their argument engages in 
value-imposition, and underestimates the nature of value-pluralism in contemporary societies. 
Contemporary societies contain various different conceptions of the good life, and an important 
precept in such societies is the idea that people should have the freedom to seek their own 
conception of the good as long as the same freedom is extended to others. In contrast with this, 
Gostin and Gostin argue that personal choices are the leading causes of death and disability in 
society, and that benign paternalism therefore have a valid role in society. Gostin and Gostin 
state that as opposed to various subjective conceptions of the good, the aim of public health is 
“posivistic and objective” (p. 218). This represents a gross misunderstanding of the value-based 
assumptions that inform public health interventions. The Gostin and Gostin line of argument 
would actively engage public health officials and the government in choosing conceptions of the 
good on behalf of members of society, and justifies this by stating that its own conception of the 
good is the ‘objective’, preferable, and value-neutral one. But this flies in the face of respecting 
the values of other people and value pluralism. For example, let us consider their example of 
motorcycle helmets. Gostin and Gostin argue that many lives can be saved by paternalistic 
motorcycle laws (p. 217). Take now a fully informed motorcycle rider who hold independence 
and an active lifestyle in such high regard, that he would rather be dead than disabled or living in 
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a nursing home. Such a rider may know that his risk of dying is higher without a helmet, but thinks 
to himself that he would rather be dead than survive in a disabled state. Furthermore, he knows 
that his risk of injury and disability is quite high should he be in an accident and survive. Thus, he 
knowingly and in fully informed fashion refuses a helmet, because living in an injured or disabled 
state are unacceptable to him, given his values and his view of the good life. He would rather be 
dead than survive in a disabled state. Gostin and Gostin would impose on him their value of lives 
saved, and potentially force him into accepting a state of life that conflicts with his own values 
and goals. In other words, the “posivistic and objective” laws aimed at saving lives through 
enforcing helmet use overtly imposes a value judgment and a conception of the good life on the 
individual in the name of scientific objectivity.  
  Gostin and Gostin therefore advocate an approach to public health that is overtly paternalistic, 
where the public health official imposes value judgements on individuals in the name of 
improving the health of populations. This view faces serious objections, but I will not go into 
further detail here. Suffice it to say that this is highly controversial and contestable, and in my 
view indefensible. Be that as it may, the point I am trying to make in reviewing this article is to 
show how decidedly at odds this approach to public health ethics is with the approaches of 
Childress et al. and Kass. Yet, they all start off with the same set of assumptions regarding the 
goals and nature of public health, as well as the role of the government.    
  Having now considered three different public health ethics frameworks, it is clear that using a 
public health ethics framework for the analysis in this dissertation would present serious 
problems. The three presented frameworks conflict with one another, and it is not clear how the 
conflict can be resolved. There is no unified conception of what a public health ethics framework 
would look like. For example, the conception and application of individual autonomy differs 
radically in the frameworks I reviewed above. Which framework should therefore be used to 
analyze public health interventions where there is tension between individual freedom and the 
public good? To answer this question would be to engage in a body of work which would itself 
be a worthwhile focus of doctoral study. 
  Furthermore, it is not always clear how the different norms and frameworks are grounded. The 
argumentation does not always provide a clear connection between a stated public health ethics 
principle and the stated ethical framework. The authors also typically engage in an unsystematic 
use of conflicting ethical theories within the same argument, raising questions as to the validity 
and groundedness of conclusions.  
  I have demonstrated how B&C’s principlism is much better grounded, a more systematic 
approach, is based on widely shared moral judgments and therefore enjoys wider endorsement, 
and much more coherent than the controversy regarding public health ethics frameworks. Once 
again, B&C’s framework is preferable for the purposes of this dissertation than using a public 
health ethics framework. 
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Intrinsic communitarian assumptions in public health 
Third, using a public health ethics framework commits one to the Communitarian assumptions 
intrinsic to public health. All of the public health literature cited share these intrinsic 
assumptions: collective action producing a public good and promoting the common good; the 
role of governments; and a focus on communities rather than individuals. 
  I have noted in chapter 1 that most writers who seek to analyze the ethics of measles vaccination 
invariably employ communitarian assumptions when considering the obligations of the individual 
to others in society. This is in order, but leaves the conclusions unacceptable to those who reject 
Communitarian theories of justice. In this dissertation I aim to additionally consider how other 
theories of justice and different conceptions of the just society grapple with this problematic. For 
this reason, a public health ethics framework is not suitable for this dissertation. Using the B&C 
principles instead would allow the exploration of different and competing theories of justice, as 
I will show in Chapter 6, and will lead to conclusions that are more widely accepted and more 
generally applicable. I also believe this will be a substantial contribution to the literature on the 
subject. 
 
(3.5) Limitations of using B&C’s principlism 
  I’ve defended B&C’s principlism as the appropriate ethical approach for ethical analysis in this 
dissertation. In particular, I’ve shown how B&C is superior to alternate approaches for this 
particular thesis, and shown how B&C’s principlism can be defended against its critics. That does 
not mean, however, that the B&C approach has no limitations.  
  The B&C principlist approach does not enjoy universal support, and has some detractors who 
are persuaded by other approaches to bioethical reasoning. This should not be surprising; no 
ethical theory or approach enjoys universal support, and it is a given that selecting any bioethical 
approach for ethical analysis will immediately leave one with a number of detractors who 
disagree with the ethical approach chosen. Specifically in this regard, it should be remembered 
that B&C’s principlist approach was developed by philosophers in the United States, and 
therefore adopts assumptions reflective of its geographical and societal context. The emphasis 
on individual autonomy, for example, can be criticized from a variety of different perspectives. 
As I’ve pointed out, feminist philosophers argue that the autonomy paradigm in B&C 
misunderstands the importance of care relationships and what it means to be a child. On the 
other hand, more Communitarian thinkers may place greater emphasis on a situated self, on 
communal and familial decision-making.  
  Thus, it should not be supposed that B&C’s principlist approach appeals to everyone or settles 
every possible ethical question. However, a similar deficiency would be present no matter which 
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ethical approach is chosen. One of the strengths of B&C’s principlist approach that buffets it 
somewhat against this deficiency is the fact that the four principles are based in widely shared 
moral judgments. There are a number of moral judgments on which adherents of different ethical 
approaches agree, and B&C base their principlist approach on these shared moral agreements. 
In this way the conclusions reached through application of the principles enjoy wider 
endorsement, I would argue, than if I were to select a single ethical theory such as utilitarianism 
for ethical analysis. 
    Being mindful of the limitations of the B&C approach, it will be important to consider a 
Communitarian approach among the different conceptions of justice and it will also be important 
to carefully consider the status and interests children.  
  Another possible limitation is that inappropriate use of the principles can easily lead to a similar 
sort of “smorgasbord” approach as the one that I’ve been critical of in the measles vaccination 
ethics literature. In order to avoid this it will be important to clearly specify and balance the 
principles, and bring them all into a state of reflective equilibrium. I’ve argued that B&C’s 
principlism does allow for a systematic and consistent application of the principles in a way that 
avoids the problem of ad hoc argumentation and conclusion, and ultimately avoids the 
smorgasbord approach. 
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(4) Principlism and measles vaccination in children 
  In the next few chapters of this work, I shall apply the principles of bioethics to the issue of 
measles vaccination in children. To do this, I will explicitly draw on the conclusions of the previous 
two chapters on measles disease and measles vaccination. The four principles will be applied 
directly to these known facts, in order to draw out moral considerations involved in measles 
vaccination.  
  I shall proceed as follows. First, I shall consider the principles of autonomy, beneficence and 
non-maleficence as they apply to the individual case of measles vaccination. Through a process 
of argued reflection and specification, I shall arrive at two moral action guides as pertains to 
measles vaccination in children: (1a) Morality requires vaccination against measles for all children 
that are eligible for vaccination, and (2a) Respect for parent-child relationships regulates the 
response to measles vaccine refusal, type of policy preferred and places limits on the amount of 
coercion that can be justified. Principle (1a) indicates a moral commitment towards vaccinating 
those who are eligible, and is a strong moral principle at least to the point of measles elimination 
from society. Principle (2a) regulates the types of responses favored in dealing with parental 
vaccine refusal, such as placing limits on the types of State coercion that can be used or favoring 
non-coercive responses to vaccine refusal. 
  Next, I shall consider the issue from a justice perspective. In doing so, I shall use the six theories 
of justice identified by B&C as being influential in contemporary discourse regarding justice. In 
turn, I shall consider measles vaccination in children from the perspective of each of these major 
theories. It will be shown that each of these theories commit us to two moral action guides as 
pertains to measles vaccination and the just society: (1b) A just society vaccinates every child 
against measles that is eligible for vaccination, at least to the point that sustains measles 
elimination from society, and (2b) Respect for liberty and the parent-child relationship regulates 
the just society’s response to vaccine refusal. The thesis I will defend is that these two action 
guides are dictates of justice, no matter which theory of justice one subscribes to; I will do so by 
showing how each of the 6 different theories of justice lead us to adopt (1b) and (2b). Principle 
(1b) defines a moral commitment for societies to vaccinate all children who are eligible, at least 
to the point where measles vaccination is sustained. Principle (2b) regulates the societal response 
to vaccine refusal, and makes room for respecting of parental vaccine refusal.  
  It is clear that principles (1a) and (2a) are very similar to principles (1b) and (2b) from the justice 
perspective. That is an important insight, and one of the major findings of this work: that 
consideration of measles vaccination from different principles bring us to similar action guides 
and lead to similar conclusions. These action guides represent the four principles of B&C’s 
principlism in balance with one another, and using these action guides to derive actual ethical 
obligations with regard to MMR vaccination brings the moral force of the four B&C principles to 
bear in a practical way. 
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 The goal is to reach a stage of reflective equilibrium, where all of these moral commitments are 
balanced with one another, removing conflict and uncertainty. Further balancing and 
consideration of these specified action guides will be the task of the last chapter in this work.  
These action guides can be blended, further specified, and combined to give us the following: 
  (1) All children eligible for measles vaccination should be vaccinated against measles, at least to 
the point of sustained measles elimination. 
  (2) Respect for parental decision-making and the parent-child relationship guide the response 
to parental vaccine refusals.   
  In light of (1), vaccinating children with MMR is a moral imperative, and vaccine refusals demand 
a response from society and healthcare providers.  In light of (2), non-coercive responses such as 
building of trust and education are preferred. If the use of State power becomes necessary 
because other measures fail to ensure sufficient vaccine uptake, the types of coercion is limited 
by considering the impact on the family unit and on liberty. 
  In conclusion I shall consider who has which moral responsibilities, and apply action guides (1) 
and (2) to vaccination policy to arrive at morally justified policy suggestions. In essence, I shall 
argue that parents have a strong moral obligation to have their children vaccinated. They are not 
always in the ideal situation to discharge this obligation, either through barriers to vaccination or 
through mistaken beliefs regarding vaccination. Healthcare providers have a strong obligation to 
provide vaccinations and to assist parents in discharging the obligation to vaccinate through 
various means such as vaccine education and the building of trust relationships.  The State has 
obligations to ensure that measles vaccines are readily available, that vaccine policies are in place 
that would ensure adequate uptake of measles vaccination, and to respond to vaccine refusal 
through education and through use of State power as needed.  
  I shall argue that measles vaccination policies will focus on three areas: 
- Use of a tightly worded opt-out system which only allows exemptions for religious 
objections to vaccination. Thus, all children will be vaccinated unless the parents actively 
show their objection to vaccination on religious grounds, or medical contra-indications 
exist. 
- The use of educational methods that have been tested and shown to be effective in 
increasing vaccination uptake. 
- The building of trust relationships between primary care providers (such as family doctors 
or primary care nurses) and parents. This should be the building block of all care provided 
to children, and the cornerstone of vaccination delivery. 
 
  These conclusions and recommendations will bring us to a place of reflective equilibrium, where 
all the principles have been specified, weighed, and balanced to clarify moral obligations and 
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remove doubts and conflicts. Furthermore, it will also be clear how these conclusions affect real-
world considerations such as vaccination policy and vaccination delivery.  
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Chapter 5: The individual child and measles vaccination 
  
  In this chapter the ethical principles of beneficence, non-maleficence and autonomy as they 
pertain to measles vaccination will be considered. To do so, these principles will be applied and 
specified as they relate to the individual case of measles vaccination. The focus here is on the 
interests of the individual child and the individual case of measles vaccination. The analysis will 
rely on the medical and scientific facts presented in chapter 2 and chapter 3.  
  In chapter 3, scientific analysis mostly related to MMR vaccines. There are good reasons for this: 
MMR is widely used to vaccinate against measles (over 90 countries, including North America 
and Europe), and a lot is known regarding the efficacy and potential adverse effects of MMR 
(Demicheli et al. 2012). Of course, MMR also contains vaccine components that protect children 
against mumps and rubella. But for the sake of this analysis, I will only focus on the effects against 
measles. In going forward, I will therefore simply use the term “measles vaccination” when 
referring to the vaccine. It is the protection against measles I am most interested in. Bear in mind, 
however, that the benefits of MMR includes protection against other diseases as well, which 
strengthens the benefit of the vaccine when considering benefit vs risks.   
  I shall furthermore assume that high quality measles vaccinations are reasonably available and 
administered by knowledgeable professionals. Of course, if one were in a situation where 
measles vaccines were of doubtful quality, or were expensive to the point of being unaffordable 
by the general public, it would change the analysis. The reality is, however, that measles vaccines 
of safe and reliable quality are reasonably available at low cost; for example, it is possible even 
in the developing world to vaccinate a child against measles for less than one US dollar (UNICEF 
2007). Furthermore, various national and international public health agencies are doing excellent 
work in ensuring availability and access to measles vaccination globally (CDC 2008, UNICEF 2007). 
These efforts have led to an increase in the global vaccination rate and a decrease in the global 
measles mortality burden (CDC 2008, UNICEF 2007).    
  Thus, the question I shall consider in this chapter will be as follows: In a society where measles 
vaccination is reasonably available, what are the ethical considerations when thinking of the 
individual case of measles vaccination? Or put differently: what would ethical considerations 
demand when it comes to an individual child and measles vaccination? Of course, there are but 
two courses of action, to vaccinate a child or to not vaccinate a child. So, the question also arises: 
do ethical considerations instruct us to vaccinate a child against measles, or do they favor non-
vaccination? Or is it neither; is the question perhaps ethically neutral? 
  To answer these questions, I shall analyze the individual case of measles vaccination by using 
the principlist approach of Beauchamp and Childress (2013). In this chapter, specifically the 
principles of autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence will be applied to the questions as 
stated. At first glance, autonomy is an issue: at the centre of the question is a young child who 
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does not have the capacity for autonomy. I will therefore firstly consider an ethical framework 
for medical decision-making for young children, namely that parents act as surrogate decision-
makers for their children in accordance with the best interest standard. I will also argue that a 
best interests standard can readily be grounded in the B&C principles: when people make 
decisions for a child in accordance with the best interest standard they are considering which 
course of action would bestow the greatest benefit and best limits harm to the child, so that in 
reality this is nothing other than weighing the implications of the principles of beneficence and 
non-maleficence against each other.  I pointed out in chapter 1 that many authors who deliberate 
about the ethics of measles vaccination in children employ parental decision-making in 
accordance with a best-interest standard as a way in which to analyze ethical considerations 
involved. However, the best interests approach is never grounded within a specific ethical 
paradigm, and the argumentation often suffers from a haphazard, smorgasbord approach in 
which different and competing ethical considerations are appealed in an inconsistent and 
unsystematic fashion. I argued that the implications of this approach are that conclusions 
reached appear arbitrary and ad hoc, not being grounded in a consistent ethical approach or in 
substantive ethical argument. Essentially, the moral case for the individual instance of the 
vaccination of a child has not been adequately made in the literature up to this point. In this 
chapter I therefore argue that parental decision-making according to perceived best interests of 
the child is grounded in the ethical principles of beneficence and non-maleficence, and then 
proceed to examine the individual case of vaccination using this framework. 
  I shall conclude that the principles applied to the individual case of vaccination will lead us to 
adopt two specified ethical action guides or specified moral principles. From these two action 
guides or specified principles, moral obligations can be derived that will bring considerations of 
autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence into balance with one another with regards to 
measles vaccination in children. The two action guides I will establish are:  
  (1a) Morality requires vaccination against measles for all children who are eligible for 
vaccination. 
  (2a)  Respect for the parent-child relationship regulates the response to measles vaccine refusal, 
type of policy preferred and places limits on the amount of coercion that can be justified. 
  In chapter 6, I shall consider measles vaccination in children from a justice perspective, 
examining the ethical implications of 5 different theories of justice. I shall argue that when it 
comes to measles vaccination in children, each of these different theories of justice would be 
committed to the formulation of two ethical action guides or principles, which I shall call (1b) and 
(2b). Remarkably, moral action guides (1a) and (2a) derived from the principles of autonomy, 
beneficence and non-maleficence are strikingly similar to action guides (1b) and (2b), derived 
from the principle of justice.  
  In the concluding chapter of this project, I shall show how these action guides can be combined 
with one another in formulating two ethical action guides or principles, (1) and (2). These two 
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action guides or principles will represent the four principles of principlism in balance with one 
another. As such, these two specified action guides can then be used to derive ethical obligations 
and ethical guidance with regards to measles vaccination in children on a societal and individual 
level. Such ethical conclusions will be grounded in the ethical foundation of the principles of B&C, 
bringing these different ethical considerations into a state of reflective equilibrium.    
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(1) The best interest standard and medical decision-making for children 
  When faced with situations where patients do not have the capacity to make their own medical 
decisions, there are different strategies that can be followed to make sure that autonomy is 
respected (Beauchamp & Childress 2013; Buchanan & Brock 1990; Elliot 2001). One such strategy 
is to take into account previously expressed autonomous choices. If an incompetent patient 
previously expressed a decision on a matter while competent, these wishes can be taken into 
account as the autonomous choices of a competent individual. This is the idea that advance 
directives are based on: autonomous persons make their wishes known with regards to 
healthcare decisions should they lose medical decision-making capacity in future.  
  Previously expressed wishes of currently incapacitated patients are not always known in this 
way. Another possible approach is to have a surrogate decision maker. If someone previously had 
the capacity to make their own decisions, and now through a car accident and concomitant brain 
injury (for example) is incapacitated, the surrogate decision maker can state what the patient 
would have decided with regards to their medical care. This is called the substituted judgement 
standard. It is assumed that the surrogate decision maker knows the patient well, and cares for 
the wishes of the patient, and can therefore reliably and faithfully decide on behalf of the patient 
as the patient would have done. Usually it is a spouse or close biological family who acts as 
surrogate. 
  The approaches mentioned above are defended by B&C, (2013, p. 226-228) Buchanan & Brock, 
(1990, p. 98-138) and Elliot (2001). The basis for the respect of individual autonomy is in 
respecting what the currently incapacitated presumably would have chosen, either by taking into 
account previously expressed wishes such as is found in an advanced directive, or by relying on 
the knowledge of next of kin who can judge how the patient would have chosen in the given 
circumstance. These approaches therefore assume an incapacitated patient who had medical 
decision-making capacity at some point in the past.  
  When it comes to measles vaccination in children, it appears that neither of these two 
approaches would be helpful. The first measles vaccine is given at 12-15 months of age and the 
second vaccine anywhere from age 18 months until school age in societies where the risk for 
contracting measles is low (Demicheli et al. 2012; Moss & Griffin 2012). In societies where the 
risk for contracting measles is higher, the recommendation is usually for earlier administration of 
the first vaccine, such as at 9 months age (Demicheli et al. 2012; Moss & Griffin 2012). It is 
therefore clear that in the individual case of measles vaccination, we are dealing with a very 
young child. A child of 18 months or younger is not capable of autonomous decisions, and has 
never at any previous time been capable of autonomous decisions. There are therefore no 
previously expressed wishes to go by, and there is no way in which a substituted judgment can 
be made since no-one knows how this individual would have decided if competent. 
  In cases where the individual in question has never been competent, various authors argue that 
the appropriate guide for substituted decision making is the best interest standard (Beauchamp 
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& Childress 2013; Buchanan & Brock 1990; Elliot 2001). There is simply no way of knowing how a 
never-competent individual would have chosen if competent in a set of circumstances. But it is 
usually possible to weigh how different treatment choices would impact the overall welfare of 
the never-competent patient by weighing potential benefits and risks of each treatment option. 
In the absence of specific knowledge regarding the choices of an individual, making decisions on 
behalf of that individual that optimally promotes their welfare, and is therefore in their best 
interest, is argued to be ethically defensible and reasonable.  
  Buchanan & Brock (1990, p. 122) maintain that in cases where substituted judgement and 
advanced directives are not feasible the best interest standard should apply. If faced with an 
incapacitated patient and a health care choice, clinicians and surrogate decision-makers should 
weigh the benefits to the patient from each decision against the potential “disinterests” from 
each choice. In the end, they should opt for the choice that provides the most net benefit to the 
incompetent patient. Usually, the incapacitated patient’s family (closest biological relatives or 
adopted relatives, or spouse) is seen as the appropriate agents to make decisions in the patient’s 
best interests (p. 136-139). Buchanan and Brock provide reasons for this – of all available persons 
the patient’s closest family members are most concerned with the patient’s best interests and 
are thought to have the best knowledge of the incompetent patient’s best interests (p. 136-139). 
Also, family is highly valued within society as a means of community and meaning, and this should 
not be interfered with by society unless to prevent harm to individuals outside the family (p. 136-
139).  
  Buchanan and Brock (1990, p.246) argue that for young children the best interest standard is 
“the only appropriate guidance principle.” B&C (2013, p. 228-229) argue along similar lines that 
patients who were never competent should have a surrogate decision maker direct their health 
care decisions in accordance with the best interest standard, as does Carl Elliot (2001). The 
interests of the young child are thought to include immediate interests such as absence of pain 
or suffering and the presence of pleasure, as well as future interests or developmental interests 
such as development, future opportunities and relationship interests (Buchanan & Brock 1990, 
p. 247).  
  These considerations apply directly to the individual case of measles vaccination in children. 
Central to measles vaccination is the very young child, usually between 9 months and 18 months 
of age. This child is not competent to exercise autonomy, and has never been competent to 
express autonomous decisions on health care previously. The correct guiding principle is 
therefore the best interest standard. I also take it that the best surrogate decision maker is 
usually the child’s parent(s). The parents care most for the child and for the child’s interests. The 
parents live with the child and will bear the consequences of any infringement on the child’s best 
interests. Harming the child will result in the most substantial distress to the parents, even to 
harm to the parents themselves, so that the best interests of the child is of the utmost concern 
to parents. Thus, the task to direct health care decisions in the best interests of the child is usually 
left to the parent(s).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 170 
 
  Most often, parents are thought to be the best judge of the child’s best interest and most 
parents discharge their responsibility well. But this is not always the case. Sometimes parents can 
be genuinely mistaken about their child’s best interest. At other times, some parents may be 
indifferent to their child, or a child-parent relationship may be abusive. In the analysis of the 
individual case of vaccination, I will assume a healthy child-parent relationship where the parent 
can act as appropriate proxy. It is obvious that in cases of child abuse or neglect, the State should 
intervene. It is also obvious that in the absence of parent or family, society at large has a 
responsibility to intervene through the agency of the State. What is more difficult is a healthy 
parent-child relationship where parents are clearly mistaken regarding the best interests of their 
child. I shall consider this scenario as part of the analysis. 
  The best interest standard has become the guiding standard of choice for decision-making for 
children, and is considered to be both and ethical standard as well as a legal standard (Birchley 
2016; Buchanan & Brock 1990, p. 216-260; Diekema 2011; Pope 2011). In chapter 1 I reviewed 
the status of the best interest standard within South African law (chapter 1, section 2.2.2). The 
best interest standard is also a guiding legal standard for courts in their decision-making for 
children in other countries, such as the USA, Canada, and the UK (Birchley 2016; Pope 2011). But 
the best interest standard is also an ethical standard, as defended by the authors and arguments 
cited above, describing the ethical obligations of those who stand in morally significant 
relationships with the child and who are tasked with making medical decisions for and providing 
medical treatments to the child.   
  The central consideration in all decisions regarding a child, therefore, is what is best for the 
child. For medical decision-making, the framework is as follows (Birchley 2016; Buchanan & Brock 
1990, p. 216-260; Pope 2011). Parents have the authority to make and authorize medical 
treatment decisions for their children, and should be guided by the best interest standard. 
Healthcare professionals who stand in a therapeutic relationship with the child offer treatment 
plans and options that are in keeping with the best interests of the child, and looks to the parent 
to choose between available treatment plans and to provide informed consent when necessary. 
Thus, physicians offer and recommend appropriate treatment options, parents choose and 
authorize treatment options. Both parties are guided by the best interest standard. The authority 
of parents are not unlimited. Parental decisions that are not in keeping with the best interest 
standard should be challenged by other parties who stand in morally significant relationships 
with the child, such as the physician. The best interest standard describes the obligations of 
parents and healthcare professionals towards children when it comes to medical decision-
making, and places limits on the decisions that can be made. The best interest standard therefore 
serves both as guiding principle, describing the ethical obligations of those who make decisions 
for children, and as limiting principle, describing the limits that are placed on parental decision-
making authority (Birchley 2016; Pope 2011).   
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Grounding the best interests standard in the principles 
  I shall now argue that the best interest standard is implicitly grounded in considerations of 
beneficence and non-maleficence. The young child does not have the capacity for autonomy, and 
has not been autonomous at any prior time. There is therefore no autonomy of the child to weigh 
in the consideration, and decision-making is purely guided by what is best for the child. The child’s 
parent(s) of course usually have the capacity for autonomous decision-making. But the parents 
are here making decisions on behalf of their child, and not for themselves. Their decision-making 
authority is therefore not unlimited, but is limited by the best interest standard.  
  In order to use the best interest standard, decision-makers need to weigh the options before 
them in light of the benefits and costs or harms of each, eventually choosing the option that has 
“the greatest net benefit to the patient” (Buchanan & Brock 1990, p.123). Therefore, the 
decision-maker has the obligation of making decisions that would maximize benefit and reduce 
overall harms to the minimum. But this in its essence is what the principles of beneficence and 
non-maleficence are about. Beneficence justifies actions which bring about increased welfare or 
the conference of some benefit. Non-maleficence justifies actions that limits harm. Therefore, a 
parent who chooses what will confer the greatest net benefit is operating in accordance with the 
principle of beneficence, and a parent who is concerned with limiting harm to their child is 
operating in accordance with the principle of non-maleficence. 
  B&C conceives of the best interest standard as mainly grounded in beneficence. They state, “The 
term best applies because of the surrogate’s obligation to act beneficently by maximizing benefit 
through a comparative assessment that locates the highest probable net benefit” (Beauchamp & 
Childress 2013, p.228). It is not hard to see, however, that the best interests standard also has a 
substantial focus on limiting harm in weighing overall benefit, and it is therefore clear that non-
maleficence is also an important grounding principle for the best interests standard. Sometimes 
the healthcare choice involving the child centers on a decision as to which course of action would 
mitigate harm to the highest degree. One would imagine that this is particularly so in the case of 
preventive actions. A preventive medical intervention does not focus so much on providing 
benefit as it does on preventing future harms. This is precisely the paradigm of vaccinations in 
children. An intervention is given to a healthy child to prevent future illness and future harms. In 
one sense it is a benefit; foregoing a serious infectious illness is a tremendous benefit. In another 
sense it is purely a harm-reduction exercise, where the potential harms of the intervention pales 
in comparison with the potential harms of not giving the intervention. There is therefore a degree 
of overlap between the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence. The exact delineation 
between the two is not clear; it is not certain where one ends and the other begins in this context. 
What is clear, is that both are grounding principles for the best interests standard, and a parent 
who chooses in accordance with best interests are motivated by considerations of beneficence 
and non-maleficence.   
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  On reflection, it seems as if parental decision-making in accordance with the best interest 
standard satisfies the demands of the bioethical principles of beneficence and non-maleficence. 
To act in a child’s best interests is the same as considering beneficence and non-maleficence with 
regards to the child. Children are uniquely dependent on their parents, and have interests that 
are intertwined with the interests of their parents (Elliot 2001). Thus, to allow parental decision-
making according to the perceived best interests of the child promotes and respects important 
interests of the child (Elliot 2001; Buchanan & Brock 1990). Generally, the judgment of parents 
should be respected due to the nature of the parent-child relationship. Not only do parents 
usually care most deeply for their children, and are thought to be best situated to make decisions 
for their children, but the interests of the child are also closely intertwined with their relationship 
with the parent. Harming the parent-child bond will ultimately compromise the interests of the 
child. Thus, the freedom of parents to choose should be given wide latitude. Once again, this is 
not an unlimited freedom to choose: parental decisions that clearly compromise the interests of 
the child should be challenged by others who stand in morally significant relationships with the 
child.  
Best interest and vaccinations: The argument of Angus Dawson (2005) 
  Dawson (2005) considers the best interest standard as guide to medical decision-making for 
children in relation to vaccinations in general. He defends the use of the best interest standard 
in decision-making on behalf of children, using the ethical framework of Buchanan and Brock 
(1990). On pages 82 and 83 he argues from the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence 
and seems to assume the grounding of the best interest standard in beneficence and non-
maleficence. When it comes to vaccines, he then argues that the relevant risks and benefits 
should be weighed in order to decide whether a specific vaccination is in the best interest of the 
child, underlining the need for empirical facts in the determination. Parents and physicians 
should choose those vaccines where benefits outweigh risks. If parents refuse vaccines, such 
refusal can be (and should be) overridden by the state if such decisions pose a threat to the child’s 
welfare. Important in such determinations is consideration of empirical data. 
  Overall, the argument that Dawson defends is summarized as follows (p. 75): 
“1. Medical decisions about incompetent patients should be made on the basis of what is in their 
best interests (where prior wishes are unknown or non-existent). 
2. Pre-school infants are incompetent (and have no prior wishes). 
3. Therefore, decisions about the medical care of infants should be made on the basis of what is 
in their best interests. 
4. Best interests in relation to infants should be determined by seeking to balance the potential 
harms and benefits of possible actions and inactions.    
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5. Where the parents make a decision about an infant’s care which is likely to result in substantial 
risk of significant harm to that infant then third-parties (such as the state) have an obligation to 
intervene to protect the infant from the consequences of that decision.  
6. Given 4, what is in the best interest of infants in relation to vaccinations is to be decided by 
seeking to balance the harms and benefits associated with vaccination versus non-vaccination. 
7. Given 3,5 and 6, where it is in an infant’s best interests to be vaccinated (or not vaccinated) 
and the parents decide the other way then the state (or other legitimate third-parties) have an 
obligation to ensure that the infant is protected from the consequences of such a decision.”  
  Generally, Dawson’s argument seems to be in agreement with the argument and framework I 
have defended thus far, and Dawson shows how these considerations can be directly applied to 
vaccinations in general. On page 84, however, Dawson states that with measles vaccination the 
evidence for the benefit and risks of MMR is unclear, and it therefore follows that it is unclear 
whether measles vaccination is in a child’s best interest. This, I will argue, is mistaken – the 
empirical evidence exists to make this determination regarding measles vaccination. To be fair to 
Dawson, Dawson’s article appeared in 2005 and since then much more empirical evidence has 
become available and the Wakefield-autism article has been discredited and retracted.  
  In what follows, I will consider the best interest framework in the light of the empirical evidence 
I presented in chapters 2 and 3. I will show that measles vaccination is undoubtedly in the best 
interests of children. However, in cases of vaccine refusal, a variety of the child’s interests have 
to be considered. I therefore now turn to applying the best interest standards to the individual 
case of measles vaccination. In doing so, it is important to analyze the expected benefits and 
harms of each possible option of the decision in question, and choose the option that leads to 
the best possible outcome for the child. This would have to incorporate a variety of the child’s 
interests: avoidance of suffering and pain, enhancement of pleasure, familial relationships, and 
development. What will emerge are two action guides, (1a) and (1b), which would represent 
specified moral principles derived from the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence.  
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(2) The individual case of measles vaccination in a child 
(2.1) Best interests of the child   
   The medical facts with regards to measles vaccination have been extensively presented in the 
previous chapters, but I summarize some relevant details here as we embark on providing benefit 
and reducing harms. Measles is a serious disease with serious complications (Buchanan & 
Bonthius 2012; CDC 2013a; Dardis 2012; De Vries et al. 2012; Moss & Griffin 2012).  It is also 
highly infectious, so that the unvaccinated child is almost certain to get measles if brought into 
contact with measles virus (Buchanan & Bonthius 2012; CDC 2013a; Dardis 2012; De Vries et al. 
2012; Moss & Griffin 2012). If the child were to get measles, there is a 30%-40% chance of some 
kind of complication from the illness (CDC 2013b; Moss & Griffin 2012). This includes a 5% chance 
for pneumonia, the leading killer, a 10% chance for otitis media which can lead to deafness, an 
8% chance for diarrhea (CDC 2013b; Moss & Griffin 2012). For every 1000 measles cases, 4-5 
children will suffer a serious neurological complications such as encephalitis (Buchanan & 
Bonthius 2012), and there will be 1-2 deaths (CDC 2013b). There is also a risk for eye infections 
and blindness of uncertain magnitude, but of substantial concern (Moss & Griffin 2012). Added 
to this, children who get measles will suffer the effects of active infection, which is similar to an 
influenza type infection. This includes fever, coughing, sneezing, eye irritation and pain, and the 
like (Moss & Griffin 2012). This syndrome is certainly unpleasant, as anyone who has had a serious 
case of the flu will be able to testify. 
  If a child were to get vaccinated against measles, protection against measles infection is 
conferred (Demicheli et al. 2012; Meissner, Strebel, & Orenstein 2004). One dose of measles 
vaccine at 12 months of age or later is 95% effective in protecting against measles, while two 
doses are over 99% effective (Demicheli et al. 2012; Meissner, Strebel, & Orenstein 2004; Moss 
& Griffin 2012). At 9 months of age a single dose is thought to be about 85% effective in 
preventing measles (Moss & Griffin 2012). The adverse effects seen with measles vaccine are 
transient and minor – fever in 5 to 15%, rash in 5%, joint pain in up to 25% and the like (see 
detailed analysis of MMR adverse effects, chapter 3 section 3). These do not cause the same 
amount of discomfort and suffering as do acute measles infection. Measles vaccination does 
increase the risk of febrile seizure by 0.3-0.8%; however, febrile seizures are thought to be benign 
in their outcome, and certainly the risk of febrile seizure with measles infection is higher than 
with the vaccine. The potential serious adverse effects of measles vaccination are extremely rare. 
This includes allergic reactions in less than 1 per million, a transient thrombocytopenia in less 
than 1 per 30,000 that usually passes without problems, and a doubtful connection with 
encephalitis (brain infection) in 0.22 per million or less. 
  Taking these facts into account, it is very clear that receiving measles vaccination to protect 
against measles infection is in the best interests of the child. The child is protected against a 
potentially devastating infectious disease by a highly effective vaccine. Furthermore, the risk of 
serious adverse effects from vaccination is extremely low, to the point where they are negligible 
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when considering the tremendous benefit conferred through vaccination. From one perspective, 
protection against a devastating illness can be seen as a tremendous positive benefit, and thus 
vaccination can be justified by appealing to beneficence. On the other hand, vaccination can be 
viewed as a harm reduction strategy; the potential harms from non-vaccination are severe, while 
potential vaccine-associated harms are minor and not worrisome. Serious vaccine related harms 
are incredibly rare to the point of being negligible when compared with the serious and common 
harms from measles infection. Measles vaccination can therefore also be justified by the principle 
of non-maleficence. 
  Of course, this assumes that there is no medical contra-indication to vaccination. In children 
who are severely immunocompromised, or who are known to be allergic to vaccine components, 
or are under 9 months of age, the vaccine benefit is lower to the point of being negligible and the 
risk for adverse effects potentially higher (Moss & Griffin 2012; CDC 2012). In such children 
measles vaccination is not in their best interests. Once again, this can be justified by 
considerations of both beneficence and non-maleficence. In a child who has a contra-indication 
to vaccination, the benefit received does not outweigh harms incurred. Therefore, the principle 
of beneficence can no longer be used to justify vaccination. If expected harms outweigh benefits, 
the principle of non-maleficence would be against vaccination. As highlighted previously, in any 
given population there will be a small subset of people who are not eligible for vaccination 
because of medical reasons (CDC 2008; Orenstein, Papania, & Wharton 2004). These include 
children who are too young to receive benefit from the vaccination. In such children, the 
potential harms and costs of vaccination are present, but no benefit is expected. Clearly 
beneficence does not justify vaccination in such cases, and non-maleficence would guide parents 
and clinicians to not vaccinate. Children under 9 months are therefore not vaccinated against 
measles, as they will not receive benefit. Consider, on the other hand, a child who has allergy to 
a vaccine component. Such a child may well receive the benefit of protection from measles 
through receiving vaccination, and the harms of measles infection are prevented. However, the 
harms that may result through a serious allergic reaction are tremendous, and far outweigh any 
benefit that the child may receive through protection against measles. Once again, the argument 
from beneficence is diminished, and considerations of non-maleficence would be strongly against 
vaccination in this case. 
  In all other children where no medical contra-indication exits, it seems that there is significant 
benefit to measles vaccination. In what follows, I shall consider three different sets of interests 
of the individual child, as per Buchanan & Brock (1990, p. 247): immediate interests, 
developmental interests and relational interests. Buchanan & Brock include relational interests 
under developmental interests, but I consider the child’s relational interests to contain morally 
relevant aspects that are different from other developmental interests, and therefore worth 
considering as a separate category of interests. 
 




  The first set of interests of note are the immediate interests of the child; that is, presence of 
pleasure and absence of pain or suffering (Buchanan & Brock, p. 247). Vaccinating a child against 
measles protects the best interests of the child through protecting the child from the suffering 
caused by the illness syndrome associated with active measles infection, and also through 
protecting the child against serious complications associated with measles disease. Now of 
course, the injection itself is painful and the minor adverse effects of the vaccination can be 
unpleasant. I would argue though that these can be minimized, say through using distraction 
techniques when administering the injection or using topical anesthetic on the skin, and by 
treating the joint pain and fever that may result with appropriate analgesics and antipyretics. 
Furthermore, the illness syndrome caused by measles infection results in much more suffering 
over a longer duration than does the fever or joint pain that can result from vaccination. With 
measles infection, the fever is high and the illness lasts for more than a week or two (Moss & 
Griffin 2012). With the vaccine, the fever and joint pain only occurs in 25% of cases or less, is 
minor in intensity, and lasts only 1-2 days (see chapter 3 section 3 of this work). Thus, when 
thinking of the immediate interests of the child with regards to active measles infection, it seems 
clear that vaccination is in the best interests of the child. When it comes to the complications of 
measles and the effect these can have on the immediate interests of the child, the protection 
offered through vaccination is even more compelling. The complications of measles can cause 
devastation for the health of a child, and cause immense pain and suffering. The vaccine protects 
against these devastating complications while carrying a negligible risk of serious adverse effects.  
Development and future opportunities  
  Children also have interests with regards to future opportunities and development (Buchanan 
& Brock 1990, p. 247). It is in the child’s best interests to be free from illness and disease that 
could hamper physical development and cognitive development, which in turn would limit future 
opportunities for the child. The complications of measles infection can substantially burden the 
development of the child and thus limit future opportunities. If infected with measles, a child 
acquires a risk of blindness, deafness, mental retardation, neurological damage and death. 
Measles vaccination protects against these risks, thereby protecting the development interests 
of the child. Opponents of vaccination sometimes claim that measles vaccinations carry 
unacceptable adverse effects, such as autism, and thus that measles vaccination would hamper 
the development interests of the child (Bean 2011; Kata 2010; Kata 2012). This is not true; reliable 
evidence shows that the common adverse effects of measles vaccination are minor, and do not 
burden the development of children substantially (see chapter 3, section 3 of this work). 
Relational and familial interests of the child 
  The third set of interests are the relational interests of the child (Buchanan & Brock 1990, p. 
247). Carl Elliot (2001) points out that a potential problem faced by the best interests standard is 
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that it focuses on the child as an individual only, not taking into account the localization of the 
child within a family [6]. In Elliot’s words: 
  “This can leave us with a kind of misplaced individualism, as if the only ethically important 
considerations are those that have to do with the child himself – intrinsic abilities like his intellect, 
his awareness, his physical abilities and so on. But this is an odd way to look at children, since 
what is most striking about children is not their intrinsic abilities but their dependence. Children 
exist in relationships of dependence on their families… It seems ungainly to try to consider 
children’s interests apart from the interests of their families because their interests are bound up 
together. This is more than simply saying that parents are best placed to judge the interests of 
their child; it is saying that very often their interests are the same. It would not be exaggerating 
to say that very often the worst thing that could happen to parents would be for something to 
happen to their children… What matters morally about a child is connected to the fact that they 
are loved by their parents, and what we value about human beings is not just their intellect but 
also their capacity for these deep human relationships” (Elliot 2001, p. 458-459). 
  Elliot’s point is that a child’s relational interests are extremely important, and that these 
interests are linked with a child’s position within the family. Parents are not just important as 
surrogate decision-makers; they are important as integral parts of the child’s best interests. The 
interests of the child are intricately interwoven with the interests of the parents, so that these 
interests are inseparable. Harming the child will harm the parents and harming the parents will 
harm the child. Thus, any complete account of the best interests of the child will have to take 
into account the vested interests the child has as a member of a family, and the relationship that 
the child has with the parents. The parent-child relationship is of substantial moral worth, and 
will need to be considered seriously as a separate set of interests of the child in question. So, the 
child does not only have interests as an isolated individual such as physical and developmental 
interests, but also interests that are bound up in the parent-child relationship. So much so, that 
an assault on the child will be an assault on the family unit, and an assault on the family unit will 
be an assault on the child. 
  The idea that the family unit has moral worth and is to be protected seems fairly widely 
acknowledged. One can see this for example in the declarations on human rights by the United 
Nations. In these documents the family unit is described as deserving of protection by all States 
and all societies. This protection and consideration given to the family unit is thought to 
transcend divisions of geography, state lines or local custom.  A few of the relevant articles from 
the UN rights declarations will be cited as examples.  
  I clarify: the intention is not to invoke a rights-paradigm. Undoubtedly, the ethical paradigm of 
the UN declarations is rights-based, but that is not my focus here. What I intend to show is that 
the family unit is widely considered to carry moral weight and to be worthy of moral 
consideration and protection. The B&C principlist account is based on the idea of widely shared 
moral intuitions. By citing the UN and their injunctions I am illustrating the fact that families, and 
parent-child relationships in particular, are widely recognized moral entities, worthy of moral 
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consideration and protection. This is meant to strengthen my principlist argument by 
demonstrating that the moral worth ascribed to parent-child relationships is a widely shared 
moral judgment, and therefore rightfully included in the principlist argument that I am 
constructing. Note specifically that the UN argues for universal recognition of the moral worth of 
the family, and specifically the moral relationships that exist between parents and children. I 
agree; this, I would argue, is a widely shared moral judgment which should form part of our 
considered judgments as we weigh the principles. 
  Here are the relevant articles from the UN declaration on Human Rights: 
  UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations 1948):  
Article 16(3): “The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the State.”  
  The Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 
1990 (United Nations 1990):  
Article 5:  “States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where 
applicable, the members of the extended family or community as provided for by local custom, 
legal guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner 
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the 
exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention.”  
Article 7(1): “The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from 
birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, the right to know and 
be cared for by his or her parents.”  
Article 9: “1. States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents 
against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in 
accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best 
interests of the child. Such determination may be necessary in a particular case such as one 
involving abuse or neglect of the child by the parents, or one where the parents are living 
separately and a decision must be made as to the child's place of residence.  
2. In any proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1 of the present article, all interested parties shall 
be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings and make their views known.  
3. States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both parents to 
maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is 
contrary to the child's best interests.  
4. Where such separation results from any action initiated by a State Party, such as the detention, 
imprisonment, exile, deportation or death (including death arising from any cause while the 
person is in the custody of the State) of one or both parents or of the child, that State Party shall, 
upon request, provide the parents, the child or, if appropriate, another member of the family with 
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the essential information concerning the whereabouts of the absent member(s) of the family 
unless the provision of the information would be detrimental to the well-being of the child. States 
Parties shall further ensure that the submission of such a request shall of itself entail no adverse 
consequences for the person(s) concerned.”  
  It is evident that the family unit is widely seen as carrying considerable moral worth. The family 
unit is worth protecting. The reasons for this are clear when considering Elliot’s argument with 
regards to the place of the child in the family unit. The child’s interests are intertwined with the 
parents’ interests. From a principlist perspective, we may argue as follows. Parent-child 
relationships are considered to be of moral worth, and forms part of our moral starting point. 
When we then consider beneficence and non-maleficence in relation to a child, it is important to 
also consider the parent-child relationship. Promoting parent-child bonds is an act of beneficence 
to the child, and avoiding actions that may strain or injure the parent-child relationship is an act 
of non-maleficence. Of course, this refers to normal, loving parent-child bonds. If a parent is 
abusive or if there is a substantial breakdown of the parent-child bond, the other interests of the 
child outweigh the moral considerations usually afforded to protecting parent-child 
relationships.  
  Now, when considering the familial interests of the child and measles vaccination, it appears 
that the moral weight lies on the side of vaccination. If a child is harmed the family is harmed. 
Measles infection has the potential to cause harm to the child, and in turn harm to the parents, 
and eventually harm to the child’s relational interests. Suffering in the child will bring suffering 
to the child’s parents; thus the suffering is shared and multiplied, not only affecting one person. 
Furthermore, if a child is severely disabled, as may happen with measles infection, the normal 
familial bonding and interaction may be hampered. Of course, if a child dies, these familial bonds 
are broken, leaving heartbroken parents behind. 
  Vaccinating against measles protects against a disease that may wreak havoc on the family unit 
and family attachments, and consequently vaccination protects the familial interests of the child. 
It is also noteworthy that the parents of the child are protected from heartache and suffering 
that may result from measles infection in their child. All around, the child’s best interests and the 
family’s best interests seem to be protected through measles vaccination. In its turn, the risk of 
harm from measles vaccination is negligible, so that the child’s family and the child’s relational 
interests are not harmed through vaccinating. 
 
(2.2) Relying on herd immunity 
  In chapter 1 I pointed out that most authors in the current literature on measles vaccination 
ethics at some point consider the issue of a parent who foregoes vaccination and relies on herd 
immunity to protect their child (Diekema 2005; Diekema & Marcuse 2007; Krantz, Sachs, & 
Nilstun 2004; Sheather 2013; van den Hoven 2012; Wood-Harper 2005). This is a specific category 
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of vaccine refusals; a child otherwise eligible for vaccination does not receive the vaccine because 
of a specific mode of parental reasoning. The argument is as follows. In a highly vaccinated 
society, the risk that an individual child would contract measles is very small. The benefit that 
such a child would get from vaccination is therefore also small. Some parents may then reason 
that it may be in their individual child’s best interests to forego vaccination, in so doing not 
running the risk of vaccine side effects, while relying on herd immunity for protection against 
measles. Authors generally respond to these arguments in two ways: from an individual 
perspective, and then from a societal perspective.  
Responses in the literature 
  First, they consider whether state interference with such parental decisions can be justified by 
ethical considerations central to the individual perspective. Diekema and Marcuse (2007) argue 
that the risk of harm to the individual child is likely not sufficient to override parental decisions. 
Diekema (2005) similarly argues that the risk of harm to the individual child does not rise to the 
level where parental decisions can be interfered with. Krantz, Sachs, and Nilstun (2004) argue 
that the risk of getting measles is “negligible” in highly vaccinated societies, while there are 
“ethical costs” to being vaccinated, but the individual child would probably still be better off 
vaccinated, especially if traveling to areas with lower vaccination uptake. Sheather (2013) argues 
that children in highly vaccinated societies may still be exposed to measles through cases being 
imported, and the harms resulting from vaccinations are usually “trivial”, so that vaccination 
seems “prudential”. Compulsion can only be justified, however, if there is substantial risk of harm 
to the child; in Sheather’s opinion the case for such interference with parental decisions 
disappears once herd immunity has been established. Wood-Harper (2005) argues that the state 
has the moral and legal right to interfere with parental decisions that are not in the best interests 
of the child, but concludes that measles vaccine refusal in a highly vaccinated society does not 
fall under this category. Her motivation is that “measles can be, but seldom is, fatal,” so that as 
long as there are any risks associated with receiving a vaccine, it is “difficult to rationalize” 
overriding parental vaccine refusals.   
  In none of these responses is it clear whether the refusing parent’s reasoning is sound or 
whether the argument is successful from an ethical point of view. Furthermore, the authors seem 
to emphasize different aspects of the benefit-risk ratio while making very different factual claims. 
Some authors focus on the benefit of still being vaccinated and call vaccine adverse effects 
“trivial”, while others minimize any benefit from vaccination in this scenario while being very 
concerned about vaccine associated harms. It is almost as if they are reasoning from different 
sets of empirical facts. Invariably, these claims are not well referenced so that it is not clear where 
such claims come from. For example, Krantz et al.’s claim that the risk of getting measles being 
“negligible” in highly vaccinated societies is not well referenced and it is not clear what set of 
facts this claim is based on. Sheather claims that vaccination still seems “prudential” because 
harms from vaccinations are “trivial” and measles may still be imported. I agree with this 
argument, but it is not clear on what data Sheather is basing these claims, and it is not clear what 
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is meant by “prudential” – does Sheather mean that it is a moral requirement of beneficence or 
not?  
  All the authors agree on one thing. The threshold for interference with parental decision-making 
is risk of harm to the child. The implications of other ethical considerations are never quite fully 
clarified, but at least all seem to agree that if there is substantial risk of harm to the child, the 
state is morally justified to interfere with parental decision-making. The burden of proof is 
implicitly placed on those who would want to interfere – there has to be an unequivocal high risk 
of harm to the child before the state can interfere. But what would this look like? Is the state and 
its agents to guess, or is there some test or measure that can be applied to each individual case? 
No objective criteria are offered by which risk of harm to the child can be evaluated, and no 
specific threshold of risk is quantified, except one: vaccination levels below the threshold 
required to establish herd immunity. Risk of harm is only demonstrably high enough when 
vaccine uptake in society falls below a herd immunity threshold.  
  What emerges from this is quite surprising. In effect, the authors all agree with the arguments 
raised by such vaccine refusing parents: such refusals are only morally relevant when population 
vaccination uptake falls below a certain level. Reading these responses, one would conclude that 
one should really only be worried about the moral implications of such vaccine refusals once herd 
immunity disappears. The moral case for overruling parents, they argue, is only made once a 
society does not have herd immunity. No other arguments are offered to provide moral guidance 
to parents in this scenario. No arguments are offered to challenge the logic of the argument that 
motivates such refusals. Varying claims are made without reference to appropriate empirical 
sources; this leaves recommendations and conclusions very vague. Telling us that vaccination is 
perhaps still “prudential” in such circumstances without making a clear arguments as to what this 
morally commits parents to leaves things very open to individual interpretation.    
  Second, authors typically argue that such vaccine refusals are instances of “free riding” and are 
unfair (Diekema 2005; Diekema & Marcuse 2007; Krantz, Sachs, & Nilstun 2004; Sheather 2013; 
van den Hoven 2012; Wood-Harper 2005). Parents who rely on herd immunity in this fashion 
make use of a public good, herd immunity, created by co-operative public efforts, without paying 
their fair share. Authors uniformly assume a communitarian justice perspective in these 
arguments. I shall consider the issue of free riding more fully in the next chapter. Here, I shall 
continue with the focus on the individual case of vaccination. 
  Thus, in highly vaccinated societies, some parents may reason that their child is best served by 
not being vaccinated. The available responses in the literature do not challenge the underlying 
argument. I think that the underlying argument is a mistaken view for a number of reasons. 
Challenging the underlying argument 
  The argument is based on the premise that an individual child is better off not being vaccinated 
against measles in a highly vaccinated society. Thus, to act in the best interests of the child would 
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be to forego vaccination and rely on herd immunity. I challenge this argument on two grounds. 
One, the underlying premise is incorrect; I will argue that the individual child is still better off 
vaccinated in a highly vaccinated society such as the US or the Netherlands. Two, the argument 
suffers from a fatal internal contradiction: it is self-defeating.   
Vaccination is better than herd immunity 
  Even in highly vaccinated societies measles outbreaks can occur and spread among chains of 
susceptible individuals. We have seen evidence of this in the US, Canada and the Netherlands – 
all countries where measles has been eliminated, but imported cases can cause epidemics that 
spread among susceptible people (Dallaire et al. 2009; Fiebelkorn et al. 2010; Knol et al. 2013). 
In these countries there are pockets of susceptibility, where local vaccination rates are low. 
Consider the Netherlands as an example (Knol et al. 2013). Although the overall vaccination rate 
in the country is very high, there are localized areas where the vaccination rate is well below the 
threshold required to confer herd immunity. For example, the vaccination rate in the 
Netherlands’ so-called “Bible belt” is quite low. Recently there has been a sustained measles 
outbreak in this community, which highlights the problem. So, even though vaccination rates in 
the country are quite high, there are susceptible people and susceptible geographical pockets. 
Countries such as the US and the Netherlands see outbreaks resulting from imported cases which 
are transmitted along chains of contact between susceptible individuals (Dallaire et al. 2009; 
Fiebelkorn et al. 2010; Knol et al. 2013).  
  The average parent does not know whether they live in a susceptible geographical pocket within 
the highly vaccinated society, or whether their child has contact with susceptible people in public. 
People do not carry signs to show whether they are immune to measles or not.  The only way to 
ensure that a child is protected against such imported epidemics is through vaccinating the child. 
Herd immunity or measles elimination does provide a measure of protection against measles for 
those individuals in society who are susceptible to measles. But this protection relies on 
uniformly high rates of vaccination; if a susceptible individual lives within a geographical low-
vaccination pocket, herd immunity is not present for that individual. Furthermore, given the fact 
that imported cases can still be spread among chains of susceptibility, herd immunity is evidently 
a lesser form of protection than is afforded through direct vaccination of a child. A child is much 
better protected against measles through vaccination than through reliance on herd immunity. 
Some people cannot receive the vaccination, and they have no choice but to depend on herd 
immunity: those who are ineligible for measles vaccination find protection through the herd 
effect. It is preferable that a child be directly protected, as this eliminates the risk of measles 
infection for the individual child, usually life-long. Relying on herd immunity for protection 
against measles when your child is eligible for vaccination is like playing Russian roulette with 
your child’s health: imported measles outbreaks can strike unpredictably and therefore cannot 
be protected against but by vaccination. This is brought home more strongly when one considers 
the high level of mobility in contemporary societies, frequent travel, and increasing globalization. 
In such a world, I would argue, direct protection through vaccination is much better than relying 
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on herd immunity, where the risk for coming into contact with imported or active cases of 
measles appears on reflection to be increased. 
  A second consideration is this. Measles vaccination rates are variable through time. Evidence of 
this can be seen in the United Kingdom, where measles returned to become endemic after being 
previously eradicated (Euro Surveillance Editorial Team 2008). Children who live in highly 
vaccinated societies have no guarantee that vaccination rates will remain high in the future. If 
vaccination rates fall in the next few years, unvaccinated children will be placed at substantial 
risk of measles vaccination. This once again shows that dependence on herd immunity/measles 
eradication from society is a lesser protection than getting vaccinated. The only way to provide 
life-long and assured protection against measles infection is to receive measles vaccination. To 
this, some may retort that they will then get the vaccination for their child once vaccination rates 
fall. I find this very unconvincing; which parent monitors CDC statistics to see what the level of 
vaccination coverage in their country or region is? Even if a parent went to these lengths, such 
statistics always appear in print at a later time than when the vaccination rates actually fall in the 
real world. Statistics are always after-the-fact. So even a diligent parent who follows this 
reasoning may vaccinate too late. It seems dubious and chancy to risk a child’s welfare in this 
way. 
The argument is self-defeating 
  The argument is inherently self-defeating. The argument asks us to imagine a specific child 
standing before us in a highly vaccinated society. This child, according to the argument, is at low 
risk of getting measles and is protected by herd immunity. Therefore it is in this child’s best 
interests to forego vaccination and not risk the harms associated with vaccination.  
  A central point to the argument is that it relies on the presence of herd immunity. In other 
words, vaccination uptake has to be above 93-95% of two measles vaccine doses within the 
population (see the section on herd immunity in this work, chapter 2 section 2.2). That means a 
whole lot of children has to be vaccinated. But in the society and child we are imagining, 
vaccination uptake is above the required level; a whole lot of children has been vaccinated 
previously and herd immunity has been established. The only reason to vaccinate this child would 
be if there was no herd immunity, and the risk for getting measles was consequently high.  
  So, if we accept the argument as it stands, we agree that this child should not be vaccinated. 
The parents forego vaccination. Now, let us move on to the next case. The next set of parents 
also make decisions for their child along the best interest standard. They reason similarly that 
non-vaccination is in their child’s best interests. They forego vaccination. Again, move to the next 
case. The parents of the third child reason similarly (and correctly, if our argument obtains) and 
foregoes vaccination for their child. And so on, and so on. At some point vaccination rates will 
fall below the threshold for maintaining herd immunity. But in the day to day delivery of 
vaccinations it will not be obvious which case it is that causes the vaccination rate to fall below 
this level. In any case, it is not necessarily important which case stands chronologically prior to 
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the loss of herd immunity; it is more important which case stands causally prior to the loss of 
herd immunity. In other words, which case is responsible for decreasing the vaccination rate 
below the herd immunity level? This is almost impossible to answer on a practical level; imagine 
a super computer standing behind a nurse about to deliver the vaccine, calculating whether this 
instance of vaccination is necessary to sustain herd immunity. It is absurd. In actual fact, all of 
these cases contributed to the loss of herd immunity. No single case can be pointed to as “the 
straw that broke the camel’s back”. No single case is responsible for the loss of herd immunity. 
Rather, it is the cumulative effect of numerous individual decisions that is to blame. The collective 
failure to vaccinate led to the destruction of herd immunity. Another way of stating this is that 
the argument is not universalizable: it cannot be universally and uniformly applied, as doing so 
would lead to loss of herd immunity and vulnerability of children to measles, denying 
unvaccinated children protection against measles, and thus defeating the very aim and 
conclusion the argument is supposed to support. 
  Here is another way to argue this point. If parents use this argument to forego vaccination, and 
rely on herd immunity, it will inevitably lead to a dramatic fall in vaccination rates and the 
eventual loss of herd immunity. The parent can therefore not reach their goal of securing the 
best interests of their child by relying on herd immunity and foregoing vaccination. Parents can 
reliably protect their child against measles by choosing vaccination. 
  Thus, using the argument of relying on herd immunity will in the end result in the loss of herd 
immunity. In that way the argument is self-defeating, and suffers an inherent internal 
contradiction. Parents who want to protect their children cannot do so by reverting to this 
argument. If this argument were successful, and parents decided to forego vaccination, it is 
inevitable that vaccination rates would plummet and measles would become endemic once 
more. The argument undermines itself, and ultimately fails.  
Ethical conclusions regarding this argument 
  I conclude that this argument is not successful. The underlying premise is untrue: it is in the best 
interests of children to be vaccinated even in highly vaccinated societies. The argument is also 
self-defeating. 
  Therefore, measles vaccination should still be considered to be in the best interests of the child, 
even in highly vaccinated societies. There is an obligation on parents to choose what is in the best 
interests of their child. They are therefore ethically obligated to choose vaccination, even in a 
highly vaccinated society. 
  Even if parents or providers reject my arguments and maintain that their children are better off 
in relying on herd immunity, we should realize that this argument would only be valid for as long 
as herd immunity exists. In geographical pockets of susceptibility, such as the Bible belt in the 
Netherlands, or in countries with lower vaccination rates, such as South Africa, this argument 
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does not even enter into consideration. In such circumstances parents are undoubtedly obliged 
to choose vaccination. 
   
(2.3) Conclusions: Best interests and the principles 
  Taken together, it is clear that vaccinating is in the child’s best interests. The child is protected 
from measles infection and consequently the child’s immediate interests, developmental 
interests and relational interests are protected from the potentially harmful effects of measles 
infection. The child’s parents are also protected from the suffering that would result from harm 
to their child. Measles vaccination does not significantly burden children or their families, having 
very low risk for harm. Measles vaccination is readily available, at reasonable cost.  
  Thus, vaccinating the individual child can both be seen as an act of beneficence and an act of 
non-maleficence. It confers a benefit to the child that substantially outweighs risks, and it is a 
powerful harm-reduction strategy. These considerations obtain even in highly vaccinated 
societies. The principles of beneficence and non-maleficence therefore confer a prima facie 
obligation on those who are in caring relationships with the child to have the child vaccinated. 
This falls primarily on the parents. In accordance with the medical decision-making framework 
for children which I have defended, parents are tasked with making healthcare decisions for their 
children according to the best interest standard. The obligation to have a child vaccinated falls 
primarily on the parents.  
  There are, however, other interested parties who stand in caring relationships with the child. 
The primary clinician, whether a nurse or doctor, has obligations of beneficence and non-
maleficence towards the child. The clinician therefore has to do their part in ensuring vaccination: 
the clinician is obliged to enable the parent to discharge their duty to choose vaccination. This 
would include offering vaccination, education, allaying fears, ensuring safe administration of 
vaccines according to the correct schedule and as painlessly as possible, and so forth. This 
approach respects the parent, and the role of the parent in the child’s life, while discharging the 
obligations the healthcare professional has towards the child patient. 
  The government or state in its role as governor and protector also stands in a relationship with 
the child. The state therefore also has obligations in this regard: removing barriers to vaccination, 
ensuring access to high quality vaccines, and enabling parents to discharge the obligation to 
choose vaccination for the child. 
  On the whole, a principles-based analysis prima facie demands the vaccination of the individual 
child against measles as long as no contra-indication exists. If a child is medically able to be 
vaccinated, the child should be vaccinated. This moral obligation falls on the parents of the child. 
The parent is the child’s surrogate decision-maker and primary caregiver, and is tasked with 
acting in the best interests of the child. There are also responsibilities on other persons or groups 
who are morally tasked with the wellbeing of the child: healthcare providers of children to ensure 
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that vaccination is offered, and is provided safely and as painlessly as possible, and the 
government and its agents. 
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(3) The objecting parent 
  Most parents discharge their moral obligation with regard to measles vaccination, and we see 
fairly high vaccination rates in many countries. However, it is clear that some parents do not get 
their children vaccinated, even though measles vaccine is readily available. Many people in the 
anti-vaccination movement are concerned parents who hold mistaken views on vaccination 
(Bean 2011; Kata 2010; Kata 2012). Parents who refuse vaccination often do so on the grounds 
that they believe they are acting in their child’s best interests, and not through nefarious 
motivations (Brown et al. 2010). These parents believe that vaccination is harmful, or part of 
some conspiracy, and that they have a duty to protect their child (Bean 2011; Kata 2010; Kata 
2012). Such parents still have a moral obligation to get their children vaccinated. However, they 
are not in a position to discharge their moral duty. They are mistaken as to what their duty is – 
they believe that withholding vaccination is the right thing to do. This is therefore not the same 
situation as when a parent wilfully neglects their child.  
  In the case of an objecting parent, a response from other parties with moral obligations to the 
child is required. Clinicians and the government have obligations of beneficence and non-
maleficence to the child, being situated in a position of moral responsibility towards the child. 
These parties also have obligations to respect autonomy. In the case of measles vaccination, I 
have argued that a child of vaccination age does not have autonomy, and that the appropriate 
decision-making framework is to allow parents to choose on behalf of their children in 
accordance with a best interest standard. Another way to say this, is that parents have the 
authority to act as medical decision-makers for their children and should use the best interest 
standard as guiding principle. However, I have also argued that parental authority is not absolute; 
their authority is limited by the best interests of the child. If a parent is clearly not choosing what 
is in the child’s best interests, such parental decisions falls outside of the limits demarcated for 
the exercise of parental authority, and it is the obligation of healthcare professionals and the 
state to challenge and potentially overrule such decisions in order to protect the interests of the 
child.  
  I shall consider the implications of this framework using a number of examples as thought 
experiments. Consider this example. If a parent chooses not to feed their child because they want 
the child to starve, such a parental decision is clearly not in the best interests of the child. The 
parent does not care about the best interests of the child, and acts in a way that is harmful to the 
child. Clearly, the parental decision here falls outside of the limits I have indicated on the principle 
of autonomy in parental decision-making. In such a situation, clinicians and the state have the 
obligation to intervene, overruling the authority of the parent. The principles of non-maleficence, 
beneficence are in unison here, placing limits on parental authority in making decisions for the 
child. Parents cannot appeal to respect for their own autonomy or own liberty in order to avoid 
discharging their obligation to the child. These principles place an obligation on the other parties 
with interests in the welfare of the child, namely healthcare professionals and the state, to 
protect the child from the harms that would result from starvation and neglect. The principle of 
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beneficence places an obligation on these parties not only to promote the welfare of the child. 
Clinicians and the state are morally obligated to interfere in this situation and secure the best 
interests of the child. This would mean feeding the child, and protecting the child from further 
neglect by the parent. 
  Consider a second example. Imagine a parent who chooses to only feed their child rooibos tea 
because they believe it to be healthier and better than other foods. The child is denied the benefit 
of healthy food, and is placed at risk of harm through starvation. The parent is clearly not 
choosing what is in the best interests of the child, but the parent is not acting from nefarious 
motives. The parent truly believes that the choice of rooibos only is in the best interests of the 
child. In this instance, clinicians and the state also have an obligation conferred through non-
maleficence and beneficence towards the child. They have to act to secure the child from harm 
and to bring the benefit of nutritious food to the child. The parent’s choice is overruled out of 
concern for the best interests of the child. This example is different from the first, since the 
parent’s motive is different. In the first example, the parent doesn’t care about the child. In the 
second, the parent does care about the child and wants to secure the child’s best interests, but 
is mistaken about what this is. Thus, although both are examples where parental choices fall 
outside of the limits placed on parental authority. However, there is an important difference 
between the two examples. In the second, the child has morally important relational/family 
interests invested in their relationship with their parent. In the first, the relationship has broken 
down, and the child-parent relationship is not an important consideration in weighing the 
interests of the child. 
  Let us return now to parental refusals of measles vaccination. Measles vaccination is, I have 
argued, in the best interests of the child (unless a medical contra-indication to vaccination exists), 
and the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence place an obligation on those in relation 
to the child to ensure that the child is vaccinated: the parents, the healthcare workers, and the 
state/government. If a parent refuses to vaccinate their child, it can be for two reasons. One 
reason is that these parents do not care for the welfare of their child. In this scenario, failure to 
vaccinate is part of a general pattern of neglect. Other parties have the obligation to act in the 
best interests of the child grounded in the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence. The 
healthcare worker, for example, should call state agents such as social services to intervene. The 
agent of the government should protect the child against neglect, including ensuring measles 
vaccination. Parental wishes that a child should be harmed should not be respected. Here, a child 
needs to be protected from their parent. Admittedly, this scenario is probably fairly rare. 
  The second, and more common, reason a parent may choose not to vaccinate their child is 
because the parent is convinced that vaccination does not serve the best interests of the child 
(Bean 2011; Kata 2010; Kata 2012).  Indeed, many parents who refuse vaccination do so because 
of concerns that vaccination may be harmful (Brown et al. 2010).  Such parents hold mistaken 
views, and have likely been influenced by the incorrect messages and tropes of the anti-
vaccination movement (Bean 2011; Kata 2010; Kata 2012). These parents are mistaken; their 
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choice does not in fact serve the best interests of their children. While their obligation to secure 
the best interests of their children remain in place, they are not able to discharge this obligation 
because of mistaken beliefs regarding measles vaccination. Again, other parties such as 
healthcare providers and the state (and its agents) who have obligations of beneficence and non-
maleficence to the child now have to act to further the best interests of the child. Here, however, 
there are additional moral considerations at play. One is the relational or familial interests of the 
child. The child-parent relationship is a morally significant relationship, and when calculating the 
best interests of the child, these familial and relational interests should also be counted into the 
equation. The parent still plays an important role in the life of the child, and the interests of the 
child are still intertwined with the interests of the parent.  The parent is evidently not choosing 
in accordance with best interests – but they want to. This is different than a general pattern of 
neglect. Considering these morally relevant factors directs the type of responses that healthcare 
providers and the state employ. They have to respond to vaccine refusal; they have a moral 
obligation to do so. But they should respond in ways that also protect the parent-child 
relationship and respect the role of the parent in the child’s life as much as is possible while also 
ensuring vaccination.  
  Ideally, the healthcare workers and the state would partner with the parent, and enable the 
parent to discharge the obligation of choosing vaccination. One avenue is to empower parents 
through a bulwark of educational approaches and trusting healthcare relationships. The focus in 
this approach falls on morally supportable persuasive techniques. The goal would be to get the 
parents to see what their duty is, thus placing them in a position where they can recognize and 
discharge their duty to vaccinate.   
  Another approach is to use state power. This would mean intervention by the State, which 
would impose some form of penalty and thus force parents to vaccinate their children or face 
consequences. The use of state power can be justified if it is effective in persuading parents to 
discharge their duties and if it does not substantially harm the relational and familial interests of 
the child.  
  The use of state power can at first glance seem appealing, since the moral obligation to see a 
child vaccinated is so strong. However, reflection on this will show that not all types of coercion 
is the right answer. The penalty for non-vaccination imposed on parents will bring harm to the 
family unit, and will end up harming the child in question. Imagine for example that parents are 
placed in jail for not vaccinating their child. This surely is a most damaging action imposed on a 
child whose interests are supposed to be protected through the action. When it comes to the 
objecting parent, it seems then that the familial and relational interests of the child place a check 
on the amount of use of state power that can be justified. It appears as if the justification for 
mandatory vaccination policies has to be balanced between the risk of measles infection and the 
relational interests of the child.  
  I shall consider different policy options and make recommendations for measles vaccination 
policy in chapter 7. Suffice it to say here that parental refusals demand a response, which could 
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include persuasive approaches such as building of trusting relationships and education, and the 
use of state power in a way that brings about vaccination while not harming the familial and 
relational interests of the child. How this can be done will be suggested in chapter 7.      
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 191 
 
(4) Conclusion – two ethical principles/action guides 
  In the young child who does not have the capacity for autonomous decision-making, 
beneficence and non-maleficence place an obligation on those who stand in relation to the child 
to secure the child’s best interests. This means that parents, healthcare workers and the state 
(and its agents) have obligations to ensure vaccination against measles, provided that no contra-
indication exists. Furthermore, the complex interests of the child justifies a framework where a 
parent chooses healthcare options in the best interests of their child; this means that parents 
play an important role in choosing vaccination for their child. These applications of the principles 
to the case of measles vaccination can be distilled into the following action guide: 
  (1a) Morality requires vaccination against measles for all children who are eligible for 
vaccination. 
  It is clear that the welfare of the child is the ultimate driving force for these moral obligations. 
When a parent decides not to get their child vaccinated, this is not in the best interests of the 
child. Therefore, healthcare workers and the state should respond to this refusal. In their 
response, the morally significant parent-child relationship should be respected. This obligation is 
motivated by beneficence and non-maleficence. These ethical obligations are optimally 
discharged when parents choose vaccination in the best interests of their child; healthcare 
workers and the state should ideally support parents and move them towards choosing 
vaccination. A parent choosing vaccination would ultimately be the best. However, the primary 
driving force is vaccination; and the use of state power may be necessary and is morally justifiable 
in order to ensure vaccination, as long as it is done in a way that does not harm the complex 
familial and relational interests of the child. These considerations can also be distilled into an 
action guide:  
  (2a) Respect for the parent-child relationship regulates the response to measles vaccine refusal, 
type of policy preferred and places limits on the amount of coercion that can be justified. 
  It is apparent, then, that children should be vaccinated against measles as a mandate of 
morality. Ideally, parents would realize their obligation in this regard and discharge it. In the case 
of an objecting parent, the moral obligation to vaccinate remains and healthcare providers, public 
health organizations and the state have a duty to respond to ensure vaccination. However, there 
are moral considerations that place limits on the state and the use of power. The child’s familial 
interests are important and are to be respected, and these place a limit on the use of coercion. 
Any action that causes a substantial burden to the child’s familial interests will be hard to justify. 
  The next step in this work is to consider measles vaccination from a justice perspective. This will 
lead to two similar action guides, (1b) and (2b). The eventual goal, which will be realized in the 
final chapter, is to balance (1a) and (2a) with (1b) and (2b) in order to arrive at a place of reflective 
equilibrium, where moral obligations are in balance with one another and conflicts have been 
clarified and removed.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 192 
 
Chapter 5 References 
Bean, SJ 2011, ‘Emerging and continuing trends in vaccine opposition website content’, Vaccine, 
vol. 29, pp. 1874-1880. 
 
Beauchamp, TL, & Childress, JF 2013, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 7th edn, Oxford University 
Press, New York. 
 
Birchley, G 2016, ‘Harm is all you need? Best interests and disputes about parental decision-
making’, Journal of Medical Ethics, vol. 42, pp. 111-115. 
 
Brown, KF, Kroll, JS, Hudson, MJ, Ramsay, M, Green, J, Long, SJ, Vincent, CA, Fraser, G, & 
Sevdalis, N 2010, ‘Factors underlying parental decisions about combination childhood 
vaccinations including MMR: a systematic review’, Vaccine, vol. 28, pp. 4235-4248. 
 
Buchanan, R, & Bonthius, DJ 2012, ‘Measles virus and associated central nervous system 
sequelae’, Seminars in Pediatric Neurology, vol. 19, pp. 107-114. 
 
Buchanan, AE, & Brock, W 1990, Deciding for others: The ethics of surrogate decision-making, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention (CDC) 2008, ‘Update: Measles- United States, 
January-July 2008’, MMWR Weekly, vol. 57, no. 33, pp. 893-896. 
 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 2012, ‘Measles’, in Epidemiology and 
Prevention of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases. The Pink Book: Course Textbook, 12th edn, second 
printing, last modified 7 May 2012, last reviewed 7 July 2014.   Available from: 
www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/pinkbook/meas.html    [31 October 2014]. 
 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 2013a, Overview of Measles Disease, last 
reviewed 31 August 2009, last updated 12 September 2013.  Available from: 
www.cdc.gov/measles/about/overview.html  [18 September 2014]. 
 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 2013b, Complications of Measles, last 
reviewed 31 August 2009, last updated 30 August 2013.  Available from: 
www.cdc.gov/measles/about/complications.html  [18 September 2014]. 
 
Dardis, MR 2012, ‘A review of measles’, The Journal of School Nursing, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 9-12. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 193 
 
Dallaire, F, De Serres, G, Tremblay, FW, Markowski, F, & Tipples, G 2009, ‘Long-lasting measles 
outbreak affecting several unrelated networks of unvaccinated persons’, The Journal of 
Infectious Diseases vol. 200, pp. 1602-1605. 
 
Dawson, A 2005, ‘The determination of the best interests in relation to childhood 
immunization’, Bioethics, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 72-89. 
 
Demicheli, V, Rivetti, A, Debalini, MG, & Di Pietrantonj, C 2012, ‘Vaccines for measles, mumps 
and rubella in children’, Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, Issue 2, Art. No.: CD004407. 
DOI: 10.1002/14651858.CD004407.pub3. 
 
De Vries, RD, Mesman, AW, Geijtenbeek, TBH, Duprex, WP, & de Swart, RL 2012, ‘The 
pathogenesis of measles’, Current Opinion in Virology, vol. 2, pp. 248-255. 
 
Diekema, DS 2005, ‘Responding to parental refusals of immunization of children’, Pediatrics, 
vol. 115, no. 5, pp. 1428-1431. 
 
Diekema, DS 2011, ‘Revisiting the best interest standard: uses and misuses’, Journal of Clinical 
Ethics, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 128-133. 
 
Diekema, DS, & Marcuse, EK 2007, ‘Ethical Issues in the Vaccination of Children’, in R Bayer, LO 
Gostin, B Jennings, & B Steinbock, (eds), Public Health Ethics, pp. 279-288. Oxford University 
Press, New York. 
 
Elliot, C 2001, ‘Patients doubtfully capable or incapable of consent’, in H Kuhse, &  P Singer, (eds), 
A Companion to Bioethics, pp. 452-462. Blackwell, Oxford. 
 
Euro Surveillance Editorial Team 2008, ‘Measles once again endemic in the United Kingdom’, 
Euro Surveillance, vol. 13, no. 27, pii=18919.  
 
Fiebelkorn, AP, Redd, SB, Gallagher, K, Rota, PA, Rota, J, Bellini, W, & Seward, J 2010, ‘Measles 
in the United States during the postelimination era’, The Journal of Infectious Diseases, vol. 202, 
no. 10, pp. 1520-1528. 
 
Kata, A 2010, ‘A Postmodern Pandora's Box: Anti-vaccination misinformation on the Internet’, 
Vaccine, vol. 28, pp. 1709-1716. 
 
Kata, A 2012, ‘Anti-vaccine activists, Web 2.0, and the postmodern paradigm – an overview of 
the tactics and tropes used online by the anti-vaccination movement’, Vaccine, vol. 30, pp. 
3778-3789. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 194 
 
Knol, MJ, Urbanus, AT, Swart, EM, Mollema, L, Ruijs, WL, van Binnedijk, RS, Wierik, MJ, de 
Melker, HE, Timen, A, & Hahne SJ 2013, ‘Large ongoing measles outbreak in a religious 
community in the Netherlands since May 2013’, Euro Surveillance, vol. 18, no. (36), pii=20580. 
 
Krantz, I, Sachs, L, & Nilstun, T 2004, ‘Ethics and Vaccination’, Scandinavian Journal of Public 
Health, vol. 32, pp. 172-178. 
 
Meissner, HC, Strebel, PM, & Orenstein, W 2004, ‘Measles vaccines and the potential for 
worldwide eradication of measles’, Pediatrics, vol. 114, no. 4,pp. 1065-1069. 
 
Moss, WJ, Griffin, DE 2012, ‘Measles’, Lancet vol. 379, pp. 153-164. 
 
Orenstein, WA, Papania, MJ, & Wharton, ME 2004, ‘Measles elimination in the United States’, 
The Journal of Infectious Diseases, vol. 189, supplement 1, pp. S1-3. 
 
 Pope, TM 2011, ‘The best interest standard: both guide and limit to medical decision making 
on behalf of incapacitated patients’, The Journal of Clinical Ethics, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 134-138. 
 
Sheather, J 2013, ‘Should childhood MMR vaccination be compulsory? Rights, duties and the 
public interest’, Human Vaccines & Immunotherapeutics, vol. 9, no. 6, pp. 1389-1391. 
 
UNICEF 2007, Measles, updated April 2007. Available from: 
www.unicef.org/media/media_36233.html [11 November 2014]. 
 
United Nations 1948, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Available from:  
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/  [07 April 2015]. 
 
United Nations 1990, Convention on the Rights of the Child. Available from: 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx [07 April 2015]. 
 
van den Hoven, M 2012, ‘Why one should do one’s bit: Thinking about free riding in the context 
of public health ethics’, Public Health Ethics, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 154-160. 
 
Wood-Harper, J 2005, ‘Informing education policy on MMR: balancing individual freedoms and 




Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 195 
 
Chapter 6: Justice and measles vaccination in children 
 
  In this chapter I shall review the implications of justice with regards to measles vaccination in 
children. To do so, I shall consider measles vaccination from the perspective of five different 
theories of justice. I shall argue that each theory of justice confers similar moral obligations on a 
just society and its members. These obligations can be summarized by the statement of two 
ethical action guides:  
(1b) A just society vaccinates every child against measles that is eligible for vaccination, at least 
to the point that sustains measles elimination from society. 
(2b) Respect for liberty and the parent-child relationship regulates the just society’s response to 
vaccine refusal. 
  I shall argue that every conception of justice here considered is committed to these two action 
guides. It will therefore follow that societies that do not vaccinate to the point necessary to 
sustain measles elimination are unjust, no matter which of these theories of justice one adheres 
to. If vaccination does not happen to the point of measles elimination, it constitutes an injustice 
to which society has an obligation to respond. But at the same time, I will show that an important 
second consideration is that just societies take parent-child relationships seriously. 
Consequently, in the ideally just society parents will freely choose to vaccinate to the point of 
measles elimination.  
  Vaccine refusal is a problem that requires specific consideration. In these cases, there is a 
tension between points (1) and (2). The question then becomes: what does justice require when 
there is significant vaccine refusal within society, to the point that measles elimination is 
threatened? I shall argue that in view of principle (1), the obligation to vaccinate demands of 
society to respond when vaccine refusal happens. There are various ways in which society can 
respond; in view of principle (2) society should favor responses that place refusers in the best 
possible position to choose vaccination freely. The best responses are those that enable parents 
to freely choose vaccination. Even if this is done, it may happen that an impasse is reached: there 
may be parents who refuse vaccination and are not persuaded through societal interventions to 
freely choose vaccination. In such cases, society may respond through use of state power. 
However, principle (2) places a limit to the amount and types of coercion that can be used. In 
essence, when faced with a significant tide of vaccine refusal, principles (1) and (2) are to be 
balanced with one another when it comes to government coercion.  
  The conclusion I will defend is therefore as follows. A just society vaccinates against measles, at 
least to the point of measles elimination. This means that children can rightly expect protection 
against measles infection through sufficient vaccination uptake. It is an obligation of parents to 
get their vaccine-eligible children vaccinated. Obligations rest on healthcare providers to offer 
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vaccination and administer it safely, while there rests an obligation on societal institutions and 
the State to ensure reasonable access and availability to measles vaccination. Preferably, parents 
freely choose vaccination for their children. Vaccine refusal demands a response from society; in 
view of respect for individual liberty within just societies, responses that encourage parents to 
freely choose vaccination should be preferred. If vaccine refusal threatens measles eradication, 
use of state power can be justified. However, principle (2) places limits on the amount and type 
of power or coercion that can be used.  
  It will be noted that principles (1b) and (2b) are very similar to the two main principles (1a and 
2a) in the individual case of measles vaccination I argued for in the previous chapter. Thus, 
whether one argues from justice, or whether one argues from individual considerations, the 
ethical conclusions are similar. There is a moral obligation to vaccinate children who are eligible, 
and ideally to vaccinate through parental free choice. If there is vaccine refusal, there is an 
obligation on the State and on society in general to respond to vaccine refusal in a variety of 
ways. If mandatory vaccination policies are adopted, the duty to vaccinate is balanced against 
the cost of coercion. The moral weight of these two guiding principles in childhood vaccination is 
therefore very strong, being supported by an individual/best-interests/principlist approach as 
well as by a societal/justice approach.  
  The implications of these conclusions for public policy will be discussed in the next chapter. In 
this chapter, the goal is to show how justice leads us to the action guides (1b) and (2b). In order 
to do so, I shall proceed as follows.  
  First I shall engage in conceptual analysis around the concept of justice. The idea is to 
understand what the questions are that the principle of justice tries to address, and what is 
morally at stake when we speak of justice. To do so, I shall consider the conceptual analysis of 
justice by Aristotle, Mill, and Beauchamp and Childress. I choose these authors for this purpose 
because each of them has provided a conceptual analysis of justice from which general themes 
can be deduced regarding the focus of justice, and the questions that justice seek to answer. 
Their work has influenced the work of others, and has identified specific themes central to the 
study of justice which will enable me to stipulate the questions a theory of justice attempts to 
answer. I shall not here slip into assuming alternate ethical frameworks such as the virtues or 
utilitarianism. I shall also not invoke a purely Aristotelian notion of justice or a purely Millian 
notion of justice.  Rather, I shall use their conceptual analyses of justice to identify what the 
underlying questions are that justice tries to address. These I will summarize before moving on, 
in order to provide clarity in moving forward. 
  Next I shall consider the question of measles vaccination from the perspective of different and 
competing theories of justice. I shall use the main theories of justice that have been influential in 
bioethics and in the principlist approach, as identified by Beauchamp and Childress (2013). B&C 
identify six influential theories of justice: utilitarian, libertarian, egalitarian, communitarian, 
capability theory, and well-being. I shall, in turn, consider the implications of each of these for 
the question of measles vaccination in children. Capability theory and well-being justice are fairly 
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recent arrivals and are remarkably similar in underlying assumptions, scope and focus and will 
consequently lead to similar modes of argument and conclusions. I shall therefore only focus on 
one of them in this analysis, namely well-being.  
  The goal in this chapter is not to present a thorough examination or defense of each of these 
conceptions of justice. I shall not defend one theory of justice over another or give preference to 
a specific theory of justice as the “correct” one. Instead, I am interested in exploring what each 
different theory of justice would commit adherents of those specific theories to. I shall therefore 
examine each theory of justice to the extent that is necessary in order to analyze the implications 
of the various theories for measles vaccination. 
  I shall eventually conclude that each theory of justice is committed to the action guide/principles 
(1b) and (2b), and that these two principles therefore articulate the ethical considerations 
regarding measles vaccination from a justice perspective. In chapter 7 I shall unify the action 
guides from the individual case (1a and 2a) and the justice perspective (1b and 2b) to yield two 
specified action guides (1 and 2) that bring the principle of autonomy, justice, beneficence, and 
non-maleficence into balance with one another. These two action guides (1 and 2) will then be 
used to make policy recommendations. 
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(1) What is justice? A conceptual analysis 
  In this conceptual analysis I shall consider what justice is, and what the underlying moral 
questions are that a theory of justice has to answer. To do so I shall present the conceptual 
analyses of Aristotle, Mill and Beauchamp & Childress with regards to justice, and then from 
these create a summary as to what justice is and what the underlying questions are that justice 
should answer.  
 
(1.1) Aristotle on justice (Aristotle 1996) 
  Aristotle describes justice as consisting of two fundamental ideas.  
  In one sense, “the just” means that which is equal or fair, and “the unjust” is therefore that 
which is not equal and not fair. So, if you were to take a bigger share of some good than is due 
to you, you would be acting unjustly. In the first instance then, justice is about what is due to 
people and making sure that they get what is due to them.  
  In another sense, “the just” refers to the laws within society. The laws of society aim at some 
good that is in the public interest, such as preserving peace or happiness within society. Justice 
in this sense requires the passing of good laws, laws that promote the public good, and persons 
who break such laws are unjust. 
  Some of Aristotle’s words in this regard (Aristotle 1996, 1129a26-b11): 
  “…the term ‘unjust’ is held to apply both to the man who breaks the law and the man who takes 
more than his due, the unfair man.”  
  “Let us call him ‘unfair’, for that is a more comprehensive term, and includes both taking too 
much of good things and too little of bad things.”  
  “’The just’ therefore means that which is lawful and that which is equal and fair, and ‘the unjust’ 
means that which is illegal and that which is unequal or unfair.”  
  Furthermore, justice has a relational component. Aristotle argues that justice regulates actions 
in relations to other persons, and is a virtue that involves relationships with others. Justice is 
concerned with actions towards others, and specifically towards ‘the good of others’ (1129b12-
30a13).  
  Justice can also be thought of as either universal or particular (1130b8-31a3). Universal justice 
is concerned with virtuous living, regulating behaviour towards others in accordance with virtue. 
In this sense justice is the primary virtue, needed to regulate the living out of all other virtues. 
Particular justice deals with objects such as money, safety, possessions, means to acquire these 
and so forth. It seems that Aristotle has in mind that particular justice has to do with the goods 
of life, those things that one may acquire or desire in order to reach one’s goals. Thus, to 
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summarize: Universal justice speaks to every person in every circumstance, and requires living in 
accordance with virtue in our relations with others in general. This is the view that a virtuous 
person will recognize that there are universal principles of justice which ought to govern 
behaviour towards others in relation to what is right and virtuous, no matter where one finds 
oneself. Particular justice has to do with the goods of life, those things that one would value as 
necessary to a good life, and seemingly with the distribution of these between persons. 
  Particular justice can again be divided in two. There is one type of particular justice which deals 
with the distribution of the goods of life within a society. In Aristotle’s words: “…the distribution 
of honour, wealth, and the other divisible assets of the community, which may be allotted among 
its members in equal of unequal shares” (1131a2-3). The other type of particular justice is 
corrective, focusing on actions between private individuals. Thus, Aristotle divides particular 
justice, concerned with the goods of life, into two types – one which seeks to correct injustices 
done, which may be thought of as corrective justice, and one which seeks to address the 
distribution of the goods of life within the community, which may be called distributive justice. 
  When it comes to distributive justice, the principle is assignment by desert (1131a4-33). The 
idea is that persons should get a share of the goods distributed within society (honour, income, 
and the goods of life in general) in accordance with what they deserve. In this sense, equals 
should receive equal shares. It would be unjust to give equal shares to those who are not equal.  
A share is allocated according to what is deserved by each person, and those who deserve equal 
portions should get equal portions. Those who deserve less should receive a lesser portion. 
Aristotle mentions some possible criteria for determining dessert, without it being clear which 
one is to be preferred:  
  “All are agreed that justice in distributions must be based on desert of some sort, although they 
do not all mean the same sort of desert; democrats make the criterion free birth; those of 
oligarchic sympathies wealth, or in other cases birth; upholders of aristocracy make it virtue” 
(1131a30-33). 
Conclusions – Aristotle 
  From Aristotle we can take the following ideas with regards to justice.  
  Justice is relational, and speaks of duties to others within society. Justice is also concerned with 
the way in which the community is ordered.  
  A particular kind of justice that is of importance is distributive justice. Distributive justice has to 
do with the fair distribution of valued goods within society. The principle is ‘assignment by desert’ 
– those who deserve equal portions should get equal portions, and those who deserve lesser 
portions should have lesser portions.  
  It seems that even in Aristotle’s day there was disagreement between people about how to 
determine desert. In contemporary society, there are different theories of distributive justice, 
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each espousing a different way of determining which criteria are relevant in determining 
distribution. 
 
(1.2) Mill on justice (Mill 2010b, p.99-113) 
  In his essay on utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill spends a whole section on the connection 
between justice and the principle of utility. In order to do so, he embarks on a conceptual analysis 
of justice. From Mill’s analysis of justice important characteristics of justice may be gleaned.  
  In order to understand what justice is, Mill says we have to find the “distinguishing 
characteristics” of the just and the unjust. There are various examples of situations and things 
that can be considered to be just, and also various situations and things that we can consider 
unjust. If we can see a common thread in these, we can perhaps understand what it is that makes 
things just or unjust. In essence, what is that quality in a state of affairs that makes it either just 
or unjust? 
  His first strategy is to consider various instances of justice and injustice, so as to find qualities 
that belongs to the idea of justice. These instances are as follows: 
1) It is unjust to deprive anyone of freedom, personal possessions, or anything else that legally 
belongs to that person. In other words, it is unjust to deprive persons of those things they have 
a legal claim to. 
2) Sometimes laws give people legal rights that they should not have had. In other words, laws 
may sometimes be wrong or unjust themselves. However, when a law is considered unjust, it is 
also considered unjust because it disallows someone something they have a right to. This right is 
not legal, because it does not derive from the law; this right therefore has to be moral. Laws are 
therefore unjust if they encroach on the moral rights of a person. 
3) Justice requires that a person get what they deserve. Someone receiving an evil they do not 
deserve suffers an injustice; someone who receives a proportionate good for the good they have 
done is being treated justly. 
4) It is unjust to break promises, or to disappoint knowingly created expectations. 
5) Justice is impartial to matters that are not directly concerned with determining desert in the 
case before it. For example, a tribunal that has to decide which of two persons rightfully owns an 
object, can only be influenced by matters that determine desert. That is, the tribunal should only 
consider those aspects that determine which person has a right to the object, such as legal 
transfer of goods. The tribunal should not consider aspects such as social status, gender, personal 
preference for one of the candidates and the like. Thus, the impartiality required in matters of 
justice is the impartiality of solely considering matters of desert. If other matters influence 
distribution or decision-making, it would be unjust. 
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  After examining these five instances of justice and injustice, Mill embarks on a second strategy. 
He looks at the history of justice, and specifically how the term justice was used in historical 
contexts. He states that justice originally referred to acting in accordance with law. However, the 
Roman and Greek civilizations that referred to justice in this way were fully aware that societies 
could sometimes enact laws that were not perfect. Over time, the idea of “injustice” came to 
refer to acts which were contrary to laws that ought to exist, even if they did not exist. Thus, an 
important aspect of justice is that it requires obedience to laws that should exist within society, 
even if such laws do not exist. Mill argues that it is not always desirable for governments to enact 
laws to punish all acts of injustice. For example, it would be very cumbersome and place a high 
burden on society if people were sent to prison for every broken promise. However, the notion 
that “one should not break promises, it is unjust to break faith” implies a law that ought to be, 
even if it is not practical or desirable for governments to enforce such laws. 
  As a third strategy, Mill argues that justice can be distinguished from general morality in the 
following way. Moral duties can be divided into duties of perfect obligation and duties of 
imperfect obligation. Imperfect obligations are those duties where a duty exists, but not to a 
particular person or to particular circumstance. For example, being generous is a moral duty, but 
there are no specific persons that can claim this generosity. The persons and the circumstances 
to which generosity applies are not stipulated as part of the duty of generosity. On the other 
hand, with perfect obligations the specific person(s) and circumstances to which the duty applies 
are specified. In other words, perfect obligations give rise to a corresponding moral right in the 
person(s) to whom the duty is due.  
  Mill argues that justice is to be distinguished from general morality in the same way. Justice 
imposes a duty of perfect obligation; in other words, justice refers to those moral duties that are 
associated with a corresponding right. Obligations of justice involve some moral duty resting on 
one party, the discharge of which someone else can claim as a right. Thus, injustice happens when 
someone is denied something they have a moral right to through the neglect of moral duty by a 
person or group of persons.  
Conclusions – Mill 
  From Mill’s analysis of justice, we can take the following: 
  Justice is a specific category of moral obligation, where a moral duty resting on one person or 
group of persons accompanies a corresponding moral right in another person or group of 
persons. Thus, someone is treated unjustly if they are deprived of a good that they have a moral 
claim to. This deprivation is the result of failure on the part of a group or person to fulfill the 
corresponding moral obligation. 
  Justice also has with it the idea of desert. The moral right of a person to some good is in 
accordance with criteria of desert. Saying that someone has a moral right to some good, is the 
same as saying they deserve that good.  
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  Justice requires impartiality with regards to distribution of goods, in the sense that only the 
criteria that determine desert are considered in the distribution of goods. So, the moral right of 
a person to some good should not be waived because of considerations that have no bearing on 
desert. In this sense, people should be treated equally when it comes to claims of justice. 
  Mill’s ideas are similar to Aristotle’s with regards to desert and distributing in proportion to 
desert. An important addition in Mill’s thought is that justice implies a moral duty on one 
person/group of persons that corresponds to a moral right to something in another person/group 
of persons. If the former neglect their duty, the latter suffer an injustice. If the former fulfill their 
duty, the latter is treated justly. 
 
(1.3) Beauchamp and Childress (2013) – the principle of justice in bioethics  
  Beauchamp and Childress (B&C) (2013) conceive of justice as treating persons fairly and 
appropriately, in keeping with what is due to persons. A subsection of justice that is of particular 
concern to bioethics is distributive justice. Distributive justice deals with the fair and equitable 
distribution of goods within society, and in healthcare terms there is a specific way of conceiving 
of this: 
  “The term distributive justice refers to fair, equitable, and appropriate distribution of benefits 
and burdens determined by norms that structure the terms of social cooperation” (p. 250). 
  B&C recognize a formal principle of justice, crediting Aristotelian ideas: Treat equals equally, 
and treat those who are unequal unequally. In other words, to all persons should be given in 
proportion to what is owed them; those to whom equal portions are owed (based on criteria of 
desert), equal portions should be given. 
  The formal principle of justice does not specify which criteria should be used to determine 
desert. To know what is owed to whom one needs a material principle of justice. Material 
principles of justice describe characteristics of persons that can be used to determine desert. 
Burdens and benefits ought then to be distributed in accordance with desert. B&C identify six 
different theories of justice, each of them stipulating their own material principle for determining 
desert: utilitarian, libertarian, egalitarian, communitarian, capability, and well-being.  
Conclusions – B&C 
  B&C incorporate the ideas of Aristotle with regards to justice, arguing that each member of 
society should get what is owed them according to criteria of desert. However, they attach to the 
notion of distributive justice the concept of benefits and burdens. When it comes to distributive 
justice and medicine, the focus is on fair distribution of benefits and burdens. For example, some 
persons should not be unduly burdened for the benefit of others. Similarly, some should not 
receive benefits beyond what is owed them at the expense of others. Rather, benefits and 
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burdens should be fairly distributed – according to what is deserved by persons according to 
criteria for desert.  
  Distributive justice speaks to the equitable distribution of goods within society, and therefore 
in terms of bioethics speaks of equitable distribution of medical benefits and burdens. Thus, it is 
possible to look at any given society, study the distribution of medical burdens and benefits, and 
ask: “Is this distribution just?” To answer this question, specific criteria for desert need to be 
adopted, which speaks to the need for employing a material theory of justice. 
 
(1.4) Conclusions – what is justice? 
  Taking all of these into account, I conceive of justice as follows. 
  Justice is a moral principle that specifies that persons should be treated fairly, getting what they 
deserve. Within bioethics, distributive justice deals specifically with the equitable distribution of 
medical benefits and burdens in society. People should not receive more or less benefits than 
they deserve, and should not receive more or less burdens than they deserve. 
  Justice places a duty on one person/group of persons, with a corresponding moral right to 
something in another person/group of persons. As a hypothetical example: if someone claimed 
that justice requires free basic health care for children, this would mean that children have a 
moral right to receive free health care. There would then be a corresponding duty on society or 
its delegates (such as the state) to provide children with free health care. If society then failed to 
provide free health care to children, the claim would be that this situation is unjust. 
  In order to determine who is owed what, a material principle of justice is needed. Material 
principles of justice specify criteria of desert, and therefore how burdens and benefits should 
justly be distributed. There are different theories of justice, each comprising of a different 
material theory of justice. I will examine each of these in turn later. 
  Justice speaks to society as a whole. We can therefore look at the distribution of burdens and 
benefits within a society and ask, “Is this distribution just?” A society can be thought of as a just 
society if it meets the demands of justice; among other things, this would mean that the 
distribution of burdens and benefits in the medical system is just. If this distribution is unjust, a 
society can be thought of as unjust. Thus, a just society is organized in a way that a just 
distribution of burdens and benefits are reached. 
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(2) Theories of justice influential in bioethics as identified by 
Beauchamp and Childress  
  B&C identify six different theories of justice, each containing a different material principle of 
justice (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p.252-262). Each of these theories describe criteria for 
deciding who deserves what, and consequently what justice requires in terms of distributing 
burdens and benefits. They recognize four traditional theories, and two newer ones: 
Traditional theories in B&C:  
Utilitarian justice is concerned with maximizing the greatest happiness for the greatest number. 
The material principle of this theory: “To each person according to rules and actions that 
maximize social utility.” 
Libertarian justice places the focus on individual rights, fair process and liberty. The material 
principle is: “To each person a maximum of liberty and property resulting from the exercise of 
liberty rights and participation in fair free-market exchanges.” 
Egalitarian justice is concerned with equal distribution of access to the goods of life, that is, those 
things that are necessary for a good life. The material principle can be stated as: “To each person 
an equal measure of liberty and equal access to the goods in life that every rational person 
values.” 
Communitarian justice is an approach to justice that focuses on promoting the good life, as 
conceived of by a moral community. The material principle is: “To each person according to 
principles of fair distribution derived from conceptions of the good developed in moral 
communities.” 
 Recent theories in B&C: 
Capability justice is a contemporary theory of justice, and argues that social and political 
institutions should be arranged in such a way that the capabilities and freedoms required for 
each individual to flourish are protected. The material principle is: “To each person the means 
necessary for the exercise of capabilities essential for a flourishing life.” 
Well-being justice is also a contemporary theory, arguing that society with its social and political 
institutions should be ordered in a way that the dimensions of well-being of each individual is 
protected. The material principle: “To each person the means necessary for the realization of 
core dimensions of well-being.” 
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(3) The different conceptions of justice and measles vaccination in 
children 
  In this section I shall examine the ethical considerations of measles vaccination in children from 
the perspective of the different theories of justice. For each theory, I shall first provide a brief 
summary of the main points of the theory. Then I shall apply the theory to measles vaccination 
in order to arrive at ethical action guides. 
 
(3.1) Utilitarian justice – maximizing welfare 
  Utilitarianism states that moral actions are those which lead to the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number. JS Mill describes the principle of utility as follows: 
  “The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, utility, or the Greatest Happiness 
Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as 
they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.” (Mill 2010b, p. 77). 
  The idea with utilitarianism is therefore that moral actions increase the overall happiness while 
immoral actions decrease overall happiness. In considering overall happiness, the happiness of 
every person counts the same as the happiness of every other person. Thus, one’s own happiness 
counts the same as the happiness of every other person. The principle of utility would therefore 
ask of us to maximize happiness for the greatest amount of individual persons. 
  Mill defends a fairly rigorous concept of justice based on the principle of utility. According to 
Mill, justice is concerned with what is due to persons; to say that someone has been done an 
injustice is to say that something has been withheld from someone to which they have a moral 
right. Every moral right has a corresponding moral duty: if I have a moral right to X, someone else 
has the duty to provide me with X. This duty may fall on government, society as a whole or some 
societal institutions, or on some individual. The person on whom the duty falls would be 
committing an injustice if they did not fulfill their duty to provide me with X. 
  The utilitarian will maintain that this concept of justice is grounded in the principle of utility. 
Justice leads to greater happiness, and just societies are happier societies. It is therefore a moral 
mandate of the principle of utility that society be ordered according to principles of justice. 
  Mill puts it as follows: 
  “To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which society ought to defend me in the 
possession of. If the objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can give him no other reason than 
general utility” (Mill 2010b, p. 106). 
  Mill (2010b) defends rights to security, liberty, equality and fair punishment on this basis. If 
these rights are protected by society, it leads to a greater amount of overall happiness within 
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society. The rights of persons that are theirs in virtue of justice therefore rest solely on the basis 
of utility. The material principles of justice, deciding who should get what, are determined by 
utility.  
  B&C (2013) describe utilitarian justice similarly. Defining the principle of utility as maximizing 
welfare within society, they state that utilitarian considerations of justice “establish correlative 
rights for individuals that should be enforced by law. These rights are strictly contingent upon 
social arrangements that maximize net social utility” (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 254). The 
just society defends a set of individual rights which would lead to greater social welfare. Society 
should therefore be so set up that the overall welfare of the greatest number of individuals 
possible is maximized. Individual rights should be recognized that lead to the maximum amount 
of overall social welfare. 
  It is of course conceivable that occasions may arise where the respecting of individual rights 
clash with the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Sandel (2009) gives the example of a 
minority religion. Imagine a society where a minority religion is oppressed by the majority. In this 
society, the majority derives exceedingly high levels of happiness by stamping out what they 
regard as an offensive religion. If the greatest happiness for the greatest number is served by this 
arrangement, then it is hard to see how an individual right to religious liberty could survive in this 
society purely on utilitarian considerations. Or think of another example. Imagine a town where 
a police officer shoots an unarmed black man. There are riots in the streets, and the populace 
demands criminal charges against the police officer. After authorities investigate they find no 
basis for charges against the police officer, and on the basis of the principle of justice decide not 
to file charges. Consequently, the entire society is unhappy and take to the streets in anger. It is 
clear that the greatest happiness for the greatest number would be served by filing charges 
against the police officer, but it seems as if the individual’s right to just treatment before the law 
trumps this. This example loosely resembles McCloskey’s famous story to illustrate the 
incompatibility of justice and utilitarianism (Rachels & Rachels 2007, p. 103-104).  I have modified 
the details slightly to be more in keeping with contemporary events, but kept the core of 
McCloskey’s story to illustrate the point of a perceived tension between requirements of justice 
and requirements of utility. 
  Perhaps Utilitarians can respond that one should not look at isolated incidents as in the 
examples above, but rather at those societal arrangements that would lead to the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number over time. In other words, an enduring ‘maximized welfare’ 
rather than a quick ‘make me happy right now’ approach. They could therefore argue that 
although charging the officer would appease the masses right now, maximizing happiness in the 
moment, society will over time experience more unhappiness if individual rights are trampled on 
in this way. We therefore have to accept momentary unhappiness by upholding the rights of the 
individual against the clamor of the crowds, because doing so consistently will over time create 
the kind of society where social welfare is maximized. Indeed, this seems much like the utilitarian 
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justice found in the pages of Mill. We are therefore to adopt criteria for distribution that lead to 
the maximal enduring optimal welfare of society. 
Utilitarian justice and measles vaccination in children 
  We are concerned with a just distribution of benefits and burdens within society. The idea of 
utilitarian justice states that we should arrange the distribution of benefits in such a way that 
social welfare is maximized. Justice in this view wants society and individual rights to be arranged 
in such a fashion that it leads to the greatest welfare/happiness for the greatest number.  
The greatest happiness for the greatest number through measles elimination from 
society 
  If we look at measles disease and the effects it has on society, it is clear that societies without 
measles are better off than societies where measles disease is present. In completely 
unvaccinated societies, measles spreads quickly and causes a high illness- and financial burden 
to society. To recall the numbers in the US as an example: prior to the vaccination age, almost 
90% of people in the US got measles before their 15th birthday. In the early 1900’s, 5 300 people 
died of measles each year. Despite better medical care, nutrition, and various public health 
improvements, measles remained a large societal concern in the mid 1900’s. From 1956 to 1960 
there were 450 measles deaths per year, 4 000 cases of measles encephalitis each year, and 48 
000 measles hospitalizations each year (Orenstein, Papania, & Wharton 2004). After the 
introduction of measles vaccination in the US, measles infection rates dropped sharply. This 
translated to a healthier society with improved societal welfare. To recall the 1985 review of the 
effects of measles vaccination in the US after 20 years of vaccination: By 1983 measles 
vaccination in the US has prevented an estimated 52 million cases of measles, 5,200 measles 
deaths, and 17,400 cases of neurological disability. An estimated net savings of $5.1 billion in 
healthcare expenditure was the result (Bloch et al. 1985). 
  It is possible to eliminate measles from a society through measles vaccination. To achieve 
elimination of measles, we need to vaccinate upwards of 93% of children with two doses of 
measles vaccine (see chapter 2, section 2.2 of this work). Countries that fall below this threshold 
experience cyclical outbreaks of measles epidemics. As was seen in the example of South Africa, 
a country where vaccination falls below the elimination threshold, such measles epidemics cause 
substantial financial- and illness burdens on society. 
  Decreasing the burden of measles leads to greater welfare in a society. Societies where measles 
infections do not occur are healthier, happier and have greater overall welfare than societies 
where measles is present. Measles can be eradicated from a society through sufficient levels of 
measles vaccination in children. Vaccination is safe, with a very favourable adverse effect profile. 
Vaccinating children as required for measles elimination does not cause substantial harm and 
does not decrease the welfare of society.  
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  Given these considerations, Utilitarians would view vaccinating children to sustain measles 
elimination as a moral imperative. A society where measles has been eliminated is better off than 
one where sporadic measles outbreaks occur or where measles is endemic. Furthermore, 
vaccinating at the levels required for measles elimination does not impose meaningful harm on 
society. Utilitarians would therefore conceive of a just society as one where measles is eradicated 
through vaccination. This means that a just society, as conceived of by Utilitarians, vaccinate 
upwards of 93% with two doses of measles containing vaccination. Of course, there are always 
those in society who are not eligible to receive measles vaccination: the very young, those who 
are allergic, those with severe immune compromise. This group usually comprises 5% or less of 
society, so that the target of vaccinating above 93% is manageable (see chapter 2, section 2.2 on 
herd immunity).  
  The obligation to vaccinate can be stated as the following principle: everyone who can be 
vaccinated against measles, should be vaccinated against measles at least to the point of measles 
elimination. A society that does not adopt this approach does not fulfil the obligations of justice 
according to utilitarian standards.  
  There are, however, two other utilitarian considerations that should also be considered. One is 
liberty, the other is the parent-child relationship.  
Respect for liberty 
  Mill (2010a) defends a comprehensive account of personal liberty based on the principle of 
utility. The argument is that the greatest happiness for the greatest number is secured when 
society respects the right to personal liberty. Mill contends that this right to personal liberty 
means that a person is free to think, act and speak as they choose as long as their conduct does 
not harm others. Under this conception of liberty, society cannot force people to do things that 
are in their own best interests, but society can stop individuals from harming others. The 
boundaries of liberty is the welfare of others. 
  A free society is, under this conception, a happier society. The principle of utility would therefore 
indicate that the free choices of individuals should be respected. If we therefore wish to maximize 
utility with regards to measles vaccination, the second principle we need to respect is liberty to 
choose and direct one’s own medical care. In the case of children, it is the duty of parents to 
direct the healthcare of their children on the basis of the child’s best interests (Buchanan & Brock 
1990, Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 228; Mill 2010a, p. 10, 67-68). Respect for liberty would 
require society to respect such decisions. 
  Some people could argue that they can legitimately refuse vaccination because utilitarian justice 
requires a strong principle of personal liberty in the just society. It is not the business of 
government to tell me how to raise my children or what medical treatment to accept in my or 
my children’s bodies, they may say. Indeed, as we have seen in the initial chapters of this essay, 
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many anti-vaccine activists portray vaccination programs as totalitarian and as an infringement 
on liberty rights. 
  The argument does not entirely succeed. It is so that society has an obligation to protect 
individual liberty. But the limits of individual liberty is the welfare of others. My liberty ends at 
the point where my actions cause harm to others. Therefore, if refusal to vaccinate leads to the 
harm of others, society can and should intervene. In the case of measles vaccination we have 
seen that falling below the elimination threshold leads to epidemics of measles within society, 
and substantial societal burden. Furthermore, there is always a susceptible subgroup in society, 
the more or less 5% of people who are not eligible for measles vaccination. This vulnerable 
subgroup depends on herd immunity (which is the same as measles elimination in society) to 
protect them against harm from measles infection.  
  Apart from harming others people in society by not vaccinating their children, parental refusals 
of vaccination may also harm their own children. An unvaccinated child is at risk for getting 
measles, and specifically if such free choices allow vaccination rates to fall below the herd 
immunity threshold. Under utilitarian theory, society should respect free choices and protect 
liberty, but not if free choices harm others. Therefore, if the free choices of a parent harm their 
child, society is not under any obligation to respect such choices. 
  Thus, appeals to liberty are limited by harm caused to others. It is clear that others in society 
are harmed when the measles vaccination rates fall below the threshold for measles elimination. 
Society must therefore interfere with the choices people make to refuse vaccination if such 
choices will result in a fall of vaccination rates below the elimination threshold. However, liberty 
is important, and respect for liberty guides societal response towards vaccine refusal. 
Respect for the parent-child relationship 
  The interests of children are narrowly intertwined with their parents (Elliot 2001). The welfare 
of society is undoubtedly best served when children are protected and nurtured. Adopting 
measures that harm parent-child relationships will be detrimental to the welfare of society. 
Therefore, maximizing the welfare of society includes adopting measures that protect and foster 
parent-child relationships, and empower parents to choose healthcare options that align with 
the best interests of their child. This important ethical consideration therefore also guides the 
societal response to vaccine refusal. Responses that harm the parent-child bond will lead to 
diminished welfare for individual children, and eventually to diminished welfare of the whole 
society if implemented in a large scale.  
Two ethical action guides – utilitarian justice 
  Ideally, the societal approach to measles vaccination will encourage measles vaccine uptake in 
a way that maintains measles elimination from society, while respecting liberty and the parent-
child relationship as much as is possible. These ethical considerations can be summarized as two 
action guides. 
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(1b) A just society vaccinates every child against measles that is eligible for vaccination, at least 
to the point that sustains measles elimination from society. 
(2b) Respect for liberty and the parent-child relationship regulates the just society’s response to 
vaccine refusal. 
  These two principles can be in tension with one another when parents choose not to vaccinate 
their children. According to utilitarian justice, principle (2) becomes limited when measles 
elimination in society is threatened. It would be ideal if all people vaccinated freely, but in cases 
of tension between (1) and (2), a just society should respect (2) as long as no harm accrue to 
others. Free choices that harm others demand a societal response, and such a response should 
incorporate respect for liberty and the parent-child relationship as far as is possible. 
 
(3.2) The liberal theories – libertarian justice and egalitarian justice 
  Sandel (2009) points out the underlying shared commitments between the two major liberal 
theories – libertarianism and egalitarianism. The liberal theories are based on the premise that 
justice is primarily concerned with freedom. A society is just if it is so arranged that individual 
freedom is extended equally and maximally to all individuals in the society. The focus is not on 
welfare of individuals, but on freedom of individuals. The liberal theories share a commitment to 
the idea of the choosing individual: the individual as a rational and free subject, choosing its own 
conception of the good life. The state is to be neutral between different conceptions of the good 
life, and a just state will ensure that the members of society are free to choose and live out their 
own conceptions of the good life.  
  Sandel (2009) argues that the basic assumptions of these theories are Kantian in nature. Kant, 
he argues, thought that persons not only acted from desire, pleasure and pain; rather, persons 
are endowed with the capacity of free will. Therefore, persons are not merely dictated to by laws 
of nature or by desires and aversions. Rather, every person is able to act in accordance with laws 
that they give themselves. Every person is able to act as a lawgiver. Now, persons only act freely 
when they act in accordance with these laws they make as rational persons. When someone acts 
in accordance with their desires or merely the laws of nature, they are not acting freely. Rather, 
such behaviour is determined by something else, and not by the free will.  
  Sandel furthermore argues that in Kantian thought to act morally is to act from the will. Moral 
actions are done in accordance with a good will, and are not merely determined by desire or 
natural/physical laws. So, if you will a moral action and the action is done from that motivation, 
it is moral. If an action is done from motivations of desire, they are not moral actions.  Thus, as 
Sandel points out, for Kant there is a link between acting freely, acting morally and acting 
rationally. One is either acting freely, obeying rational laws given by the choosing self, or one is 
acting non-freely, non-rationally and non-morally, directed by desire or natural law. Thus, to say 
one is acting morally entails within it the idea that one is acting freely. Kant therefore strongly 
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defends a political system where the freedom of individuals are protected, and freedom is only 
limited by the freedom of others. The idea of the free, choosing individual is in its essence 
Kantian, according to Sandel, and the liberal theories are grounded in this Kantian conception. 
  Although adherents of these two theories, libertarian and egalitarian, are often times bitter 
enemies in the political sphere (think Republicans and Democrats in the American political 
arena), they really are two sides of the same coin. That is, these theories share a commitment to 
the free, choosing individual. As Sandel points out, they disagree on how freedom is best to be 
achieved, but they do share a commitment to the principle of liberty. This commits both theories 
to the liberal individual, free to choose her own conception of the good life. The state is to ensure 
that society is such that freedom is protected, and the state is to be neutral between different 
conceptions of the good life. The state is not to promote a specific conception of the good life, 
but should ensure that individuals are free to live the good life as they themselves choose. 
Libertarian justice maintains that the best way to reach the goal of freedom, is through equal 
individual rights, an unfettered free market and a minimal state. Egalitarian justice states that 
freedom is secured by equal access to the goods of life. That is, everyone should have equal 
access to those things that make for a good life, at least minimally. The State is then tasked with 
the obligation to ensure that social institutions are structured in this fashion. 
(3.2.1) Libertarian justice – maximal individual liberty 
  One of the most influential defenders of Libertarian justice is Nozick (1974). Nozick develops a 
theory using a foundation of assumptions garnered from Kant and Lock. These basic assumptions 
include that people may never be used as a means only, but always as an end in themselves, and 
that people belong to themselves, and not to another. Nozick therefore argues foundationally 
that individuals are self-owners and should be morally respected as ends in themselves. These 
considerations place constraints on what governments or other people can do to the individual, 
and furnishes the individual with certain rights – the right to life, the right to liberty, and rights 
to control the fruits of one’s labour. 
  Such moral rights place constraints on others. Others may not forcibly take possessions that an 
individual has worked for and has rightful ownership of. Others may not deprive the individual of 
life, harm the individual’s body, or infringe the liberty of the individual. As such, many activities 
that contemporary governments engage in – redistribution of property, taxation, welfare 
programs and the like – infringe on the rights of individuals and are unjustifiable. In fact, the only 
government that can be tolerated is a minimal government – one that protects people from harm 
and the infringement of their liberty by others. Such a government protects citizens against theft, 
fraud, and other forms of crime by instituting police and military forces. It also establishes law 
courts for administration of laws and settling disputes. But such a government cannot interfere 
with the lives of its citizens, or interfere at all with their rights to liberty, life, and ownership. 
Thus, the state cannot decide what can be printed and circulated, read and viewed, created and 
consumed; nor can it regulate economic or private relational decisions of individuals. If a 
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government were to interfere in any of these areas – for example by banning certain types of 
publications or by heavily taxing certain kinds of foods – it would infringe on the rights of 
individuals, and be unjust. 
  With regards to distributive justice, Nozick’s focus is mainly on economic issues and goods 
created through work. The individual has the right to own what she has worked for, and the right 
to dispose of it as she sees fit. The labor of the individual and the products of that labor belongs 
to the individual. When we examine the distribution of such goods in society, and want to 
determine whether the distribution is just, there are only three principles of justice that need to 
be considered. These principles are justice in acquisition, justice in transfer, and justice in 
rectification. Acquisition refers to how a good was initially acquired or created. For example, if 
someone made use of a freely available natural resource and mixed her labour with it, the 
product belongs to the individual. Transfer refers to change in ownership from one person to 
another. Goods are justly transferred between people if there is a voluntary exchange of 
ownership of goods from one person to another. Rectification refers to actions that correct 
previous injustices; for example, if previous transfers were based on deceit or coercion leading 
to the infringement of the rights of one of the parties, actions that correct the injustice are actions 
of rectification. When these principles are followed, the resulting distribution is just. There is 
then no need for redistribution. In fact, government redistribution would be unjust. If there was 
justice in acquisition, justice in transfer and justice in rectification, any resulting distribution of 
economic goods should be considered just.  
  It is not clear to what extent these principles can be applied to the distribution of benefits and 
burdens within a healthcare system: Nozick’s focus is quite evidently on economic matters and 
on goods created through work. What is clear, is that the state cannot redistribute wealth to 
create a publically funded healthcare system; this would infringe ownership rights. Also, the state 
cannot interfere with free decisions with regards to healthcare. Individuals are free to accept or 
reject healthcare interventions as they see fit, even to their own detriment. People belong to 
themselves and can govern themselves. A minimal state would protect other people, however. 
If the actions and decisions of individuals cause harm, fraud, theft and the like – the minimal state 
is tasked with intervening.  
  The libertarian Nozick argues that only a minimal government can be tolerated. The only 
interference from government that can be accepted is the protection of members of society’s 
liberty and property rights. Any coercive actions on behalf of government apart from protection 
of liberty and property rights, or indeed any government action beyond these parameters, is seen 
as an infringement on the rights of individuals. According to Libertarian conceptions of justice, 
the main focus of justice is not the welfare of people in society, but rather liberty. Justice requires 
of us to respect the right to individual liberty of all members of society. Under Libertarianism, the 
freedom to choose one’s own goals and to live out one’s own choices is paramount. Coercion 
and government intrusion are frowned on, and the only type of government that can be tolerated 
is a minimal government that enforces liberty rights and national security.  
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  B&C interpret the implications of libertarian justice for distributive justice in healthcare matters 
(Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 255-256). In distributive justice and healthcare benefits and 
burdens, libertarians are not so much concerned with the end distribution as with fair 
procedures. As long as the procedures that lead to the current distribution were fair, and as long 
as everyone’s liberty was respected, the resulting distribution is fair (Beauchamp & Childress 
2013, p. 255-256). Therefore, end distributions with inherent inequalities may be just, if the 
processes that led to that distribution were just. As long as nobody was coerced or deceived, and 
everyone’s liberty was respected, resulting inequalities in healthcare outcomes and healthcare 
access is thought to be just. 
  Sandel interprets the main points of Nozick’s libertarianism as follows (Sandel 2009, p. 60-70). 
Libertarians endorse a minimal state, one that “enforces contracts, protects private property 
from theft, and keeps the peace” (Sandel 2009, p. 60). If a state interferes with the free choices 
of its citizens beyond this, it is morally unjustified and an infraction on liberty. Libertarians reject 
the following (Sandel 2009, p. 60):  
- Paternalism. Libertarians maintain that government cannot decide on my behalf what is 
in my best interests. As long as no one is harmed, government cannot limit my free 
choices. Government cannot even force me to act in my own best interests. 
- Legislation of morality. Libertarians argue that government should be neutral among 
different conceptions of the good life and different conceptions of morality. Government 
cannot enforce a specific view of morality through law. 
- Redistribution of wealth or material goods. Libertarians reject any government programs 
that redistribute wealth. Nobody can be forced to give help to others, and nobody’s goods 
can be forcibly taken away.  
  Simply stated, libertarians argue that justice requires an utmost respect for individual liberty. 
Society or government cannot interfere with individual free choices, not even when the individual 
makes choices that clearly is against that individual’s best interests. I am the only one who can 
decide what is in my best interests. Any societal coercion beyond a minimal government 
represents a violation of liberty, and is therefore unjust. The only legitimate role of the State is 
to protect property rights and to protect liberty rights. Thus, the State (and society in general) 
can only interfere with my actions when my actions limit the liberty rights of others. In essence, 
this can be summarized as: I am free to do whatever I choose, as long as I don’t harm others. Or, 
as per the well-known colloquial adage: I am free to swing my arm, but the right to swing my arm 
ends where your nose begins.  
Libertarian justice and measles vaccination in children  
  Under the libertarian conception of justice people cannot be forced to accept healthcare 
interventions of any sort that go against their free choices. Thus, when it comes to measles 
vaccination individuals should be free to choose. Given the sizeable benefits of measles 
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vaccination and the very low risk for harm, it seems reasonable to assume that by far most people 
who are shown the benefits of vaccination over non-vaccination will choose vaccination.  
  People who oppose vaccination could however forward an argument based on libertarian 
principles as follows. Government and society have no business interfering with my free choices 
when it comes to health care. I alone can choose what is in my best interests. I have the right to 
make decisions with regards to my own body, my own good, and my own healthcare. It is not up 
to government to decide what is in my best interests, and I can therefore not be coerced to accept 
vaccination. When it comes to children, parents are the substitute decision-maker. Parents 
decide on behalf of their children according to the best interest standard. Parents who oppose 
vaccination may therefore similarly argue that they alone can judge the best interests of their 
children, and that government and society cannot interfere with free decisions they make on 
behalf of their children. 
  This argument does not succeed, as it overlooks the limits of liberty. There are three ways in 
which this argument can be refuted: 
   Firstly, liberty cannot be used to defend actions that would harm others. Liberty is limited by 
the rights of other individuals in society. Actions that lead to the harm of others within society 
are not protected by the right to liberty. We know that approximately 5% of individuals within 
society cannot receive the measles vaccine and therefore remain susceptible to measles infection 
and its potentially devastating consequences. These susceptible people depend on herd 
immunity to protect them from measles infection. With measles, the herd immunity threshold is 
similar to the measles elimination threshold; only when measles is eliminated from a society are 
these 5% of susceptible individuals protected. Thus, any action taken by individuals that threaten 
the elimination of measles from society is unjust under the libertarian conception of justice. If 
personal refusal or the spreading of misinformation leads to a decline in measles vaccination 
rates beneath the elimination threshold, harm will accrue to individuals susceptible to measles. 
Such personal refusals or spreading of misinformation would therefore be unjust according to 
Libertarian theory. 
  Secondly, the point of libertarian justice is that society be so ordered that the liberty of everyone 
is respected. The liberty of all persons in society weighs equally. There is therefore a positive 
obligation on members of society to respect the liberty of others, and to not take actions that 
limit the liberty of others. There is also an obligation on the State to protect the liberty of all 
members of society. Now, as stated before, there are always members of society who will be 
ineligible for measles vaccination and therefore susceptible to measles. In order to protect such 
individuals, elimination of measles in society is required. If measles is not eliminated from society, 
it restricts the liberty of susceptible individuals in two ways. (1) To protect themselves against 
measles infection, as reasonable people would want to do, susceptible persons have to take 
extreme measures such as social isolation and protective clothing to protect themselves against 
measles infection. Since they cannot receive measles vaccination, they have no other way of 
protecting themselves. Living in such a way is severely restrictive to liberty. (2) If such susceptible 
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people get measles, there is a fair chance they will suffer a complication. This could lead to 
hospitalization, disability, or death. Any of these outcomes restrict the liberty of persons. 
Furthermore, if it is a child that is affected by measles infection, it may hamper their development 
and growth, harming the full development of faculties necessary for liberty. 
  Thirdly, with measles vaccination the free decisions of parents impact on children. When 
parents decide whether or not to have their child vaccinated, parents are not deciding on their 
own behalf, but on the behalf of their children. Under Libertarian thought, the individual is 
sovereign over her own life, and has the final say in decisions that impact her. But the individual 
is not sovereign over the life of another, and does not have the final say over choices that impact 
the life of another. It follows that there are limits to parental authority over their children. 
Parents do not have unlimited authority over their children in the libertarian theory, and the 
question is raised what the limits of parental authority is. In the previous chapter, I argued that 
the best interest standard is the only acceptable guide when deciding for children, that parents 
are thought to be in the best position possible to direct care in the best interests of their children, 
and therefore parents act as surrogate decision-makers. Parental authority is therefore linked 
with the best interest standard. When parents make decisions that are clearly not in the best 
interests of their children, it is not obvious that appeals to parental liberty rights provide the 
necessary moral force to overrule the best interests of the child. The freedom of the parent to 
choose must be limited by the interests of the child, and if parents make choices that are wildly 
incompatible with the best interests of the child, such choices should rightly be limited. Of course, 
the threshold for interference with such parental decisions should be quite high. I argued in the 
previous chapter that it is undoubtedly in the best interests of children to be vaccinated against 
measles if they are medically eligible to receive measles vaccination, and presented arguments 
to justify a response to such parental decisions from other persons who stand in morally relevant 
relationships with the child. Consequently, it seems hard to accept that parental liberty should 
override the best interests of children. It is not clear that parents’ appeal to liberty rights can 
justify non-vaccination of their child.  
  Some may object that forcing those who are eligible to receive measles vaccination so that harm 
to non-eligible subgroups may be prevented is unjust, because it inflicts harm to the recipient of 
vaccination. If this were true, and measles vaccination were quite harmful, this line of argument 
would perhaps be correct. There can be no moral duty on some individuals to accept substantial 
harm to themselves so that harm to others may be avoided. Of course, this objection is mistaken. 
Measles vaccination has a negligible risk for adverse events, and does not lead to substantial 
harm. Furthermore, the benefits to the individual through receiving measles vaccination are 
sizeable so that the recipient benefits exceedingly from the arrangement.  
  There are therefore good reasons to argue that vaccine refusal would require a societal 
response. When individual free choices by parents impact the freedom of others and risk harming 
their own children, society has to respond. The minimal state has to secure the freedom of all 
members of society, and has the duty to limit individual free choices that harm others within 
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society. Measles vaccination in children therefore is a matter of societal concern, and is rightly 
within the jurisdiction of the minimal state. 
  Taking all of these considerations into account, we can state the following with regards to 
measles vaccination in children according to Libertarian justice: 
- If individual free choices harm others/limit the liberty of others, such choices are unjust, and 
society should respond to such choices. If measles vaccination rates drop beneath the threshold 
for measles elimination, there is a high chance that harm may accrue to others in society, children 
of vaccine refusers may be harmed, and that the liberty of those who are not vaccine eligible will 
be severely restricted. It therefore follows that individual choices that lead to decline in measles 
vaccine coverage rates below the elimination threshold are unjust. Here, we encounter again a 
problem that I previously highlighted: it is in practice virtually impossible to state which individual 
case of vaccination is the one that leads to the loss of herd immunity. We cannot, in practice, 
identify the individual case of vaccine refusal that is the straw that breaks the camel’s back. When 
we additionally take into account that the threshold for elimination is coverage of 93-95% of 
children with 2 doses of measles vaccine, and that 5% of society is typically vaccine ineligible [8], 
we may conclude that very few vaccine refusals can be tolerated. Thus, according to Libertarian 
justice it would be unjust to allow parental refusals that threaten herd immunity. In practice we 
cannot identify the individual case that would endanger herd immunity. Every case of vaccine 
refusal should therefore require a societal response, and libertarian justice would endorse a 
system where every eligible child receives measles vaccination.  
- In just societies personal liberty is respected when it comes to healthcare decisions. This means 
that parental free choices should be respected, as long as such free choices do not harm others 
in society. Small children do not have the capacity to express individual free choices; choosing on 
behalf of children without capacity requires allowing parents to choose in accordance with the 
best interest standard. These considerations have implications for societal responses to vaccine 
refusal. Libertarians want to respect liberty to the maximal degree; in this case it would mean 
respecting the parents’ role as decision-maker for their child, and the parents’ liberty rights, as 
far as is possible, while ensuring adequate measles vaccine uptake. Thus, vaccine policies that 
afford the greatest amount of respect for the child-parent bond and parental liberty are 
preferred, keeping in mind that loss of the measles elimination threshold would be unjust.  
  It turns out therefore that under the libertarian conception of justice, a just society vaccinates 
up to the point of measles elimination while respecting the liberty of individuals to choose freely. 
Once the measles elimination threshold is threatened, libertarian justice views this as unjust, and 
requires society to respond. In such cases government coercion could be justified under the 
conception of the role of the minimal state. Yet, societal responses to vaccine refusal are guided 
by respect for parent-child decision-making and parental liberty.  
  These considerations can be stated as two principles, (1b) and (2b): 
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(1b) A just society vaccinates every child against measles that is eligible for vaccination, at least 
to the point that sustains measles elimination from society. 
(2b) Respect for liberty and the parent-child relationship regulates the just society’s response to 
vaccine refusal. 
A possible objection 
  Here is one possible objection to this line of argument.2 Perhaps there are other ways in which 
an individual can protect the susceptible portion of the population against measles infection 
while refusing to receive measles vaccination. For example, perhaps an unvaccinated individual 
can freely choose to live the life of a hermit, avoiding contact with all susceptible people and 
therefore not cause harm to susceptible individuals in society by not vaccinating. Thus, I could 
freely choose to forego vaccination even if this would compromise the threshold for measles 
elimination if I then agree to avoid contact with susceptible persons and thus refrain from causing 
them harm. 
  This objection fails for two reasons. 
  Firstly, given the realities of contemporary society, it is virtually impossible to consistently live 
in such a way that one could guarantee that one would not spread measles infection to 
susceptible people. Contemporary society forces us to depend on other people for food, for 
shelter, for transport and the like. We often come into contact with other people, and it is not 
possible for us to merely look at people and know whether they are susceptible to measles or 
not. To make good on my commitment to avoid all contact with measles infection and all contact 
with those who are susceptible, it would mean a type of isolation that results in withdrawal from 
society. Consider the measles outbreaks that happen in susceptible people in the US and Canada. 
Even in these highly vaccinated societies, outbreaks happen where measles spreads between 
susceptible people. It is not always clear how and when these people came into contact with 
each other. Thus, to avoid spreading measles if you are unvaccinated you would have to largely 
avoid human contact altogether. The hermit type of existence foreseen by this objection is 
extremely restrictive and is basically incompatible with life in a contemporary society. There just 
seems to be no way to remain a participating member of society and yet live in such a way that 
one could guarantee that one would not spread measles if you declined vaccination. If one 
wanted to remove oneself from society, then of course one would be exempt from the argument 
I have made; the argument presented here is focused on a just society, and individuals who 
remove themselves from society and live in remote isolation are obviously exempt from such 
arguments. 
  Secondly, even if a person may be able to choose such a restrictive life for themselves, it is hard 
to see how choosing such a life for one’s child is in the best interests of the child. Parents are 
                                                          
2 Brought to my attention by Dr. Paul Ford, (Center for Ethics, Humanities and Spiritual Care, Cleveland Clinic) 
during a presentation of this argument at the Cleveland Clinic in January 2015. 
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tasked with choosing what is in the best interests of their children. It is simply not reasonable to 
maintain that utter isolation is in the best interests of one’s child in order to avoid vaccination 
against measles. 
  The objection therefore does not succeed. It follows that libertarian justice requires societal 
vaccination against measles up to the point of measles elimination. If this level of vaccination is 
not maintained harm will accrue to those who are susceptible and cannot get measles vaccination 
for themselves. The actions of some (vaccine refusal) therefore leads to harm to others. Under 
libertarian justice such a situation is unjust, and society has to respond. 
A second possible objection 
  A second objection might surround the idea that parents have to agree to pay the costs of 
measles vaccination and the healthcare encounter. The objection may go something like this. 
Since libertarian justice traditionally makes no provision for government subsidized healthcare, 
but usually leaves medical care to regulation by the market, how can one argue that it is a duty 
for parents to choose MMR when they have to pay for it?  I will respond to this objection in two 
ways, because there are essentially two different objections rolled into one here. 
(1)  The central claim here is that parents cannot be held financially responsible for discharging a 
duty towards their own children. But this is quite mistaken. Parents have a host of duties towards 
their children that require of parents to expend time, money, and/or effort in order to discharge 
these duties. For example, it is not hard to see that parents have a duty to ensure that their 
children receive food and clothing. But government does not typically provide food and clothing 
free of charge; parents usually have to pay for these. The same goes for housing and security – 
parents have a duty to provide these items to their children, usually at personal cost. It would be 
wrong and quite mistaken for a parent to claim that, because government does not pay for food 
or clothing, they have no duty to provide these for their children. One of the essential duties of 
parenthood is to provide for their child, and this means securing the means in order to provide 
for one’s child.   
  I have argued that parents have the duty to choose measles vaccination for their child, based 
on a number of reasons. Firstly, non-vaccination threatens measles elimination, and if measles 
becomes endemic it will lead to harm for those people who cannot receive measles vaccination. 
Secondly, non-vaccination limits the liberty of people who cannot be vaccinated. Thirdly, measles 
vaccination is in the best interests of the child, and parents cannot compromise their child’s 
interests through their own choices. Rather, parents have a duty to choose what is in their child’s 
best interests. This last point perhaps needs further reflection. Not only can measles vaccination 
be shown to be in the immediate best interests of a child, but non-vaccination can be shown to 
be liberty limiting to the child. A non-vaccinated child is at risk of measles illness, and the only 
way to avoid measles is to avoid active cases. This harkens back to my response to the first 
objection: in order to avoid getting measles and/or spreading measles, a child would have to live 
outside of mainstream society, a life of isolation, and devoid of the normal travel and social 
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contact we take for granted in contemporary life. Such a child has their range of life options and 
social contact markedly restricted because of a parent’s choice not to vaccinate. The child’s 
interests and developing liberty are therefore markedly restricted by the parent’s choice. Under 
libertarianism, this cannot be: decisions of individuals that limit the rights or that harm others 
should be interfered with, and require interference by society’s delegates such as government. 
  Thus, parents plainly have the obligation to choose measles vaccination, and if needs be to pay 
for it. This assumes that measles vaccination is not cost prohibitive and is readily available. This 
assumption mirrors the reality in many countries; I have for example shown in chapter 3 that 
measles vaccination is readily available in countries such as the US, Canada, and South Africa, and 
is not cost prohibitive. The alternative parents face in this case is not paying for the vaccine; this 
would mean paying for the measures needed to avoid/prevent measles infection, and paying for 
the costs associated with the child’s medical care should the child get measles, while at the same 
time neglecting the parent’s duty towards the child and society. 
(2) But perhaps the objection is made stronger if measles vaccination was not freely available or 
was cost-prohibitive. It could be thought of as follows. Since government does not have the duty 
to regulate health care (and thus not vaccination), and vaccines are just regulated by market 
forces, it could foreseeably happen that measles vaccination is not available in some society, or 
that it is priced so high that it is simply unaffordable for parents. Or, if it is technically affordable 
they must choose between paying for measles vaccination and some other good such as food or 
clothing. After all, one cannot argue that a parent has the duty to vaccinate instead of paying for 
secure housing or food. 
  Firstly, I agree that it is perverse to argue that parents have the duty to vaccinate if vaccination 
is not available. Clearly, if vaccination is not present in a society or is cost-prohibitive, such a 
parent cannot discharge her duty to vaccinate. Here, parents are not making a free decision, but 
a coerced decision: the decision to vaccinate or not is essentially not a free decision but is 
determined by societal factors outside of the parent’s control. And there is therefore more to the 
story.  
  I have argued that measles vaccination is undoubtedly in the best interests of children, and that 
non-vaccination is liberty limiting to both the child and to society. If children therefore are not 
vaccinated against measles, and parents are coerced into non-vaccination by societal factors, 
then the focus of justice moves towards the societal institutions responsible. Given that we live 
in a world where measles vaccination is readily available and not expensive, the question 
presents itself: what is it about this country that makes measles vaccination unavailable to its 
members? The answer is a question of justice. Since non-vaccination leads to harm and limits 
liberty, measles vaccination is a question of justice. If parents face a coerced choice to forego 
vaccination, libertarian justice requires a societal response, since non-vaccination is in essence 
liberty limiting. The responsibility would fall on government and its delegates; the role of 
government in a libertarian society is to protect the liberty of all its members, and to protect 
members from harming each other through their actions. 
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  So, in this society, one would have to examine the social and governmental institutions to find 
out why parents are coerced into non-vaccination. Is it a matter of unethical business practices? 
These are ultimately individual choices that prioritize individual gain over the liberty rights of 
others. Is it a matter of government corruption? Again, here we have the prioritization of 
individual gain and the exercise of power for individual gain over the liberty of others. 
  The argument is simple. If parents are coerced into non-vaccination, there is a problem of justice 
in the society. Coerced non-vaccination limits liberty for various members of society. 
Government is tasked with ensuring liberty, and therefore has the obligation to respond when 
non-vaccination is mandated through societal forces. In essence, the non-availability of measles 
vaccination in a specific country in the contemporary world raises substantial questions regarding 
the nature of the societal and governmental institutions within the country under the libertarian 
conception. Since government has the obligation to ensure liberty for all, it means making sure 
that no barriers exist to access to measles vaccination, and to ensure that parents have the 
opportunity to freely choose vaccination. 
  Another way to say this, is as follows. Parents have the duty to vaccinate their children, and 
foregoing vaccination risks harm to the child and others, and limits the liberty of the child and 
others. If parents do not choose vaccination, it requires a response from society’s institutions, 
such as the government and the health care sector. If the reason parents forego vaccination is 
because of safety fears or mistaken beliefs, the response from society should be aimed at those 
factors, employing government power (such as state mandates) and education. (I will focus on 
this type of policy in more detail in Chapter 7.) If the reason parents forego vaccination is because 
of non-availability of vaccines due to the business sector importing cheap vaccines and pricing 
them very high at point of delivery, government has the duty to intervene and ensure reasonable 
access for parents to vaccination.  
  The point is that non-vaccination requires a societal response. Again, we see the two principles 
I have derived reflected here. A just society vaccinates to the point that sustains measles 
elimination. If this does not happen, a societal response is required. A just society respects the 
parent-child bond and parental decisions making; thus, a just society places a parent in the 
position where she can freely choose vaccination. It is important to see that these follow from a 
purely libertarian view of justice. And, as I have pointed out in chapters 2 and 3, what is 
encouraging is that many countries take these obligations seriously, making vaccinations 
available to children, responding to non-vaccination. Consequently, vaccination rates are being 
raised globally, and vaccinations are readily available and not cost prohibitive in many countries 
(such as the US, Canada, Netherlands, and South Africa that I referenced in chapters 2 and 3). 
(3.2.2) Egalitarian justice 
  Egalitarian justice is a liberal theory of justice, meaning that it is committed to the idea of the 
freely choosing individual self. But egalitarian justice is also committed to the idea of equality of 
persons. All persons are morally equal and deserve to be treated equally. With regards to 
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distributive justice, egalitarian theories hold that persons should be treated equally “in certain 
respects” in the sharing of the benefits (and burdens) of society, although no major egalitarian 
theory is in favour of a strictly equal sharing of all social benefits (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, 
p. 256). 
  A prominent and extremely influential view of Egalitarian justice is the theory of justice of John 
Rawls (1971). Rawls’ theory is contractarian in that he invokes as basis for his theory a 
hypothetical social contract according to which the goods necessary to live a good life are 
distributed among the members of the just society. From this imaginary contract, Rawls deduces 
principles of justice that can be used in order to frame the commitments of the just society. Rawls 
claims that his statement of the “initial position” and the terms of the contract, together with 
the principles he derives from it, best matches our “considered judgments” regarding justice. 
That is to say, the theory of justice he proposes, based on the principles he derives from the initial 
position, provides the best explanatory framework that matches those moral judgments 
regarding justice we have the greatest degree of confidence in. In the next few pages I will 
gradually unpack Rawls’ theory of justice and the essential commitments of his egalitarian 
contractarian theory of justice.  
  Rawls asks us to imagine all members of society behind a “veil of ignorance” where no-one 
knows what their eventual social position within society will be, and that behind this “veil of 
ignorance” the members of society are deciding how to arrange the society they are to be part 
of. This is called the “initial position”, the hypothetical starting position from which Rawls derives 
his principles of justice. In such a society, Rawls argues, one would want to make sure that, 
whatever one’s eventual social position in society, one is the best off one could possibly be. One 
would for example want to ensure one is not the target of discrimination or in dire, unliveable 
poverty. 
  Rawls’ theory has strong Kantian underpinnings, as pointed out by Sandel (2009, p. 138-144): 
Kant argues that legitimate government derives its power from a contract with the governed. 
This contract is not necessarily an actual contract, but a hypothetical one. This hypothetical 
contract asks of the government to only pass such laws that members of society would have 
chosen for themselves. Important in Kantian thinking is the idea of the free, choosing self. The 
decisions and moral commitments of this choosing self should be respected, and thus 
government can only govern over a society of free individuals insofar as they have the permission 
of these free individuals to do so. It is not clear from Kant’s writings how such a model of 
government and societal justice would work in practice. Sandel argues that Rawls’ theory of 
justice is an attempt to answer these Kantian questions in a practical way. This means that the 
egalitarian theory of Rawls has strong commitments to the Kantian conceptions of the liberal 
individual and the contractarian basis of government.  
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 Based on the hypothetical contract, Rawls argues for two central principles of justice (Rawls 
1971, p. 60-61). 
(1) “Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a 
similar liberty for others.” 
(2) “Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably 
expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.” 
  Principle (1) guarantees a maximum amount of basic rights for all members of society. This 
includes things such as freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of religion, political 
rights such as voting, and freedom from unreasonable arrest. Principle (2) focuses on things that 
all human beings need to live a good life. Rawls calls these things the primary social goods. The 
primary social goods are those things that all human beings want and need to live their lives, 
whatever their conception of the good life may be (“…things which it is supposed a rational man 
wants whatever else he wants”) (Rawls 1971, p. 92). This includes rights, liberty, opportunities 
within society, power, income, and material wealth. Thus, Rawls argues for maximal rights and 
liberties for all in principle (1) and for power, wealth, income and opportunities to be distributed 
according to (2). 
  The implications of principle (2) can be further considered so that the commitments of justice 
become even clearer with regards to distribution of the primary social goods. One thing that is 
apparent when looking at the distribution of the primary goods within actual societies, is that 
there is a marked inequality in distribution. Some people have more power, wealth and 
opportunities whereas other people have less. Some people are less well-off than others. 
According to principle (2), such inequalities should benefit everyone in society, not just those 
who happen to be well-off. It is obvious that those who have a lot of power, income, and wealth 
benefit from such an arrangement. But how would one ensure that everyone, including those 
who are less fortunate, benefits from the unequal way in which these primary goods are 
distributed? This leads Rawls to argue for a principle he calls the difference principle: inequalities 
in the distribution of the primary goods can only be tolerated if these inequalities ensure that 
society’s least well-off people are maximally benefited. In other words, there should be no other 
possible distribution of primary goods where the least well-off will be benefited more. The idea 
is to maximize the welfare of the least well-off as ‘good as it gets’. If this is arrived at through an 
unequal distribution of primary goods, such a distribution is just. 
  Rawls furthermore argues that justice should correct the unfairness of “life’s lottery”, stating a 
principle of fair equality of opportunity, and then uses this idea to further amend principle (2).  
Rawls argues that if one were to think about how primary goods such as income, wealth and 
power are distributed in society, one would see that they are closely tied to certain social roles 
and positions. This includes certain modes of employment, or political office. Thus, to ensure that 
persons have access to primary goods, one has to ensure that they have access to such positions 
and offices. There should therefore be equality of opportunity; everyone should have access to 
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those opportunities that distribute the goods of life. Looking a little closer, however, one notices 
that not everyone has a fair shot at such opportunities. Some have barriers in the way. The 
playing field is not level; not everyone has fair access to such positions and offices. For example, 
someone who is born in extreme poverty and is consequently uneducated and physically weak 
cannot compete with someone who is born in affluence, who has an Ivy-league education and 
excellent physical qualities, when it comes to occupations and positions. Thus, Rawls argues that 
we have to ensure fair equality of opportunity; we have to ensure that everyone has fair access 
to these opportunities. That means that those who are disadvantaged and have obstacles in the 
way of their path to such opportunities should receive some help to overcome these obstacles. 
Society should be so set up that systematic obstacles in the way of equal access to opportunities 
be removed. 
  Principle (2) can therefore be restated as follows (Rawls 1971, p. 83): 
  “Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”  
  Norman Daniels (1985) has extended Rawls’ theory to health care, examining the implications 
of Rawls’ theory of justice for health care policy within the just society. Daniels argues that illness 
and disease limit the access persons have to opportunities, and therefore decrease their access 
to social goods. Rawls’ fair equality of opportunity principle would require of a just society to 
respond to such barriers which would unfairly prevent persons from accessing the goods of life. 
If we are sick, we cannot secure positions, income, power or opportunities like when we are 
healthy. A just society therefore requires a health care system that prevents illness when people 
are healthy and responds with appropriate care when people are sick. It is a matter of justice to 
prevent, in so far possible, those illnesses and disabilities that would create a barrier to 
opportunities.  
  “Health care has normal functioning as its goal: it concentrates on a specific class of obvious 
disadvantages and tries to eliminate them. That is its limited contribution to guaranteeing fair 
equality of opportunity” (Daniels 1985, p. 46). 
  This implies that everyone in society should have access to that degree of health care that would 
protect them from the disadvantages that disease conveys. Of course, it is not always possible to 
heal all diseases or ameliorate all afflictions. Daniels argues for a basic minimum health care 
standard, a decent level of health care that is considered to be adequate given the limitations of 
finite resources and the level of scientific advancement. Thus, according to Daniels, everyone in 
society should have access to an adequate level of health care (sometimes called a decent 
minimum), regardless of their societal position, income, or wealth. B&C summarizes this idea as 
follows:  
  “The allocation of health care resources, then, should be structured to ensure justice through fair 
equality of opportunity” (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 257). 
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  “On this account, each member of society, irrespective of wealth or position, would have equal 
access to an adequate, although not maximal, level of health care – the exact level of access being 
contingent on available social resources and public processes of decision making” (Beauchamp & 
Childress 2013, p. 257). 
Egalitarian justice and measles vaccination in children 
Measles vaccination and fair equality of opportunity 
  Health care plays and important role in ensuring fair equality of opportunity. Health care so 
conceived has various functions: preventing illness as far as possible, and restoring normal 
function when illness does strike as far as possible. According to the Daniels/Rawls argument, 
each member of society should have access to such a basic minimum of health care. 
  Measles vaccination is an important and very effective way in which to protect the health of 
children from the onslaught of a serious infectious disease. If a person contracts measles, there 
is a risk of complications setting in that would pose a threat to the person’s access to the primary 
goods of life. For example, a child who contracts measles may end up with encephalitis and 
consequent disability. Or, a child may die and not realize their life goals at all. Even in the best 
case scenario, where measles lead to no complications, measles infections carry a financial and 
societal burden to parents and other members of society.  
  Measles vaccination therefore protects against the effects of measles infection on health, and 
consequently plays a role in ensuring fair access to opportunity and to primary goods. It therefore 
follows that measles vaccination should form a central part of the decent minimum health care 
to which every person in society should have access. Everyone in society should have access to 
the protection afforded by measles vaccination in order to ensure that measles infection does 
not interfere with their access to the primary goods of life. 
  As stated before, there are some in society who cannot be vaccinated because of medical 
reasons. This, and vaccine failure, leads to about at least 5% of the population being susceptible 
to measles infection at any given time. It is possible to arrange health care provision in such a 
way that these persons are protected against measles infection: through elimination of measles 
within society. This requires vaccinating children with two measles containing vaccine doses at a 
population rate of 93-95%. 
  Another way to put it is this: Measles vaccination is a benefit. According to Egalitarian justice, 
everyone in society should have equal access to this benefit. Consequently, every child that is 
eligible should receive measles vaccination. There are some in society who are not eligible for 
vaccination. They are able to benefit from measles vaccination of others, provided that such 
vaccination leads to adequate levels of immunity to prevent the spread of measles in society. 
Given that the risk of measles vaccination is very low, and that receiving the vaccine is considered 
a benefit, it is a requirement of Egalitarian justice that society vaccinates at least to the point of 
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measles elimination. This ensures that both those who are eligible for vaccination and those who 
are not eligible for vaccination themselves receive the benefit that is due them.  
Protecting the least advantaged/the vulnerable and the difference principle 
  Some may object to this last idea based on an unequal distribution of burdens associated with 
measles vaccination. Measles vaccination comes with some burdens – a needle jab in the arm, 
potentially some minor adverse effects such as rash and fever, and a financial cost. There is also 
the extremely small risk of serious adverse events; this risk though is extremely small. Those who 
receive vaccination bear these burdens, while those who do not vaccinate do not share these 
burdens. Is it not unfair that some persons in society get all the benefits of vaccination while not 
sharing in the burden? To this objection we may respond in a number of ways.  
  Firstly, receiving measles vaccination is considered a tremendous benefit, whatever potential 
burdens may be associated with it. A child who receives vaccination is being helped, not harmed. 
This undermines concerns regarding unequal burdens.  
  Secondly, the protection from getting the vaccine yourself is much stronger than the protection 
that depends on measles eradication. Those who do not receive the vaccine remains susceptible 
to measles, and if they come into contact with measles virus they will be at risk of measles 
complications. On the other hand, those who receive the vaccine will be protected with over 95% 
certainty.  
  Thirdly, one can consider the difference principle in this context. For our purposes, we can state 
it as follows: benefits and burdens should be equally distributed, unless the unequal distribution 
of such benefits and burdens ensures that the most disadvantaged group is maximally well-off. 
In other words, we can tolerate unequal distributions of benefits and burdens as long as it 
maximally favors the welfare of those who are most disadvantaged. If we consider the case of 
measles vaccination, we will see that 5% of society cannot receive the vaccine or remain 
susceptible to measles infection. These people are, with regards to protection against measles, 
the most disadvantaged group. Consider as well that this 5% group includes people who are quite 
vulnerable to measles infection and its complications, even more so than the general population, 
for instance the very young and the immune-compromised. The 95% of people who actually 
receive measles vaccination therefore are the advantaged group. Now clearly we have an 
unequal distribution of benefits and burdens here; the 95% have more protection and more 
benefit than the 5%, but they also shoulder more burden. This inequality in distribution of 
burdens and benefits can however be justified, since this is the distribution that ensures the 
maximal protection and thus maximal welfare of the most disadvantaged group. Now, this 
argument would of course not work if the burden of vaccination was very high, for instance if the 
vaccine was very costly or had serious side-effects. It works quite well with the measles vaccine, 
however. 
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  Egalitarian justice therefore requires that all children who are eligible for vaccination be 
vaccinated against measles, and that vaccination in society happens at least to the point of 
measles elimination. 
Respect for liberty 
  Egalitarian justice is strongly committed to the liberal, choosing individual. This means that 
people should be free to do as they wish, provided that the freedom of others are respected. 
Rawls argues for the “most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others” 
(Rawls 1971, p. 60). Egalitarian justice therefore respects the freedom of people to make their 
own health care choices, in keeping with their own view of the good life. The idea of egalitarian 
justice is not to force an adequate level of health care on people, but rather to ensure that it is 
available to them. Freedom of choice with regards to one’s own health care is paramount under 
the egalitarian conception.  
  This is very akin to the liberty defended by Mill or the liberty defended by libertarians. Against 
claims that individual liberty should excuse one from the egalitarian distribution of burdens and 
benefits, one could appeal to the same argument that I used when I considered the claims of 
libertarian justice and liberty in general. The freedom of the individual cannot be used to limit 
the freedom of others. Thus, a free choice on behalf of some individuals should not endanger the 
rights of those who are not eligible for vaccination. Liberty is always restricted by the liberty of 
others. In the case of egalitarian justice, the argument is even stronger. Under the egalitarian 
conception, access to basic health care such as protection against measles infection is a basic 
right, necessary to ensure fair equality of opportunity. Personal liberty comes to its limit when it 
endangers the rights of others within society. 
  In general, the same arguments and limits to liberty apply as was considered under libertarian 
justice: Parents have the authority to make decisions on their children’s behalf, guided by the 
best interest standard. There are limits to parental authority, and these are demarcated by the 
best interest of the child. The choices of individuals can also be limited when others are harmed 
by such choices, and therefore parental choices in favor of non-vaccination can be challenged if 
it would lead to harm to others in society. Thus, in accordance with egalitarian justice the family 
unit and familial/parental decision-making is respected as long as free decisions do not result in 
compromising the interests of the child, or harm to others in society. 
Two ethical action guides 
  We therefore see the same two principles emerge in the egalitarian conception of justice: 
(1b) A just society vaccinates every child against measles that is eligible for vaccination, at least 
to the point that sustains measles elimination from society. 
(2b) Respect for liberty and the parent-child relationship regulates the just society’s response to 
vaccine refusal. 
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  Once again, as seen with the other conceptions of justice, principle (1b) is a very strong 
consideration, but should be balanced with (2b) in cases of vaccine refusal. Vaccine refusal can 
at minimum not be allowed to harm others within society, and thus should not endanger measles 
elimination. Given the protection afforded by receiving the vaccine, and the duty of justice to 
ensure fair equality of opportunity, a case of vaccine refusal demands some kind of societal 
response. That does not always mean coercion; there may be other approaches that could be 
used, and principle (2b) guides the types of societal response and vaccine policy response to 
vaccine refusal. 
 
(3.3) Communitarian justice 
  Various different theories are collected under the banner of communitarian justice (Beauchamp 
& Childress 2013, p. 257). Instead of focusing on individual liberty, these theories focus on the 
idea of the common good. As such, tradition, loyalty and social relationships along with shared 
communal decision making play an important role in these theories (Beauchamp & Childress 
2013, p. 257). The focus of communitarian theories is on the common good of members of the 
community. As an example of the implications of this for public health institutions, B&C reiterate 
Callahan’s view that public policy should be based on “a shared consensus about the good of 
society rather than the basis of individual rights” (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 258). 
  Sandel is a proponent of communitarian justice, and argues that communitarian views of justice 
are preferable over liberal or utilitarian views (Sandel 2009, p. 208-269). The argument proceeds 
as follows.  
  The liberal views of justice, libertarianism and egalitarianism, are both based on the Kantian 
concept of the freely choosing, individual self. The implication is that apart from respect for the 
rights of others, the individual only has those moral commitments which has been chosen by the 
self. Society under the liberal views is therefore made up of a collection of individuals, each of 
which has its own conception of the good life and each of which only has those moral 
commitments which the self has chosen. The role of government is to ensure that liberty and 
other rights are respected while maintaining a strict neutrality between different views of the 
good life. Government is therefore not to promote a specific view of the good life, but rather to 
protect the freedom of individuals to pursue their own view of the good life. 
  The communitarian argues that this view of society and of the self is mistaken. I am not just an 
individual: I am someone’s son, someone’s brother, someone’s father, someone’s friend, 
someone’s neighbor. I find myself within a society and within a social role that I myself have not 
chosen. This place in society and these relationships furnish me with moral obligations that are 
not merely dependent on those commitments I myself have chosen. For example, I recognize 
duties of special obligations to my children, my parents and other close family members; 
obligations I have not chosen but that are nonetheless binding. The communitarian argues that 
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individuals have moral obligations in virtue of their place in society and their relationships. 
Examples are moral values such as loyalty, patriotism, special obligations to relations, correction 
of historical injustices and the like; these cannot be explained under liberal conceptions of justice, 
but rather these values assume a communitarian perspective.  
  An important moral value in communitarian thought is solidarity, or membership. The idea is 
that an individual has concern for the good of fellow members of the community, and that the 
community as a whole has concern for the good of individual members. Thus, I have the 
responsibility to seek the good of the collective, and the collective in turn has the responsibility 
to seek my good.  
  The communitarian does not think of people as unencumbered selves, or primarily liberal 
choosing selves. Rather, the Communitarian argues that people are encumbered selves, situated 
selves, and that people find themselves with certain relationships and histories. The fact that we 
are situated has implications for our moral responsibilities. Sandel argues that there are three 
categories of moral responsibility (p.225): 
(1) Natural duties (This applies to everyone, and is basically respect for the rights of others.) 
(2) Voluntary obligations (These obligations are those moral commitments that the self has 
chosen.) 
(3) Obligations of solidarity (These are particular obligations on a person, derived from the 
historical and relational situation of the person. These are not chosen and do not require 
consent.) 
  The liberal views urge a neutrality towards different conceptions of the good in public life. 
Sandel argues that this is not always possible, and is often not desirable (p. 251). Resolving 
matters of justice in the public sphere often requires weighing of opposing moral claims and 
giving preference to one over the other. Take the example of abortion rights (p. 252). Opponents 
of abortion often argue that abortion is akin to murder, since the fetus is a human being with the 
right to protection under the law. Now, if the State allows abortion, the State is effectively saying 
that it disagrees with the argument raised by the opponents of abortion. That is, the State 
disagrees that abortion is murder. No-one would think that murder should be allowed by the 
State in the name of neutrality between different conceptions of the good life. Therefore, when 
the State makes a decision that abortions are legally permissible, it commits itself to a position 
on the morality of abortion and the moral status of the fetus – that is, that abortion is not the 
same as murder and that the fetus does not have the moral status of personhood. The same issue 
applies to other dilemmas of justice in the public sphere, such as stem cell research and same-
sex marriage: making a decision on these issues requires consideration of substantive moral 
questions. It is therefore not possible, and sometimes not desirable, to maintain neutrality 
between different conceptions of the good life. 
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  Instead of trying to remain neutral on conceptions of the good, the communitarian argues that 
communities should engage in active discourse on the good. Communitarian justice is therefore 
Aristotelian in the sense that a society should be engaged in understanding and promoting the 
good. In Aristotle’s view, a just society should encourage citizens to be good and virtuous, 
rewarding virtue and discouraging vice. Similarly, communitarians think that a just society 
encourages the good within society. For a society to be just, under the communitarian 
conception, the society has to engage in deliberating together about what is good, and promote 
the good. Societies should actively promote the good for all its members through social and 
political institutions, and encourage its citizens to be good people. Communitarian justice is 
committed to the idea of the common good: we all work together to promote everyone’s good. 
In this respect, Sandel argues that justice requires a commitment to a robust civic life and 
dialogue, to promoting everyone’s good through social and political institutions, to a politics of 
moral engagement. Instead of arguing for neutrality, we should engage in moral dialogue about 
the good life and actively promote the good life for all.  
  Sandel argues that Communitarian theories are improvements over utilitarianism and liberal 
theories. Utilitarianism is inadequate, because it reduces moral values and engagement to a mere 
calculation of welfare and reduces all the things people value into a single measure of value. 
Liberal theories are an improvement in that they respect rights over Utilitarian considerations, 
thus ensuring justice is not a mere welfare calculation. But liberal theories cannot provide 
grounding for many of the moral commitments we recognize as requirements of justice. 
According to Sandel, communitarian justice provides a solution to serious deficiencies in 
utilitarian and liberal theories of justice. 
A potential objection: communal tyranny  
  Of course, communitarian views are open to criticism. What if the community or family is 
oppressive? What if I find myself in Nazi Germany or Apartheid South Africa? What of the 
impoverished woman in rural Africa that is told that her moral commitments include forced 
servitude and genital mutilation? Sandel acknowledges this objection by pointing out that liberal 
theories historically developed in response to oppressive communal systems where people were 
consigned to a horrible fate through being born to a certain class, race or caste (Sandel 2009, p. 
221). This is a serious objection to communitarian theories. If we go the route communitarians 
suggest and abandon societal neutrality in favor of a specific conception of the good, it seems 
that some persons will be forced to abandon a conception of the good that they prize dearly. For 
example, if society as a whole reaches a consensus that black people are morally undesirable for 
some reason, and society then promotes this “conception of the good”, it will force those who 
are black either out of society or to endure subjugation and discrimination. Or, if a minority 
religion is found undesirable by “social consensus”, persons who hold to that religion would 
either have to leave or recant. This sounds more like tyranny of the majority and ruling of the 
strong over the weak than it sounds like justice. Of course, the antidote to communal tyranny is 
a respect for liberty and for human rights, but to resort to this would be an acknowledgement 
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that communitarianism alone is not feasible; it needs the help of the liberal theories at least in 
part. Sandel acknowledges and addresses this objection, but does not entirely resolve it. His 
solution is a “robust and active civic life”, an ongoing public deliberation about social and moral 
issues in which progress is made towards the common good. Sandel writes (2009, p. 268): 
  “Politics and law should not become entangled in moral and religious disputes, we often think, 
for such entanglement opens the way to coercion and intolerance. This is a legitimate worry. 
Citizens of pluralist societies do disagree about morality and religion. Even if, as I’ve argued, it’s 
not possible for government to be neutral on these disagreements, is it nonetheless possible to 
conduct our politics on the basis of mutual respect?  
  The answer, I think, is yes. But we need a more robust and engaged civic life than the one to 
which we’ve become accustomed. In recent decades, we’ve come to assume that respecting our 
fellow citizens’ moral and religious convictions means ignoring them (for political purposes, at 
least), leaving them undisturbed, and conducting our public life – insofar as possible – without 
reference to them. But this stance of avoidance can make for a spurious respect. Often, it means 
suppressing moral disagreement rather than actually avoiding it. This can provoke backlash and 
resentment.”   
  Sandel’s communitarianism seems to be a response to the problems faced with the 
commitment to political neutrality found in the liberal theories of justice. Neutrality on moral 
and religious questions is not possible and is not always desirable, as it may lead to “backlash and 
resentment” in that certain moral points of view are suppressed. This is a valid concern, and one 
liberal theorists need to take seriously. In this way, communitarian justice has some strengths. It 
reminds us of moral obligations in virtue of our relationships and histories; we are also situated 
selves and not only individuals. Communitarian theories revive civic engagement, solidarity, and 
actively deliberating about and pursuing the common good. 
  Sandel’s suggestion hints at respect for the individual; in his communitarianism, individual moral 
views need to be engaged with through civic dialogue in order to make sure that everyone’s voice 
is heard, and that no-one is excluded. However, it is not quite clear if Sandel’s solution to the 
problem of communal tyranny entirely solves the problems communitarian theories face. What 
if “robust civic engagement” does not lead to a solution or to a clear answer regarding the 
common good? What if we still have a minority religion with customs that are repugnant to the 
majority, and any amount of moral deliberation cannot establish a view of the common good 
that is acceptable to everyone? Should the majority opinion rule, and the minority views be 
squashed? But this is exactly the type of tyranny that liberal views provide an escape from. To 
my mind, communitarian theories have value, but need some way of coming to terms with this 
objection. If the objection of impotence to tyranny cannot be overcome, it would present a 
knock-down argument against the feasibility of communitarian theories. Here one can think of 
an example. Should the practice of ritual female genital mutilation be tolerated in Western 
countries among immigrant communities? Such immigrant communities may view female genital 
mutilation as a culturally important practice, and as in important part of their conception of the 
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good. These communities therefore would argue that the practice should be allowed and 
promoted under communitarian views of justice. However, Western societies at large views such 
practices as female genital mutilation as wrong and abusive, and contrary to the good. The 
broader Western conception of promoting the good would include a ban on female genital 
mutilation. How would one bring these two competing notions of the good together under the 
communitarian view of justice? What if no compromise can be reached through civic 
engagement and dialogue? Should the practice be allowed? It is not clear that communitarian 
theories have the necessary tools to resolve such intractable disagreements on what constitutes 
the good, or disagreements between various communities within one society. 
Two possible solutions to the objection 
  I can think of two possible ways of overcoming this crippling objection. 
  (1) Retain respect for liberty rights.  
  One way of overcoming this objection is to retain a respect for basic rights within the theory of 
Communitarian justice. This would mean that a building block of the moral commitments of all 
communities should be a respect for basic liberty and political rights, such as freedom of speech, 
thought and conscience. It seems as if Sandel appeals somewhat to this idea by giving us three 
sources of moral commitments: Natural duties (respect for rights, non-voluntary), voluntary 
duties (those commitments the individual chooses, voluntary), and obligations of solidarity 
(duties the individual has due to membership of a group/community, non-voluntary) (Sandel 
2009, p. 225). So, any individual would have the obligation to respect the rights of other 
individuals, and in addition we have obligations of solidarity in view of our historical and societal 
situation. 
  The difficulty with this solution is that a strict communitarian theory rejects the idea of the freely 
choosing self as the basis for moral duties in favor of a situated self with a set of moral obligations 
in view of history, tradition and society. It is unclear what the basis would be for “natural duties” 
and liberty rights once the liberal basis for these rights has been removed. Trying to retain respect 
for liberty rights and individual freedom may be necessary to avoid communal tyranny and 
suppression of minorities, but that seems to be an admission that an appeal to liberalism is 
unavoidable. This may undermine the whole communitarian scheme. A possible solution to this 
difficulty can perhaps be to look once again at what solidarity involves: the individual is 
concerned with the good of the collective, and the collective is concerned with the good of the 
individual. Thus, there is room in communitarian thought for considering the good of the 
individual and assigning weight to the thoughts of the individual. 
  (2) Liberty is a common good. 
  According to communitarian theories, a just society promotes the common good and 
encourages its citizens to pursue the good. It could be argued that individual liberty is such a 
good: respecting the freedom of others is in itself a good thing. Thus, a community that seeks the 
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common good and seeks to encourage pursuit of the good in its members, has to encourage 
respect for liberty rights. 
  This is perhaps a promising way of retaining the communitarian project and maintaining respect 
for liberty, which would protect minorities and individuals against oppression. It is not clear if this 
entirely solves the problem though. What if, through a process of civic engagement and moral 
dialogue, a majority of society feels convinced that liberty is not essential compared to other 
goals of the community? Say, for example, the majority feels that criticism of community leaders 
threaten the peace and cohesion of society, peace and cohesion is a greater good than individual 
liberty, and therefore freedom of speech should be curtailed in order to promote the common 
good? In this hypothetical scenario, it is not clear how respect for liberty rights such as freedom 
of speech can be defended purely on communitarian grounds. 
  Seeing liberty as a societal good that should be promoted and respected is a potential solution 
to the problem, but is seems as if this places individual liberty on shaky ground. If a majority of 
people in a community feel that liberty is after all not important, it is unclear that a basis for 
individual liberty would remain within that community, if one were to argue from purely 
communitarian grounds. To maintain respect for individual liberty against the opinion of the 
masses, one would seemingly have to appeal to liberal theories. 
Communitarian justice: Summary 
  Communitarian justice focuses on moral obligations that exist because of membership of a 
group or community. An important aspect of communitarian theories is the idea of solidarity: the 
individual has moral obligations to the collective, and the collective has moral obligations to the 
individual. Furthermore, in communitarian theories the just society promotes a specific view of 
the good, and encourages its members to seek the good. Communitarians are thus concerned 
with the common good, and the just society seeks to promote the common good. 
  A serious objection to communitarian theories is the problem I have called communal tyranny. 
That is, in the absence of a firm grounding for individual liberty, it seems as if minorities are 
vulnerable to oppression by the suppression of their views and rights by the collective. If the 
collective has a specific view of the good that is at odds with the views of the views of minorities, 
communitarian justice seems to require society to promote the view of the good favored by the 
collective, which would bring pressure and potential hardship to bear on minorities within 
society. Communitarians like Sandel seem aware of this objection, and seem troubled by it. I have 
suggested potential ways around this objection, both of which leave the communitarian with 
difficult problems to solve. It is important to find a satisfactory way around this problem if 
communitarian theories are to be taken seriously: a theory that seemingly allows oppression of 
minorities under certain circumstances is morally extremely suspect. 
  It appears as if communitarians like Sandel take the problem of individual freedom seriously, 
and try to incorporate individual freedom within their moral thought. In my analysis of measles 
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vaccination and communitarian justice, I will take this into account. There are ways in which 
individual freedom and consequently autonomy can be incorporated within the communitarian 
way of thought, even though it does leave the communitarian with some questions to answer.  
Communitarian justice and measles vaccination in children 
Measles vaccination and the common good   
  According to communitarian theories, just societies seek and promote the common good. There 
can be no doubt that measles vaccination promotes the common good: individuals are much 
better off in societies where measles disease is absent than in societies where measles is present. 
Protecting individuals against measles infection is a good thing. Thus, according to 
communitarian justice, a just society would promote vaccination in order to rid society of measles 
infection, thereby promoting the common good. 
  Furthermore, according to communitarian theories, obligations of solidarity exist within 
communities and societies. That is, individuals have a moral obligation towards society to further 
the common good and the good of others within society. Society also has an obligation to further 
the good of its members. According to the communitarian, I have the duty to seek the good of 
the community, and the community has the duty to seek my good. Of course, the duty of the 
individual to act in the best interests of the community is limited by other considerations, such 
as harm to the individual in question or moral commitments to other persons or groups. Thus, 
when it comes to measles vaccination, we find that a just society has obligations to its members, 
and members have an obligation to society. Society has the obligation to employ measles 
vaccination to protect its members against measles disease. This means that everyone that is 
eligible should be vaccinated against measles, and those who cannot be vaccinated should derive 
protection from the herd effect. As I have argued before, herd immunity for measles happens at 
the same point that measles is eliminated from society, so that a just society would at least 
vaccinate to the point of measles elimination.  
  Because of the obligation to promote the common good, individuals have an obligation to get 
vaccinated against measles. It is in the best interests of society if measles is eliminated from 
society. There are some members of society that should justly benefit from protection against 
measles, but who cannot receive direct protection from measles vaccination, for example 
through medical contra-indication to measles vaccination. This susceptible segment of society is 
usually around 5%. According to communitarian justice, society has the duty to protect these 
susceptible members of society through establishing herd immunity. It is therefore the duty of 
every individual who can receive vaccination to contribute to the creation of herd immunity in 
order to serve the common good. It is therefore a civic duty of every individual to receive 
vaccination in order to protect society as a whole. Not only through protecting the individual at 
stake, but also through the creation of herd immunity and eventual elimination of measles from 
society. Another way to put it is this. Through sustained measles vaccination, it is possible to 
eliminate measles from society. The common good is served through measles elimination. 
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According to communitarian justice, individuals have a duty to seek the common good, to act in 
such a way as to promote the good of the collective. The individual therefore has the duty to 
contribute to the project of measles elimination through receiving measles vaccination. 
  Of course, we are dealing with children here, and therefore the civic duty we speak of falls to 
parents. It is a civic duty of parents to have their children vaccinated against measles in order to 
promote the common good. The only possible objection to this arrangement would be if the 
measles vaccine was harmful. The duty to contribute to the common good can perhaps rightfully 
be limited when the harm to the individual is substantial. However, the potential harms from 
measles vaccines are minor and negligible. Serious harms from vaccination are incredibly rare. 
The benefit to the individual and to society through measles vaccination far outweighs any 
potential adverse effects from vaccination.  
  In communitarian thought, measles vaccination can be seen as a public good. Some can benefit 
directly from this public good through receiving the vaccine themselves.  Those who are ineligible 
to receive the vaccine or who experience vaccine failure benefit from it through measles 
elimination. Measles vaccination therefore can be seen as both a right and a duty. It is the right 
of every child to receive protection against measles disease through the public good that is 
vaccination. It is also the duty of every child that is eligible to contribute to the herd effect 
(elimination of measles) in order to give access to the public good of protection against measles 
to those who cannot access the vaccines for themselves. 
Vaccine refusals   
 It is not clear to what extent communitarian theories are tolerant of vaccine refusals. As I have 
argued before, it appears that communitarian theories do not provide a solid grounding for the 
respect of individual rights and especially for refusal to participate in the common good. If society 
views action A as furthering the common good, and some individuals reject A as morally dubious 
or as harmful to society, it is not clear that individuals can legitimately object to A on purely 
communitarian grounds. I view this as a serious objection to Communitarian theories, and have 
argued that communitarian theories need some way around this in order to succeed as a theory 
of justice. When it comes to measles vaccination, the point is pressed even further. Respect for 
autonomy and informed choice is one of the building blocks of medical ethics, and medical care 
that excludes consideration of the wishes of the individual is morally wrong. It would therefore 
be strange to advocate a theory of justice that seems to exclude individual choice entirely.  
  A further consideration when it comes to vaccine refusals is the role of the family and parent-
child relationships. In communitarian thought, people are situated selves and not merely Kantian 
choosing selves. When we look at society, we see that people are situated in morally significant 
relationships that involve various moral obligations. One such morally significant relationship is 
the parent-child bond. I have previously pointed out Elliot’s arguments in this regard: that the 
interests of children and parents are narrowly intertwined with one another, and that a striking 
characteristic of children is their utter dependence on their parents (Elliot 2001). The parent-
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 235 
 
child bond is a morally significant one, and fits in well with the communitarian notions of a 
situated self. Within the communitarian theory of justice, society seeks to promote the common 
good, and seeks to advance the good for its members. The just society would therefore seek to 
protect the parent-child bond, recognizing it as a morally significant relationship. Protecting the 
parent-child bond fits in well with the communitarian view of justice. But how do we weigh two 
competing goods? The communitarian wants to promote the good of measles vaccination, but 
also wants to promote the good of flourishing parent-child relationships. In the case of parental 
vaccine refusal, one can appreciate a tension between these two moral values.  
  Given these considerations, one wonders to what extent Communitarian theories can allow 
vaccine refusals for non-medical reasons. I will examine two articles where the authors consider 
this question.  
Article 1: The unfairness of free riding (van den Hoven 2012) 
  Van den Hoven argues that herd immunity constitutes a public good.  Collective action through 
adequate levels of vaccination establishes herd immunity, and this benefits those who remain 
susceptible through vaccine failure or medical contra-indication to receive vaccination 
themselves. Thus, the establishment of herd immunity creates a publically available good, free 
and accessible to all who are susceptible to immune-preventable disease. Some people may 
consider it in their own best interests (or their child’s best interest) to depend on herd immunity 
for protection against measles, and forego vaccination for themselves in order to avoid the 
potential for vaccine related adverse effects. Such intentional use of a public good without 
contributing to establishing the public good can be deemed as unfair. Using a public good without 
paying one’s fair share is not fair and cannot be justified.3  
  It is clear that intentional use of a public good without paying one’s fair share is unfair. This is 
called free riding. Usually, free riding is thought of as the deliberate, intentional use of a freely 
available public good without contributing to the public good, and it is always considered morally 
unjustifiable. 
  Van den Hoven proceeds to ask: What is it that makes free riding unfair? Is it the intention of 
the person to free ride the public good or something else? To answer the question, she applies 
                                                          
3 I have argued in the previous chapter that it remains in the individual child’s best interest to be vaccinated 
against measles, even if there are high levels of vaccination within the population. We have seen that in countries 
with high vaccination rates such as the Netherlands, USA, and Canada, measles can be imported and can be 
transmitted through chains of susceptible individuals even though measles is eliminated from the country. 
Furthermore, measles vaccination has very low risk of adverse effects; it is a safe intervention and the benefit far 
outweighs the risk. Thus, the best is to vaccinate the individual child, and reliance on herd immunity should really 
only be reserved for those who cannot receive the vaccine or who experience vaccine failure. Protection through 
herd immunity is a lesser protection than through receiving the vaccine; however, some persons have no choice 
but to rely on herd immunity. Even though it would be faulty to think that it is better for the individual child to rely 
on herd immunity and forego vaccination so that harmful effects from vaccination can be avoided, I can accept for 
the sake of the argument that some people may reason in this way and thus intentionally refuse vaccination for 
their children. 
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the Extended Principle of Fairness of Garet Cullity to the idea of free riding. According to this 
principle, it is unfair if a person benefits from a scheme or arrangement without meeting the 
requirements of participation, under the following three conditions: (1) Participating in the 
scheme confers a net benefit to the person; (2) It is not true that practically everyone would be 
made worse off if contribution to the scheme would be obligatory for those who participate; (3) 
There is no plausible or legitimate moral objection to the scheme.   
  Van den Hoven applies this principle to vaccine refusal as follows. Vaccination confers a net 
benefit to the individual. (Condition 1). Requiring vaccination of everyone who benefits (with the 
exception of those who have medical contra-indications) does not lead to a situation where 
practically everyone is worse off; in fact, practically everyone is better off if they have to comply 
with vaccination. Thus, Van den Hoven argues: “Demanding the contribution of all to achieve 
collective protection is a fair requirement: not practically everyone would be made worse off by 
the requirements of the practice of vaccination.” (Condition 2). There is no legitimate moral 
objection to the practice of vaccination, since credible evidence shows that vaccinations are safe 
and in the best interests of those who receive vaccination. (Condition 3). Thus, refusing to 
participate in vaccination programmes while benefiting from them through herd immunity is an 
instance of free riding. The question is not whether a refuser wishes to benefit from herd 
immunity; the fact that they do benefit makes it free riding. 4  
                                                          
4 I think van den Hoven’s argument that those with religious objections cannot raise legitimate moral objections to 
the vaccination scheme can be disputed by some persons. Van den Hoven writes: “Thirdly, could they raise a 
legitimate moral objection? It is difficult to see what the objection would consist of, unless they view vaccines as 
poisonous or satanic. Thus, condition three also holds.” She does not address what would happen if a religious 
objector viewed vaccines as “poisonous” or “satanic”. It seems to be implied that if someone were to claim that 
vaccines are “poisonous” or “satanic”, their objection may be legitimate, although this is not further discussed by 
van den Hoven. 
It is not clear in her article what would constitute a legitimate moral objection to van den Hoven. Perhaps a 
religious objection to vaccines could be similar to a Jehovah’s Witness objection to blood transfusion? Some may 
be tempted to argue that no ‘legitimate moral objection’ can be offered by the Jehovah’s Witness adherent to 
receiving a life-saving blood transfusion. After all, the blood-transfusion is quite beneficial to the individual. But the 
Jehovah’s Witness sees blood transfusion as morally objectionable for religious reasons – the blood transfusion 
would have negative consequences for the afterlife. This is widely recognized as a legitimate moral claim for 
refusal of blood transfusions; could a religious objection against vaccination not be similar? 
So, if moral objections raised by religious objectors cannot be dismissed, does the charge of free riding disappear? 
On first glance, it appears as if it may. If condition (3) of the Extended Principle of Fairness is not fulfilled, then 
presumably the charge of free riding disappears. Except, van den Hoven’s main argument is that those who benefit 
from a vaccination program without contributing to it is acting unfairly, no matter what the reason is that 
vaccination is refused. It is not the reason for refusal that makes refusal unfair; it is the fact that someone benefits 
without contributing. This still seems to apply for those who refuse vaccination, even if they have a moral 
objection to vaccination itself.  
Perhaps then the idea of a ‘legitimate moral objection’ in condition (3) should be reframed to say ‘a moral 
objection to which virtually everyone would agree’. This would mean that if virtually everyone would agree that a 
specific scheme is morally wrong because it tortures innocents (for example), refusal to participate in the scheme 
would not amount to free riding. 
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  The conclusion van den Hoven comes to is that any instance of vaccine refusal (except those 
where medical contra-indications to vaccination exists) qualifies as an instance of free riding, and 
is unfair. The unfairness of free riding does not depend on the nature of the objection to 
vaccination or on the intention of the free rider. The fact that someone benefits from the 
vaccination program without contributing their fair share is what makes it an instance of free 
riding, and what makes it unfair. This even applies to those with religious objections to 
vaccination, van den Hoven argues. Those who refuse vaccination because of a religious objection 
such as “God doesn’t want us to master our health” still fulfill the three conditions of the 
Extended Fairness principle. They receive a net benefit from the vaccination program, whether 
they embrace the benefit or not. Their participation in a vaccination program would not leave 
“practically everyone worse off.” Moral objections against the scheme does not hold. If they 
claim that vaccines cause harm, this can be shown to be untrue. Van den Hoven concludes that 
even those with religious objections to vaccination could face the charge of free riding. They 
benefit from a public good (protection against infection) without contributing to the public good 
(accepting vaccination) in a way that satisfies the Extended Principle of Fairness. 
  The implications of the argument thus far are quite far reaching: every instance of non-medical 
vaccine refusal, no matter what the reason for vaccine refusal is, is unfair. It is the duty of 
everyone to contribute to the wellbeing of the collective by doing their bit and receiving 
vaccination. Not receiving vaccination while enjoying the protection of herd immunity amounts 
to free riding a public good. The collective engages in a vaccination program, and thereby the 
public good of herd immunity is created. Those in the collective who cannot receive vaccination 
for medical reasons or in whom the vaccine fails, receive protection against infection through 
herd immunity. It is unfair for those who are eligible to receive vaccination to refuse vaccination 
while benefiting from herd immunity, because they free ride a public good without contributing 
their fair share.  
  One can recognize in the argument themes consistent with communitarian thinking; the 
argument in this article is in fact based in a communitarian perspective. It appeals to 
communitarian ideas and uses communitarian language. The collective has a duty to the 
individual, namely protecting those who are vulnerable against infection through herd immunity. 
The individual has a duty towards the collective, namely to participate in the vaccination program 
and contribute to herd immunity (unless a contra-indication to vaccination exists). Herd 
immunity is a public good, created by the actions of individuals within the collective, leading to 
the benefit of the collective overall.5 Those who do not contribute to herd immunity while 
benefiting from herd immunity takes advantage of the protective actions of the collective while 
not doing their part in protecting the collective. This is unfair, and in communitarian thought, 
                                                          
5 I have argued that measles vaccination can be seen as a public good under communitarian thought, and that all 
should have access to the protection that measles vaccination offers – through individual vaccination if eligible, or 
through herd immunity/measles elimination if not eligible for vaccination. However, while considering van den 
Hoven’s argument, I will stay with her argument that herd immunity is a public good rather than measles 
vaccination/vaccination programs as a whole. 
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unjust. If the argument thus far is correct, any instance of non-medical vaccine refusal is 
considered to be unjust according to communitarian theories of justice. This is a rather strong 
claim, and would mean that vaccine refusal should not be tolerated as it is unjust. 
  Van den Hoven realizes how far reaching this conclusion is, and moderates her conclusion by 
appealing to three reasons why vaccine refusals can be tolerated. The first reason is that it is not 
reasonable to force someone to pay costs to contribute to a public good if it would not add 
anything to the public good. If herd immunity exists, and the case of vaccine refusal does not 
threaten herd immunity, forcing the refuser to vaccinate does not add anything to the public 
good. Thus, the argument goes that even though it is unfair for people to free ride the public 
good, it is not reasonable to force people to vaccinate if doing so does not add any additional 
benefit. The second reason is that it seems as if public trust is an important component in 
vaccination uptake. It is frequently seen that some countries have high vaccination rates, yet 
does not have mandatory vaccination. In these countries, such as the UK and the Netherlands, 
public controversies regarding vaccine safety decreased public trust in vaccinations, which led to 
a decrease in vaccination rates. This decrease in trust in vaccinations can affect herd immunity, 
as was seen in the UK with measles. So, van den Hoven argues, we shouldn’t accuse people of 
free riding as it is not necessarily helpful. Even though vaccine refusals are unfair, labeling it too 
forcefully as such when trust in vaccinations is absent can make parents feel they have to choose 
between their own child’s wellbeing and public duty. Instead, the strategy should focus on 
establishing trust in vaccinations. The third reason is that the reasons offered by vaccine refusers 
for their refusal should be considered seriously. The motives for refusing vaccination should be 
seriously engaged with. Labeling people as free riders can have negative consequences that can 
decrease vaccine uptake, such as alienating parents and polarizing the debate. Instead, parents 
should be engaged, their motives discussed, and a strategy of reassurance and persuasion should 
be followed. 
Summary – article 1 (van den Hoven 2012) 
  Van den Hoven’s argument can be summarized as follows. Collective vaccination establishes a 
public good. This good protects the health of the entire collective, especially those individuals 
who cannot receive vaccination for themselves. Except where a medical exemption to 
vaccination applies, those who benefit from the public good without contributing their share are 
acting unjustly. No matter what the reason is for vaccine refusal, vaccine refusal can rightly be 
seen as a particular instance of injustice named free riding. It may seem that this conclusion 
constitutes a basis for an argument for mandatory vaccinations, but there are reasons why 
vaccine refusals can be tolerated to a certain extent. Firstly, if herd immunity already exists, 
mandating vaccination will add nothing to the public good. Secondly, trust in vaccinations are an 
important aspect of vaccine uptake, and a focus should be on establishing and nurturing such 
trust. Thirdly, accusing parents of free riding while they have doubts about vaccinations may lead 
to unwanted complications such as polarizing the debate, eroding trust and so forth. 
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  Van den Hoven argues from communitarian principles, and reaches the conclusion that any 
instance of non-medical vaccine refusal can be deemed unfair. This is in keeping with 
communitarian thought: the individual has a duty to act in the best interests of society. Yet, there 
are good reasons to make room for vaccine refusals, even if this does not follow directly from the 
communitarian theory itself. Some of these reasons are moral, some are more pragmatic. But it 
does lead to the endorsement of the idea that vaccine refusals can be tolerated in communitarian 
thought, as long as it doesn’t threaten the health of the collective. 
Article 2 – Balancing Individual Freedoms and Collective Responsibilities (Wood-
Harper 2005) 
  In this article, Wood-Harper examines the tension between individual liberty rights and the 
demands of justice with regards to MMR. She starts off with the assumption that parents can 
make medical decisions on behalf of their children in their children’s best interest. This right to 
direct the healthcare of one’s child is a fundamental right, but is not absolute. There are times 
when this right can be overridden by other considerations. Wood-Harper cites an example of a 
Roman Catholic family where parents did not want conjoined twins to be separated, yet surgical 
separation would save one of the twins’ life. In situations like this, the wishes of the parents can 
be overridden. Now Wood-Harper asks: is measles vaccination an instance of medical treatment 
where parental refusals can be overridden, or should such refusals be respected on the basis of 
individual freedom? 
  The argument then proceeds to consider principles of communitarian justice. Measles 
vaccination is different than other healthcare decisions, because other people are also affected 
by the decision made. Measles vaccination influences not only the health of the individual, but 
also the “present and future health of the wider community.” Wood-Harper argues that 
members of a community have responsibilities to ensure the health of the community (present 
and future). This means that the moral acceptability of individual vaccine decisions that threaten 
the health of the community can be questioned. Furthermore, individuals who have benefited 
from health interventions (such as vaccine programmes) owe a debt to society to contribute to 
the general health of society. An example would be nontherapeutic medical research on children. 
The individual child is unlikely to benefit, but the medical knowledge gained may be beneficial to 
society as a whole. Because individuals have benefited from such knowledge themselves, they 
have a duty to consent to being involved in such research due to the debt to society.  
  From these communitarian considerations, Wood-Harper argues that it is reasonable to expect 
of people to take on some individual risks so that the public good may be promoted. She quotes 
Leask and Chapman:  
  “Furthermore, immunization requires that a parent take a small but active risk with their child 
for the benefit of disease prevention in the community and for future generations who face a 
world free of such disease, as has been the case with smallpox. Some may see the risk that they 
are being asked to take as a risk that will bring little benefit to their child, with the arguments for 
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vaccination embracing communitarian rather than individualistic values” (Leask & Chapman 
1998, cited in Wood-Harper 2005, p. 48). 
  Thus, according to this communitarian justice view, individuals have a duty to contribute to the 
health of the community by accepting measles vaccination for themselves and their children. 
Wood-Harper states that the benefits to society from collective vaccination action is threatened 
by those who benefit from the vaccination program without contributing. She asks whether such 
free-riding should be tolerated.  
  In general, she says, free riding is tolerated if vaccination rates are high and the health of the 
general society are not threatened by them. But if vaccination rates fall and free riding 
compromises the public good, it should be viewed more seriously and perhaps requires some 
response. Possible responses would be to make sure free riders incur some consequences for 
their decision, such as treating vaccinated children differently from non-vaccinated children. This 
would mean that scarce healthcare resources would be allocated preferentially to vaccinated 
children. However, punishing the unvaccinated child for decisions made by the parents seems 
troublesome. Perhaps, she argues, if free riding is to be tolerated in a society a better response 
may be to expect parents to “redress the additional burden to the health system resulting from 
their decision.” Thus, parents would be penalized for non-vaccination, perhaps through higher 
taxes or financial measures. Another option is to not tolerate free riding at all, and deliberate 
about increased paternalism in vaccination decision, but this will “restrict individual freedom of 
choice.” 
  Wood-Harper acknowledges the tension between the principle of autonomy and the 
communitarian view of justice. As long as any risk from vaccination remains, she argues that it is 
difficult to see how parental refusals can rightly be overridden. 
  “As long as there exists any risk of side effects, however small, associated with a vaccine, it is 
extremely difficult to rationalize overriding parents’ right of refusal” (Wood-Harper 2005, p. 52) 
  “Because measles can be, but seldom is, fatal, it is arguable whether enforcing vaccination is 
ethically sound. The position could become more defensible only if vaccination uptake, by falling 
below a critical level, constitutes a serious threat to public health either in localized areas or on a 
national basis” (Wood-Harper 2005, p. 52). 
    As a solution to the tension between justice and autonomy, she recommends educational 
interventions that would enable parents to choose vaccination. Such educational persuasion 
should focus on informing decision-making while respecting the final decision. This would take 
seriously the demands to respond to vaccine refusal, while respecting individual liberty rights. 
  “Persuasive approaches that aim to encourage the public to comply with mass vaccination 
policies may be favoured over methods of enforcement” (Wood-Harper 2005, p. 53). 
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Summary – Article 2 (Wood-Harper 2005) 
    Wood-Harper examines the tension between autonomy and justice in cases of vaccine refusals. 
She defends a communitarian perspective of justice. She argues that individuals have a duty to 
contribute to the health of society, future and present, and therefore have the duty to accept 
measles vaccination for themselves and their children. Those who benefit from the vaccine 
program without accepting vaccination are free riders, and are acting unjustly. Arguing from 
justice, such free riders should face some form of penalty if the herd immunity is threatened. 
However, Wood-Harper takes individual rights seriously and eventually argues that autonomy 
trumps justice. Her commitment to liberty rights does not stem from her communitarian 
conception of justice; rather, she starts off with a commitment to individual liberty 
rights/autonomy as a foundational assumption, and then balances these rights against the 
requirements of justice. 
  In this argument, the liberty rights that form the foundational assumption are not derived from 
communitarian justice. Instead, they form a starting point prior to introducing considerations of 
justice. I have previously argued that communitarian justice faces the objection that it does not 
take individual liberty rights into account, and therefore is potentially vulnerable to communal 
tyranny. In Wood-Harper’s article we see one of the possible solutions to this problem at work. 
This solution is to incorporate respect for liberty rights along with the communitarian conception 
of justice. These rights are not derived from communitarian theories as such, and perhaps are an 
admission that communitarian theories ‘need help’ from the liberal theories. An appeal to 
individual liberty rights is perhaps an admission that some form of liberalism with its conception 
of the freely choosing self is unavoidable in discussions on justice. 
  Be that as it may, Wood-Harper’s article shows a possible way in which communitarian thinkers 
respond to vaccine refusals. Although vaccine refusal is unfair in communitarian thought, such 
refusals can be accommodated through appealing to respect for individual liberty rights. In 
Wood-Harper’s argument, it is specifically when herd immunity is threatened and the health of 
the society in general is at stake that the argument for invoking some form of penalty on refusers 
becomes more relevant. Interestingly, Wood-Harper’s eventual conclusion is that vaccinations 
should not be mandated even though refusals may be unfair, but rather that persuasive 
educational interventions should be employed to ensure adequate vaccine uptake. 
Communitarian justice and measles vaccination in children – two ethical action 
guides 
  I have argued that measles vaccination is a public good which should be encouraged by society. 
The just society vaccinates those who are eligible for vaccination, and protects those who are not 
eligible through collective action. Individuals have a duty to contribute to the good of the 
collective, and the collective has the duty to protect individuals. With measles vaccination, this 
means that a just society vaccinates against measles at least to the point of measles elimination. 
An individual child can justly expect to be protected against measles by society. At the same time, 
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individuals have a duty to contribute to this protection. Thus, according to communitarian justice, 
we find the following principle once again: 
(1b) A just society vaccinates every child against measles that is eligible for vaccination, at least 
to the point that sustains measles elimination from society. 
    I have examined two arguments from communitarian thinkers with regards to vaccine refusals. 
Both have argued that non-medical vaccine refusals are unjust, labelling such vaccine refusal as 
free riding. However, both have argued that such refusals may be tolerated. The first author 
argued that refusals can be tolerated if the health of the public is not threatened, and also that 
pragmatic considerations such as public trust should be considered. The second author argued 
that liberty rights should be respected, and that in view of these rights refusals can be tolerated 
even if unfair. When the health of the collective is threatened, arguments for penalties on 
refusers or not tolerating refusals become stronger. It is clear that there is scope for tolerating 
refusals within communitarian thought, by appeal to various other moral considerations. 
  I have argued that respect for individual choice should be incorporated in some fashion in 
communitarian thinking as an antidote to the problem of communal tyranny. In the case of 
medical decision-making for children, I have before established that young children cannot 
exercise free choice, but that parents make decisions for their children based on the best interest 
standard. Such parental authority should be respected. I have also argued that the parent-child 
bond is a morally significant relationship, and can be seen as a good thing. Communitarian justice 
seeks to promote the good, and the just society would therefore protect and promote the parent-
child relationship. 
Thus, we once again find a second principle: 
 (2b) Respect for liberty and the parent-child relationship regulates the just society’s response to 
vaccine refusal. 
  In a communitarian justice perspective, the focus falls on protecting the public good and thus 
the imperative to vaccinate those who can be vaccinated is quite strong. Vaccination is a public 
good, and children within a just society should have access to this good – either through 
individual vaccination or through herd immunity when a medical contra-indication to vaccination 
exists.  
  Once again, we see the emergence of the same two ethical principles: (1b) and (2b). Once again, 
(1b) is an absolute requirement in the just society, meaning that the just society vaccinates to 
the point of sustained measles elimination, with (2b) regulating the societal responses and 
policies in reaction to vaccine refusal. 
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(3.4) Recent theories of justice – capabilities theory and well-being theory 
 In their catalog of theories of justice, B&C identify four traditional theories of justice and two 
recent theories (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 252-261). The four traditional theories are the 
four theories I have considered in detail thus far: utilitarian, libertarian, egalitarian and 
communitarian. The two recent theories are capability theory and well-being theory. 
  Both of the recent theories are fairly recent arrivals on the philosophical landscape, and both 
have strong Rawlsian and Aristotelian influences (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 258-259). Both 
theories have a commitment to the idea of human flourishing, an Aristotelian idea. That is, a just 
society is one that is ordered in such a fashion that each member of society has access to those 
things required to function properly, or to flourish. Thus, flourishing (human functioning and well-
being) is seen as a good that has moral importance. The just society ensures that every member 
of society has access to this good. In this sense these theories are Aristotelian: it assumes a telos, 
a specific view of the good, and tasks a just society with the obligation to ensure the furthering 
of this good. The social, political and economic institutions of society should be so ordered and 
arranged that everyone has access to those things needed for human flourishing. If some 
members of society or some groups within society do not flourish, justice requires an 
examination of the various institutions within society to see whether these institutions are set 
up in accordance with the demands of justice. 
  The two theories differ as to how we should evaluate human functioning, and thus what the 
focus of justice should be in ensuring human functioning; the capability approach focuses on 
capacities for functioning, while the well-being approach has actual well-being as focus.  
  The capability approach to justice was initially developed by Sen (1985), and subsequently 
further developed by Nussbaum (2001; 2011). The capability approach places the focus of justice 
on securing the development of human capabilities or capacities that allows flourishing. Society 
should be such that every person in society has access to the means required to develop a set of 
basic capabilities, capacities of human functioning, each of which is necessary for a minimally 
decent level of human functioning. Capabilities in this sense refer to abilities that, if realized, 
allows flourishing. Nussbaum provides a list of 10 such essential capabilities (Nussbaum 2011, p. 
33-34): (1) life, (2) bodily health, (3) bodily integrity, (4) senses, imagination, thought, (5) 
emotions, (6) practical reason, (7) affiliation, (8) other species, (9) play, and (10) control over 
one’s environment. If any of these capacities are missing from an individual’s life, it diminishes 
proper functioning and affronts the individual’s dignity. Each of these capabilities are seen as 
essential to proper human functioning, and the just society should ensure access to these 
capabilities for each of its members. The just society is so ordered that all of its members are 
granted the opportunity to develop all of these capabilities at least to the minimal extent 
required for human flourishing.  
  The well-being theory of Powers and Faden (2006) does not focus on capacities that enable well-
being, but on well-being itself. Social justice requires that every member of society reaches a 
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sufficient level on each of 6 core dimensions of well-being. Rather than just thinking of 
capabilities that allow people to flourish, this theory states that justice requires that people 
should actually flourish. Thus, in this theory of justice, people should actualize well-being and not 
just have the capabilities to pursue well-being.  
  Thus, both theories maintain that justice requires of society to further human flourishing, and 
both theories argue for a specific conception of human flourishing. These are overtly Aristotelian 
themes, as I have already pointed out. However, there are Rawlsian components present in both 
theories as well. For example, both theories incorporate a liberal conception of self-
determination. The capability theory includes “practical reason” as one of its core capabilities 
that each person should have access to. This means being able to reason about the good, and 
form a conception of the good life, and form life plans to pursue the good (Nussbaum 2011). We 
also see other capabilities such as “control over one’s environment” (Nussbaum 2011) – the 
ability to be politically active and contribute to societal government and goals – that remind 
strongly of the liberal conception of rights. The well-being theory includes “self-determination” 
as one of its core dimensions of well-being (Powers & Faden 2006). Thus, an optimally functioning 
life can determine its own version of the good life and make life plans to pursue the good life. 
The optimally functioning person can engage in political activity, societal government, and 
decisions that affect the individual (Powers & Faden, p. 261). Apart from a commitment to the 
liberal foundation of Rawls’ egalitarianism, both theories also share a strong commitment 
towards ensuring protection for the least well-off in society, so that those who are least well-off 
are as well off as they can possibly be (Nussbaum 2011; Powers & Faden 2006). A just society is 
concerned with the wellbeing of the least well-off, and one of the jobs of justice is to be on guard 
against systematic patterns of discrimination and injustice that allows people to fall below 
acceptable standards of wellbeing (Powers & Faden 2006). These are ideas that seem inherently 
Rawlsian in nature, and reminds strongly of Rawls’ difference principle. 
  It seems therefore as if these two new theories of justice, well-being and capabilities, are quite 
similar. They both have strong Aristotelian components, and see justice as promoting a specific 
conception of human flourishing. But both theories are also committed to liberal conceptions of 
the choosing self, where proper human functioning includes the idea that individuals should 
reason and deliberate about the good life and choose life plans that help them reach the good. 
These theories therefore incorporate liberal conceptions of individual liberty and respect for 
basic rights within its conception of optimal human functioning. It can also be said that these 
theories draw on aspects of utilitarianism. Every person’s flourishing is important, and the just 
society cares about every member of society reaching levels of proper human functioning. The 
difference between the recent theories and utilitarianism are two-fold. Firstly, the recent 
theories are not concerned with a unitary conception of human happiness or welfare as is the 
case with utilitarianism. It is not simply a case of “the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number”. Rather, the conception of flourishing in the recent theories are much more nuanced 
and complex, and seem to be much more complete. Secondly, the recent theories do not seek to 
maximize well-being for the greatest possible number. Rather, the idea is to ensure a minimum 
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level of human flourishing for everyone. This means that everyone in society should have access 
to enough of the 10 capabilities, or should have a sufficient level of 6 dimensions of well-being. 
  It can be argued that these theories draw on the strengths of the traditional theories and seeks 
to combine them in a single theory of justice. It takes what is good from utilitarianism, liberal 
theories, and Aristotelian notions of flourishing and combines them. 
  These two recent theories are also remarkably similar, and in the discussion of measles 
vaccination and children will yield similar arguments and similar conclusions. It is therefore not 
necessary to focus in depth on both theories. Rather, I will focus on the well-being theory of 
Powers and Faden. The arguments I raise and the conclusions reached with regards to measles 
vaccination in children would hold for capability theory, and could readily be extrapolated to a 
capability account of justice. 
Well-being justice (The social justice theory of Powers and Faden) (Powers & 
Faden 2006) 
  In the well-being theory of justice, the focus falls on ensuring optimal human functioning, 
conceived of as well-being. In a just society the institutions and practices within society are so 
arranged and ordered that each member of society attains well-being. Well-being consists of six 
dimensions, and to achieve well-being an individual must reach a sufficient level on each of these 
six dimensions. Powers and Faden (P&F) introduce their theory as follows (Powers & Faden 2006, 
p. 15): 
  “Social justice is concerned with human well-being. In our view, well-being is best understood as 
involving plural, irreducible dimensions, each of which represents something of independent 
moral significance. Although an exhaustive, mutually exclusive list of discrete elements of well-
being is not our aim (and may not be possible), we build our account around six distinct 
dimensions of well-being, each of which merits separate attention within a theory of justice. These 
different dimensions offer different lenses through which the justice of political structures, social 
practices and institutions can be assessed. Without attention to each dimension, something of 
salience goes unnoticed.” 
  The six different dimensions of well-being are as follows: 
1) Health (p. 16) 
  In this respect and for the purposes of the well-being theory, health is to be understood as bodily 
health and mental health in the plain-language sense of the word. It refers to a body functioning 
properly, free from injury or disease, and a healthy mind, free from mental illness. 
2) Personal security (p. 18) 
    This dimension refers to the absence of the fear of harm and the psychological threats of harm, 
and the presence of a sense of safety. Some injustices do more than cause physical injury or 
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physical harm – they invade one’s sense of security and safety and cause psychological scars. 
Among these are things such as slavery, rape, abuse, and torture.  
3) Reasoning (p. 19) 
    The dimension of reasoning refers to all forms of cognitive and intellectual capacities necessary 
for “practical and theoretical reason” in the Aristotelian sense. Theoretical reasoning is the ability 
to think about and understand truths about the world. Practical reasoning refers to being able to 
consider possible versions of the good life and to make suitable plans to reach these. In order to 
engage in these forms of reasoning, various skills are required, such as memory, attention, the 
ability to learn, skilled motor function, and executive cognitive functions (decision making and 
goal setting). Whatever shapes cognitive development, learning and reasoning ability is therefore 
of significance to justice. 
4) Respect (p. 22) 
   Respect refers to considering others as beings who should be afforded equal moral 
consideration. Being treated with respect by others in society is an important component of well-
being. P&F also argue that there is a relationship between respect for others and self-respect, 
where self-respect is the ability to consider the self as an entity endowed with moral worth and 
deserving of equal moral treatment with other moral beings. A life not receiving respect and a 
life without self-respect falls short of the standard of well-being. Discrimination on the basis of 
gender, race, ethnicity or social class are examples of patterns of injustice that diminish well-
being by not affording the respect due to people. 
5) Attachment (p. 24) 
  Attachment refers to the forming of relationships and bonds with other members of society. It 
includes friendship, love, solidarity, and intimacy – some of the most central of human emotions 
and concerns. Such relational attachments are an important aspect of humanity, and is endowed 
with moral worth. P&F argue that the ability to form attachments is not only important because 
it facilitates respect for others, but also because they are morally relevant in themselves.  
  One important societal institution in this regard is family. P&F argue that there is evidence which 
suggests that the bonds formed between children and parents are related to the ability children 
have to later form bonds with others. Such bonds between parents and children are responsible 
for the transmission of social values from one generation to the next. Where the familial bonds 
between parents and children are compromised, children struggle to form other social 
attachments and this can in turn lead to a variety of behavioural and societal problems.  
6) Self-determination (p. 26) 
  The dimension of self-determination appeals to the liberal conception of liberty and political 
rights. That is, a just society has a set of political rights and liberties designed to protect 
individuals from arbitrary interference by the state or others, affording individuals the ability to 
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make decisions regarding their own best interests. P&F state such liberties and rights are 
recognized in “many moral and political systems”. Furthermore, P&F argue that a life where all 
the dimensions of well-being is present but self-determination is absent would be deficient in 
what is required to live a fully flourishing human life; a life that is self-determined is better than 
a life that is determined by others. They write: “Our defense of self-determination as an essential 
dimension of well-being thus rests on simple and we believe widely shared views about having 
some control over who we are and who we will become. It does not depend on some 
controversial metaphysical claims about the nature of the self or the sources of all value.” 
 
  When it comes to health policies or public health issues, it is often the case that multiple 
different dimensions of well-being are at stake rather than just the dimension of health. P&F use 
the issue of female genital mutilation as an example (p.17). Female genital mutilation affects 
health in that it causes bodily injury and harms normal sexual functioning. The dimension of 
health is therefore negatively impacted in the life of the individual. But female genital mutilation 
also impacts other dimensions of well-being: it affects personal security, and it affects self-
determination. Thus, a policy concerning female genital mutilation would rest on three different 
moral foundations, each represented by a different dimension of well-being.  P&F argue that it is 
often the case with public health policy of this kind that multiple dimensions are involved and 
should be considered in framing of policy. I shall come back to this point when discussing measles 
vaccination in children, as it is also the case with vaccination policy that more than one dimension 
of well-being is at stake.  
  The focus of justice, then, is to ensure that every person has enough of each of these six 
dimensions to ensure that their life is worth living. If an individual lacks in any of these six 
dimensions, their life falls below the standard for a decent life. These six dimensions can interact 
with each other, and it is often so that an injustice that focuses on one of the six dimensions can 
spill over to the other dimensions. For example, racism is an affront to the respect due to 
individuals. If such disrespect is institutionalized and pervasive in society, it would lead to 
decreased opportunities for the disrespected individuals. Decreased educational opportunities 
can lead to compromise in development of those faculties necessary for the dimension of 
reasoning. Decreased economic opportunities and unequal access to health care can lead to 
adverse effects on health. Decreased access to political liberty can hamper self-determination. 
Thus, in this instance disrespect can lead to insufficiency over multiple different dimensions of 
well-being. Furthermore, compromise over all these different dimensions of well-being leads to 
further discrimination. If the stigmatized group ends up being less advantaged, less educated and 
less politically free than other members of society, it can perpetuate and “confirm” unfair 
stereotypes, which will entrench disrespect of the stigmatized group even further. In this way, it 
forms a vicious cycle of injustice. For this reason, systematic patterns of disadvantage is of 
particular importance to justice. Justice requires society to be on guard against systematic 
disadvantage and social determinants that perpetuate such disadvantage. Justice requires of 
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society to recognize such patterns of disadvantage, and to adjust its social and political 
institutions and practices so that systematic disadvantage may be eliminated. P&F write (Powers 
& Faden 2006, p. 78): 
  “As we see it, the job of justice in its most pressing role demands a permanent vigilance and 
attention to social and economic determinants that compound and reinforce insufficiencies in a 
number of dimensions of well-being.”  
  And on page 79: 
  “The permanent background condition of the job of justice is, as Hume also reminds us, the 
enduring tensions of cooperative living in a world characterized by limited resources, limited 
imagination, and limited sympathy. In one historical context, it may be the monarchical state that 
poses the gravest threat. In another context, it may be the hierarchy of an official religion, the 
tyranny of the uneducated masses, or the unchecked power of concentrated capital. 
  The job of justice under any of these conditions often involves the re-medial task of ensuring that 
the basic social structure is one in which each person has a sufficient material, cultural, and 
political basis for the pursuit of his or her own life through the development of all the distinctly 
human dimensions of well-being that are the central focus of justice.” 
  Children have a particular place of importance in the well-being theory of justice. Children are 
in a phase of growth and development, still acquiring the abilities necessary for reasoning and 
attachment. If social determinants negatively impact a child’s health and development, it could 
lead to lifelong problems with reasoning, attachment and health. Thus, if children are exposed to 
injustices it has the potential to impact them for the rest of their lives. Disadvantage is locked in 
at an early age, affecting all future life prospects. Furthermore, children are completely 
dependent on others. They are therefore particularly vulnerable to injustices, which may then 
lead to lifelong disadvantage and injustice. P&F point to particular issues that are of importance 
in protecting children from injustice. Children should be protected against injustice, with 
particular focus on protecting their health, development of reasoning abilities and development 
of abilities to form attachments. They can develop these only if they are nurtured and protected 
in the appropriate way at the appropriate development stage (p. 39). So, during critical 
development periods, insults to health could lead to lifelong problems. For example, inadequate 
food or exposure to toxic materials in the womb or in the period after birth can lead to irreparable 
damage to a child’s health (p. 77). Similarly, serious infections or injuries early in life can 
compromise physical and cognitive development, hampering several dimensions of well-being 
over the course of future life. There is no doubt that measles infection should be counted as an 
infection that can have disastrous consequence for the future prospects of a child, and that a just 
society should seek to protect its children from measles infection wherever possible. 
Furthermore, the family environment influences the development of children (p. 77). Parents are 
responsible for the protection and nurturing of children, and as argued before, also play an 
important role in the ability of children to form attachments later in life. It would therefore seem 
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that it is important that family relationships be viewed as worthy of moral consideration and 
protection. A just society protects parent-child relationships, and encourages healthy families. 
A possible objection 
  To my mind, there is a possible objection to this kind of theory of justice. If one were to assume 
the theory as correct, justice requires of a society to be so ordered that every member of society 
has a sufficient amount of each dimension. Dimension 6 is self-determination, which can be 
thought of in the same terms as the liberal conception of liberty and political rights.  
  Now, the objection is thus. What if some people fall below the sufficient level in some of the 
dimensions purely through exercise of dimension 6, which is their free autonomous choices? I 
am not thinking here of persons who are coerced into unfortunate choices by things such as 
economic inequalities or by asymmetric power relations in society. Rather, let us imagine a just 
society according to the well-being theory, meaning that society is so structured that everyone 
in society achieves a sufficient amount on all the dimensions. Let us now further imagine that in 
this society, some members or groups make deliberate autonomous choices that eventually lead 
to decline in some of the dimensions of well-being. How should society respond?  
  The problem is a difficult one. For if we conclude that it is unjust that people are allowed to fall 
below the level of sufficiency in some dimensions, and therefore ask society to intervene to stop 
those free choices that led to decline in some of the dimensions, it would mean that society 
interferes with self-determination. This would let people fall below the level of sufficiency in 
dimension 6, by compromising their self-determination. So even if society interferes with the free 
choices of people to prevent them from falling below the level of sufficiency in other dimensions, 
a problem of injustice would remain: people would fall below the level of sufficiency in self-
determination. 
  In a sense, this is precisely the point of liberal views, and libertarianism in particular. Liberal 
views are strongly committed to a principle of liberty that is suspicious of paternalism. It is the 
thought that no-one can decide what is in my best interest, except I myself. Society and its 
institutions have no business in deciding on my behalf what is in my best interests. This is then 
the problem that the recent views will run into: how to balance personal liberty with societal 
promotion of a specific version of the good. If personal liberty (required by their theory of justice) 
clashes with the conception of the good life society should promote (required by their theory of 
justice), it is not clear how to balance these competing obligations of justice. It appears as if the 
attempt to combine Aristotelian notions of flourishing and teleology with liberal individualism is 
endowed with an inherent tension, the solution to which is not obvious. If one were to weigh 
personal liberty higher, it seems little different than just endorsing a liberal theory and dispensing 
with notions of human functioning. If one were to weigh promotion of the good and of human 
flourishing above personal liberty, it seems little different than a communitarian theory, where 
a specific view of the good life has been decided upon. 
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  I suspect that people with a strong commitment to a robust principle of personal liberty will balk 
at the recent theories (capability and well-being theories). For to my mind, the only way to 
harmonize the different dimensions of well-being with self-determination in a way that leaves 
room for existence for both, is to place caveats and conditions on self-determination. But such 
an approach would be hard to swallow for those who take personal liberty seriously. Of course, 
the principle of liberty does admit to exceptions. Liberty is rightly limited when free choices 
impact others. If individual choices harm others or limit the freedom of others, the principle of 
liberty rightly states that those individual choices can be interfered with. Any other intrusions to 
liberty (self-determination) should not be allowed. Which is the source of the tension within the 
well-being theory. 
  One can think of examples of such free choices that could cause individuals to fall below the 
level of sufficiency on other dimensions: refusal to work, refusal of educational and development 
opportunities, adoption of unhealthy eating habits, and adoption of high-risk pleasurable 
behaviours. For example, extreme sports place an individual at high risk of injury and can pose 
health problems. Should society interfere with the free choice to participate in extreme sports if 
it emerges that those who do so as a group fall generally below the health indicators society finds 
acceptable? Or, what of people who decide they want to eat unhealthy fast food every day 
because they like it and find no other life worth living. Should society mandate them to eat 
healthy meals instead, in order to prevent them from falling below the levels of sufficiency?  
  It is not clear how to resolve this tension, but it does present a problem to the well-being 
theorist. One solution would be to say that people’s free choices should simply be respected, and 
if there is no other source for their insufficiency in some dimensions than their own free will, 
justice is satisfied. Thus, there is no problem with justice in a society where some individuals do 
not flourish because of their own free will alone. Another solution could be to go the other way: 
to say that it is imperative that people flourish, and that free choices should be interfered with if 
it limits flourishing on some dimensions. I would argue that the first option is preferable, given 
the commitment of the well-being theory to individual liberty. The problem then would be to 
discern between actual free choices, and choices that appear free but are coerced through some 
unjust societal factors such as economic inequality or discrimination. 
Well-being justice and measles vaccination in children 
Measles vaccination and the well-being of children   
  Measles infection represents a threat to the health of children, and measles vaccination 
provides protection against threat. Thus, in order to protect the health of children, measles 
vaccination is important. Simply by considering the first dimension of well-being, health, we can 
see that an argument for vaccination of children can be made on the basis of well-being justice. 
  The argument can be strengthened considerably by also looking at the other dimensions of well-
being. In the well-being account of justice, children are afforded particular concern. Because 
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children are still developing the abilities needed to ensure well-being later in life, insults to health 
and well-being during childhood can lock in disadvantage at an early age, and cause individuals 
to fall below the standard of well-being later in life. For example, an injury or illness that affects 
physical development can lead to ill health later in life, or an illness that affects cognitive 
development can affect reasoning ability later in life. A just society therefore protects the health 
and development of its children insofar as possible. Measles can cause havoc on the health and 
development of a child. If a child gets measles, a 30% chance of complications exist. These 
complications can include pneumonia, brain infections, eye infections, blindness, hearing loss 
and so forth. Many of these can interfere with normal development, cause disability and interfere 
with normal functioning later in life. In the worst case scenario, measles can lead to death in 1-2 
out of a thousand cases. All of these complications and deaths can be avoided through adequate 
levels of vaccination against measles: those who are eligible can receive direct protection through 
vaccination, and those who are not eligible for vaccination can receive protection through 
measles elimination from society. As said before, usually the portion of society that is ineligible 
for direct vaccine protection is about than 5%, so that adequate levels of vaccination to protect 
the vulnerable is possible (92-95% coverage with two measles vaccines is required). 
  P&F make an interesting point regarding what is possible and what is not possible in society 
(Powers & Faden 2006, p. 60-61). In the early days of the AIDS epidemic, when AIDS was poorly 
understood and no effective treatment existed, the high death rate from AIDS was simply a 
tragedy. However, with recent advances in both the understanding and treatment of AIDS, 
similarly high death rates would not just be tragic, but would also be unjust. Since society has the 
tools to prevent these deaths, justice requires of society to respond to the AIDS epidemic that 
threatens the well-being of members of society. Differential death rates are context-specific as 
to whether they should be considered injustices or not. So, when no treatment for AIDS exists, 
and when society does not understand what AIDS is, a proportionately higher death rate among 
people with AIDS is not unjust. But when it is possible to treat AIDS effectively, disproportionate 
death rates among people with AIDS become unjust. The same can be said for measles. In the 
pre-vaccination age, the burden of disease caused by measles was astronomical. Many children 
became ill, many suffered complications, many were hospitalized, many were left disabled, and 
some died. Before an effective preventative measure existed, these complications and deaths 
were tragic, but were not unjust. However, since the advent of the vaccine age, it is possible to 
eliminate the effects of measles infection from society. No society need to have measles infection 
present, provided that they vaccinate children to sufficient levels. Added to this, the risk of harm 
from measles vaccination is sufficiently low that it can be considered negligible when compared 
to the tremendous benefits conferred by sufficient levels of measles vaccination. It would 
therefore follow that complications from measles infection can now be considered unjust. It is 
possible for society to eradicate all measles complications; those who suffer measles 
complications suffer an injustice. 
  Well-being justice would therefore require of society to protect its children against measles. At 
a minimum, this would mean vaccinating against measles to the point of elimination. As I have 
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argued before, being vaccinated is preferable than having to rely on herd-immunity/measles 
elimination. Because measles infections can be imported and spread through chains of 
susceptible contacts in society, as we have seen in highly vaccinated countries such as the US, 
Canada and the Netherlands, it is preferable that every child that is eligible should receive 
measles vaccination. Those who are ineligible should be afforded every protection that society 
can give, and this means eliminating measles from society.  
Respect for liberty and for the parent-child bond 
  Well-being justice also recognizes self-determination as a domain of well-being. In bioethics 
terms, this can be thought of as akin to respect for autonomy: respecting the free choices of 
autonomous individuals. In the case of children, this means that parents decide on behalf of their 
children according the best interest standard. Given the facts regarding measles vaccination, it 
seems reasonable to accept that most parents would freely choose vaccination for their children 
if they were fully informed of the benefits and risks of vaccination. Some however may not, and 
this brings us once again to the problem of vaccine refusal. 
  Another consideration in this regard is the focus of well-being theory on protecting the 
development of children. P&F have argued that the parent-child bond should be protected, 
because a healthy parent-child bond is important in protecting the development of the child 
(Powers & Faden 2006, p. 24, 77). This is similar to the argument I made in the previous chapter, 
regarding the varied interests of children. Children have interests that stretch beyond their 
physical health or other immediate interests (Elliot 2001). Children have interests vested in their 
familial relationships. Well-being justice incorporate these interests into its account of justice and 
consider the child’s familial relationships an issue of justice. Thus, any interference with the 
parent-child bond that affects the relationship adversely is an injustice. This places a limit on the 
societal response to vaccine refusal. For example, if the State vigorously enforces vaccination by 
placing parents who refuse vaccination in jail, the parent-child relationship is severely damaged 
by the removal of the parent. This directly harms the interests of the child, and the well-being of 
the child. The State in this instance would be committing an injustice in its response to another 
injustice. The societal response to vaccine refusal is therefore a complex issue, for in responding 
to vaccine refusal, care must be taken to protect the other interests of the child.  
  According to well-being justice, free choices should be respected and the parent-child bond 
should be protected. This means that autonomous decisions with regards to healthcare should 
be respected, and that familial decisions in this regard should also be respected. Of course, if the 
familial decision is not in the best interests of the child, it may behoove society to intervene; care 
should be taken not to harm the interests of the child in so doing. 
Well-being justice and measles vaccination in children - two ethical action guides 
  The arguments and conclusions presented regarding well-being justice and measles vaccination 
can be summarized by the same two action guides (1b) and (2b): 
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(1b) A just society vaccinates every child against measles that is eligible for vaccination, at least 
to the point that sustains measles elimination from society. 
(2b) Respect for liberty and the parent-child relationship regulates the just society’s response to 
vaccine refusal. 
  According to the well-being theory of justice, we see the same two principles as we have seen 
with the other conceptions of justice. Namely, that a just society vaccinates at least to the point 
of measles elimination, and preferably every child that is eligible for vaccination. Secondly, that 
respect for liberty and the parent-child bond places limits on the type of societal response to 
vaccine refusal.  
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(4) Justice and measles vaccination in children: Two ethical 
principles/action guides 
  I have considered various different influential theories of justice, and have shown how each of 
them leads us to adopt two specified principles or ethical action guides with regards to measles 
vaccination in children. These two principles are: 
(1b) A just society vaccinates every child against measles that is eligible for vaccination, at least 
to the point that sustains measles elimination from society. 
(2b) Respect for liberty and the parent-child relationship regulates the just society’s response to 
vaccine refusal. 
  It does not matter which of these theories of justice one turns to; the ethical implications are 
similar. No matter which of these different influential theories of justice an individual or society 
adheres to, the obligations of the just society with regards to measles vaccination are the same.  
  A just society vaccinates its children against measles in a way that sustains measles elimination. 
This means that vaccine refusal is taken seriously and demands a response. Just societies respect 
freedom and the parent-child bond, and the societal response to vaccine refusal is therefore in 
keeping with these values. Approaches that maximize vaccine uptake while respecting the 
parent-child bond are favored. 
  I would consequently argue that a society that does not vaccinate to the point of measles 
elimination is simply unjust, whatever theory of justice is appealed to. This places obligations on 
members of society, and society’s institutions such as government. In the next and final chapter, 
I shall examine the implications of the ethical action guides for parents, healthcare workers, and 
the state. 
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Chapter 7: Applying the ethical action guides 
(1) Bringing the four principles into balance: reaching reflective 
equilibrium 
  In chapter 5 I showed how two ethical action guides can be derived by applying the principles 
of beneficence, non-maleficence and autonomy to the individual case of measles vaccination. 
These two action guides represent specified principles in accordance with the principlist 
framework, and can be used to derive obligations and direct action as far as the individual case 
of measles vaccination is concerned. These two action guides are: 
  (1a) Morality requires vaccination against measles for all children who are eligible for 
vaccination. 
  (2a)  Respect for the parent-child relationship regulates the response to measles vaccine refusal, 
type of policy preferred and places limits on the amount of coercion that can be justified. 
  In chapter 6 I demonstrated how two ethical action guides can be derived by considering 
measles vaccination in children from a justice framework. I showed how the two ethical action 
guides follow from various different theories of justice, meaning that the two ethical action 
guides are valid and binding no matter which theory of justice one finds persuasive. These action 
guides can be used to derive the obligations of the just society and to guide the societal response 
to parental vaccine refusals. Furthermore, they represent specified principles in the principlist 
framework, being the product of a process of further specification of the principle of justice with 
regards to measles vaccination in children. These two action guides are: 
  (1b) A just society vaccinates every child against measles that is eligible for vaccination, at least 
to the point that sustains measles elimination from society. 
  (2b) Respect for liberty and the parent-child relationship regulates the just society’s response 
to vaccine refusal. 
  It is not hard to see the similarity between these two sets of action guides. Their scope and focus 
are different, but their ethical content and wording is similar. The first set (1a and 2a) focuses on 
the individual case of vaccination, and sees vaccination from the perspective of the individual 
child. Thus, from the first set we can derive ethical obligations which pertains to the persons who 
stand in close relationships with the child, and who are tasked with securing the child’s best 
interests. The second set (1b and 2b) views vaccination from a societal perspective, and can be 
used to derive obligations that rest on individuals and societal institutions. Thus, the focus here 
is on measles vaccination as a societal enterprise, and not on what is best for the individual child. 
Yet, from these different perspectives we find very similar sounding action guides with similar 
moral content. In fact, these action guides can be merged with one another and stated as follows: 
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  (1) All children eligible for measles vaccination should be vaccinated against measles, at least to 
the point of sustained measles elimination. 
  (2) Respect for parental decision-making and the parent-child relationship guide the response 
to parental vaccine refusals.   
  Ethical action guides (1) and (2) bring autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice in 
balance with one another. Thus, (1) and (2) represent two specified principles or ethical action 
guides that bring the four principles into reflective equilibrium. They can be used to derive ethical 
obligations either in the individual case of measles vaccinations, where practitioners or parents 
are tasked with providing care to an infant, or to derive ethical obligations on a societal level. 
Such derived ethical obligations would be grounded in the four principles of the principlist 
approach, bringing the different prima facie obligations into balance, and can directly be applied 
to different potential actions in a given situation.  
  Principlism is not dependent on a specific ethical theory or theoretical approach, and in fact 
finds its grounding in moral commitments that are widely shared across the theoretical spectrum. 
Therefore, action guides (1) and (2) can be used whatever one’s theoretical commitments or 
ethical background. These action guides contain moral force for everyone who is committed to 
living a moral life, whether they are consequentialists, deontologists, religiously affiliated or not, 
or whatever theory of justice they subscribe to. In any situation where individuals are faced with 
moral questions regarding measles vaccination, or any society considering the issue of measles 
vaccination, can apply these two action guides in order to find morally defensible guidance with 
regards to individual action and societal policy. 
  The strengths of these action guides are numerous. They will enjoy wide appeal, delivering 
conclusions with moral force. They can be applied on a societal level and on an individual/care 
level. They bring the four principles and various different theories of justice into balance, leading 
to reflective equilibrium. 
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(2) Who has which obligation? 
(2.1) What is owed to children? 
  According to action guide (1), children are owed protection against measles infection through 
vaccination. This means that children who are eligible for measles vaccination should be 
protected through measles vaccination. Children who have a medical contra-indication for 
measles vaccination are also owed protection against measles vaccination. Such children cannot 
receive the benefit of direct vaccination, but can be protected through the collective action of 
others in society through measles elimination. This is the herd immunity point, where those who 
are not eligible derive protection through the immunity within the population. As I have shown 
previously, this requires an uptake of measles vaccination of 93-95% with two doses of measles 
vaccine.  
  For the individual child, the case is clear: children should receive measles vaccination unless a 
medical contra-indication exists. On a societal level, the case is also clear: children should be 
vaccinated, at least to the point that sustains measles elimination from society. If an individual 
child who is eligible for vaccination does not receive vaccination, that individual child is wronged 
in that she is deprived of something that is morally owed her. On a societal level, children who 
are not protected from measles vaccination through direct vaccination or measles elimination 
are wronged. This means that children who live in a just society can rightly expect to be 
vaccinated. Children who receive all that is morally due to them receive, among other things, 
protection against measles infection. 
  Action guide (2) reminds us that children have other interests besides protection against 
measles. Elliot (2001) and Powers and Faden (2006, p. 77) point out that children’s interests are 
narrowly intertwined with their parents’ interests, and that the parent-child bond is important. 
This morally significant relationship is integral to the future wellbeing of the child, and to many 
of the child’s present and future interests. Thus, actions meant to secure the protection against 
measles owed to children should not harm the parent-child bond, and should be respectful of 
the importance of this relationship. 
  Children are owed protection through vaccination, both from an individual and societal 
perspective: This places obligations on individuals who stand in caring relationships to children, 
such as parents and healthcare providers, as well as on societal institutions such as government. 
 
(2.2) What obligation rests on parents? 
  Parents play an important role in the lives of the child, and are primarily responsible for the 
child. They have the obligation to make decisions on behalf of their child, furthering the child’s 
best interests (Buchanan & Brock 1990). This task falls to whoever fulfills the role of parent for 
the child, whether it be biological parents, adoptive parents, foster parents or the like. For 
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simplicity sake I shall keep using the term “parent” for whomever stands in this critical relation 
to the child. 
  Parents have the obligation of seeing that their child is vaccinated against measles, if the child 
is eligible for vaccination. This means taking the child for vaccination to a healthcare provider 
where such vaccination can be administered. Parents, as members of society, also have the 
obligation to have their eligible children vaccinated in order to establish herd immunity and 
protect those in society who cannot be vaccinated. Parents have a civic duty to have their children 
vaccinated, an obligation they owe as members of society to other children in society who are 
dependent on herd immunity. 
Of course, this assumes that vaccination is readily available and affordable or free; this is an 
assumption that I took into the construction of the initial argument when considering the best 
interests of the individual child. Indeed, measles vaccination is readily available all over the world, 
and even in the third world is it possible to vaccinate a child against measles for less than $1, 
including injection equipment and operational costs (UNICEF 2007). It should go without saying 
that parents cannot be blamed if vaccination is not available or if it is simply unaffordable. 
  Most parents discharge the obligation to take their children to be vaccinated; this is borne out 
by the epidemiology and statistics I referenced in chapter 2. But it is so, as I have also previously 
shown, that there are many parents who do not take their children for vaccination, and that there 
exists a fairly active opposition to measles vaccination. Such parents fail to discharge their duty 
to their child, and wrong their child, and also fail to discharge the civic duty owed to other 
members of society, wronging those who are dependent on herd immunity. But it is often the 
case that such parents do not withhold vaccination through neglect or abuse. In fact, many 
parents who oppose vaccination are well-meaning parents who do so because of a mistaken 
belief that it is in the best interests of their child not to be vaccinated (Bean 2011).  Such parents 
need the assistance of other individuals who stand in morally significant relationships with the 
child (such as healthcare providers), and societal institutions (such as government). The challenge 
is to enable vaccination of children while not unjustifiably burdening the parent-child 
relationship. 
 
(2.3) What obligation rests on society (members of society and societal 
institutions)? 
  Society has the obligation to ensure that children are protected against measles through 
vaccination. This means that the members of society and societal institutions should ensure that 
vaccination takes place and respond when it doesn’t. A society that falls below the elimination 
threshold wrongs its children, and falls below the threshold of what is required of a just society. 
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Government/The state and its delegates 
  Government is an important institution in society, and has the obligation to respond to injustices 
within society. Children within a society are owed protection through adequate levels of 
vaccination: direct vaccination to those who are eligible, and herd immunity to those who are 
not. This means that government has the obligation to respond to anything that threatens 
vaccination uptake, or that wrongs children by withholding vaccination from them. 
  Government therefore ought to respond to barriers to vaccination. One such obligation is to 
ensure that measles vaccines are readily available and not cost prohibitive. If, for some reason, 
vaccines become too expensive and many parents cannot afford vaccination, it is the duty of 
government to respond and ensure that this barrier is removed. For example, in 2000-2003 there 
was an unexpected vaccine shortfall in the USA which included MMR and DTaP vaccines (The 
Lancet Infectious Diseases 2004). UNICEF warned of a shortfall of 70 million vaccine doses 
worldwide, which included vaccines against measles and tetanus (The Lancet Infectious Diseases 
2004). The reason for these shortfalls was decreased production as individual vaccines became 
less profitable. Whereas there were 30 companies making vaccines for the US in the 1970’s, this 
decreased to 5 companies in the early 2000’s (The Lancet Infectious Diseases 2004). In the face 
of such shortages, the US government provides financial investment towards securing adequate 
vaccination production (The Lancet Infectious Diseases 2004); this is an excellent example of how 
a government may respond towards a barrier against vaccination uptake. 
  Another such obligation is to respond to parental vaccine refusals. There are many ways in which 
government could respond: coercive measures, using its police power; addressing incorrect 
messaging and misinformation on vaccination; persuasive educational approaches directed at 
parents; access to health expertise through the health system and the like.  
  At minimum, the government needs to establish a policy towards measles vaccination which 
includes access to vaccination and response to vaccine refusals. This policy should be tailored 
towards sufficient vaccination uptake to ensure sustained measles elimination from society, 
while not harming the parent-child bond. 
Business/Corporate institutions 
  Companies manufacturing vaccines are an important societal institution in ensuring adequate 
vaccination uptake. One obvious obligation resting on such companies is that they cannot cut 
corners with quality or place an inferior product on the market. Measles vaccinations must meet 
the minimum standards set by those vaccine formulations which have been the subject of 
extensive research; producing inferior product which may not perform as the research would 
predict would fall foul of their societal responsibility. 
  Vaccinations should also not be cost prohibitive. Now, it may not be possible for companies on 
their own to realize this goal, and they may need the help of government (as I argued before) to 
discharge this obligation. But at the very least, drug companies have the obligation to not raise 
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prices to an unreasonable level. This would mean striking a balance between the making of profit 
and keeping measles vaccines affordable and accessible. This is a delicate balance; on the one 
hand profit margins need to be large enough to keep companies incentivised and interested in 
making vaccines, while on the other measles vaccination needs to be of a certain quality and 
needs to be reasonably available. This means that, when it comes to measles vaccination, profit 
is not the only consideration. Minimum quality standards and reasonable availability and 
affordability are also important considerations. 
  This may at first glance seem difficult to do. Vaccines account for only 1.5% of a drug company’s 
profit, and the process to test and produce a vaccine is extremely onerous and costly (The Lancet 
Infectious Diseases 2004; Salinsky & Werble 2006). However, it is possible to ensure adequate 
vaccine availability through the working together of government and the corporate sector, for 
example through government investment, government incentives, regulated insurance vaccine 
payment schemes and so forth (The Lancet Infectious Diseases 2004; Salinsky & Werble 2006). 
Such obligations fall on governments no matter which conception of justice of the theories I 
reviewed one appeals to; I have shown (in chapter 6) that even in a libertarian conception of a 
minimal government, these obligations fall on the government as an important societal 
institution tasked with safe-guarding the liberty of its members and protecting members from 
harm by others in society. 
  I will not go into further details on specific actions in this regard, but will underline the ethical 
obligations. The corporate sector, as a societal institution, has obligations towards society. With 
regards to measles vaccination, corporations have to adhere to minimum standards of 
production, and have the obligation to ensure that they place no barriers to measles vaccination. 
It may be difficult for corporate institutions to discharge this obligations on their own, and it 
would likely be necessary for them to work with government along a number of policy lines to 
discharge their shared obligations to ensure adequate societal measles vaccination uptake. 
  According to action guide (1), a society that falls below the elimination-vaccination threshold, 
children are wronged and the society cannot be considered a just society. If it is purely because 
of the actions of the corporate institutions in this society that the vaccination threshold is not 
reached, for example through excessive pricing or inferior quality of product, such institutions 
are responsible for injustice in society, and are themselves unjust. It is then the responsibility of 
the society to respond to these barriers to vaccination by addressing the injustices present within 
the corporate institutions. One way in which such injustice could be addressed is through the use 
of governmental power. To reiterate, it is unlikely that any corporate institution could be 
considered to carry sole responsibility to ensure adequate vaccine uptake; rather, corporate 
institutions would ideally partner with other societal institutions such as government to ensure 
that society’s moral obligations to ensure adequate vaccination are discharged. But corporations 
certainly have the obligation to ensure that they place no barriers to vaccination, and if they do 
a societal response is required. 




  Providers who stand in clinical relationships towards children have an important role to play in 
ensuring measles vaccination uptake. Such providers should offer and encourage vaccination, 
and initiate discussions on vaccination with parents. Providers are also a resource to parents, 
providing education and information regarding measles vaccine, answering questions and 
addressing concerns. 
  Trust is an important factor in parental decision-making with regards to vaccination. Parents are 
more likely to value vaccine information received from sources and people they trust (Bean 
2011). Lack of trust in official organizations or those perceived to have an agenda is an important 
factor in vaccine refusal, as is dissatisfaction with vaccine information provided through health 
resources (Brown et al. 2010). On the other hand, there is evidence that a trusting relationship 
with a healthcare provider can assist a parent in resisting anti-vaccine messaging and 
misinformation (Leask et al. 2006). An important factor that protects parents against anti-
vaccination misinformation is trust in a healthcare provider. Those who trust their healthcare 
provider and who have had positive experiences with a provider explaining vaccination 
information seem relatively protected against vaccine misinformation. Healthcare providers have 
obligations to foster trusting relationships with parents of the children they provide care for, and 
to deliver positive vaccine messaging and information against the background of this trusting 
relationship. Such an approach fulfills the requirements of both action guides (1) and (2). 
  This implies the need for ongoing provider self-education in the area of measles vaccination, 
making sure that the provider knows the relevant facts, or at least where to find them. 
Furthermore, the provider cannot end the clinical relationship because a parent refuses 
vaccination. Such a course of action would be nothing short of disastrous. A trusted provider is 
an important cog in the wheel of vaccination uptake, and ending a clinical relationship purely 
because of non-vaccination robs the child of medical care, potentially erodes parental trust in 
the system further, and removes an important avenue through which positive vaccine messaging 
can be communicated. 
  Providers are the in the front lines of care delivery, and have obligations towards the individual 
children they care for and society as a whole to ensure adequate vaccination uptake through the 
building of trusting relationships and the provision of education.   
Members of society/Institutions of society 
  Societies have the obligation of ensuring the vaccination of its eligible children. Individual 
members of society and institutions of society (such as churches, clubs, organizations and so 
forth) share in this obligation. At minimum, this obligation includes not creating barriers to 
measles vaccination or not obstructing measles vaccination. Any action by an individual or 
institution that hinders the vaccination of children is therefore unethical. One example to be 
thought of here is the number of celebrities and internet users who instruct parents not to have 
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their children vaccinated, stridently advocating non-vaccination as the only responsible parental 
choice (Kata 2010; Kata 2012).  
  Perhaps one should differentiate between honest questioning, where someone may have 
serious doubts about vaccination and raises these in a public forum, and directly advising parents 
not to have children vaccinated. The latter can even be construed medical advice, and it is 
alarming that such advice is given by those who are not medically qualified. Persons and 
institutions who engage in such actions, whether they are well-meaning or not, violate their duty 
to society of not placing barriers to the vaccination of children. Furthermore, such actions foster 
mistrust and suspicion against healthcare providers and authorities. Indeed, one of the recurring 
themes in the vaccine opposition movement is the idea of a grand conspiracy and the implied 
untrustworthiness of the healthcare system and the government (Bean 2011; Kata 2010; Kata 
2012). In the long run, if parents lose trust in their providers and the healthcare system, it may 
lead to reluctance in accessing such services and eventually compromise the best interests of the 
child. 
  If barriers to vaccination exist, society has an obligation to respond. Because of respect for 
liberty, the free speech of individuals cannot be unduly burdened. However, there are a myriad 
of ways in which society can respond to barriers of the kind I have mentioned. This could include 
countering erroneous messaging by correct messaging, engaging those who place barriers in 
various ways, maintaining trusting relationships with parents, encouraging vaccination through 
public policy and so forth. Such duties fall in varying ways to the government, healthcare 
providers, and other members/institutions within society. In essence, ensuring sufficient vaccine 
uptake is a societal endeavour, and requires the co-operation of various levels of society. The 
goal is to empower parents to choose vaccination, in order that parents can discharge the duty 
they owe to their children and to society. 
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(3) Suggestions for measles vaccination policy  
  I have argued that government should institute a measles vaccination policy that would 
encourage maximal uptake of measles vaccination in children, while not harming the parent-child 
bond. In what follows, I offer some suggestions as to what such a policy would look like. The focus 
here is on encouraging vaccine uptake among the public, and specifically responding to vaccine 
refusal. 
  In suggesting policy options in response to vaccine refusal and to encourage vaccination uptake, 
two options are usually presented: the use of government power, and persuasive/educational 
interventions (Diekema 2005; Diekema & Marcuse 2007; Krantz, Sachs, & Nilstun 2004; Sheather 
2013; Wood-Harper 2005). 
  Coercive policies, by which I mean the use of State power to force vaccination, has a long history 
as a tool to ensure vaccine uptake. In the battle against small pox, Britain had a mandatory 
vaccination policy from 1871 that subjected refusers to fines, loss of property, or a sentence to 
the workhouse (Allen 2007, p. 64-111). Eventually, in the face of organized resistance, Britain 
ended mandatory vaccination in 1948 (Allen 2007, p. 64-111). The United States also 
implemented forced vaccination policies in the early 1900’s in response to vaccine refusal (Allen 
2007, p. 64-111). In 1905 the Jacobson v. Massachusetts case set legal precedent, and formed 
the basis for compulsory vaccination State laws in the US (Omer et al. 2009). Currently, in the US, 
all States have laws mandating vaccination for school entry, with 48 states allowing some non-
medical exemptions to vaccination requirements (Omer et al. 2009). 
  Educational interventions are frequently recommended as a response to vaccine refusal (Kata 
2010). Some have suggested that parents can be “vaccinated” against misinformation and 
erroneous arguments through promoting correct vaccine information (Kata 2010).  
  These approaches are not necessarily either-or, and coercive policies and educational policies 
can be combined. Consider a recent article, where the author examines forced vaccination and 
educational interventions by the use of a hypothetical Ebola outbreak in the United States (Brown 
2014). The author asks us to imagine an outbreak of Ebola in the US and the availability of a 
vaccine that is 80% effective and recommended for children. Would we allow people to refuse 
vaccination in such a scenario? If we would not, we should perhaps reconsider exemptions to 
vaccine mandates for disease like measles, where the disease is serious and the vaccine highly 
effective. The author furthermore argues that we should use the Ebola outbreak as a means to 
educate people regarding other contagious disease for which effective vaccinations do exist, and 
suggests using avenues such as media and pop culture to disseminate such educational 
messages. Thus, in this article we see an argument for using a combination of government 
coercion with various innovative and diverse educational interventions. 
  These responses, coercion and education, have a common-sense appearance about them. In 
accordance with action guide (1), it is imperative to engage vaccine-refusers in order to ensure 
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that their children benefit from vaccination and that society benefits from high vaccination 
uptake. However, it is not as straightforward as it seems. Policy should be guided by action guide 
(1), meaning that respect for parental liberty and the parent-child bond are important 
considerations. This means, for example, that persuasive approaches should be favored where 
possible, and that there are limits to the types of coercion government can engage in. In what 
follows, I will show that coercion can present serious difficulties and education has some 
limitations. These two approaches certainly have their place, but vaccination policy needs to go 
further in its response to vaccine refusal.  Specifically, given the limitations of coercive and 
educational responses, a further step is needed. I shall argue that this amounts to rebuilding of 
trust; that an important focus of policy should be building of trusting relationships between 
parents and healthcare providers, using this as the basis for a multi-faceted approach towards 
vaccine refusal. I propose here a three-pronged approach that optimally satisfies the 
requirements of action guides (1) and (2): using government power within its limitations, using 
educational interventions that are well researched, and fostering trusting relationships between 
providers and parents. 
The limits of coercion 
  Coercion is limited by action guide (2). Government actions that place an undue burden on the 
parent-child bond violate action guide (2) and are unethical. Consider an extreme example of 
imprisoning parents for not getting their child vaccinated. It is clear that an undue burden is 
placed on the parent-child bond.   
 There are different types of mandatory vaccination policies, aimed at increasing vaccination 
uptake through use of state power (Ross & Aspinwall 1997). 
A) Force all parents to vaccinate their children or face legal consequences.  
B) Vaccinate children at school without the consent of the parents, or allow vaccine refusal 
only for home-schooled children or private schools.  
C) Mandatory vaccination of children with the option to opt-out (the current situation in 
many States in the United States).  
 
  Option (A) seems problematic as it would introduce substantial costs to families and 
consequently society (Ross & Aspinwall 1997).  Prosecution would fall on parents that fail to 
vaccinate their children, incurring harm to these parents, consequently harming the family, and 
eventually harming the child. Thus, in an attempt to protect the best interests of the child, the 
child ends up being harmed. Since families are the building blocks of society, harming families in 
this way would also harm society. 
  Yet, this approach can perhaps be justified when the costs to individual children and to society 
are very high should vaccination be refused. Consider Brown’s thought experiment of a 
hypothetical Ebola epidemic in the United States (Brown 2014). Ebola is a contagious illness, 
difficult to treat and with high mortality rates. If it were so that Ebola were endemic in the United 
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States, and it were so that there was a safe and effective vaccine, it could be argued that 
mandated vaccination would be reasonable despite the costs of government power. This was the 
background of the famous 1905 US case, Jacobson vs Massachusetts: the United States faced a 
small pox epidemic, and a vaccine was available (Ross & Aspinwall 1997). The Supreme Court 
decided that the state has the authority to mandate vaccination in these circumstances to protect 
public health (Ross & Aspinwall 1997). Brown (2014) argues that endemic Ebola would be a 
similar situation. According to this line of thinking, government should have the power to 
intervene through various coercive ways to protect the public against a public health disaster.  
  Justifying the use of such power is less clear if the risk from the disease is very low, say for 
example an illness is not really that serious or is not endemic in society, or if the protecting 
vaccine has substantial harms associated with it. Punishing parents who fail to vaccinate in the 
absence of a public health emergency (such as a large disease outbreak) seems to incur unduly 
high levels of harm for minimal benefit (Ross & Aspinwall 1997). Policy option (A) can therefore 
perhaps be justified as an emergency measure to prevent public health disasters, such as to 
contain a measles outbreak in a society where vaccine uptake has fallen well below the 
elimination threshold. One should realize that this compromises action guide (2), and should only 
be used when the need is dire. Furthermore, the fact that vaccination levels have already fallen 
below elimination thresholds in this society points to the fact that action guide (1) has already 
been compromised. For some reason, this society is not giving children the protection against 
measles due to them. If policy option (A) becomes necessary, it points to the fact that the society 
in question is already not discharging its ethical obligation, and a serious reflection on the 
underlying problem with an appropriate remedial response is needed. Option (A) is therefore not 
an optimal policy option in order to satisfy the requirements of action guides (1) and (2), and 
should rather be seen as an emergency response in societies where action guide (1) has been 
compromised and a public health disaster has to be averted. 
  Another consideration with regards to the use of legal consequences as per option (A) is this. 
The history of mandatory policies show that coercion can sometimes have the unintended effect 
of galvanizing the resistance to vaccination. Britain introduced a mandatory vaccination policy in 
1871, with rather harsh penalties for vaccine refusal such as loss of property or a sentence to the 
work-house (Allen 2007). They eventually abandoned mandatory vaccination in 1948 in the face 
of organized resistance (Allen 2007). In the United States, the introduction of compulsory 
vaccination laws also changed the anti-vaccine movement from a passive resistance to a more 
organized, active resistance (Allen 2007). An aspect that is present in some sectors of the 
contemporary anti-vaccine movement is the idea that parents should take responsibility for their 
own child, resisting those who would coerce them to act against the best interests of their child 
(Kata 2010). Some types of coercion may therefore paradoxically strengthen resistance to 
vaccination; using too strong a hand may hinder the goal of ensuring vaccination uptake, 
compromising not only the requirements of action guide (2), but also of action guide (1). 
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  Policy option (B) may have some merit, in that it respects liberty and the parent-child bond while 
using government power to ensure vaccination, but it does face some difficulties. One such 
difficulty is that it has the potential of unfairly denying children the good of a publicly funded 
education (Ross & Aspinwall 1997). If one were to imagine that the refusal is based on adherence 
to a minority religion, this could introduce social isolation of members of this religion, and 
introduce systematic discrimination against this religion. The other problem is that this option 
may lead to the geographic congregation of susceptible individuals, through attending the same 
private schools (Ross & Aspinwall 1997). In fact, geographical clustering of non-medical 
exemptors is readily observed (Omer et al. 2009), and the use of option (2) may encourage such 
geographical clustering.  These are ideal circumstances for outbreaks of vaccine preventable 
diseases. In this case, children are not protected from measles disease through vaccination, and 
in fact find themselves quite susceptible to outbreaks. This falls afoul of ethical action guide (1). 
Home schooling is not exempt from these concerns; home schooled children are at risk of being 
the index case (first case of an outbreak) and put others at risk as well (Ross & Aspinwall 1997). 
It is also not clear that home schooling would prevent geographical clustering, as all the factors 
that lead to clustering are not understood (Omer et al. 2009). Thus, though policy option (B) at 
first glance seems possibly in line with both action guides (1) and (2), further reflection reveals 
some difficulties and objections. 
  Option (C) allows respect for parental choice and the parent-child bond while using government 
power to encourage vaccination uptake. This option includes legal mandates to have children 
vaccinated, but allows refusal by opting out. There is evidence that this type of opt-out approach 
increases vaccination uptake (Omer et al. 2009). In the US, States that allow only religious 
exemptions have higher vaccine uptake than States that also allow philosophical exemptions 
(Omer et al. 2009). Furthermore, in States where the opt-out process is more difficult (such as 
parents having to come in to school to signing a form) have higher vaccination rates than States 
where opt-out is easier (Omer et al. 2009). Thus, if policy option (C) is implemented, the opt-out 
policy should be fairly tightly worded, so as to encourage maximal vaccine uptake.  On balance, 
this approach seems to better align with action guides (1) and (2) than the other coercive policy 
options thus far considered. Option C would optimally make use of government power to 
encourage vaccine uptake, while providing an avenue of refusal for those who strongly oppose 
vaccination. In this way, room is made for parental decision-making and the parent-child bond is 
not overly burdened.  Since it allows opt-out, option (C) is unlikely to be sufficient on its own to 
ensure sustained high vaccination uptake, but it certainly seems the best option of the three for 
use of state power, all things considered.  
The limitations of education 
  Parents who refuse vaccinations are more likely to have garnered anti-vaccination information 
from the Internet, specifically from certain anti-vaccination websites (Kata 2010). These parents 
therefore have been exposed to a variety of misinformation and tropes regarding vaccination, 
influencing their attitude towards vaccinations (Kata 2010). One could easily reason that this 
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misinformation merely has to be corrected to regain parental trust in vaccinations. If this were 
successful, it would satisfy both action guide (1) and (2): children would be vaccinated, and the 
parent-child bond be respected.   
  However appealing such notions are, education is not always successful in changing parental 
attitudes about measles vaccination. Kata, for example, argues that many people in the anti-
vaccine movement adhere to alternate views of health, alternate explanatory models, and what 
she calls a “post-modern paradigm” (Kata 2010; Kata 2012). Thus, Kata argues that it is not 
effective to engage the anti-vaccine movement solely with education based on scientific data and 
scientific arguments. These types of approaches are seen either as part of a conspiracy, or is seen 
as “your version of the truth” (Kata 2010). Education and evidence therefore do not change “my 
version of the truth” (Kata 2010). Thus, although education is important, it may not be enough 
to remove the arguments typically forwarded within the anti-vaccine movement. 
  A study has shown the limitations of different types of educational interventions aimed at 
correcting mistaken beliefs and attitudes regarding vaccination (Nyhan et al. 2014). Parents were 
randomly assigned to one of four measles vaccine educational interventions: (1) information 
focused on correcting misinformation, (2) written information on the dangers of vaccine 
preventable diseases, (3) a dramatic narrative of a child hospitalized due to measles, and (4) a 
visual intervention using images of children suffering from vaccine-preventable diseases. The 
study found that none of these interventions increased the intent of parents to vaccinate their 
children. In fact, parents who had a negative view of vaccination prior to these educational 
interventions communicated a decrease in intent to vaccinate after the interventions, meaning 
that they were strengthened in their resolve not to vaccinate. Also, the use of dramatic narratives 
or visuals of sick children increased fears and misconceptions regarding vaccine adverse effects. 
The study shows that parents who have moderate or favourable views of vaccination may benefit 
from educational interventions such as was used in this study, but parents who are resistant to 
vaccines may be strengthened in their resolve not to vaccinate by such  interventions.  The 
authors conclude that educational interventions can often have unexpected and even opposite 
effects to what was intended, and that vaccination educational interventions need to be carefully 
researched and tested before being used on the public.  
  Brown et al. (2010) advance the following argument with similar conclusions in their systematic 
review regarding factors that influence vaccine decision-making. Individual vaccine refusers may 
hold strong views on some anti-vaccine issues and arguments, and less strong views on others. 
Persistently confronting vaccine refusers on issues on which they hold strong opinions may lead 
to a more deeply held anti-vaccine position. In this way, educational interventions may have 
opposite results than what was intended. The authors recommend that educational 
interventions be tested before being used in the public, to ensure they have no detrimental 
effects on vaccine uptake. 
  The point is that educational interventions are not a cure-all as an approach to vaccine refusal, 
and can often have the opposite effect than intended. The goal, in accordance with action guide 
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(1), is to encourage measles vaccine uptake in a way that maintains measles elimination from 
society. To reach this goal, educational interventions must be effective in changing the attitudes 
of refusers, while also reassuring those who have moderate or strongly positive views of 
vaccination. To this end, it is crucial that educational interventions be well researched and tested 
to be sure of their effect on parental attitudes towards vaccination. 
Rebuilding trust as an important policy focus   
  Many things can influence parental attitudes towards measles vaccination: media reports, 
information on the internet, and information from other parents, among others (Brown et al. 
2010). As I pointed out before, two important issues emerge as factors in parental vaccine refusal: 
dissatisfaction with vaccine information provided by healthcare sources, and lack of trust in the 
healthcare system, providers, or government agencies that promote vaccination (Brown et al. 
2010).   
  On the other hand, there is evidence that a trusting relationship with a healthcare provider 
assists parents in being able to resist anti-vaccination messages and maintain positive attitudes 
towards vaccination (Leask et al. 2006). Clear communication regarding risks and benefits of 
vaccines from a trusted health care provider plays a large role in promoting vaccination uptake, 
whereas poor communication or inadequate knowledge on the part of a provider impedes 
vaccination uptake (Simone, Carrillo-Santisteve, & Lopalco 2012). Receiving correct and 
understandable information from a healthcare worker whom parents trust is an important factor 
in ensuring acceptance of vaccination (Simone, Carrillo-Santisteve, & Lopalco 2012). 
    There appears to be a breakdown of trust between the health care system and many vaccine 
refusers, fuelling vaccine refusal and placing a barrier against vaccine uptake. The response of 
the government through policy and the healthcare system through action must address this trust 
issue, and must seek to restore trust. It may not necessarily be possible to engender trust on the 
large scale through educational interventions, but it may be possible to build trust with 
individuals. This would mean a strong focus on building of trust relationships between healthcare 
providers and parents, and maintaining a strong patient-centered health care model. Individual 
providers establishing trusting relationships with individual refusers has the potential to 
eventually have a large influence on vaccine uptake. The obligation falls on individual providers 
and on government health policy. Providers have to foster and maintain such relationships in 
professionally appropriate ways. Government healthcare policy should see clinical relationships 
as the building block of care provision to children, and should adopt a relationship based, patient-
centered model of care delivery. Every parent should have access to a provider they trust, 
whether this be a nurse, a family physician, or a pediatrician. Such providers should be expert in 
fostering a clinical relationship, and in communicating vaccine facts in a manner that engenders 
trust. Coercion and education are not enough; trusting health care relationships are an essential 
component in ensuring high levels of vaccine uptake and should be the focus of any policy 
response to vaccine refusal.  
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  This conclusion is similar to a conclusion in Brown et al.’s systematic review (Brown et al. 2010). 
They similarly argue that the focus in responses to vaccine refusal should be on multifactorial 
interventions which improve parents’ satisfaction with vaccination consults and information, as 
well as encouraging the formation of trusting clinical relationships between providers and 
parents. 
Summary and recommendations 
    In summary, I would argue that the following policy approach satisfies the requirements that 
action guides (1) and (2) place on government and the healthcare system: 
- A strong focus on building of trust relationships between providers and parents. This 
should be the primary building block of health care delivery to children, and also the pillar 
in our strategy to ensure adequate vaccine uptake and education. This would mean 
moving from a mere systems healthcare approach to a relationship-based and 
individualized patient-centered approach. 
- Educational interventions that are well researched, known to improve attitudes towards 
vaccination, and complement the building of trust through relationship-based care. 
- Mandatory school vaccination policies with provisions for opting out, with a carefully 
worded opt-out policy that maximizes vaccine uptake. 
- Forego opt-out only to prevent or respond to public health emergencies. 
 
  Action guide (1) underlines the ethical imperative for those in government and in healthcare 
leadership to ensure maximal uptake of vaccinations against measles. Action guide (2) reminds 
us that how government and the healthcare leadership go about this duty is important: parent-
child relationships and parental decision-making should be afforded respect. The policy options 
I have suggested offers ways in which government and healthcare leaders can discharge these 
dual duties in an ethically justifiable way.  
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